MARXISM AND ALTERNATIVES

SOVIETICA

PUBLICATIONS AND MONOGRAPHS

OF THE INSTITUTE OF EAST-EUROPEAN STUDIES AT THE

UNIVERSITY OF FRIBOURG/SWITZERLAND AND

THE CENTER FOR EAST EUROPE, RUSSIA AND ASIA

AT BOSTON COLLEGE AND THE SEMINAR

FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY

AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH

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MARXISM AND ALTERNATIVES

Towards the Conceptual Interaction Among Soviet Philosophy, Neo-Thomism, Pragmatism, and Phenomenology

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

DORDRECHT : HOLLAND / BOSTON : U.S.A.

LONDON : ENGLAND

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Marxism and alternatives.

(Sovietica ; v. 45)
Includes index.
1. Dialectical materialism. 2. Neo-Scholasticism.
3. Pragmatism. 4. Phenomenology. I. Rockmore, Tom, 1942-
II. Series: Sovietica (Université de Fribourg. Ost-Europa Institut) ;
v. 45.
B809.8.M3733 146'.32 81-12153
ISBN-13: 978-94-009-8497-4 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-8495-0
DOI:10.1007/978-94-009-8495-0

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Boston Inc.,
190 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland.

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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st Edition 1981
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the following permissions to reprint parts of my essays: To Prof. Norris Clarke, S. J., Editor, *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Fordham University, New York, N.Y., for parts of 'William James on Language' (Vol. XVI No. 1, March, 1976); to the D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, for permission to reprint some pages from Chapter VI, 'Underlying Themes and the Present Cultural Context'. This later appeared as part of the volume co-authored with Professor Blakeley, and entitled *Russia and America: A Philosophical Comparison* (Dordrecht, 1976); to the D. Reidel Publishing Company for permission to use parts of my article 'The Importance of Context: Reflections on Kuhn, Marx, and Dewey', which appeared in their journal *Studies in Soviet Thought* (Vol. 21 No. 1, Feb. 1980); to Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, The Netherlands, for permission to use parts of my article entitled 'James' Metaphysics: Language as the House of "Pure Experience"' which appeared in their journal *Man and World, An International Philosophical Review* (Vol. 12, No. 2, 1979).

WILLIAM J. GAVIN
Portland, Maine 1981

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary philosophy is by its nature pluralistic, to a perhaps greater extent than at any moment of the preceding tradition, in that there are multiple forms of thought competing for a position on the center of the philosophic stage. The reasons for this conceptual proliferation are numerous. But certainly one factor is the increasing development of contemporary means of publication and communication, which in turn make possible the rapid dissemination of ideas as well as an informed reaction to them. And this in turn has increased the possibility for serious philosophic exchange by enhancing the available opportunities for the interaction of competing forms of thought.

But, although informed philosophic interaction has in principle become increasingly possible in recent years, the frequency, scope and quality of such discussion has often been less than satisfactory. Contemporary philosophic viewpoints tend not to interact in a Hegelian manner, as complementary aspects of a totally satisfactory and a-perspectival view, facets of a singly and all-embracing true position. Rather, contemporary philosophic viewpoints tend to portray themselves as mutually exclusive alternatives only occasionally willing to acknowledge the possible validity or even the intrinsic interest of other perspectives. Thus, although the multiplication of different forms of philosophy in principle means that there are greater possibilities for meaningful exchange between them, in practice the tendency of each of the various philosophic positions to raise claims to philosophic truth from its point of view alone has had the effect of impeding such interaction.

This point can be illustrated through a brief glance at the generally hostile Marxist-Leninist reception of other philosophic tendencies. The touchstone of all forms of Marxism – as species of neo-Hegelianism – is the dialectic. In the case of Marxist-Leninist philosophy this has taken the specific form of dialectical logic, where the "subjective dialectic" reflects the "objective dialectic"; and the proletariat creates its revolutionary method and historical world, subject only to the removal of man's alienation from nature and other men. All non-Marxisms – as well as other Marxisms – are judged, assessed, and condemned on the basis of their incapacity for handling one aspect or the other of the dialectical-logical worldview.

From the Marxist-Leninist perspective, to take a series of examples, neo-Thomism sins on the side of "objective idealism" through misplaced and non-dialectical concretion of fictitious entities; pragmatism fails correctly to identify the dialectical and historical character of human practice; and phenomenology robs the dialectic of any concrete (read "material") referent.

Initially, Soviet preoccupation with neo-Thomism came from the latter's connection both with certain political movements in Eastern Europe and in Latin America, and its involvement with the Catholic religion, the most militant opponent of Communism throughout the world.

These extra-philosophic linkages of neo-Thomism not only discredit it in Soviet eyes (as well as in those of many pragmatists and phenomenologists) as reactionary but also are said to find expression in its philosophic ideas on concreation and "double truth". Through the neo-Thomistic doctrine of double truth (viz. truths of reason cannot contradict truths of faith) man is robbed of his integrity and made to depend on figments of his imagination, namely God, saints, etc. In concreation, the human being who is said to collaborate with divine creativity loses his revolutionary vigor and practical autonomy; religious otherworldliness destroys man's efficacy in the real world.

Even more destructive within neo-Thomism, for the Marxist-Leninists, is its denigration of human nature through the doctrine of sin and its assignment of nature in general to the realm of the Devil. As there are two truths, there are two worlds, and man has no need to make revolutionary efforts in the here and now. He need only study theology and let the Church take care of the rest.

The set of philosophic views that the Marxist-Leninists see as posing perhaps the greatest threat to a truly dialectical-logical worldview belongs to the heirs of the Vienna Circle – variously called "neopositivists" or "analytic philosophers". The verificationism, conventionalism and physicalism of Anglo-American philosophy are rejected as so many "subjectivisms", as so many attempts to reach some sort of certainty that reduces science to formal-logical, Cartesian validity and, hence in principle, rejects the Marxist-Leninist dialectical model

Even the assimilation of ideas from pragmatism does not help such neo-positivism in its effort to link up with the real world. In fact, there is a tendency on the part of the Marxist-Leninist simply, but misleadingly, to identify neopositivism and pragmatism. Neopositivism on this interpretation fails because the "praxis" of pragmatism is abstract – it is the merely rational practice of an ahistorical agent, instead of the world-historical practice of the proletariat.

Were neopositivism-pragmatism able to identify a historical agent, it would not lose itself in interminable disputes on questions of method. Its method is abstract and subjective. It is grounded purely and simply in a Humean belief, lodged in a Berkeleyan mind, with no links to history or society.

Because of this methodological commitment, neopositivism-pragmatism is incapable of giving any answer to the question "what do we know about what we know beyond what we know about it?". In other words, they cannot account for a reality beyond the immediate knower.

Nor can neopositivism-pragmatism say anything about human misery or alienation, because it has no account of a nature beyond the knower, and reduces the human context to the biological constitution of the same knower.

The Soviet critique of phenomenology and existentialism contains some of the same elements as their critique of pragmatism because both existentialism and pragmatism have roots in nineteenth-century *Lebensphilosophie*. Just as the Marxist-Leninists sometimes find it difficult to distinguish between neopositivism (which is basically a view of science and method) and pragmatism (which can be described as an account of man and his world), so they are often not too clear about the distinction between contemporary phenomenology (which stresses a method and view on science, originating with Husserl) and existentialism (concerned mainly with man and his hostile world).

What is clear to the Marxist-Leninist who criticizes phenomenology and existentialism from a dialectical-logical perspective is that these latter join neopositivism-pragmatism in failing correctly to identify the human context. For this reason they cannot explain nature or man's relationship to it; which is why their extensive commentaries on the symptoms of man's alienation remain abstract and unconvincing.

The failure of existentialism to explain man, nature, and history parallels and may be caused by the subjectivist methodology of the phenomenologist. According to Soviet accounts, the anti-psychologism, doctrine of the life-world and transcendental reduction of phenomenology remain on the level of pure description. Phenomenology is Cartesian in the worst sense; and neither Ingarden nor Sartre has been able to do anything to remedy this.

It is the work of the later Sartre that the Marxist-Leninists see as demonstrating the final bankruptcy of phenomenology-existentialism. In effect, they argue, if Sartre's version of dialectical reason cannot justify the praxis of history, then it is clear that the "constitutivity" of the phenomenologists is historically meaningless.

In sum, the Soviets see all non-Marxist-Leninist philosophies as falling

short on a number of counts, having to do with a non-dialectical-logical view of nature, man, history, and society. All of them are "idealist": neo-Thomism "objectively" and the other two "subjectively". No one of them can account adequately for autonomous human activity. Two of them (existentialism and neo-Thomism) try to account for human misery (alienation) but do so only at the price of dehumanizing man. Nature appears significant to two of them (pragmatism and neo-Thomism) but only as abstract; existentialism fails utterly to pay any attention to nature.

Admittedly, the Marxist-Leninist reaction to other views is extreme, although it illustrates well the inherent difficulty of entering into dialogue with Marxism-Leninism from another angle of vision. An equally extreme position is taken by Husserlian phenomenology, in which the claim is made that all forms of "science" – i.e., systematic knowledge – in which the transcendental reduction is lacking, in practice all other viewpoints, must necessarily forfeit all claims to scientific status.

But, these and other examples which could be cited should not be taken as an indication that interaction between competing tendencies is not possible. On the contrary, such exchange is both possible and necessary, if we are ever to transcend the parochialism inherent in the uncritical, or even in the critical, espousal of one philosophic viewpoint as opposed to other possible viewpoints.

It seems clear from the examples cited that it is indeed difficult to confront competing philosophic tendencies, since all too often they harbor mechanisms for the exclusion of the possibility of meaningful discussion with their doctrinal rivals. The present volume should be seen as an endeavor to contribute to the development of an indirect dialogue through the detailed exposition of responses to central philosophic concerns from four main perspectives: Marxism-Leninism, neo-Thomism, pragmatism, and phenomenology. In each case, the treatment of the various philosophic tendencies will be developed in a series of stages, beginning with the respective views of essential questions of man, progressing to the related views of society, and then on to the underlying concepts of epistemology and ontology, before closing with an internal criticism of the fundamental presuppositions as such.

The intention of the present discussion is basically two-fold. Every effort has been made to choose the series of concerns, preselected as the structure around which the discussion will take place, in such a manner as to avoid an intrinsic bias toward any single viewpoint, and so as to stress what is characteristic of the interests of contemporary thought, broadly conceived. To the extent that this attempt has been successful, the intended effect is to provide

an occasion for a somewhat novel parallel exposition of the various tendencies, which is indeed indicative of their respective intellectual resources. Further, despite the independent character of the exposition, its parallel form, reinforced where possible by cross-references to the other sections, provides material for the kind of indirect comparison that is difficult and perhaps impossible, as has been indicated through illustration above, to carry out from a position within any single viewpoint. As seems likely, this kind of discussion brings out not only some expected differences, but also unsuspected analogies between the various positions.

To avoid possible misunderstanding, two caveats should immediately be entered. In the first place, the claim is not made here that the philosophic tendencies to be considered comprise an exhaustive list of contemporary viewpoints. It should not be difficult for anyone familiar with the current philosophic scene to cite other positions which have, in fact, been omitted here. Nevertheless, it does appear that if judged in terms of such criteria as intellectual influence, breadth of interest, and explanatory power, these are among the most significant philosophic movements of the day. It should be further noted that the exposition in any case is less than exhaustive. Stress has in each instance been placed less on the complete development of the response to one or another concern from a given point of view than on the expository statement of how one or more of the major representatives of such a perspective can or in fact does react to the problem at hand. But, although the discussion is thus admittedly restricted in scope and depth, it is hoped that to the extent that it, in fact, reflects the current state of philosophy it can at least contribute to opening or to reopening the debate. But, the inherent limitations, which are freely acknowledged, need not be considered a fatal defect since, as has been remarked, although comprehensiveness may be desirable, the important thing is progress.

What is more, in what follows we look at the capacity of the other schools to deal with some of the same problems that Marxism-Leninism considers its private preserve. The fact that the non-Marxist-Leninists deal with these problems in a non-class-bound way is in itself a response to Marxism-Leninism with its dogmatic positions on *partijnost'* and revolutionary spirit in philosophy. In other words, as we watch each philosophic approach proceed from normative perspectives to speculative issues and then to epistemological-logical considerations, we see a need for communication which no one of them can avoid and which transcends the explicit or public interchange which is often the work of well-meaning but marginal representatives of these philosophic approaches. For example, there is a sense in which some "progressive"

neo-Thomist advocates of dialogue with Marxism are as "Marxist" as their Marxist-Leninist interlocutors.

Philosophic debate is not political rhetoric. To the extent that what follows succeeds, it establishes the contours of a theoretical landscape, over which all of our protagonists can travel. It is our contention that these travellers – despite their varied historical situations – cannot avoid meeting, at least relative to the basic questions we evoke below.

Only the reader will be able to say whether we have provided merely further evidence as to the incompatibility of various philosophic views or a useful map of the paths across the contemporary theoretical landscape.

Although this book is the result of close collaboration, primary responsibility for the several parts was, in fact, assumed as follows: Thomas J. Blakeley – Soviet Marxism: James G. Colbert – neo-Thomism; William J. Gavin – pragmatism; Tom Rockmore – phenomenology. We join together in thanking George L. Kline (Bryn Mawr), James J. O'Rourke (Manchester NH) and Edward M. Swiderski (Oxford) for their careful reading of the manuscript and for the many constructively critical remarks.

PART ONE

THE IMMANENCE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

CHAPTER 1

EMERGENCE OF THE "NEW SOVIET MAN"

According to G. L. Smirnov, the notion of the "new Soviet man" marks the third stage in the evolution of the Soviet notion of the human person, following on the concept of "builder of Communism" which served as focus to the scholastic development of mainline Marxist-Leninist ethics.[1]

In the Marxian corpus there is no sign that an idea like the "new Soviet man" would emerge among his disciples a century later. Yet, we all have to admit that almost everything Marx did was anthropological. In fact, among the commonplace descriptions of Marx, we find that he "combined Hegel's dialectic with Feuerbach's anthropology", that he dealt with man, alienation and history, that he insisted on the unity of theory and practice, that he fought Hegel's inversion of subject and object, as well as private property as its concrete locus. In short, even superficial accounts of Marx make it clear that anthropology – man – was at the center of his concern. However, a rapid glance at Marx's thought on man will show how difficult it is to lay the "new Soviet man" at his doorstep.

For Marx, man is the being-in-and-for-itself; he is the completely self-sufficient being; he is *causa sui* (although Marx did not use this terminology). What is more, it is in producing his world (*Vergegenständlichung*) that man undergoes externalization (*Entäusserung/Entfremdung*) as cause of the social world. With this in mind, we can view Marx as a peculiar synthesis of Hegel and Spinoza, inasmuch as man's identity is immanently involved in an activity, of which he is the agent. Marx is thus squarely in the modernist tradition of ignoring divine agency in favor of some intrinsic or "anthropological" causality. Both Althusser and Sartre dispute the claim that Marx is an anthropologist. Althusser says that Marx moves to "science", and Sartre wants to supply the anthropology for Marxism (cf., his *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*). However, just as Hume, Kant, and Fichte can be seen as drawing the final, demythologizing conclusions to a long-term process of the weakening of the central categories of metaphysics, so Spinoza, Hegel, and Marx can be seen as putting in place the essential underpinnings of an atheistic anthropology (or "metaphysics of man"). In Marx's "praxis", human creativity is no longer limited to mental acts and speech acts, but becomes sovereign. No longer a spectator, man becomes an actor. As we shall see, this view of

the human person as actor is common to Marxism-Leninism, pragmatism, phenomenology and neo-Thomism, though the lines of development are different in each.

Nevertheless, this sovereignty of productive agency risks being a utopian, "merely ontological" designation, unless one can show how mental acts, speech acts, and all other significant human acts can be satisfactorily subsumed under a higher principle of explanation. Marx's notion of praxis, therefore, had to specify that man is self-realizing (self-actualizing) in the manipulation of tools for the transformation of nature. It is through the tool rather than through the "idea" or the word that man is given to himself as productive of himself. The instrumentality of the tool is further reinforced by the fact that for Marx, the tool is itself "humanized nature"; so that one can say that "man humanizes himself to the extent that he humanizes a humanizable nature through an already humanized nature (i.e., the tool)". Nature, thus, is given to man as something standing "out there", over against man as subject of his thoughts and words. By contrast, the Thomistic philosophy of nature (see Chapter 7) sees as basic elements of the constitution of the physical world, form and matter, pre-existing man's activity; the form is the objective condition of intelligibility; universals have a basis in nature.

So, Marx's basic stance is that of modern liberationism, but his explanation of the way that liberation occurs differs radically from the type of explanation that had prevailed after the decline of medieval thought. For the medieval thinker man's place in nature was a question of man's *real* relation to God and God's grace, man's *real* relations to nature (God's creation), and man's *real* relations to other men (who were God's creations, like nature, but were also autonomous centers of *real* relations). In addition to these manifold real relations, there were the "conceptual" or "rational" or "logical" relations (as we shall note in Chapter 8). Late Scholasticism (e.g., Ockham) came more and more to interpret all relations as "mental", as happening "among concepts", with the sole exception of physical causality. This contrasts with the Thomistic view (see Chapter 7) that beings of reason such as universality or contradiction are second intentions, of a different order from real beings, including relations.

The removal of this last remnant of traditional metaphysics was what preoccupied Hume and Kant. By reducing valid knowledge to the correlation of *apriori* concepts of the understanding and to what is synthetic *apriori*, Kant "liberated" the main problem areas of traditional metaphysics – God, the soul, the Universe – from the restrictions of *real* relations; by then

assigning "regulative" status to these ideas, Kant opened the door to a more voluntarist account of man's place in nature.

To the extent that Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were not satisfied with the results of the Kantian account, they began to re-examine both the method and the postulates of Kant's philosophizing, and each comes up with what we might call a "correlating agency". In the case of Fichte, this was the self-positing ego which posits not only itself and its world but also the very conditions of this self-positing. In Schelling's case, it is nature as absolute force, of which all other forces are but special cases. Finally, for Hegel, it is Spirit's positing of itself as concept, nature and totality (or "system" or "Absolute"). What is noteworthy is that in all three cases (as well as in those of most other post-Kantians) the ultimate principle of explanation and of action is (1) active rather than passive, (2) correlating rather than substantial, and (3) quasi-teleological, moving toward some outcome that turns out to be itself.

Against this account of man's place in nature, "idealist" as Marx and his Soviet descendants call it, Marx reacts. According to his *Theses on Feuerbach*, instead of being liberated from the passive restraints of the past, man is made a creature who restrains himself from exercising his full potential. In the development of his notion of instrumental or "praxiological reason", Marx takes his cue from Hegel's notion that "Spirit spiritizes itself into Spirit" because everything is part of an organic and intelligible whole. For Marx, this idea is true to the extent that it represents the best expression to date of the liberationist view of man's place in nature but false to the extent that it keeps man subject to something not fully human, namely Spirit. The latter remains "alien(-ated)" as long as one has not shown convincingly how all of what it contains derives exclusively and absolutely from man.

Marx's "praxiological reason" thus reveals man as defining himself both in relation to nature and in relation to other men. Man's relationship to nature is one of domination through fashioning. Man's relationship to fellow man is, or should be, one of coproduction. "Alienation" or deviation from this normal relation can happen in two ways: either by conceiving that man fashions nature through something designed by some agent other than man, or by reducing the coproductivity of one's fellow men to an instrumentality of one's own productivity, thus rendering passive what is essentially active. The two errors might be abbreviated to the "detooling of nature" and the "exploitation of man by man".

Examination of the "new Soviet man" shows that it entails at least the beginnings of both of these un-Marxian tendencies. But, to get a clear understanding of this we need to go back to the notion "builder of Communism",

which is the "ideal form", around which Soviet anthropology and ethics had organized themselves prior to the appearance of the "new Soviet man".

According to G. L. Smirnov, again, there have been three stages in the development of the "socialist person" (*socialističeskaja ličnost'*): (1) the industrializer and collectivizer of the period from the revolution until the mid-1930s; (2) the man of the cultural revolution that lasted from the mid-1930s until the mid-1950s; (3) the "new Soviet man". Other literature from the periods involved shows, however, that one has to distinguish four periods, the third being occupied by the "builder of Communism", or at least subdivide the third into two subperiods which are in some respects radically different from one another.

The "builder of Communism" lived according to the "moral code of the builder of Communism", analyzed by Richard DeGeorge, Peter Ehlen and Philip Grier.[2] Its leading spokesman was A. F. Šiškin; its soundest philosophical exponent was V. P. Tugarinov; and the theorist who seemed destined to bring it up to the requirements of the "new Soviet man" was Oleg Drobnickij.

The "moral code of the builder of Communism" contains, on Šiškin's account, twelve "commandments" or, more accurately, "virtues":

(1) devotion to Communism, the socialist Fatherland, and to the socialist countries;
(2) conscientious work for the good of society;
(3) care for the preservation and increase of social wealth;
(4) high social consciousness with lack of tolerance for social crimes;
(5) collectivism and comradely mutual support;
(6) good human relations and mutual respect;
(7) honesty, uprightness, and moral purity both in public and in private;
(8) mutual respect in the family and devotion to the education of children;
(9) intolerance of crime, hooliganism, etc.;
(10) fraternity and amity of all peoples of the U.S.S.R.;
(11) no compromise with the enemies of Communism, of peace, and of freedom;
(12) fraternal solidarity with all workers.[3]

The abstract, anthropological, "non-natural" or "anti-natural" character of these virtues can be seen in the sentence with which Šiškin opens his account: "The principles of morality are the basic norms and demands that society (a given class) prescribes for people's conduct". Tugarinov, although more

sophisticated in his presentation, asks the same sort of question – assuming the qualitative specificity of man (i.e., his "distance" from non-human nature), how are men to interact?[4] In his *World of Animated Objects*,[5] Drobnickij points out that if, for Marx, man is part of nature and nature is humanized only through man, then "human nature" must mean "humanized nature" and one can wonder if "value" can mean anything more than "what has occurred". We must come back to this question in the next chapter.

The "new Soviet man", then, succeeds the 'builder of Communism"; and this succession seems due mainly to two external circumstances: first, there is the end of the "Cold War" or, in Soviet terminology, the "emergence out of capitalist encirclement"; then, there is what is called in Soviet jargon the "scientific-technological revolution".

All through Stalin's time, the notion of "capitalist encirclement" had been used in conjunction with "socialism in one country" to explain a major inconsistency between historical materialism and Soviet reality. According to orthodox historical materialism, the socialist revolution was to begin in more developed capitalist countries and spread rapidly to the entire world. When this did not happen, "socialism in one country" was used under Stalin to explain the isolation of Soviet Russia and "capitalist encirclement" gave theoretical plausibility to what the rest of the world perceived as the "Cold War".

The "scientific-technological revolution" is the other contextual innovation for the "new Soviet man". This development is due to pressures which built up in the "satellite empire" of the Soviet Union after World War II, specifically in Czechoslovakia. The "socialism with a human face" of Radovan Richta and his "Prague Spring" group asserted that whereas labor had been the central category of Marx's anthropology, developed in the nineteenth century, progressive developments in the twentieth century require Marxism to take a more careful look at the dialectic of labor and leisure in the context of a radical humanism.

In response to this "revisionist" challenge Soviet historical materialists have turned to the notion of the "scientific-technological revolution", which is – frankly speaking – the Soviet philosophers' own controlled revision of historical materialism.

Against this background, one has to examine the new virtues attributed to the "new Soviet man". In fact, they are not new; they are essentially the virtues of the "builder of Communism" but transposed – even *aufgehoben*, to use an appropriate Hegelian term – to a level which is higher and more adequate to the new context.

The new "super-virtues" are a "harmonious development of the person" and an "all-round human development". The former belongs to the "new Soviet man" who has emerged from encirclement and from a feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis the non-Soviet world; the latter belongs to the "new Soviet man" as the first stage in a paradigm for the "new humanity" which is the historical subject of the Communist era in mankind's existence.

* * *

The "new Soviet man" as the central category of contemporary Marxist-Leninist philosophical anthropology invites comparison with other lines of thought, both past and present. Some such parallels are used by the Soviets themselves in stressing the uniqueness of the "new Soviet man" and of the anthropology built around him.

Little imagination is needed to draw a parallel between the "new Soviet man" and the "new man" in St Paul. The whole idea of a "lack of fit" between man and his natural and social environment is basic both to primitive Christianity and to its further refinements in writers like Augustine and Aquinas.

Even the way Marxism-Leninism fits into a larger movement, with its hierarchy, customs, chain of command, etc., has been invoked by some scholars[6] as strikingly similar to the way in which Thomism, neo-Thomism, personalism, transcendental Thomism, etc. relate to a theology, Church hierarchy, a perennial tradition, and so on.

But, the resemblances between Marxism-Leninism's "new Soviet man" and the anthropological notions of neo-Thomism in its diverse variants, are more than superficial. To begin with, both have a conception of the relationship between an individual, particular good and a common, "universal" good, which radically departs from the civil libertarian or "mechanistic" idea of social constitution – and to this we must return below in another context.

Limiting ourselves to what we have brought out above as the central notions for understanding the "new Soviet man", both Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism find man as a center of creativity in an environment which is unstable; and for both it is this very instability which is at the same time a mortal danger ("alienation" for one, "sin" for the other) and golden opportunity ("salvation" in both cases, albeit with radically different meanings).

Both Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism recognize the importance of instrumentality, the use of mediating tools, for human existence. The difference lies in the neo-Thomist conviction that this life is a moment in a superior mode of existence and hence instrumental. Having such an instrumental

understanding of man's place in nature, both philosophies distinguish various practical virtues and both construct moral codes.

Finally, one even finds a neo-Thomist analogue to the encirclement theme of Marxist-Leninist anthropology in the "embattled fortress/defenders of the faith" attitude which long dominated neo-Thomists of all stripes. The "scientific-technological revolution" of Marxism-Leninism finds its counterpart in the immense seriousness with which the neo-Thomists from Garrigou-Lagrange to Lonergan have taken the apparent conflicts between science and traditional philosophy (to which we will return below).

The divergence between these two ways of viewing man comes on at least three fundamental points: the existence of real relations, the assertion of a transcendent unity, and substantialism.

The first of these oppositions between Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism may not be as radical as might seem at first glance. According to the standard account, whereas the Marxist-Leninists have joined the moderns in reducing all relations to what the tradition called "rational", the neo-Thomists have maintained the traditional distinction, with all the advantages that this comports. However, a look at the history of neo-Thomism at the turn of this century discovers certain characteristics that make it perhaps closer to its neo-Kantian contemporaries than to its assumed origins in Thomism. Several of these characteristics concern the nature of knowledge and will occupy us below. Others involve man's place in nature and basically consist in viewing man as an autonomous center for the creation of value – a term that Aquinas would find strange.

Be that as it may, mainstream neo-Thomists at least think they are distinct from the likes of Marxist-Leninists by an acceptance of real relations that link man with God, nature, and other men.

By asserting the existence of a transcendent unity, namely in God, neo-Thomists hold an anthropological conception that cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with that of Marxism-Leninism. True to Marx, who was an instinctive atheist, the Marxist-Leninists resolutely exclude any trace of God from the whole of their philosophy and most particularly from their account of man.

Finally, although both lines of thought include an instrumental conception of man, neo-Thomism's is rooted in a substantialist understanding of human nature and operation. According to Marxism-Leninism, which is relatively faithful to Marx in this respect, man is what he does. For neo-Thomism, man is what he is before becoming what he will be. Both what man is and what man becomes are functions, 'accidents', of a substantial principle – the soul.

In their rejection of the soul, God, and real relations – accepted by neo-Thomists as determinative of anthropology – the Soviets are in agreement with what are called "positivists" ("neopositivists", "analysts", and several other modes of thought that are popular in the Anglo-American world). These trends, with the exception of pragmatism, do not carry anthropology beyond a few generalizations. This is probably why the Soviets are so cavalier about lumping pragmatism in with the rest; it supplies the ethical target that the others do not.

To say that Marxism-Leninism and neopositivism share a notion of human creativity and of the instrumentality of human existence, is only to point out the intellectual heritage they share as post-medievals. They are all forced to be Kantian to the extent that no post-Kantian Humean can avoid it. Concretely, for the post-medieval, man is a sensual being who uses some sort of rational 'scan' or 'combinatory' to make sense, in the form of a 'calculus', of the sense-data.

On the question of the nature of science, the neopositivists and Marxist-Leninists have a veritable love-hate relationship. Both pretend to be scientific and to be the only valid interpreter of science. Both also claim that philosophy must concern itself with science.

Similarly rooted in the enlightenment ideology and similarly Kantian in its essence, is the line of contemporary thought that includes Husserlian phenomenology and existential phenomenology.

In the phenomenologists one finds some of the most complex contemporary accounts of man and his place in nature. Its starting point, Husserl's anti-psychologism, is in the spirit of a return to Kant as well as to Descartes. Its outcome in the solipsism of intentional constitution re-enacts the Fichtean reconstruction of Kant. To all of these elements of knowledge, we will return below.

On properly anthropological topics, Marxism-Leninism agrees completely with phenomenology (Husserl's "crisis") and with existentialism (Sartre's "nausea") on the inhumanity of the current state of man. It disagrees with both on the hopelessness of this situation and on their inability to envisage and espouse revolution.

As we will see below, the Marxist-Leninists tend not to regard the phenomenological line as containing important social theory or serious anthropology, although phenomenologists have influenced a number of leading "bourgeois" anthropologists. The one member of this trend to articulate an anthropological doctrine of his own is Jean-Paul Sartre, who offers his theory as genuine Marxism in explicit opposition to the "Marxist idealism" of the Soviets.

The enraged reaction of the latter will be examined in the sequel. Suffice it to say here that the Soviets dismiss phenomenological anthropologies as "dead branches" of the same evolutionary trunk from which Marxism came.

SOCIALITY

Just as the "builder of Communism – it is claimed – lived under the "dictatorship of the proletariat" so the "new Soviet man" lives in the "state of the whole people".[7]

The "dictatorship of the proletariat" – currently being scrutinized in the context of "Eurocommunism" – is the linchpin of the encounter between Marxist-Leninist historical materialism and Soviet reality, both current and projected. Historical materialism is officially described as the application of the categories and laws of dialectical materialism to human society and history. It presents a static analysis of social structure and an account of the dynamic development of the main forms of human association. Within the latter, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" plays a decisive role.

The static historical-materialist analysis of social structure is inspired basically in the Preface to Marx's *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), which is the most concise expression of Marx's views on such basic categories as relations of production, mode of production, revolution, and so on.

Drawing on this and on various texts by Engels, the Soviet historical materialists have developed an account of man's place in society which runs as follows: human productive activity consists in the manipulation for human use of the forces of production – raw materials, tools, factories, etc. In this productive activity, men enter into relations of production – commercial, financial, and other relations of an economic nature. These relations of production form the "base" of society. Two levels of superstructure are constructed on this base: the legal and juridical forms of theory and institutions, taken by economic activity, and on the other hand, the religious, esthetic, and philosophic forms in which men become conscious of the conflicts involved in their placement in society. The relations and forces of production taken together form the "mode of production"; they are also called the "economic infrastructure" (*Unterbau*) in contradistinction to the "ideological superstructure" (*Überbau*).

The account of the development of the main forces of human association depends more on Engels and Lenin than on Marx. In his mentions of the

historical eras Marx is as careless as Aristotle, who seldom lists all ten of his categories. According to the Soviet historical materialists, history consists of five main periods: primitive society without classes; ancient society with slaves and slaveowners; feudal society with serfs and lords; capitalist society with workers and capitalists (or proletarians and bourgeois); finally, classless society – "socialist" in Marx's terminology and "Communist" according to current usage. Impetus for transition from one social-economic formation to another is provided by class war, which Marx in the *Manifesto* calls the "locomotive of history". In a given class society, the ruling classes control the superstructure and, through it, the base, which is the domain of the oppressed classes. "Social consciousness" (superstructure) thus controls "social being" (economic infrastructure).

The transition from one social-economic formation to another is prepared by an evolution in which the forces of production progress, the relations of production progress less quickly, and the superstructure stagnates. The tension between base and superstructure caused by the lag of the latter creates the "revolutionary situation" (Lenin's expression). Both the tension and revolutionary situation find concrete expression in class struggles of increasing intensity.

Revolution, then, is the violent readjustment of forces and relations of production, of base and superstructure, of social being and social consciousness. The various slave revolts marked the transition from ancient to feudal society. Modern society was ushered in by the "bourgeois democratic revolutions". The proletarian revolution introduces the final era of human existence. This is where the problem begins for the historical materialist.

To visualize the transition from capitalist to socialist society, Marx postulated a transitional period, the "dictatorship of the proletariat", in which the proletariat, having seized revolutionary power, would assure itself of complete control over the economy, thus eliminating the capitalists as a class. This, according to Marx, would also eliminate the proletariat as a class. It is worth noting that in Marx's mind the transitional period would not be very long since it would merely formalize what would have already happened in fact. In other words, for Marx, the economic determinist, the proletariat's activities during the dictatorship would be predicated on the premise that real, economic, power would already have fallen to them – which is why the revolution had succeeded. What would remain would be to take possession of the superstructural forms which precisely derive their efficacy from the economic infrastructure.

Two elements of Soviet history combined radically to alter this doctrine

and make inevitable a confrontation with theorists like the Eurocommunists. The first of these was Lenin's modification of Marxism to adapt it to Russian circumstances. The second was Stalin's extension of the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat to the international scene.

There have been suggestions that what happened to Marxism in Russia under Lenin was due to an "Asiatic connection" (cf. Wittfogel[8]), to something called the "Russian soul", to the lack of a genuine middle class because of the absence of Renaissance or Reformation, to the presence of the peculiarly Russian phenomenon of the intelligentsia,[9] to the nihilism and populism of the native Russian revolutionary tradition, and so forth. All these circumstances and others, such as the absence of an influence of Roman law and of Aristotle, doubtless helped shape the assimilation of Marxism in Russia under Lenin and before. What can be determined with some degree of accuracy, however, is that Lenin modified the kernel of Marxism, substituting political voluntarism for economic determinism; and also extended, through his doctrine of imperialism, the span of Marxism in a way that Marx would, it seems, have rejected.

Lenin's political voluntarism comes down to a few relatively uncomplicated assertions:

(1) Political power is *the* issue.
(2) It is more efficient to use political power to effect economic change than vice versa.
(3) A schooled élite can use this political power more efficiently than the unschooled masses, capable only of "trade-union consciousness".

Lenin's Communist Party results from the application of these views. It must be secret, as small as possible, controlling as much as possible. It organizes the élite into tightly controlled, professional organizations that are dependent on it for financial support. It controls the masses but must never get lost in them. It will make coalitions with anyone as long as Party principles are not compromised.

Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat which was to be a rather severe but short-lived repression of the defeated minority by the victorious majority now gains in focus and substance by the addition of a leadership group. It becomes the dictatorship of someone over someone. One might say with Bertram Wolfe that Marx's use of the word "dictatorship" was allegorical because there was no real dictator to wield the immense power that became available. Lenin supplies the identifiable dictator.

Lenin's doctrine of "imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism" has

received too much attention both in Russia and in the West for us to go into detail about it. However, it constitutes a serious distortion of Marx – almost as serious as the ultra-centralized Party that Lenin created. Marx did not regard nationalism as an issue. He seems to have shared a fervent nationalism with the general run of German philosophers typified by Fichte. The internationalization of the proletarian struggle was a natural consequence, in Marx's ideas, of the internationalization of bourgeois oppression. The liberation from this oppression might well be carried out within the confines of the existing national states. Since the state would wither away, nationalism, at least in its evil consequences, would also vanish. In other words, the internationalization of the proletarian endeavor was for Marx an ad hoc affair, dictated by circumstances. For Lenin, on the contrary, it was a matter of principle and a historically necessary mission. This seems to flow naturally from his inversion of Marx and establishment of an identifiable dictator. Once Lenin had invented his Party machine, the theory of imperialism gave it the whole world as a field of action.

In line with Lenin's hypostasizing of certain Marxian categories, Stalin extended the dictatorship of the proletariat in all its ferocity to the international arena. What originally was to be a vigorous but brief repression in the name of historical justice, becomes a permanent, institutionalized repression.

Then Stalin died (1953). Even before his death various theoretical issues including the status of language and logic and the nature of psychology, had been thrown open to debate.[10] Now, the Soviet leadership and theorists had to take stock and get their bearing. The Constitution of 1936 had declared that Soviet society had already achieved socialism and was in the process of constructing Communism – hence the ideal of the "builder of Communism". The dictatorship of the proletariat was conceived as having three stages, including the "rapid development of Communism" and the "large-scale development of Communism". This latter designates with the expression "state of the whole people" the historical context for the "new Soviet man".

Before trying to understand the "state of the whole people", we should examine the current controversy between the Eurocommunists and those who consider themselves orthodox Marxists. We can see from the above that when the Eurocommunists call into question the dictatorship of the proletariat as a permanent structure of domination by the Party, they are being at least in part faithful to Marx. However, they might have to abandon not just the dictatorship of the proletariat but all of Marxism.[11] For, the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be dropped in favor of something bourgeois.

It can only be rejected in favor of something Marxist, namely final Communism. So, the Eurocommunist is suspended between the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the necessity of giving it a Marxist-Leninist interpretation. In this vein orthodox Leninists like Balibar claim that Lenin's revision is the only possible form that the dictatorship of the proletariat can take today. Both, therefore, make crucial what for Marx was a passing designation for a relatively unimportant phenomenon.

Not only is the "state of the whole people" an *Aufhebung* (in the Hegelian sense) of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it also attempts to solve one of the most difficult riddles in Soviet "scholasticism", the running conflict between historical materialism and Soviet reality. Marx and especially Engels had made much of the withering away of the state, emphasizing the necessity for the disappearance of the exploitative, bourgeois state after the successful proletarian revolution. After all, the state was the instrument of class oppression; once oppression and classes were gone, there would be no more state. This was not only a concession of Marx and Engels to the 'anarchism' of many of their followers; it was a logical deduction from the whole dynamic relationship between base and superstructure. Historical progress liberates the economic base from its trammels, one of which is the state. Furthermore, the withering away of the state assumed the status of a Messianic sign in the Soviet Union; one could measure progress toward the goal of final Communism by the degree to which the state was daily getting weaker. Unfortunately, especially under Stalin, the state became weaker and weaker only in theory; in practical matter of fact, it became enormously strong and repressive.

Capitalist encirclement and socialism in one country served as necessary if not sufficient justification for the continuance of state repression under what was supposed to be socialism. By the time Stalin had been dead for four or five years Khrushchev felt it necessary to make some small motions toward the withering away of the state. This took the form of allowing some relatively minor administrative functions to devolve to more informal bodies, like neighborhood organizations and people's courts, while insisting that there was no possible connection between the withering away of the state and the withering away of the Party.

Even these small concessions to decentralization proved, however, too much to digest, especially combined with the self-management contagion coming from Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

We could therefore describe the "state of the whole people" as the "non-wither-away-able" state. V. N. Pankratov bases himself on the 22nd Party

Congress[12] in deriving the main functions of this state, which are commercial-organizational and cultural-educational. The state is destined to play a more and more creative role in planning and launching economic endeavors, and there can be no talk of its dying out. The cultural-educational function of the state is one way the Party carries out its role of vanguard of the proletariat.

* * *

At issue in the historical-materialist discussion of the transition from "builder of Communism" to the "new Soviet man" and from "dictatorship of the proletariat" to "state of the whole people" is the question of who is the subject of history.

As we have seen, Marx put great emphasis on the fate of the individual, on his freedom and on his contribution to social existence. It is also true that Marx inveighed against "bourgeois individualism" and described man in terms of his "natural" relation to nature and his "social" relation to his fellow men; there is, therefore, a certain "connaturality" and "sociality" to the human being. This semi-Aristotelian view is expressed in the Feuerbachian term "species-being" (*Gattungswesen*) that was current in the philosophic language of Marx's time. As Marx uses it, the term "species-being" indicates that no single human being exhausts what it means to be man; what the individual is is essentially determined by the species; it is through the species-labor of the individual that human reality is actualized. In other words, the social dimension of man is prior, both logically and ontologically, to his individual traits (see Chapter 6).

In this respect Marx departed from the mainstream libertarian tradition of modern thought. In the individualism of this line of thinking, Marx saw the most concrete manifestation of modern man's alienation. For Marx, the autonomously rational individual – Robinson Crusoe, in the language of his day – was precisely the most abstract, alienated and oppressed of beings. Marx sees the root of the error in the reduction of human activity to the activity of thought, of pure reason (cf. *Theses on Feuerbach*).

Marx – like all left-Hegelians influenced by Fichte's stress on *Streben* – tried to show that dealienation can occur only if man's abstract activity is put back into harmony with his concrete, material (or economic) activity; i.e., only if theory is reconciled with practice.

When, therefore, Marx makes the proletariat, the urban, industrial, working class, the subject and agent of history – as the Messiah of the secularized world – he thinks he is simply acknowledging that in the proletariat human theory, as exemplified in German Idealism, and human practice, material

production, are coming back together. It is essential to note that for Marx the proletariat does not choose to be the savior of mankind; nor is it chosen by some superior force, for there is none for Marx. One could say that history designates the proletariat for this historic mission; but since man makes history, one might as well say that history manifests the coming together or de-alienation in the person of the proletariat. Both the will of the individual and the wills of various groups are helpless before the inexorable emancipatory progress of history.

In Lenin's voluntaristic reading of Marx an élite which politically leads the masses to the needed economic changes necessarily operates by decision since by definition the requisite material (economic) conditions are not yet ripe. Since this élite is drawn from the masses, the masses themselves are involved in action through the exercise of will. Thereby, the whole societal operation becomes one of greater or lesser activity of the will.

In this way, everything in man's life, which is by definition social, is now governed by political exigencies, expressed through the Party and the state. What the Party and state decide to do becomes "good" by the very act of decision. It is not a good for the individual in some contemplative sense but in the precise meaning that he must bend his will to it. There is thus established a type of macroanthropological-microanthropological correlation between Party and state, on the one hand, and individuals, on the other. Marx's species-being has been converted from the anonymous historical actuality of man, the perfecting of which was to bring the perfecting of each of us, to a highly charged field of forces, relative to which each individual is anonymous to the degree that he decides to survive and where even the controllers of the forces are not sure what the outcome of their decisions will be.[13] While this is not the positivist voluntarism of a Kelsen, it is a far cry from the cautious Thomistic natural-law doctrine of developing secondary conclusions and contributing positive solutions according to first principles (see Chapter 6).

To conclude, the virtues necessary for the builder of Communism are all functional, i.e., related to the social context and governed by Party fiat. The same is even more true of the principal super-virtues of the new Soviet man, since the Party-state does the harmonizing and provides the all-round development.

In characteristic style, Marxism-Leninism has nothing but contempt for the social theories of other contemporary philosophies, although it can be very gentle toward certain social theories of the past.

Neopositivism is condemned for its detached individualism, its functional

amoralism, and its reduction of politics to game-playing. Even pragmatism, which might be thought to find favor because of its practical orientation, is rejected for its "biologism" and "supposedly" value-free approach. However, there is more than a little irony in the fact that Marxism-Leninism because of its very plasticity, and neopositivist political amoralism seem to be at ease negotiating treaties on a value-free basis.

Neo-Thomism is also condemned but for other reasons. It is said to draw man's attention away from the evils of this life and to turn his attention to non-revolutionary perspectives. In addition, neo-Thomism supposedly holds that what is true in Heaven is absolutely true; anything that is true on earth but contradicts what is true in Heaven must be false. This double-truth theory decisively weakens human reason and reduces revolutionary fervor.

Phenomenology – especially in the form of existential phenomenology – is condemned for its cultural pessimism, for its anti-revolutionary stance, and for its reduction of everything to the individual subject. It is atheistic but inconsistent, and humanistic, but in despair.

HUMANITY

A standard presentation of "scientific Communism", directed at Soviet university teaching staffs, contains five themes which are organized under the title 'The Transition to Communism, The Developmental Path of all Mankind'.[14] The species-being of historical materialism has evolved from Marx's "social-historical *apriori*" to a *bona fide* eschaton. Whereas in Marx "species-being" designates what man necessarily is if he will allow historical progress to overcome the cause of alienation, for scientific Communism as successor of historical materialism, it designates what mankind has to become, following the enlightened leadership of the Party.

The term "scientific Communism" is derived by Marxist-Leninists from Lenin's discussion of 'The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism' and Engels's *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*. For a long time, it was a surd in the Marxist-Leninist division of sciences, which consisted of philosophy, political economy, and scientific Communism. Philosophy was dialectical materialism and historical materialism; one set forth Marxist political economy via analyses of moribund capitalism particularly in the form of the "four iron laws of history"; and then one acknowledged scientific Communism without being able to say exactly how it complemented the other two.

Scientific Communism began to come into its own with the death of

Stalin and therefore with the reassessment of contemporary Soviet reality. Scientific Communism is in a sense the coming to self-consciousness of post-war Soviet society. It begins as the science of the builder of Communism and gains impetus as the anticipatory autobiography of the new Soviet man.

For forty years historical materialism had been considered more than adequate as "Marxist sociology". However, its explanations of base and superstructure, dynamic evolution of society, revolutionary upheaval, and establishment of proletarian hegemony were too abstract to render fully intelligible the situation of the new Soviet man. In the 1960s, the historical materialists went off on a short excursion into empirical sociology, drawing models and theories from what had happened in the West since the turn of the century. David Zilberman's 'The Post-Sociological Society'[15] provides a brilliant analysis of the deeper causes and consequences of this excursion; and explains why it could not last. It represented a questioning of Soviet power that could legitimately be that of the new Soviet man but which the Soviet leadership could not accept.

All Soviet accounts of scientific Communism open with an explanation of how Marx, Engels, and Lenin converted socialism from utopia to science, where the emphasis is on Marx's discovery of surplus value as central to social-economic analysis, and on Lenin's grounding of the revolutionary party. Such explanations are couched in terms which recuperate all the essential elements of classical historical materialism as well as accepted Marxist-Leninist political economy from the previous forty years.

Innovation begins when these same categories are applied to current Soviet reality. The classical historical-materialist distinction between socialism ("from each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution") and Communism ("from each according to his ability, to each according to his need") is taken seriously. Past Soviet reality is shown to have conformed to Marxist-Leninist social theory; the dictatorship of the proletariat is analyzed and defined in terms of the various forms it has taken; class theory and other social models like the "socialist family" are applied to what has happened in the Soviet Union and in other parts of the Communist bloc. In class theory one talks not about classes in mortal conflict but about "fraternal layers" in friendly competition – between urban and rural, intellectual and manual laborers etc. Political revolution is replaced by cultural revolution in all domains. Spontaneity is gone from all areas, replaced by social planning and control. Attention is directed to the Party's role in seeing to the welfare and education of the new Soviet man. Finally, the "world socialist system" is invoked as the ultimate stabilizing factor on the international scene.

Such presentations of scientific Communism are more than *ex post facto* justifications of Soviet reality in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the latter in terms of the former. A coequal thrust of these efforts is to provide a sort of charter of the new Soviet man within which the virtues of the builder of Communism can come to full fruition under the aegis of the super-virtues of the new Soviet man, namely harmony and all-round development.

To what extent does "scientific" in scientific Communism cover more than the social-engineering outcome of Lenin's Party coming to power? Is there any genuine filiation between the Communist future of the the new Soviet man and the post-capitalist state of mankind, implicit in Marx's project?

Admitting that neither Marx nor the Soviets in their advocacy of humanism, are talking about the autonomous human individual, we have to ask what lies behind the use of terms like "species-being", "mankind", and "humanity". To answer the question, we have to go back behind Marx's evident, if partial, agreement with the enlightenment tradition to his roots in the social Messianism and millenarism, to which he owes perhaps more than to German idealism and classical French materialism.

Marx probably owed more to the enlightenment tradition than he himself realized. By accepting Locke's labor theory of value, Marx acquires a concept of "autonomous rationality" and "property" that makes it difficult to escape the consequences drawn by Stirner in *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum.*[16] Marx's notion of ideology as false consciousness not only thrusts him into a Kantian dichotomy of "noumenon-phenomenon", it also commits him to the ideal of Fichte and others that there is a liberation through universal enlightenment and specifically through education. Finally, Marx shared the general enlightenment enthusiasm for science and for the indefinite extensibility of the benefits of technology.

Marx's break with the main libertarian tradition is concretized in his divergence from Hegel. But the latter is specifically a break with the post-Kantian effort to find what Emil Lask calls the value-filled individual of the third *Critique*. This certainly is not to be found in the self-positing ego of Fichte, the self-propelling forces of nature (Schelling), or the self-actualizing Spirit of Hegel. Neither can Marx find it in the inertly mechanistic humanism of traditional materialism[17] (cf., *Theses on Feuerbach* among other texts). Whence, then, comes the self-producing species-being? Better, whence is Marx's notion?

It will help to distinguish within the development of Western thought and life, official religiosity from what might be called instinctual or underground

religiosity. Official religiosity took organized form in the Church and theoretical form in theological doctrine. Instinctual religiosity is what the common people had, often despite the Church, as heretical movements on the popular level, and definitely without any significant theological elaboration. To the orthodox, it appeared as rank and dangerous supersitition. It fed on the ups and downs of the ordinary daily lives of common people who looked for practical-religious means to overcome the mysteries of coping with daily problems. It was most often leaderless, but would at times follow the leader who met the mainly millenarist and Messianic characteristics of a savior (Christ in His second coming, the charismatic person as prophet). Because the initiated were the reality of the second coming or Messiahship, such groups easily came to identify themselves as the bearer of salvific grace, and the historic life of the group becomes the history of salvation. Thus, there was not only instinctual religiosity, but an unreflective socialism.

What has this to do with Marx and scientific Communism? As Henri Desroches points out,[18] not only was eighteenth- and nineteenth-century socialism in Europe an outgrowth of this populist religious socialism, but Engels as a youth shared in the pietism which often was the organized expression of these feelings. It can, therefore, be suggested but not really proved, that the socialist ideas that Marx inherited from mainline socialism and more directly from Engels' collaboration in the common task carried a strong imprint of this instinctual religious socialism.

Marx himself as a liberated Jew [19] in the enlightened circumstances of the early nineteenth century (in fact, his father had converted to Christianity) carried the seeds of another worldview, which have consequences for our understanding of what lies behind his notion of the self-producing species-being. These are certain notions of the Kabbala, a mystical line of theory and practice within Judaism, which Marx may have received from his Jewish background but which were certainly present in German thought of the time in general, and very specifically in the cosmogonic ideas of Schelling. The Kabbala had – albeit in a seriously distorted form – influenced Western thought through the works of a number of writers usually called "mystic": Jakob Boehme, Johannes Tauler, *et al.* Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx were all familiar with Boehme;[20] Engels underwent similar influences, not only through his pietistic background but also through attendance at the lectures of the old Schelling, who was the contemporary spokesman for this theosophical understanding of man and his place in nature.

As transmitted by Boehme, the theosophical idea can be summarized as the claim that the Divine Mystery expressed in the Tetragrammaton, or

four-lettered name of God, is laid down in the complex configuration of elements, at the center of which is man who can know all. Manipulation of the known symbols is identical with control over the symbolized elements. Kabbalism is thus both a theory and a practice where the theory – as an initiation – is itself a form of practice.

The theurgic conception – again, as transmitted by Boehme and descending via Schelling – is a special case of the theosophical; namely, a cocreationist conception of creation. Most creation myths of primitive peoples include an antecedent matter, so that order is brought out of antecedent chaos. Classical Western thinking, with the appearance of Christianity, was confronted by the need to explain creation out of nothing (*creatio ex nihilo*). Mainstream attempts at such explanation, as in the work of Augustine and Aquinas, have taken the form of asserting that all creation is infinitely inferior to the Creator, but that man is less inferior in that he can also create. Man's creativity, however, is in no way autonomous; it is a co-creativity, whose very existence depends essentially on the creativity of God – and all of this is a mystery.

Boehme borrows from the Kabbala the notion of a two-fold creation. The first creation was of an external, spiritual, perfect world ruled by angels, of whom the three most important are Michael, Lucifer, and Uriel. The second creation formed an earthly nature out of the remnants of the first creation. There is no mystery. God creates out of what is at hand, which is not nothing, but Himself. The only way to imagine this is through the process of contraction. God created finite, contingent being by willfully contracting Himself, and this happened in two stages – the residue in the first case being nature, and in the second man. Each of these regions contained a residue of the divine – more in the case of the human, less in that of the merely natural. Man's co-creativity consists in recuperating from the merely natural what is divine in it; thereby reinforcing his own divinity; and ultimately "restoring all things in God".

In German idealism, this theurgy took the form of conceptual constitution, but it is easy to see how God, as a mere "idea of pure reason", could be stripped away by an atheist like Marx, leaving a self-producing species-being (the group Messiah and consalvational praxis of instinctual religiosity) whose theory (theosophy) and practice (theurgy) consists in recreating a divinity which existed in primitive classless society, is hidden behind the narrow individualism of class conflict society, and can only emerge now that the proletariat's appointed time has come.

Seen in this historical perspective, the species-being status of the builder

of Communism and the new Soviet man, as expressed in historical materialism and scientific Communism, is not an idiosyncratic creation of the Russian *mužik* come to enlightenment, but a neo-Soviet development of what was implicit in Marx's originary worldview. In a society which is in constant development (progressive evolutionism) toward the better (historical optimism), where social being determines social consciousness, and dealienation of the latter comes via human productive transformation of the former, salvation (Communism) can only be the task of all mankind. To the proletariat falls the right and duty of leadership, a leadership for which it is qualified by its ability to bring together fruitfully (dialectically) mankind's theory past, present, and future, and practice (production), where its initiation through the Party into the theory has eminently practical import. It is clear why harmony and all-round development emerge as the super-virtues of the new Soviet Man.

* * *

If there is a ground for an interchange between Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism, it most certainly lies in the affirmation that there is a common good which eventually belongs to all mankind but which belongs at any given historical moment to the saved, i.e., those marked by certain cognitive-practical traits. In fact, the resemblances are so striking that some scholars have suggested that all forms of Marxism are nothing but variants of Christian gnosticism in modern clothing.

For the same reason, both Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism – as quite distinct from most forms of neopositivism and phenomenology – have problems with the doctrines of providence and predestination. The Marxist-Leninist has to explain how the Party's knowledge is efficacious through the "annointed" masses without becoming a dictatorship over the proletariat instead of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The neo-Thomist has to explain how the fore-knowledge of the Almightly Creator does not determine the "saved". Also, the Marxist-Leninist has to explain how the macro-super-virtues of the Party (harmonization and the providing of all-round development) are not imposed on the Messianic masses but emerge naturally, humanly, in the form of micro-super-virtues. The neo-Thomist has to reconcile the immensity of God's grace with human ability to be virtuous.

In a more general way, both Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism reject speculation (*theoria*) as having a value independent of the pragmatic context. Both hold knowledge and practice to be salvific; and only knowledge which contributes to salvation has intrinsic value. In this sense, both are

"ideological", and antithetical to the "language of science" orientation of neopositivism and the effort at presuppositionlessness of phenomenology.

One could justifiably ask, however, if the original presuppositionlessness of the anti-psychologistic orientation of phenomenology has really lasted. To the extent that Husserl moves from epoché and eidetic intuition to a consciousness which intentionally, noetically-noematically, constitutes its life-world, he comes closer and closer to something like a mankind which has "transcendental" properties like those of the proletariat in scientific Communism. Neopositivism would thus be the only line of thought without such a historical agency.

When it comes to virtue and value, it seems that a clear line of demarcation has to be drawn between Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism, on the one hand, and phenomenology, on the other. Phenomenological ethicists like Nicolai Hartmann and Max Scheler speak of virtue only in function of value as what is immediately available to analysis, as "given".

The autonomy of value and the minimal status of virtue appear even more clearly in Sartre's existentialism, where there is only one value, "existence". To some extent, Sartre softens his stand in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* – to the satisfaction neither of the Soviets [21] nor of Western commentators.

On the question of the cognitive-practical, phenomenology restricts its discussion to the domain of the third *Critique*; namely, aesthetic production – remaining within the post-Kantian quest initiated by Fichte and rejoining in a way the neo-Marxist fascination with artistic creativity.[22]

Neopositivism seems to have little to add to this discussion. As we have noted above, it has no historical agency which can be called by that name. It does not recognize any of the anthropological, psychological, or theological-theosophical problems, let alone the solutions proposed by Marxism-Leninism, neo-Thomism, and phenomenology. All of them are reduced to matters of language.

However, recent developments, particularly a return to earlier pragmatists like Peirce, raise questions about the nature of the non-physical sciences, about how the community of scientists determines what science will be and do, etc. One might sum up these concerns in the question: if doing science is a value-transcendent exercise of a human agent, is this human agent anyone? Or only someone special? Or someone so privileged as to amount to a kind of Kantian transcendental unity of apperception incarnate?

PRODUCTION

Of all the central terms of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, few are as easily misunderstood as 'production', 'labor', 'worker', and the constellation of categories growing up around them.

As we have seen, the new Soviet man succeeds the builder of Communism because he represents the best of what mankind does best; namely, he produces himself as species-being. We obtain a full picture of the new Soviet man as self-producing species-being when we have compared what scientific Communism means by production-reproduction to what Marx meant by it.

Classical Marxism-Leninism says nothing particularly problematic when it elucidates "practice" in the form of labor. Had not Marx done the ultimate reduction in *Capital*? There he distinguished abstract and concrete labor, use-value and exchange-value, and employed the distinction to explain the division of labor and the generation of surplus value under capitalism.

This was taken to mean that labor was the central category of Marxism so that Marxist-Leninists need only explicate its meaning and find applications to the circumstances of the present.

There was in the Soviet Union a thorough philosophic discussion in the 1950s on the role of human practical activity. The main question under study was labor's epistemological status and function. Ultimately, it was decided that practice was both the basis of knowledge and the criterion of truth – a point to which we will return below.[23] Earlier Soviet thinkers like Iliadi had looked at the problem of labor and production in terms of esthetic creativity and of the difference between industrial and artistic production. Now Marxism-Leninism is concentrating on the scientific-technological revolution and Soviet philosophers are being permitted to rediscover the early Marx, the Marx of the *Grundrisse*, and of other previously unpublished texts. On this set of questions contemporary Marxism-Leninism seems closest to the positions of Marx himself.

The scientific-technological revolution is recognized by Marxist-Leninists to be a very complex phenomenon.[24] Part and parcel of the Marxist-Leninist explanation of this phenomenon is a rejection of all "bourgeois" interpretations of it, especially in the form of "second industrial revolution", "post-industrial society", or "unified industrial world".[25] For Marxism-Leninism what counts is that now "science becomes a direct force of production" with implications for the direct producer (see Chapter 2) and for social science theory. The latter have to do with the basic historical-materialist

understanding of how man makes his own history, with man's relationship to nature and society, and with the issue of social "control" (*upravlenie*).

Marxist-Leninist scientific Communism, despite its interlude of approximation to empirical sociology, had already been an attempt to update historical materialism and to adapt it to advanced Soviet conditions. Just as in classical Marxism and in the scientific Communism discussion, the central role in the discussion about the scientific-technological revolution is played by production. The question is: what becomes of forces and relations of production under the conditions of the scientific-technological revolution?

Whereas in classical capitalist manufacturing, "constant capital", capital in the form of the machine etc., intervenes between the direct producer and nature, in advanced industrial processes scientific-technological mechanisms intervene so as to shunt the direct producer aside, thus automating production.[26] Marx does not seem to have pursued the logical consequence this would have for his theory: casting doubt on the affirmation that work is the first necessity of man.

Having admitted following Stalin but also the inherent logic of the situation, that science belongs to the base, the Marxist-Leninists had to fight the seemingly natural consequence that human scientific-technological activity, and with it all other human activity, whether belonging to the relations of production or to superstructure, are assimilated into the forces of production; the outcome would be "vulgar" mechanistic materialism in which all phenomena are material in the same sense as air, earth, fire, and water are material, or idealist in that all phenomena are shot through with human intentionality and creativity.

In other words, the central focus of the Marxist-Leninist discussion was transported back to the crucial Marxian problem of the relationship between human and natural phenomena. This concern expressed itself in the form of extended discussions on cybernetics, computers, and thought, the nature of control systems, and so on.[27] Out of these basic contours of the discussion of the scientific-technological revolution flowed the problems which have constituted what Western observers have called the "*upravlenie* debate".[28]

As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 2, especially in 'Freedom as Project and Product', the issue comes down to balancing microcontrols and macrocontrols in terms of the respective roles of automatic systems (cybernetic controls), the direct producers (material economic controls), and the Party (political controls).[29] The central cybernetic notion of feedback plays an essential role in the discussion of this issue, and an Aristotelian-Thomist might be apt to suggest that the notion of analogy would be helpful here.

However, for the Marxist-Leninist, of primary concern is the nagging issue of the nature of production under conditions of the scientific-technological revolution and of the status of Communist Party control over the actual process of production in the Soviet Union. There is no sign that the Soviets are willing to profit from the Maoist discussion of ideological vigor vs. technocracy. The central point remains unresolved: either science and technology are wholly assimilated and the Communist Party has to get along with what control it can salvage by adding political consciousness, an evidently arbitrary voluntarism; or else science and technology are political in their very essence, and the onus is on the Marxist-Leninist to explain how so much non-Marxist-Leninist, i.e., non-Party-controlled, science and technology has eminently practical import – such success, in fact, that a great number of Soviet students in the United States are committed to computer, cybernetic and managerial studies.

How Marxism-Leninism came to this pass and how the elements for a solution are being refined is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

When we call Marx's own view of the social function of science and technology "humanist" we have in mind not only the contrast with the scientism of Engels, but also the more complex issue of Marx's own understanding of science and technology as well as of the status of his work as scientific.

The last two points must be seen in the context of Western understanding of science and technology as they had been developed up to the time of Marx.

Aristotle had not only laid down the distinction between theoretical science dealing with the eternal and unchangeable, or *epistémé* in the strict sense (see the opening remarks of Chapter 7), and practical wisdom about the eternal and unchangeable in what is changeable, he also established that the practical, political, sciences both attain a lesser degree of certainty and deal with phenomena, in which is latent the peculiar danger which might be given the modern name of "indefinite recursivity".

As Lobkowicz has shown, this understanding of the relationship between the theoretical and practical was preserved throughout the medieval period, albeit in a theologized form. It was not preserved in the theosophy and theurgy of the mysticism and underground religiosity, to which we alluded earlier (cf. Chapter 1).

The nature of the modern understanding of science and technology continues to be the subject of a wide-ranging and complex discussion, much of which (e.g., in the Habermasians) is quasi-theosophic in character. What seems indisputable is that with the shift to modernity: first, science no longer seeks essences but laws; second, a quantitative perspective comes to dominate the qualitative, mere life over good life; third, teleology has been displaced by efficacy since Bacon and Hobbes; fourth, increasingly, a synthetic scientific picture of the world came into conflict with the analytic penchant for specialization in the sciences.

This last element – filtered to him through German Idealism, French materialism, and classical British political economy – had a particular influence on Marx's own understanding of science and technology and of his own work as scientific. Discussion of the latter point is reserved for our final consideration of fundamental categories. On the former point, it seems that the early Marx is somewhat reticent. It is true that in the *Manifesto* and elsewhere

Marx sees the development of science and technology as a component in the general universalization of bourgeois production and culture. But it is only later in the *Grundrisse* and especially in the 1861–1863 notebooks, that he defines his view of their precise function:

> The domination of living labor by capital appears within capitalist production as a technological fact . . . it is a *technological truth*.
>
> Mass production – cooperation on a large scale, using machines – first made use, on a large scale, of natural forces (wind, water, steam, electricity) in the process of production, turning them into *agents of social work*. In pre-capitalist agriculture, human labor merely assisted nature, so to speak, rather than controlling it. Of these natural forces, it can be said that *no one made them*. They are not products of human labor. But their *harnessing* is done only through machines which have value only as products of past labor . . . The use of natural agents – so to speak, their inclusion in capital – coincides with the development of *science* as an autonomous factor in the process of production. If the productive process becomes the sphere of the *application of science*, then it can be said that science becomes a factor in or function of the process of production. Every discovery grounds new inventions or new refinements in methods of production. The capitalist mode of production is the first to put the natural sciences into the direct service of the productive process, and the development of production provides the means for the subjugation of nature. Science receives the vocation to be a means for the production of riches.[1]

It has long been recognized that Marxist scientism is mainly due to Engels, who from his early exposure to the *Naturphilosophie* of Schelling to his almost positivistic exploitation of the "latest" scientific discoveries in the *Dialectics of Nature*, could not tear himself away from the conviction that science was an all-embracing system, where everything would eventually be ordered according to the canons of natural science.

Since the dialectical materialism that Engels invented to complement the so-called "historical materialism" of Marx is fundamentally identical to the Soviet dialectical materialism, to which we will return below, let us restrict ourselves here to the essential traits of Engels' view:

(1) To the extent that he elevates natural science to a dominant position over theology and philosophy, which deal with the epistemological "remnants" of science, Engels is a *positivist*.
(2) Engels espouses sensationalism by claiming that all data are available directly to the senses or indirectly through instruments. He is an empiricist.
(3) *Naturalism* is a spontaneous bent of Engels, for he sees all science

reduced to talking about one "nature" which is that described by the natural sciences.

(4) The *scientism* of Engels expresses itself most explicitly in his assertion that the final key to the understanding of nature has been provided by the three great discoveries of (a) the transformation of energy, (b) the cell as foundational to all life, (c) biological evolution.[2]

However, Engels's positivism is tempered by

(5) His Schelling-Hegel position that there is a universal *dynamism* in nature, and by

(6) His *metaphysics of matter* or materialist ontology (the "dialectic of nature" and the "forms of the motion of matter"), which has had a decisive influence on the Soviet Marxist-Leninist understanding of science and technology.

Given the excellent account of the subject in Kołakowski's history of Marxism, we can pass over the neo-humanist, almost Romantic perspective on science and technology of Lukács and others, pausing only to note that this view owes far more to a stereotypical concentration on the early Marx than to a reasoned understanding of Marxian thought as a total project.

As indicated above, Marxism-Leninism has come to view problems of science and technology almost exclusively in terms of the wide-ranging discussions on the scientific-technological revolution, described and analyzed by Buchholz, Burrichter, and Hoffmann. These discussions center on the role of science and technology in the productive process (see 'Progress and Productivity' in this chapter), on the logical-epistemological-methodological impact of science and technology (cf., Chapter 3, below) and on the very nature of science and technology.

What is science? The *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* provides us with Marxist-Leninist perspective:

> Science (*nauka*) is a very important (*važnejšij*) element in spiritual (*duxovnoj*) culture. It is the higher form of human knowledge. It is a system of developing knowledge that is attained through appropriate cognitive methods and is expressed in precise concepts, the truth of which is confirmed and proved by social practice. Science is a system of concepts about the phenomena and laws of the external world or of the cultural activity of people, making possible prediction and the transformation of reality in the interests of society. It is a historically cumulative form of human activity, "cultural production", having as content and result the purposive (*celenapravlenno*) collecting of facts, the elaboration of hypotheses and theories, as well as the basic laws and methods of investigation.[3]

The end of the same rather extensive (22 pages) article is even more

emphatic about the social dimension of science when it characterizes (on p. 571) natural science:

> Natural science (*estestvoznanie*) is a system of sciences about nature. It is one of the three basic realms of human knowledge. It is the theoretical ground of industrial and agricultural technology and of medicine. It is the scientific foundation of philosophical materialism and of the dialectical comprehension of nature. Knowledge of nature is attained as the result of the theoretical and productive activity of man. Natural science pursues a double goal: (1) discovery of the essences (*sušč̌nosti*) of natural phenomena, knowledge of their laws, and prediction on this basis of new phenomena, and (2) indication of possible uses in practice of the discovered laws of nature.

The belief that science is both logically and temporally foundational is what makes Soviet philosophers of science counterpose scientific knowledge to religious faith. All that is sound, logical, empirical, and true in human knowledge and affairs comes from science; all that is deviant, irrational, metaphysical, and false comes from religion, which is idealist and obscurantist by nature.[4] Science impels technology; religion impedes human progress. Consequently, human progress consists in a gradual elimination of metaphysical and religious beliefs (Comte) and the historically inevitable imposition of scientific norms on all domains of human knowledge and activity (Engels).

Science, therefore, is a totalizing and highly philosophic enterprise for the Marxist-Leninist. But the conflict between the Comtean positivism and Schellingian *Naturphilosophie* – both strains present in Engels – led Soviet philosophers of science to fight a battle on two fronts: against the temptation – following Engels's own words – to reduce philosophy to the "handmaiden of natural science", and, on the other hand, against the elevation of philosophy to the status of a positive "science of sciences".[5]

Resolution of this difficulty took the form of a more exact specification and enumeration of the dialectical laws which are the prime objective of science (cf., Chapter 3), as well as the establishment of a classification or hierarchy of science, reminiscent of the efforts of some Aristotelians.[6]

Marxism-Leninism comprises philosophy, political economy, and scientific Communism, following Lenin in the *Three Sources* . . . Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the *science* of the most general laws of nature, society, and human thought, consists in turn, of dialectical materialism, the *science* on the most general laws of nature and thought, and historical materialism the *science* on the most general laws of history and human society. While in dialectical materialism, one asserts that all is matter, in historical materialism one proposes forces and relations of production – the base – as ultimate

constituents of human sociality. When dialectical materialism affirms that all matter is in motion, historical materialism asserts the continuous evolution of the base as determinant of all other evolution. Dialectical materialism's "all motion is dialectical" – in terms of the three basic laws of the dialectic – appears in historical materialism as the same three laws applied to social progress. Finally, the Leninist theory of reflection surfaces in dialectical materialism as "consciousness reflects being" and in historical materialism as "social consciousness reflects social being", that is, superstructure reflects base.

Such is the most general context for the unity of science, where each special science has to do with how these most general dialectical laws are discovered in specified domains of scientific concentration. B. M. Kedrov, the most eminent Soviet specialist in philosophy of science, schematizes the situation as follows:[7]



The list of sciences that result from Kedrov's schematism is interesting on more than one count:

PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES
Dialectic
Logic
MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
Mathematical logic
Mathematics
Social-economic statistics

and practical mathematics
including cybernetics

NATURAL AND TECHNICAL SCIENCES	
Mechanics	and applied mechanics
Astronomy	and cosmonautics
Astrophysics	
Physics	and technological physics
Chemical physics	
Physical chemistry	
Chemistry	and chemical-technological sciences
Geochemistry	with metallurgy and mining
Geology	
Geography	
Biochemistry	
Biology	and agricultural sciences
Human physiology	and medical sciences
Anthropology	

SOCIAL SCIENCES
History
Archaeology
Ethnography
Economic geography
Social-economic statistics

SCIENCES ABOUT BASE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE: political economy; sciences about State and law; history of art, etc.
Linguistics
Psychology and the pedagogical and other sciences [8]

That the list trails off into " . . . and other sciences" is only an indication of the fact that for Marxist-Leninist epistemology human knowledge is in continuous development both horizontally and vertically, both systematically and historically (cf. 'Freedom as Project and Product' in this chapter). More interesting is the inherent difficulty of precisely delineating the range of validity of "most general laws" and "less general laws" (which, nevertheless must be general in some sense, in order to function as laws). This is a matter of dialectical logic (cf. Chapter 3, 'From Logic to Methodology') but also of the ambiguous status of historical materialism as a social science, namely as Marxist sociology.

Looking at this matter more closely than we did above (Chapter 1, 'Humanity') the root problem that faces Marxist-Leninist philosophers of science is this: if the categories, laws, etc. of dialectical materialism serve historical materialism for the analysis of history and society, either the Marxist sociology thus formed remains on a dialectical-materialist level of generality and a more specific criteria of applicability to actual social phenomena would have to be found (which in turn, would have to occur either within historical materialism, which would be circular, or outside, which would be revisionist) or historical materialism has to contain at least two levels of generality (which issues in a problem of "schemata", not unlike that of Kant).

PROGRESS AND PRODUCTIVITY

The Marxist-Leninist stand on science and technology which we have just described, evolved over the whole transformation from the "builder of Communism" to the "new Soviet man", from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to the "state of the whole people" – described by both Joravsky and Kołakowski.[9]

Although *ex post facto* justifications for Soviet power, the Stalinist slogans of "capitalist encirclement" and "socialism in one country" established a conceptual framework for "combat on two fronts": vigilance in domestic production against wreckers, class enemies, revisionists, etc., and an unrelenting effort to catch up with and surpass the non-Communist world in all respects, but above all in production.

In both campaigns, science and technology played essential roles and both came to be seen almost exclusively in the light of these combat situations, at least until the so-called "de-Stalinization".

While the illusions of post-Revolutionary worker democracy and of the *Proletkul't* passed rather quickly (the latter under the energetic pummelling of Lenin), the Soviets could never and have not yet abandoned the idea that progress and productivity are somehow due to a special gift or grace lodged in the proletariat because of the role it plays in the fundamental human activity, production.

The proletariat directly uses the means of production without owning them: it is the class of the base and sees all reality, nature, man, etc., as it is, in genuine human consciousness. They are the exploited: subjectively, if in full awareness of their misery and its causes, or objectively, even if they allow themselves to be bought off by crumbs from the bourgeois banquet table.

The bourgeoisie owns the means of production without directly using them: it is the class of the superstructure and sees all reality – natural, human, logical, etc – through ideologically tinted glasses, in permanently false consciousness. They are the exploiters: subjective, if by choice, or objective, if simply by force of social status.

Marx neatly formulates the intellectual disenfranchisement of the workers by the bosses:

> Just as the machine has now become "Boss-Machine" and its function is determined by its role in the *production* process, so too in the case of science which is embodied in the machine or in the methods of production (in chemical processes, etc.). Science appears as foreign and inimical to labor – as a force dominating it – and its application and development vis-à-vis the productive process suffers the same alienating phenomena as the separation of the worker from the conditions of labor. What is more, the worker in the factory learns only a few processes ... (which is why the government fights for worker education) ... the application of science in the process of production coincides with the elimination of any mental development in the course of the process. Of course, not a few workers become quite skilled but their number does not compare with the masses of 'intellectually disenfranchised' (*entkenntnisten*) workers.[10]

One could expect then that, whereas the increasingly rapid development of science and technology had, in the past, worked to the disadvantage of the "vast majority", Soviet power would enable the proletariat to reappropriate its birthright – making every worker, in the spirit of the *German Ideology*, a laborer in the morning, a technician in the afternoon, and a scientist in the evening.

The non-occurrence of this event has been rationalized since the 1930s in terms of the "leadership role of the Communist Party" – a formula which blankets a number of ideological difficulties and a few political ones as well. On this reading, during the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the proletariat gradually enters into the possession of its birthright, its role as knower and producer of historical truth is assumed by the Communist Party, its vanguard. The so-called "cult of personality" of Stalin merely carried this usurpation one step further – logically according to Kołakowski[11] – to the personal tyranny of Stalin.

This mentality makes intelligible a series of Soviet phenomena. Political intervention into purely scientific realms like microphysics, relativity theory and genetics, is part and parcel of the vanguard's protection of the interests of the proletariat.

The phantasmagoric image of Soviet science and technology that is fed by the episodes involving Lysenko, Müller, Maksimov, *et al.* is only the tip of

an iceberg, described in more detail in the works of Jeu, Müller-Markus, Graham, Joravsky, and others.[12] Much of this difficulty can be and has been put at the doorstep of "Great Russian chauvinism" (Lenin's term) and misguided patriotism. More deeply rooted in the Soviet structure, however, are the utopian-Messianic elements we mentioned above.

Rigid planning, not only of production but of all research and development, flows naturally from the Party's oversight function. Control over employment and unemployment is equally the province of the overseer.

Domestically, then, science and technology were not only the *conditiones sine qua non* of progress and productivity, but it was only through progress in production that science and technology could be furthered. Anyone who, subjectively – out of ill-will – or objectively – out of ignorance, inattention, hunger, etc. – failed to further the scientific and technological pursuits of the Party was a wrecker, opportunist, revisionist or even worse.

If, following Lenin on imperialism, the world is seen as consisting of proletarian and bourgeois nations, and if the proletariat possesses truth while the bourgeoisie is in a state of systematic self-delusion, then it follows *a fortiori* that science and technology are practiced in their purity in the proletarian or socialist world, while they are distorted out of all recognition in the imperialist world. This state of affairs has several consequences, both theoretical and practical.

As far as theory is concerned, Marxist-Leninist philosophy provides the only true versions of all sciences as well as the only trustworthy guide for the application of science in technology. Conversely, bourgeois philosophy, being fundamentally false, can only contribute to the stagnation and decline of scientific knowledge, and can produce only wildly destructive and uncontrolable technology.[13] Here, the Soviet view parallels both proponents and critics of "technological determinism" which asserts that technology has a logic of its own, because it is as value-free as science itself.

For a long time, the Marxist-Leninists seemed to be arguing that science and technology, as practiced in the non-Communist world, were inherently wrong, wrong not only in social destination because they serve deviant class interests, but also in content; "a bourgeois physicist like Einstein could not come up with sound science". The absurdity of such a position became clear to even the most convinced Marxist-Leninists – although, it may be noted, it is a logical and necessary deduction from the principle of *partijnost'* and from "sociological determinism". Retreat from this extreme version of condemnation of bourgeois science and technology took the form of a distinction between ideological form and scientific content. This was aided by

Stalin's famous but puzzling exclusion of language and logic and therefore science, from the base-superstructure tension.[14]

A final twist in the Soviet position on science and technology is provided by the reinterpretation of "scientific Communism" as meaning not just socialist social theory, shunning utopia to be entitled to the status of a science (albeit one that supplies its own criteria), but also as affirming that only within the world socialist system can science and technology be properly applied for the benefit of all mankind. This follows, of course, from the fact that, of the two world systems, the bourgeois and the proletarian, one is made up of knowers (and knowledge is power) while the other consists of ideologists and their dupes.

FREEDOM AS PROJECT AND PRODUCT

Marxism in its variety of forms has long regarded itself as a doctrine of freedom and of the liberation from need: not from the need for production or labor but from labor and production imposed as needs from the outside.[15] This liberation is conceived and presented as a self-achievement of the proletariat which attains complete species-being status by, among other things, overcoming the division of labor.

Marxism-Leninism still speaks at length of freeing man from need. It continues to describe this liberation in terms of human self-actualization; and sees the outcome as a species-being propelled beyond the limits of the division of labor. The essential difference from what might be called the original Marxian perspective lies in the Marxist-Leninist theoretical and practical specification both of the nature of species-being and of the way the division of labor is to be overcome.

The Soviet Communist Party represents species-being in its actual form. These expressions might seem to some simply to represent an ideological mask over the grim realities of power. Yet, as Kołakowski and Glazov[16] have pointed out, such Marxist-Leninist theoretical formulations often do refer to practical political realities that seem to have, at first glance, little or nothing to do with the theoretical content they express.

The practical political reality in the present instance is that in arrogating to itself the status of species-being, the Communist Party has created what might be called a second-level division of labor; and transcending this division of labor is proving to be as delicate and complex as overcoming that to which Marx originally referred. This second level division of labor falls between the Communist Party and the Soviet people and comes down to the need to

define and actualize the freedom from need of each immediate producer in such a way that it is compatible with and non-threatening toward the freedom from need of all, i.e., freedom of species-being or of the Communist Party.

The context for the Party's attempt at resolution of this problem is currently provided by the scientific-technological revolution, the main lines of which we sketched in Chapter 1, under 'Production'. The Soviet supervirtues which we previously defined as "harmonious development of the person" and the "all-round development of man" receive, in this context, an elaboration in hundreds of books and thousands of articles, to the effect that science and technology are not only the conditions of all human progress and socialist productivity, but also that the emphasis is shifted from the social-structural functions of science and technology to the fundamental importance of individual and personal assimilation of science and technology by the immediate producers.[17]

The concrete task is, of course, creation of the material, technological base of Communism – the fundamental duty of the builder of Communism. This is not only an expression of the basic physical condition for achieving freedom from need, it is also a reformulation of Marx's idea that in humanizing nature man humanizes himself. Furthermore, it can be seen as evidence that Marxism-Leninism has gone beyond merely "catching up with and overtaking" the capitalist world. An already scientized and technologized nature faces a humanity which must show itself appropriately scientific and technological.

The efficacious agent in this context is scientific-technological education of all mankind through the Communist Party. This education must be both formal in colleges, universities, technical institutes, etc., and in the workplace, where the practicalities of science are assimilated, via actually functioning technology, into the consciousness of the direct producers. The assimilation of theory to practice overcomes the positivist separation of the moral and technical by making the direct producers simultaneously moral deciders and scientific-technological operators. Thus is solved, in a concrete way, the Stalinist problem of the status of science in terms of base and superstructure. Since under conditons of the scientific-technological revolution science becomes a direct force of production, its reflexive appropriation by the workers makes it part of the base: in effect the scientist becomes worker as the worker becomes scientist – specialization declines and the division of labor is overcome.

The formal structure of this process is a function of a mimetic relationship

between the Communist Party as species-being and the individual worker or proletarian as he whose conscience, honor, etc. the Party is (cf., microcontrol and macrocontrol above). In other words, the direct producer approximates more and more the ideal Party species-being as he successfully imitates the Party's harmonious integration of science and technology which, in this context, are species-science and species-technology. Because the Communist Party achieves this harmonization through its superior, proletarian insight into history and society, a correct political attitude is part and parcel of such species-science and species-technology. As such, it is correctly able to co-opt such apparently bourgeois discoveries as cybernetics, systems theory, structuralism, and management methods (*upravlenie*). The notion of "feedback" from cybernetics, for example, is an integral element in clarifying how the direct producer forms the Communist Party and, in turn, is formed by the advanced consciousness of the Party. No scientific or technological advance is foreign to man, or to the Communist Party, or to its adherents.

True freedom for immediate producers, then, lies in their creative identification with what is best in themselves as prefigured in the species-being structure of the Party. Rejected is the "purely negative" freedom of neo-positivist game-playing in science as well as in politics; the falsely "transcendent" freedom of neo-Thomist otherworldliness; and the "narcissistic" freedom of the "anti-scientific" phenomenologist-existentialist.

However, it is also worth indicating that these noble perspectives are somewhat beclouded by what can only be called theosophical and theurgic leftovers from the original Marxian heritage. For one does not have to be a bourgeois obscurantist or anti-Party wrecker to wonder just how far a chemical engineer-worker, as they are called in the Soviet Union, can go in assimilating the nature of aniline dyes just from working within the process, or how well a computer operator will ever comprehend the piezo effect.

Here we encounter a second facet of this set of problems. In the Leninist theory of reflection knowledge is a copy or mirror-image of reality and social thought – consciousness – is a reflection of social being, the economic infrastructure of society. As developed by Lenin's disciples, it also affirms that the structure of the reflecting is a function of the presence in the reflected reality of an objective dialectic, in contrast with which thought is the subjective dialectic. So, the science and technology possessed in harmoniously integrated form by the Communist Party stand in a reflective relationship with the science and technology being practically assimilated by the direct producer. The problem consists in specifying which of these is objective and which is subjective. For, if science and technology, as eventuating at the

level of assimilation by the direct producer constitute the objective dialectic, then the Communist Party's level is abstract and subjective. If, on the other hand, science and technology at the micro-level of the immediate producer are subjective, then the Communist Party's objectivity makes it the immediate producers. The former consequence is politically dangerous; the latter absurd.

The difficulty cannot be avoided by invoking the second principle of Marxist-Leninist epistemology, the dialectic of absolute and relative truth. Knowledge, we are told, is both a correspondence and a process of approximation. It is also either relative or absolute. Subjectively relative knowledge is that of the individual knower; subjectively absolute knowledge is that of species-being – read: Communist Party. Knowledge is objectively relative when it deals with the current state of the objective dialectic which is constantly developing throughout history. Knowledge is objectively absolute when it grasps the first principles of all reality, which are the basic laws of the dialectic. The conundrum of who is subjective or objective might then be approached by asking whether science and technology are absolute in the possession of the Communist Party or in the assimilation by the direct producer? If one maintains Communist Party superiority, the objective, absolute truth of the Communist Party becomes something like the Cartesian spectator or the Absolute Knowledge of Hegel – and equally abstract on strict Marxian criteria. However, putting absoluteness into the hands of the immediate producer seems both contrary to fact and destructive of any significant Communist Party role.

If the problem resists theoretical resolution, one can always fall back on *praxis*. "Practice is the basis of knowledge and the criterion of truth" reads the third canon of Marxist-Leninist epistemology. According to the resolution of an extended Soviet debate in the 1950s practice is neither a third stage in knowledge, added to sensory and rational knowledge, nor an extra-cognitive element. It is rather the living unity of all forms of knowing and doing. Since science and technology are the forms of theory and practice under discussion here, their living unity would have to appear at the levels both of the Communist Party and the immediate producer. This is relatively clear at the level of the immediate producer. There is, for him, no practical, productive activity that is not permeated with science and technology.[18] Conversely, there are no scientific or technological secrets from him since all the principles and laws must eventually occur in one form or another in his practical, productive activity. But the situation with the Party seems far from clear. For the harmonious integration of science and technology with industrial practice is reduced to a trivial observation if it merely refers to the control

function that the Communist Party exercises over Soviet society in general and Soviet production in particular; or, if it simply means that some Soviet scientists and technologists – though by no means all – belong to the Communist Party. If it means more, then this could imply the seemingly absurd consequence that the social and political activities of the Communist Party are through and through "industrial", because they are scientific and technological.

This antinomy is not perceived by the Marxist-Leninist participants in the perspective of the scientific-technological revolution due to the fourth principle of Marxist-Leninist epistemology: the dialectic of the historical and the logical. The logical is the historical reflected in the form of the recurrent traits which are universal and essential. For the Marxist-Leninist historicist, following Lenin's description of the axioms of logic, it is the recurrence which conditions this universality and essentiality. There is, therefore, in addition to the concrete in reality and the universal in the mind, a concrete in the mind (the "concrete Universal" of Hegel) and a universal in reality (the basic laws of the dialectic). On this account, science and technology both historically accumulate, as man's possession, and have a logical structure which is their dialectical essence.

Because the Party represents the best interests of the proletariat and thereby of mankind in general, the Party is the dialectical logician *par excellence*. Besides knowing history best, it knows the logic of history in the only absolutely true manner; namely, as identical with its own world-historical *praxis*. In it absolute knowledge becomes identical with the general will, and no one, least of all the immediate producer, has any genuinely human will outside of the Communist Party.

The key to grounding such a view lies, of course, in elaborating such a logic, in a way that definitively removes any suspicion of absurdity – especially when this logic has to come up against the canons of consistency and validity that have governed and still continue to govern logic since ancient time.

This is our next theme.

CHAPTER 3

DIALECTICAL LOGIC

FROM LOGIC TO METHODOLOGY

Despite its title, Hegel's *Science of Logic* is not a logic in the ordinary sense of the term; it is an ontology, and a dialectical ontology at that. This fact, and its misunderstanding by Lenin, perhaps has been the most decisive formative influence on Soviet dialectical logic. Because of Lenin's peculiar confusion of Hegel with Aristotle, it is only gradually that the discussion has been able to free itself from psychologism.

Although Marx's contributions to logic are minimal and although consideration of these contributions has come into Marxist-Leninist literature only recently, there is now a lively debate among Marxist-Leninists and throughout the Marxist world, on the "logic of *Capital*",[1] following up on Lenin's suggestion that Marxist logic is to be found in *Capital*.

The main lines of this discussion, which has been summarized in a number of works, Soviet and Western,[2] derive more directly from Engelsian positivism than from Marxian political economy. The main positions are outlined in the *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* as follows:

(1) The dialectic is the science of the most general laws of the development of nature, society, and human thought, and appears simultaneously as the logic of Marxism-Leninism (M. M. Rozental', E. P. Sitkovskij, I. S. Narskij);
(2) Dialectical logic forms part of the theory of knowledge which, in turn, forms part of the dialectic (V. P. Rožin, M. N. Rutkevič);
(3) Dialectical logic is the logical aspect or the logical function of the dialectic (B. M. Kedrov);
(4) Dialectical logic is the science of the dialectical forms of thought – dialectical concepts, dialectical judgments, dialectical reasonings (M. N. Alekseev, S. B. Cereteli, V. I. Čerkesov, V. I. Mal'cev);
(5) There is only formal logic; the dialectic is not logic but a philosophic method for the understanding and transformation of reality (K. S. Bakradze).[3]

Although the matter seems to deal with a relatively technical question

of the correlations between formal logic and dialectical logic, in reality it grows to include all the basic questions about the nature of philosophy, about the compatibility of the philosophical disciplines among themselves, and on their relationships with the remaining sciences, natural and social. It determines how historical materialism relates to sociology, psychology, history, etc. It establishes for scientific atheism the sources or roots of religion as well as the nature of the "remnants" of religion in the consciousness of the Soviet people.[4] Through it alone do socialist realism in art,[5] the forms of reasoning in socialist legality,[6] and even the logic of military operations[7] find their ultimate grounding. Finally, it is the basis for rejecting all manner of bourgeois formalism and for detecting the weaknesses of all pre-Marxian forms of thought.[8]

If we provisionally agree to call dialectical logic a "social ontology", then it is essential to establish the conditions under which such a social ontology can be developed free from psychologism. By "psychologism" is meant here the reduction of whatever is at issue (logic, art, technology, social theory) to a univocal dependency on individual acts of consciousness. Every act of consciousness is uniquely individual and unrepeatable. If what occurs can be adequately explained only through the individual act of consciousness by and in which it is generated, we have psychologism which might also be called "cognitive empiricism". If, on the other hand, what occurs is to be grounded in more than the individual act of consciousness, it is essential that one account for the supra-individual or intersubjective validity thereof.

In modern times, the mainstream Western attempts at resolution of this nest of problems went, not in the direction of ontology, but of methodology; and it is characteristic of Marxism-Leninism here, as on other questions, to be suspended between these two poles.

If method is, in general, the way of accomplishing a process or achieving a goal, then one might distinguish theoretical methods from practical methods. Concentrating for present purposes on the latter, one contemporary expert[9] has suggested distinguishing between method (the ways), logic (the rules and structures), and philosophy of logic (what they all mean). There are direct methods of knowledge and indirect ones, the latter depending essentially on language in a way the former do not. The principal direct method of knowing today is the phenomenological method – bracketing (*epoché*) of history, theory, existence, and individuality in favor of an intuition of essence (*Wesensschau*) based on descriptive completeness. Among the indirect methods there is the semiotic (formalization, levels of discourse and meaning,

modes of verification), the axiomatic (from axioms through rules to theorems, the deductive method of tradition), and the "reductive" (including the historical) methods (with the problems of the uniqueness of phenomena, the use of documentary evidence, the issues of probability, and predictability – in short, many of the traditional problems of induction).

During the later years of Stalinism, there was an extended debate on the "Marxist dialectical method". This method was held to be Marxist, because it was revolutionary (following the deterministically progressive motion of matter and man in society), party-minded in seeing each individual as class-bound, massive, i.e., of the masses, and practical, since without practice, theory is impotent just as, without theory, practice is blind. It was dialectical because it recognized and applied the basic laws of the dialectic. But the puzzle which precipitated the discussion on dialectical logic was how it was a method. One commentator has suggested that the Marxist dialectical method issue was a sign of Marxist-Leninist malaise concerning the methodological nature of their whole enterprise and concerning the Party's role as master dialectical logician. For, if natural science in general proceeds from data, inductively, to the establishment of hypotheses and thence deductively to conclusions subject to verification for confirmatory strengthening of the theory at issue, Marxism-Leninism seems to combine its modes as follows:[10]



As a result of this mixing of modes, the methodological question necessarily becomes a social-ontological one, in which the status of the Party as definer of data and controller of verification is absolutely decisive. Or, to put the same matter in the terms we used in the previous chapter, what is at issue is

a comparative "psycho-logical" profile of the Communist Party and the immediate producer – both of whom are dialectical logicians.

As the Sovietologist and historian of logic, Bocheński, has put it, "I will grant them their 'dialectical logic' if they can come up with one logical law which is not at the same time a law of formal logic." Some Soviet philosophers – most notably M. N. Alekseev – pushed the dialectical logic discussion so far as to try to come up with dialectical counterparts to all the elements of formal logic.[11] But, the discussion itself made it clear that the correlation between formal logic and dialectical logic was only the external aspect of a much more foundational matter. For if dialectical logic is the "logic of the dialectic" and the dialectic includes the "dialectic of the logical and the historical", then the quasi-Leninist question "whose dialectic?" becomes more important then the technical details about the categories, elements, and laws of the dialectic. Parenthetically, Aristotelico-Thomists (see Chapter 10) have a similar problem with their assumption that the categories or predicaments are parallel classifications of terms and things.

Rather than mere method, Marxism-Leninism is involved in a search for an "onto-logic", surpassing both that of Aristotle and that of Hegel in being an "onto-socio-logic". It is here that the significance of the debate on the logic of *Capital* lies, as well as the importance of the development of social psychology in the Soviet Union,[12] and of the extensive discussions on ideology as a form of social consciousness.[13] If success in specifying the nature of dialectical logic depends on elucidating dialectically developing concepts (*razvivajuščij ponjatij*)[14] then where better to look than to the masterpiece of developmental analysis, *Capital*, and its initial version, the *Grundrisse*? There one finds that "human anatomy is the key to that of the ape", a feedback principle which serves to clarify not only the basic notions of political economy and all the other social sciences but also the basic terms of all sciences, including the axioms of logic. One could even hazard that *Capital* is therefore the key to the *Grundrisse*!

Were we to describe Marx's total project as continuous critique of all critique which is not self-criticizing, we would come close to showing how in a roundabout way the Marxist-Leninist dialectical logic rejoins this project. For, with due respect to other accounts,[15] if we admit that Marx is the scion of German Idealism who dilutes the philosophical enterprise in favor of a critique of culture (*Kulturkritik*), this merely means that he situates his own enterprise as follows: whereas modernity through its agent, the bourgeoisie, had more or less completely demystified the realm of religion through the process of secularization, the realm of philosophy through critique, politics

in the form of bourgeois democracy, and art by stressing individual creativity and "art for art's sake", it had exorcised these realms, only to see their demons reincarnated in political economy – the famous "fetishism of commodities". To the proletariat falls the responsibility and privilege of demystifying this remaining nest of superstition – a task to be accomplished through the combined impact of theory (critique) and practice (revolution). One could feel the world-historical task with which Marx charges the proletariat as inscribed in the heart of the dialectical-logical Party.

Except for works of narrow focus, all logical and methodological matters are attached to the general framework of practical Party tasks in Communist construction, the scientific-technological revolution, etc. There is a striking analogy here with the analytic or neopositivist philosopher for whom ideological or "ontological" (to use his term) considerations impinge increasingly the more he widens his focus from the very narrowly defined problems of his tradition.

In conclusion, the Marxist-Leninist discussion of dialectical logic is far from ended, and in view of the vast perspectives sketched above, one could surmise that it will continue for some time to provide the contextualization for the methodological specification of the "new Soviet man".

SEMANTICS, SEMIOTICS, PRAGMATICS

The story of Marxism-Leninism's involvement with language begins with the Stalinist historical-materialist specification of language and logic in terms of base and superstructure. Once N. Ja. Marr's theory on the historical relativity of language had been rejected and language put in the base, on the level of the other forces of production, its social status and function was decided and it was striking how extremely apolitical Soviet works on linguistics became in a very short time.

The pronouncement from on high did not, however, solve the question of the nature of language from a philosophical or ontological viewpoint. One problem that faced Marxism-Leninism on language had to do with the cognitive-existential status of the elements of language: what are word and proposition? and how do they relate as mental occurrences to other mental occurrences, concepts, etc.? An additional problem, which brought Marxism-Leninism into possible interplay with events elsewhere in the world, involved the signifying or meaning-bearing function of the elements of language.

Properly human reflection is the work of the "second signal system", the ultimate stage in the evolution of matter's general property of interaction.

The word, a stimulus like any other stimulus, is a signal or sign of another signal; it is the "natural matter" of thought; it bears meaning. (While a Thomist [see Chapter 8] might consider words to be a kind of matter of thought, there is not a parallel here to the doctrine that the concept is a natural sign.)

The highly physiological and even reductionist character of this account of human thinking and language led to an extended Soviet discussion in the 1950s of the nature of psychology, simultaneous with the discussion of dialectical logic.[16] The physiological reduction was countered by a classical psycho-physical parallelism and the resolution came down in the form of a dogmatic affirmation that the psychic is the subjective portion of the physical. This affirmation has continued to provide the context for Marxist-Leninist efforts to decide on the status of mental events and their relationship to linguistic events within the limits of the objective and subjective dialectics.

However, the other question regarding the signifying or meaning-bearing function of the elements of language, has come to occupy the attention of Marxist-Leninist philosophers of language. For decades their efforts were dominated not by Marx, who had little to say on language, but by Engels' derivation of thought and language from labor. Under pressure from developments in philosophy and linguistics outside of the Soviet Union and driven by the needs of advanced technology, contemporary Soviet philosophy has embarked on the road toward a more sophisticated semiotics.

If one were to take the three basic semiotic realms – the syntactic (sign related to sign), the semantic (sign related to meaning), and the pragmatic (sign related to users) – as currently employed by philosophers of language, one might deduce that the first two would not be problematic while the third would absorb most of the attention of Marxist-Leninists. This deduction is partially borne out by the facts. For, whereas Soviet linguists regrouped after the Stalinist reconstruction to pursue apolitical lines of development – returning to traditional Russian linguistics and taking up with de Saussure and the Prague Circle – Soviet philosophers of language found themselves impelled into socio-linguistics and applied semiotics, more directly useful for the Party's needs for communication with the direct producers.

However, the more technical issues of semiotics and semantics could not be ignored if only because of their importance for cybernetics, control systems, and the other novelties facing the new Soviet man in the context of the scientific-technological revolution. In the flood of Soviet publications on semiotics and semantics, one finds the same inverse proportion between

technical focus and ideological account, that we pointed out in the case of Soviet logicians and of their neopositivist counterparts. M. V. Popovič's *Philosophical Questions of Semantics*[17] is a representative example of an almost perfectly objective account of the historical background and central issues that have to be discussed. A more classical presentation is that of L. O. Reznikov,[18] whose works are cited by nearly all contemporary Soviet writers on the subject. According to Reznikov, the sign expresses (*vyražaet*) a meaning (*značenie*) which reflects (*otražaet*) an object (*predmet*) which the sign (*znak*) designates (*oboznačaet*). Since, following Marx's insight in *Capital* on paper money as signs of value, what is reflected in meaning is an ever-changing object, in signs we achieve only a relative fixation of the multiplicity of meanings that are present.

> Although the thoughts expressed in the process of communication – as generalized reflections – are correlated with the help of linguistic signs, it is not these signs which give thought its general character, but the fact that they are reflections of the really objective universality of objects and phenomena of the world around us.[19]

We have here a more or less traditional Aristotelian position: the sign (linguistic or other) intervenes between the knower and known and must therefore participate in the nature of each. Whereas the German Idealist inspirers of Marx had put almost exclusive emphasis on language's conformity to and even mimicking of the processes of cognition, the materialist-monist challenge for Marxism-Leninism is to delineate the reflective correspondence between object and meaning-bearing sign. Since the materiality of the sign is of a piece with the materiality of the object, the latter's interactional traits (*vzaimodejstvie*) must be shared by the former. Because, further, the material interactions occur at distinct levels of complexity, each discipline is distinguished by its own system of semiotic fixation – in short its own sign system or vocabulary. One Soviet author goes on to specify areas like biosemiotics, ethnosemiotics, and linguosemiotics as subsections of general semiotics.[20]

If the subjective dialectic is inhabited by semantic entities, whose developmental character reflects that of the things and signs which make up the object-range of the objective dialectic, it is only by specifying the agent or subject of meaning that one can be clear about the meaning-bearing function of linguistic signs. That this agent cannot be an abstract ego, consciousness, or Spirit – as the German Idealists would have it – is clear from the *Theses on Feuerbach*. That it cannot be a set of impersonal functions or structures – as the varieties of structural-functionalism would have it – is equally clear

from the Engels-Lenin derivation of meaning from "living practice". It can only be that

> Signs form a variegated world of actively functioning modes of information and orientation, and are, therefore, a profoundly social phenomenon. Signs exist exclusively in the service of social collectives.[21]

In the end, then, it is the pragmatic dimension of the sign that has to establish the guidelines for the Marxist-Leninist discussion of all the other dimensions.

> The perfecting of human communication, then, can be achieved through all-round development of man himself on the basis of successful resolution of the most important tasks of the establishment of the material-technological base of the new society – of the builder of Communism.[22]

Therefore, while the formal specification of semiotics and semantics may be set aside for the moment as a technical matter, the elaboration of the content – semantics in the strict sense – includes the Party as prime meaning-bearer.

As Bocheński has shown,[23] the two basic forms of authority – the pragmatic context *par excellence* – are triadic in structure. In a situation of epistemic authority, the emitter is obeyed because of his mastery of a content which the receiver (a) does not know, at least not as well as the emitter, and (b) needs. Deontic authority is exercised by an emitter who holds vis-à-vis the receiver a position which is not cognitively grounded: I obey my sergeant not because he knows more than I do but because he is my sergeant, and I am his private. The two positions converge to a certain extent when one asks either how I know that my epistemic superior does possess mastery over the field in question or who or what establishes the deontic context which makes me, for example, the private of some sergeant. Both questions, in the first instance, find an answer in terms of a special, functional specification of something like Peirce's community of scientists and in the second, a community of needs and interests, which serves to establish the need for something like an army.

The Communist Party does form the community of scientists in the fundamental sense that the Party's dialectical-logical perspective establishes what it means for something to be science and which practical tasks of the construction of Communism are to inspire scientific research. Also, the Party possesses the sufficient and necessary perspective on history to be

in a position to define the community of needs and interests, not only of the proletariat but of all mankind.

Concretely, the meaningful content of every word and combination of words is a function of this world-historical social function of the Communist Party. The more intense the meaning of a word or phrase, the greater the stake of the Party in it. Whence the convoluted distinction between "layers" (*sloja*) under socialism and "classes" under capitalism, which possess, respectively, "non-antagonistic" and "antagonistic contradictions", or between sudden and gradual "leaps" (*skačok*), etc. The meanings of words do matter to the Party because the whole impact of the dialectic is condensed therein and domination-free communication depends on everyone maintaining the Party-established content for all essential terms.

The Communist Party as master dialectical logician lays down both *de facto* (who can say what, when, and to whom) and *de jure* (as sole emitter of Marxist-Leninist truth) the total worldview of all new Soviet men, both in its grand outlines and in its logical, semiotic, and semantic detail – this is the paradigm of the "scientific picture of the world".

THE REALITY OF THE WORLD

Soviet participation in the discussion on possible worlds is sometimes highly technical and sometimes full of ideological hesitations. Under the significant title of *Logic and Ontology* [24] a group of Soviet logicians and semanticists has recently provided a thorough discussion of all the major themes that have currency among Western leaders of this discussion like Quine, Kripke, or Hintikka. A more historical, but still very technical discussion is provided by M. V. Popovič in *Philosophic Questions of Semantics*, where we find this warning about the discussion of possible worlds:

> Just as there is in objective reality no value, mass, energy, information, etc., in pure, immediate form, so there are in it no possible, necessary, or accidental actual phenomena.[25]

This preservation of what might be called "categorial purity" throughout all such discussion is part and parcel of a concern on the part of Marxism-Leninism to protect the integrity of what is called the "scientific picture of the world" (*naučnaja kartina mira*) as integral to the Marxist-Leninist worldview as a whole.

Clearly, Marx, Engels, and their contemporaries considered science to have replaced all other human endeavors and to have produced an account

of the world that was adequate in its over-all outlines. It remained only to fill in the details in this larger scheme.

An opposition to the movement of science toward greater fragmentation and toward probabilism was also at work in the Marx-Engels background. Western science had been born in the intellectual climate of Descartes' search for certitude as well as Hobbes' assertion of the "constructability of all", arguing from cause to possible effects instead of effect to cause (Aquinas). While the Cartesian certitude had gradually swelled into Hegelian absolutism (*das Wahre ist das Ganze*) and into empiricist sensationalism, the Hobbesian thrust had been dulled into a neo-Hegelian mystical overlay of "abstract practice". In the proletarian Messianism of Marx's *Kulturkritik* is latent a "unified science" motif that was adumbrated by Engels at Marx's interment, and which emerges in Lenin's Promethean electrification of Soviet Russia.[26]

If Habermas is correct in establishing an inverse proportion between surplus and scarcity in the satisfaction of needs, on the one hand, and the fragmented or holistic nature of world-images as legitimizers, on the other,[27] then what we have in the case of the Marxist-Leninist scientific picture of the world is an effort to recuperate the unity of the need-fulfiller (the immediate producer) and the need-producer (the Communist Party). The concrete context is provided by the production of the material-technical base of Communism; the agency is the constructing of Communism; the ultimate end is need-satisfaction on both macro- and micro-levels; and the formal specification is provided by the scientific picture of the world, which is to be that of both the Party and the immediate producer.

The work of forming a scientific picture of the world is at its beginnings, according to the most complete Soviet report to date.[28] Its origins are to be sought in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, where Lenin affirms that the original, Newtonian scientific picture of the world was undergoing changes misinterpreted by non-Marxist philosophers of science. Viewed by Lenin as a "revolution in physics", this lays down the basic guidelines of a Marxist-Leninist construction of the scientific picture of the world. The central problem area in what concerns the natural sciences, involves the interpretation of relativity theory and quantum mechanics, again following Lenin. They also have to do with the role of mathematics in scientific descriptions and, going beyond Lenin, with the integration of cybernetics, systems theory, etc., into one unified scientific picture of the world.

After the integration of the natural sciences, the scientific picture of the world has to extend, through the inclusion of the biological sciences, to the

social or humanistic sciences.[29] A necessary continuity exists between the concepts of the particular sciences of nature and the more humanistic social sciences, including philosophy.[30] Thus is established the functional connection between the ideologically relevant level of Communist Party operation and that of the scientist, both pure and applied, who is the immediate producer as possessed of the requisite science and technology. There is to be no divorce at all between theory and practice:

> ... it is difficult to agree with those Marxist philosophers who say that the physical picture of the world is a special intermediate link between physical theory and philosophy, because the logical conclusion from this would be recognition of the independent existence of physics and materialist philosophy – which contradicts the real state of affairs.[31]

This real state of affairs can be seen from the fact that

> The history of the development of physics and philosophy incontrovertibly demonstrates the existence of an objective tendency toward the unity of materialism and physics, i.e., the dominance in physics of materialist notions about circumambient nature.[32]

A leading Soviet theoretician of physics has developed the totalizing function of the scientific picture of the world in a facinating, futuristic book. Kuznecov's conclusion sums up the basic thrust of the scientific picture of the world:

> One of the most impressive turnabouts in the cultural and even material history of mankind was the idea of production as the basis of the fundamental actualization of social ideals which are themselves the result of the development of production; as well as the idea that mankind sets itself only tasks it can solve; that work transforms not only nature but also society, that it inevitably leads to liberation from exploitation and from alienation, and that it is the source of and instrument for the realization of human ideals. With the collectivization of production, when the basic trait of work – its intentional character (which according to Marx marks the worst architect off from the best bee) – defines the distribution of effort not only in the enterprise, but also in the context of the whole planned economy, ideal schemata are transfomed into plans and into economic, technical-economic and constructive-technological projects. Ideal schemata, in which objective scientific laws are sedimented, become elements of productive technology, enter into planned production, inspiring economic projects and thereby becoming social-economic ideals. Thus, national economic plans constitute a real synthesis of scientific truths and their values, a real incarnation of the values of knowledge.[33]

Violà, the unity of social science and "socialized science"; there is no need to ask again "whose science?" for it is clear from what we have said, that it is

the Party's science. The latter is raised to the level of an all-encompassing worldview where science and social theory no longer coexist but interpenetrate each other in both form and content.

In the last analysis, however, neither the interplay between Party and immediate producer, nor the assimilation by both of their scientific picture of the world, can be seen in static terms of reflection. They are dynamic processes, functions of the dialectic of the historical and the logical, and of the search through relative truth for absolute truth. The focus of these dynamic processes is provided by the pivotal assertion of Marxism-Leninism on the unity of the world, namely that this unity consists in its materiality. This is the theme of our next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

THE DIALECTIC OF NATURE

For a long time, "philosophy of nature" (*Naturphilosophie*) was a derogatory term in the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary.[1] It applied to idealists like Schelling;[2] whereas Marxist-Leninists were said to do science. By "philosophy of nature" we do not mean simply a philosophic account of nature, which every theoretical system has to contain in one form or another. Aristotelianism has a philosophy of nature (basically inherited by the neo-Thomists, as we will see in Chapter 7) but Aristotelianism is not merely a philosophy of nature. One could call the pre-Socratics, including the Eleatics, philosophers of nature in the strict sense. However, the paradigm of Western philosophy of nature is in the work of John Scotus Eriugena, Paracelsus and the German mystics like Boehme, some Renaissance thinkers, Spinoza, and Schelling. As such, it has been a constitutive part of what we might call "the other way of doing philosophy" and has interacted not only with the mainstream of Western thinking, but also with what we called in Chapter 1 the "underground religiosity" that never quite surfaced in the form of an official theology.

Due to its essentially neo-Platonic origins and character, classical philosophy of nature contains elements that are central to the Marxist-Leninist picture of the world and which therefore have to be excised from philosophy of nature and cleansed of their objective idealist taint. Among such key elements one finds: the givenness of nature as an "Other"; the dynamic process character of nature; the dialectical constitution of reality; natural teleology as structural correlate of human intentionality.

Both Alfred Schmidt in his *The Concept of Nature in Marx* [3] And Armin Wildermuth, in *Marx und die Verwirklichung der Philosophie,*[4] go into the question of the extent to which one can find a materialist ontology in Marx himself. Schmidt asserts that: "Nature was for Marx both an element of human practice and the totality of everything that exists,"[5] but goes on to add that "Only by recognizing , as Marx does, that material reality is from the beginning socially mediated, is it possible to avoid ontology . . . "[6] Wildermuth, on the other hand, sees the Marxian project as part of modern philosophy which is, since at least Descartes, a detranscendentizing move toward total immanentization. He distinguishes four phases in Marx's own development; from the immanentization of self-consciousness against Hegel

and Bruno Bauer into Engels' Schelling; next to anthropological immanentization in interplay with Feuerbach; then to immanentization of the life-process through praxis; finally to the immanentization of metabolic processes (*Stoffwechselprozess*) as in *Capital*. Whatever the merits of Wildermuth's general thesis concerning the overall unity of the Marxian project and corpus, he does make it clear in a way that Schmidt does not, that Marx's so-called materialism makes sense only as an ontology, i.e., as accounting for both *Sein* and *seiende*. "Social praxis" could save Marx from ontology – as Schmidt seems to say it does – only if it in turn allows for a non-ontological grounding, as we shall see below.

Engels, as we have mentioned, has dominated Marxist philosophy of science from the beginning and has done so in a clearly positivist direction. However, we also pointed out that the residual Schellingian influence in Engels makes him oscillate between a flatly empiricist account of nature and a philosophy of nature in the classical sense. This appears most clearly in his central notion of the correlation of the forms of matter with the types of motion or change – which, mediated by Lenin, has become the centerpiece of the Marxist-Leninist materialist ontology.

This mediation by Lenin, especially in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, provides an illuminating instance of how decisively mixed modes can influence the development of schools of thought. Lenin here owes as much to Aristotle as he does to Hegel, and it is only through Hegel and Engels that the Schellingian strains reach him.

What Aristotle meant by nature (*physis*) has over time been beclouded both by the terminological reduction of "physical" to mean the merely material or inorganic, and by the expansion of the term "nature" to say non-human or even non-Divine correlative of man or God, respectively. "Nature" originally seems to mean for Aristotle "what a thing is as given"; not "essence" which is expressed in the definiton; not "substance"[7] or what a thing is; not "form", what makes a substance be what it is; but "informed materiality" and/or "enmattered form" as constituting this substance as it is. There are grounds for suggesting that the term "essence" (for *ousia*) has no place within any account of Aristotle's philosophy. For the principal problem connected with it does not arise within Aristotle's naturalism but only later in the context of the Scholastic elaboration of essence and existence to explain Creator-creature relations. Briefly, if existence is distinct from essence and comes to informed matter through the form, there is only a short step to be made, as Duns Scotus does with his *haecceitas*, to taking existence as a higher formality or $form_2$ which would then stand to $form_1$ as $form_1$

stands to matter. Mainstream Scholasticism avoided the hermeneutic problems this short step entails through use of a hierarchy of forms, where each lower form inheres potentially in each higher or more active form. Such a hierarchy of forms depends, in turn, on the clear distinction between real and merely rational relations – which is precisely one of the metaphysical devices that fell into disuse and even disrepute during the transition from Aquinas to Hegel. In Hegel the paradoxes of double formality appear in sharpest delineation – perhaps for the last time with such clarity. It may be that all of Hegel and Hegelianism is reducible to this one principle; for our purposes, however, the most relevant seems to be the conception of nature as Other of Spirit and the "going beyond the limit (*Grenze*)". For, if Nature is Other of Spirit, then it must contain what of Spirit is Other, and this is formally Spirit, although it may in content be Nature. Equally, if limit makes any actualization of Spirit what it is, it can be gone beyond only in function of an element – again formal – in an Other which from the viewpoint of the originary limited Spirit is merely material, or in more Hegelian terms, merely other. Finally, if Reason (Hegel) sublates (*aufhebt*) Understanding (Kant), it does so as realizing itself to be the formality of all formalities that make particular manifestations of Spirit what they are.

When Marx has the proletariat produce humanity in the act of producing a human world, he is heir to this double formality perspective. More to the point, Lenin grafts the double formality or dialectical conception onto the Aristotelian or ontological version of nature, creating the need for a metaphysics of nature, which would explain how the scientific picture of the world is both an account of nature and of man and society, and also a process inherent in nature – the objectivity of the subjective-objective dialectic of nature.

Orthodox Stalinist dialectical materialism expressed its materialist ontology in a series of brief, catechetical formulae which have remained current in contemporary Marxism-Leninism. "All is Matter", reads the first. Matter is not only all, but also each and every. This material unity of the world (micro-matter and macro-matter) expresses itself in the infinite appearing and disappearing of particular forms of matter within the universal matrix of matter as such. Therefore, "All matter is in motion"; and, just as each form of matter has its type of motion, so macro-matter has its macro-motion. Everything that is in motion is connected with everything else through its motion, and interacts with everything else. Thus, there is macro-motion and micro-motion, corresponding to macro-matter and micro-matter. Finally, since all things exist in space, which is tridimensional, and time, which is

unidimensional and irreversible, there will be macro and micro-spaces and times.

What is relevant here, however, is the grounding or ontological function of the dialectic. It is one thing to say that the micro-level is dialectical, the macro-level is dialectical, and there is a dialectical relation between them; and totally another matter to explain in what the mediating and totalizing nature of this dialectical character consists. In other words, one can assume the dialectic to be constitutive of all things, and then proceed to show how it emerges in each; or, one can examine each and everything – the object-domain, discovering the inherent dialecticity. Philosophy guides natural science, or science comes to philosophic conclusions. It seems that one cannot have it both ways.

Marxist-Leninists seem to want to have it both ways. There is the constant affirmation that the developments of modern science tend more and more to "demonstrate the truth of philosophic materialism".[8] Throughout Marxist-Leninist texts, scientific questions, discoveries, and discussions play a large role in the elaboration of purely philosophic notions.[9] What is more, there is a zig-zag – dialectical, perhaps – process at work. On the one hand, there is constant dogmatic appeal to the classics of Marxism-Leninism as having established the basic principles of a philosophy of nature, which are then discovered to be at work in the most modern scientific endeavors. The classics themselves, in turn, are said to have established these basic principles on the basis of the generalization of the data of the sciences of their day. The Marxist-Leninist hermeneutic thus runs $\text{science}_1 \rightarrow$ classics' generalization-basic principles $\rightarrow \text{science}_2$.

Such a posing of the problem does much to explain two aspects of the Marxist-Leninist metaphysics of nature: its rejection of classical philosophy of nature, and its utter fascination with philosophical appropriation of the latest discoveries in natural science. Since classical philosophy of nature – of the Boehmian, Schellingian, or even Hegelian type – paid less attention to the appropriation of natural science and more to the delineation of the overall contours of the set of problems, Marxism-Leninism rejects it as "metaphysical". (The same condemnation is, of course, applicable to the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of nature, outlined in Chapter 7.) Conversely, successful and complete appropriation of all scientific discoveries becomes the most urgent task of Marxism-Leninism, not just to maintain itself as the scientific philosophy *par excellence* but, more importantly, to keep intact the classical position and, hence, to protect Marxism-Leninism from destruction at its very root – its material-technical base.

To demonstrate that all science possesses dialectical character in the precise Marxist-Leninist meaning is, obviously, no easy task. Most contemporary scientists are hardly Marxist-Leninists nor of any other philosophical persuasion. Even in the case of Soviet scientists, dialectical character is difficult to establish, as the case of Pavlov showed early on. Whence the alacrity with which the Soviets seize upon the theories of thinkers like Roy Wood Sellars or J. D. Bernal.

The issues that emerge as central to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of nature or metaphysics of nature always take on a paradigmatic form, which follows with a certain lag the problems raised in world science. Currently these are [10] relativity theory and the issue of philosophical relativism; the "red death" of the Universe and the question of the Leninist inexhaustibility of matter; space and time in the context of relativity theory; the mathematization of science and questions of formalism; cybernetics, information theory, and related problems. The Marxist-Leninist appropriation of these and other developments in various fields of world science falls into a pattern: (1) the problem is presented with appropriate distinctions as to terminology, historical background, etc.; (2) the non-Marxist-Leninist solutions are shown to be based not on false science but on idealist philosophy; (3) the correct dialectical and historical materialist principles are induced from the classics and from science itself to show that only Marxism-Leninism can solve the problem or, at least, offer a better approach to a solution than all the others.

Even if one were to be satisfied with this Marxist-Leninist metaphysics of nature, it would be incomplete since it accounts only for the "objective dialectic". In the appropriation of modern science, Marxism-Leninism has met with its most serious challenges from the side of the subjective dialectic. We will now examine such challenges.

EXPERIENCE AND OBSERVATION

To say that the subjective dialectic reflects the objective dialectic, then, is no longer adequate either as description or analysis of the foundations of the material unity of the world within the scientific picture of the world, held by the "builder of Communism". The reflecting itself has to be grounded – a problem that became acute when the Marxist-Leninist assimilation of modern science began to encumber dialectical materialism with indeterminacy, relativity, and complementarity – among other apparently "idealist" notions.[11]

The ironclad distinction between "idealist" and "materialist" came to

Marxism-Leninism from Engels' formulation of the "basic question of all philosophy". Within this basic question – on which there exists a vast Soviet literature [12] – there is lodged an ambiguity. To ask about the relations between matter and consciousness is to pose a question which calls for an epistemological or psychological answer. On the other hand, to ask about the real and ideal is to seek a logical or ontological answer. Lenin maintains the ambiguity when he asserts that the opposition between matter and spirit is only epistemological without any ontological grounding. Here he is, unwittingly, close to Husserlian phenomenology.

The epistemological manifestations of this basic ambiguity involve a whole set of sub-ambiguities within Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. For if the knowing and practicing subject is the active bearer of the basic reflecting, then all the basic cognitive modes (concept, judgment, reasoning, induction, deduction, hypothesis, theory-formation, etc.) participate in this basic reflecting; there seems no way to designate a basic reflected as some sort of passive counterpart of the active reflecting. Further, within each cognitive mode, if the basic reflecting is continuous, any distinction between subject and object becomes problematic. Finally, unless the basic reflecting is found to be limited at least in some form of self-limitation, somewhere along the line, no object-domain can be fixed for cognitive operations and all scientific investigation, all methods, become problematic.

In ontology, this ambiguity has emerged as the central dialectical-logical question on the relation between formal-logical models of the world à la Wittgenstein and the dialectical-logical models. While the Soviet discussion of the 1950s and 1960s about dialectical logic had a highly epistemological and psychological coloring, the most recent discussions have turned – as Kirschenmann [13] has shown – to elucidation of the epistemological, psychological, and ontological functors of Marxism-Leninism in a terminology which is adequate to cybernetics, systems research, and information theory.

Visible here is not only the general Soviet tendency to appropriate the latest scientific developments, but also a profound conviction that the three realms cited represent the inevitable becoming material of modern thought. What, after all, could be more representative of the materiality of thought than the model?

Rapp [14] has shown in convincing detail that the background to these developments is provided by Marxism-Leninism's understanding of itself as a determinism. If all phenomena – psychological, epistemological, ontological, etc. – are determined, then the conditions of their being determined must also be determined, and therefore, the statistical regularities which are

discovered contribute to the formulation of laws which are as essential as non-statistical laws. Western science provides Marxism-Leninism with notions like "system", "structure", "model", "information", whose main appeal is that they offer a series of heuristic devices which push back the potentially shadowy correlation between the subjective (less determined) and objective (more determined) dialectics. I. V. Novik [15] sees in cybernetic modeling the dialectical-materialist monist solution to dealing with complex systems. The Marxist-Leninist master in the field, V. S. Štoff [16] goes so far as to attribute universality to cybernetic modeling and systems. Both he and D. P. Gorskij [17] see such modeling, which they trace back to Engels, as developmental in nature.

Despite the increasing and undeniable sophistication with which these issues are discussed in Marxist-Leninist circles, there is latent in these approaches to the basic ambiguity a problem which might be compared with Aristotle's third man objection against Plato. For, even if one were to grant that cybernetic models, bits of information, structures of scientific experiments and theories, and other such elements of contemporary science are reflections, the same fundamental question returns in each and every respect at each and every level; namely, is the basic reflecting ontologically attributable to reflector or reflected, or to both in an equal degree? If the last, then there is no basic ontological distinction between objective and subjective dialectics, and Hegel has returned, for no one with the possible exception of Husserl would dispute a merely epistemological distinction between them. If either of the first two, then the spectres of mechanist materialism or subjective idealism arise. No multiplication of intermediaries – model, structure, system – contributes to an answer since the very same question has to be asked in reference to each. Nor does the notion of relative stability [18] help; for, one must ask "relative to what or to whom?" If relative to some more basic element, this must meet the test, too; if relative to some agent, then the same question arises concerning the basic structure of this agent as generative of both objective and subjective dialectics. Even belated recourse to Bogdanov is of no help.[19]

The underlying logical difficulty here at the very foundations of Marxism-Leninism is clearly what we have previously called the problem of double formality. For if there is a formality which is higher than that which is constitutive of the phenomena under study, the dialectic risks becoming a mere scan between two poles of formality, a Thomistic *ens rationis*. The subjacent psychological problem involves finding an agent whose process of knowing simultaneously gives it the reality of the reflected as well as the

reality of its own reflecting nature. Epistemologically, truth is to be found both as this agent's experience and as its constitution. Finally, the ontological dimension can be satisfied only if the agent has the capacity to be totalizer of all the processes in which it is equally sub-totalizer.

The heuristic device which serves to bring the whole of Marxism-Leninism together exhibits a striking resemblance to the Aristotelian hierarchy of being. It is a hierarchical distribution of and correlation among the forms of motion, the types of matter, the varieties of structure, and the efficacy of controls. As the basic forms of motion – local, physical including thermal, electrical, magnetic, etc., biological, cognitive, social – supersede each other in intensity, the corresponding types or levels of matter supersede each other in complexity. Conversely, as the structural complexity of each successive level increases geometrically, the intensity of the control function grows apace. Qualitative change is structural change [20], and since structure is a function of control, this last becomes the decisive determinant in the Marxist-Leninist picture of the world. This also makes clear why Marxist-Leninists and perhaps Russian thinkers in general – can become enamored of Spinoza or Teilhard de Chardin.[21]

Social-historical control by the Party thus takes on the status of a Kantian transcendental condition but also of a neo-Thomist transcendent entity and a phenomenological intentional value. This control is grounded, as noted above, in the Communist Party's identification over world-historical time with mankind, and extends down the hierarchy of forms of motion and types of matter. Only through symbiosis, through living with the Party in its macro-micro-control does the individual proletarian or human gain theoretical-practical access to genuine social status, that is correct class position, or to true knowledge, including all science, philosophy, technology, etc., or to authentic life, including personal hygiene and ecology,[22] or to the physical prerequisites of a genuine good life.

Without going into the appeals of Communism or the "indisputable superiority of the Marxist-Leninist worldview", it seems clear that this social ontology of the master dialectical logician covers all the essential questions except, perhaps, the most basic philosophical question, "is it consistent?"

CHAPTER 5

META-MARXISM

Examination of any total explanation of all that is faces seemingly insuperable difficulties – multiplied in the present instance by the claim to do so in the context of the interplay of the four principal streams of contemporary thought. The inside examiner can be trapped by the totality of the explanation and by his commitment to the view in question. The outsider can be accused of "dogmatism" for applying something "foreign" to what was to be explained. Even the "detached" or "neutral" observer has to declare a "standard" for comparison – which would be clearly *a priori* in the most destructive (i.e., uncritical) sense.

A potentially fruitful path involves asking of any such total explanation – Marxism-Leninism in the present instance – "what are the basic categories?" Categories are the *summa genera* of Aristotle – philosophic terms behind which one cannot go, which serve as keys in the definitions of all other terms of philosophic discourse in particular, and of scientific discourse in general. In the Aristotelian worldview, the table of categories consists of substance and the nine accidents, to which are to be added act and potency, matter and form, and so on. According to Trendelenburg,[1] there have been only three fundamentally distinct categorial systems in the history of Western thought – the Aristotelian and then, in rapid succession, the Kantian and the Hegelian.

What is really of interest here are the categories in function of which the Marxist-Leninist explanation is itself formulated, explicated, and totalized.[2] Getting at these seems to involve us in the insuperable difficulties with which we began these remarks. If specification of these formative categories is done by a Marxist-Leninist, he can only iterate – in more primitive or more sophisticated form – something like the "basic laws of the dialectic". Specification by a non-Marxist-Leninist drives us back to his formative categories, for which, of course, there is a Marxist-Leninist account – and we have not a hermeneutic circle but an infernal one. Finally, a neutral specification would face not only the Marxist-Leninist challenge from the *partijnost'* principle but also the tantalizing question as to whether there are absolutely ultimate ground(s) from which all human discourse must begin – a *philosophia perennis* with a vengeance.

Examination of the works of the great categorist, Aristotle, suggests a heuristic device which is attractive in its simplicity. Perhaps, one can and must speak of something like "pre-categorials", despite the apparent inconsistency, within the Aristotelian perspective, of making something "more *summa*" than the *summa genera*. Evidence for the existence of something like these can be found throughout Aristotle's works: is act not better than potency? and form than matter? and substance than accident? What is this "better than?" Certainly not a sign of ethical preference, i.e., a higher value or virtue on some objective scale – in which case we would have categories and not pre-categorials. Also, it could not be just a psychological or linguistic [3] priority (or preference), for then priority in being would follow priority in thought. The only alternative that can be seriously entertained is that the priority is ontological and logical.

Obviously, "ontological" and "logical" cannot be taken at this point in the discussion to refer to Aristotle's mature theory of being and of logical validity, for these are categorial rather than pre-categorial. A moment of reflection, however, on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Bk. VI) and the *Posterior Analytics* (Bk. II, Ch. 19) shows that the contextualization of Aristotle's categories is a question of the nature of the scientific enterprise – more specifically of the way in which intuition and demonstration interplay in the constitution of scientific knowledge. Briefly put, the priority of act over potency, form over matter, substance over accident, etc., is experienced – simultaneously pre-scientifically (in "everydayness") and scientifically (convex-concave is a way that Aristotle sometimes describes such an interface) – at the moment of incipient universalization in the consolidation of sense-experience (99b 15 ff.) and of intuitive emergence of the *archai* (1139a 18ff. and 1140b 31 f.).

Can such a pre-categorial approach help with the assessment of Marxism-Leninism as a total explanation? To decide, we would need a finite enumeration of the basic categories of Marxism-Leninism, which – as Soviet authors unanimously contend – is impossible since matter in motion is in infinite development. However, we have seen that in Marxism-Leninism there are basic types of motion and forms (levels) of matter; these can be taken, until further notice, as constituting a finite set, permitting us to ask our pre-categorial question.

Our basic question now reads: given interaction (physical), biogenesis (organic), reflection (cognitive), and organizational control (the social) as foundational to Marxism-Leninism, can one detect "better than" structure(s) which function as pre-categorials?

The following can only be hints toward formulating a Marxist-Leninist answer to this highly abstract and complex question:

(1) The complex is better than (higher than) the simple (interaction → biogenesis → reflection → social control);
(2) The dialectical-formal is better than the merely formal (dialectical logic over formal logic and dialectically applied science over pure science);
(3) The historical is better than the logical (and *histoires* than *Histoire*);
(4) The practical is better than the theoretical.

With just this in hand, we can suggest that the contextualization for such Marxist-Leninist pre-categorials has to be sought in the Leninist correlatives to what we have called in Aristotle incipient universalization and intuitive emergence of first principles. 'Leninist' because Marxism-Leninism obviously owes far more to Lenin than to Marx when it comes to fundamentals. The incipient universalization is of the Communist Party in this case, since in it history comes to self-consciousness for the first time. Similarly, since the basic laws of the dialectic are the *archai*, it is the Communist Party's intuitive eduction of them that underlies all Marxist-Leninist categories. The picture can be completed by pointing out that the essence of the Leninist Communist Party is its will to be what it is, i.e., the substance of history.

PART TWO

THE TRANSCENDENCE OF NEO-THOMISM

CHAPTER 6

NATURAL LAW AND THE COMMON GOOD

Etienne Gilson (1884–1978) recalls the sense of strangeness produced by his first contact with Thomistic philosophy in Sebastien Reinstadler's *Elementa philosophiae scholasticae.*[1] Gilson, who studied at the Sorbonne with Brunschvicg and Lévy-Bruhl, was shocked by the bad manners of Reinstadler and the Scholastics who tended to label any opinion contradicting their own as absurd.

Unfortunately, the neo-Thomists are hardly unique in this respect, for some existentialists dismiss other thinkers as "inauthentic", some logical positivists label all substantive philosophic discourse as "meaningless", and many Marxists make a blanket indictment of other philosophers as rationalizers of bourgeois class-interests.

However, as Gilson indicates, the rigidity of the neo-Thomistic textbook presentation is related to its use as a preparation for theology. This theological connection makes neo-Thomists unique among contemporary philosophers.

In 1879, four years before Marx died, when Husserl was 20, Pope Leo XIII published the encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, in which he directed the attention of Catholics – in particular, bishops responsible for seminaries – to the teachings of Thomas Aquinas and the great tradition of Patristic and medieval thought.

There followed a remarkable response within Catholic circles to study anew the work of St Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas had not always enjoyed this official status. During his lifetime he was in heated debate with different tendencies among his colleagues at Paris (the Averroists, the secular clergy, the admirers of St Augustine, and so on): still the university petitioned that he be returned to the Sorbonne when his Order transferred him to Italy for the last time.

Although Aquinas was quite prominent in the intellectual life of the thirteenth century, it is through his commentators that he came chiefly to be known: Capreolus (1380–1444), Thomas de Vio or "Cajetan" (1468–1534) and John of St Thomas (1589–1644). The dates suggest that there was a Thomistic revival during the Renaissance. These men were members of Aquinas' Dominican Order, as was Domingo Bañez (b. 1604), from whom some of the more "existentially"-minded neo-Thomists have drawn inspiration.

Of these men, Cajetan (the sobriquet comes from the fact that he was

bishop of his native Gaeta, hence "Gaetanus" or "Caetanus") had the most brilliant career. He was selected as papal legate to Germany in 1517–1519 to deal with the Lutheran movement. With such followers, Thomas Aquinas was more than a dim medieval memory when Leo XIII published his encyclical. Indeed, men like Kleutgen in Germany and Zeferino González in Spain, had already begun a small Thomistic revival and Thomas had been accorded the title of *doctor communis* (the common doctor).

Does this not give ample grounds for the suspicions that both Marxists and many English-speaking analytic or pragmatist philosophers have about neo-Thomism, namely that it is merely a tool for the clergy to further its designs? The question becomes all the more pointed because, as Gilson has stressed, St Thomas himself employed a theological order to expound his positions on the great philosophic questions. Some historical observations may be helpful. There is the obvious fact that St Thomas wrote a number of purely philosophic works: Grabmann lists twelve commentaries on Aristotle, the commentary on the neo-Platonic *Liber de causis*, and nineteen opuscula.[2] Secondly, the extraction of systematic Thomistic philosophy that bothers Gilson is found in John of St Thomas's *Cursus philosophicus*, which is to say that the extraction had been done at least 300 years before Gilson started to complain about it.

Thirdly, it is Gilson's contention that Christian philosophy is a historical fact.[3] Although Gilson's viewpoint never gained complete acceptance, even in Catholic circles[4], it is fair to say that Scriptural teaching and Christian tradition have directed attention to themes such as the person, freedom, history, immortality and God, in a perspective they lacked for a pagan. Gilson has studied the difference between the medievals and the Greeks for a considerable number of specific points in his Gifford lectures.[5] He maintains that these are philosophic differences and were understood to be such by their medieval creators, even when the points were put to theological use. Since Thomas Aquinas at least, there has been an explicit distinction between theology and philosophy, so that what is given in theology might not be philosophically provable; philosophy is not expected to manufacture edifying conclusions.

However, even if we understand that the neo-Thomist at times philosophizes by arriving at conclusions he knew beforehand, this would not be unique. Indeed, analytic philosophy consists essentially not in arriving at new conclusions but in elucidation.

A parallel can be drawn between neo-Thomism and Marxism here. Both neo-Thomists and Marxists articulate the views of a larger community of a sort and in a way that phenomenologists and analytic philosophers do not.

Also, neo-Thomism and Marxism are critical of the age in which we live and of the spirit of the age. The liberalism anathematized in the *Syllabus* of Pius IX and blasted by the *Communist Manifesto* is the same.[6] The neo-Thomists are often hostile to liberal capitalistic society, as witness Maritain's remark that had the medieval strictures against lending money at interest been observed, the very essence of capitalism would have been aborted. Or, again, there is Pius XI's "faint praise" in *Quadrigesimo anno* that capitalism is not intrinsically evil.[7]

The neo-Thomist, though he shares with the Marxist a radical suspicion of the age, unlike the latter, may be tempted to look backward rather than forward, while the American pragmatic tradition is future-oriented. A naive but clear expression of this may be found in works like *The Thirteenth, Greatest of Centuries*, or again in the *New Middle Ages* of Berdyaev who was neither naive nor neo-Thomist. There is a danger here of romanticizing, as there is in Marxism, although the medieval romanticism in neo-Thomism is dampened because it does not expect perfection in this world.

The neo-Thomist, like the Marxist, thinks that something is radically out of kilter with prevailing philosophic schools. This dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in philosophy is not strange to the other two strains we are considering. Phenomenologists like Husserl try to begin anew, although they are much more wary of extraphilosophic ties than neo-Thomists or Marxists; and analytic philosophers have often felt that the prevailing philosophy is a disease to be diagnosed and treated.[8]

This dissatisfaction is less marked in what might be labeled "epistemological neo-Thomism", the so-called transcendental school of Louvain, whose major figures are Mercier (1851–1926) and Maréchal (1878–1944), and whose most distinguished living representative is the Canadian, Bernard Lonergan. Transcendental neo-Thomists tend to be slightly more sympathetic to the issues raised by Descartes and Kant than those we might roughly call the "metaphysical neo-Thomists" – Gilson, Maritain (1882–1973), Garrigou-Lagrange (1877–1964), Ramirez (1891–1967), Fabro, and so on. Sometimes the response is no more than the assertion that certain modern epistemological challenges must be met before the metaphysical vision of the past can be regained. In any case, it is clear that contemporary philosophy has gone astray. The American pragmatic tradition of James and Dewey would hold that this going astray results from ignoring the conditions of the present contextual situation.

Mortimer Adler has analyzed philosophy's historical situation and attempted to offer a remedy.[9] Adler's work is significant in that he does not

start from a religiously-based criticism of society but from a critique of philosophy itself. Philosophy, in the analysis of Adler, has failed by abandoning Socrates' project; namely, to organize a professional counterpart to the spontaneous wondering about the meaning and mysteries of life. Philosophy, increasingly over the past few centuries, has tended to be incapable of keeping simultaneous control over the need to address the basic problems that concern all men and that arise out of common experience, and over the obligation to deal with these problems rigorously, i.e., scientifically, in the strict sense. Other disciplines – law, history, natural sciences – can remind us of the general traits that any rigorous knowledge ought to have. We can learn by analogy, as Aristotle did in his time.

Adler stresses that philosophers have not always understood their discipline as a body of knowledge subject to revision; except for a limited number of self-evident propositions, philosophy consists of well-grounded opinion rather than of final, definitive truth. Contrary to what the pragmatists and others say, philosophy aims at truth and must be judged by its attainment thereof and not by some other standard of excellence. Philosophy cannot be an expression of personal feeling but rather must deal with issues that are public in the sense of admitting agreement and disagreement and cooperative effort as well as some agreement in principle as to what kind of evidence might resolve conflicts. Philosophy must have some questions peculiar to it and methods for solving them – which does not exclude mixed questions which are approached jointly by philosophy and some other discipline. Finally, philosophy does not deal exclusively or even primarily with questions of methodology but rather with first-order problems, i.e., with questions about what is or what ought to be.

Adler bases his conclusions largely on an examination of the history of philosophy. When he rejects the tendency of the existentialists to emphasize private, unique intuitions, or of the positivists to deal only with questions of procedure and not substance, or of Plato or the rationalists to claim absolute knowledge, he is able to point to the results of such positions as well as to call on a broad spectrum of opinion similar to his own. Yet, Adler confesses, the matter of how philosophy should proceed involves substantive presuppositions about man and the world, which Adler calls "realism": the world has definite structures which allow it to be known and man has intellectual and not simply sensory faculties by which he knows.

Adler's view is worth noting at length, if only because it is a proof of the vigor of the Aristotelian strain in neo-Thomism. Following a good medieval tradition, the neo-Thomist tends to regard as creeping historicism any

reluctance to treat Aristotle, Aquinas and ourselves as contemporaries. For our present purposes, it should suffice to agree that Aquinas' understanding of Aristotle is, on the whole, quite defensible and that no weight other than chronological will be given to the terms "neo-Scholastic" and "neo-Thomist".

Neo-Thomists reject the notion that philosophy is subjectively based, whether as an expression of class interests or as asserting that the subject is involved in a way that cannot be objectified, while pragmatists see the subject-object dichotomy as absent from the primordial level of experience. On the other hand, the neo-Thomist – along with the Marxist – holds that philosophy matters a great deal. As Gilson recalls [10], Leo XIII explained in *Aeterni patris* that he expects sound theory to have a beneficial effect on society; in fact, that it will help society to end the crisis that led to war and revolution. This is a fairly tall order and places some considerable burden on the neo-Thomist theory of man and society, and the natural law that governs them both.

MAN AS A SOCIAL ANIMAL

Man is evidently the stuff of which human society is made. His nature demands society.

Ross notes [11] that Aristotle would have said that man is political. But, of course, to say that man is by nature a member of the *polis* (the city) means much more for Aristotle than it does for us because he would not have distinguished between state and society. Hence, even apart from the consideration that "political" today means "wheeling and dealing" in some circles, we may use the Latin translation "social" instead of "political".

It is revealing that on the first of several occasions in the *Summa Theologica,* [12] where St Thomas proclaims that man is naturally social, what he means is that man by his very nature (even in a state of innocence before original sin made things more difficult) needs to live with others under the direction of a leader. "Life would not be social unless someone presided".

Classical authors grounded human sociability at least partly on the slow maturation rate of human beings when compared to other animals. Children are dependent on their parents far longer than the young of other animals.[13] The smallest social unit, the family, is thus required by the long-lasting needs of human young. Of course, companionship is another basic need, although of a less tangible sort than the *educatio* (upbringing of all kinds) of the young.

When we consider that which is properly human – as opposed to generic

animal needs – it is even clearer that we are social. Language is *per se* social; it is a means of communication. Culture and knowledge are themselves social. Man is distinct from animals because he can acquire knowledge (he can, of course, for the very same reason, fail to acquire it) and pass it on (but, here too, there is the possibility of failure). Culture and knowledge are traditional; tradition is social and *per se* progressive [14]; we pass on acquisitions, animals do not. Tradition in this sense is a descriptive term and carries no notion of particular content. There is a revolutionary tradition which also includes a full set of symbols – flags, colors, metaphors, etc. – like any other traditions.

Man's social nature is actually underlined in fictional attempts to depict people outside of society. *Robinson Crusoe* can be viewed – as Marx noted – as the attempt of an adult to rebuild a life from what he had learned in society. In this sense, sociability profoundly affects Crusoe even before he finds Friday. The mysterious phenomenon of the wolf children is not fully understood, but it seems safe to say that they are irreparably harmed by living outside of human society; alternatively, some authors suspect that these wolf children survive because they lack some normal human ability and, hence, are able to function on an animal level. However that may be, their deficiencies are connected to a lack of social integration.

Society is more than a simple sum of individuals. It requires organization. A "mass of people" may indicate a large number but it certainly connotes lack of structure or form.

One may distinguish with Maritain (who apparently follows Tönnies here) two layers in human association: the spontaneous or natural *community* and the deliberate and hence, in a sense, artificial (though not unnatural) *society.* [15] Community is more material; almost biological. Society is more formal, almost spiritual. There are as many types of communities as there are shared experiences and interests: neighbors because of geographical proximity, speakers of the same language, the "intelligence community" (to use a current expression), and so on. In the natural order of things, a community will lead to a society.

So, man is social not only in the sense of being part of a community, but also in that of having a need for an organized society. In the words of Maritain:

> Here the question is not only of his material needs – of bread, clothes and shelter, for which man requires the help of his fellow men – but also, and above all, of the help which he ought to be given to do the work of reason and virtue, which responds to the specific feature of his being. To reach a certain degree of elevation in knowledge as

well as a certain degree of perfection in moral life, man needs an education and the help of other men.[16]

It is worth stressing that the obligations that stem from this nature are permanent because this nature is fixed in some sense – a notion which has troubled philosophers like John Dewey. The latter is not only disturbed by the idea of an unchanging human essence but, even conceding that there are some characteristics without which a creature would not be human, the pragmatist rejects the notion that this concession has any moral implications. Desmond Fitzgerald has answered Dewey from the very findings of science of science on biological evolution.[17] It has been 100,000 years since man's appearance has changed, since the last notable modification of skull capacity; we seem to be essentially on a plateau. Even further back, we recognize the Australopithecine as human because of tool manufacture and use; one might argue that a lack of information about the more intangible and more typically human activities – speech, law-giving, religion, etc. – keeps us from being certain that we must deny humanity to these rather slow-learning creatures. In *The Everlasting Man*,[18] Chesterton points out with some glee that a legend has been developed about the habits of the "cave" man, of whom it cannot even be said that he lived in the caverns where he drew such startling wall paintings.

St Thomas' remark that "The nature of man is mutable"[19] has been over-emphasized.[20] In its context it means that human nature is fickle; people are variable (his examples deal with not returning a weapon to an enraged person who is its owner). Aquinas certainly does not mean to deny that man has a definite essence or nature (which is essence considered as the principle of operation).

Some of the demands that we have seen to be placed upon the new Soviet man are not foreign to neo-Thomistic ethics. The idea that a new humanity is to be fostered does, however, run counter to the neo-Thomistic vision of society stemming from human nature rather than vice versa. Neo-Thomists do not see man as *causa sui.*

NATURAL LAW

No less an authority than St Paul in *Romans* (2: 14–15) informs us that there is a law of nature by which even those who lack the guide of revelation may know what is right and wrong. St Paul succinctly suggests that the Gentiles know what is written in their hearts, and indeed the Vulgate has

it that *sui sibi sunt lex*, "they are the law unto themselves". The seminal texts are already ambiguous as to whether the following of the natural law more a matter of sentiment or of thought.

William Temple, late Archbishop of Canterbury, explains

> In earlier times Christian thinkers made great use of the notion of Natural Law. They did not mean by this a generalization from a large number of observed phenomena, which is what a modern scientist means; they meant the proper function of a human activity as apprehended by a consideration of its own nature. In practice the Natural Order or Natural Law is discovered partly by observing the generally accepted standards of judgment and partly by consideration of the proper functions of whatever is the subject or enquiry. This is a task for human reason; but so far as reason enables us to reach the truth about anything in its own essence and in its relationships, it enables us to see it as it is in the mind of God.[21]

St Thomas distinguishes between positive law which depends on the will of the lawmaker and natural law which we discover. The important thing is that the natural law is a propositional content. The basic habitual insight that embodies that content in a general way is called *synderesis* in neo-Scholastic jargon. The natural law belongs to practical reason. The most basic principles of practical reason are self-evident. The most basic precept of the law is that good is to be done and sought while evil is to be avoided. There are several orders of natural inclination, which reason naturally apprehends as good: in all beings there is the inclination to preserve existence; in all animials there is the inclination to preserve the species; in man there are certain tendencies proper to his rational nature, such as living in society and knowing God.[22]

The term "inclination" can be misleading. Jacques Maritain explains our knowledge of the natural law by a kind of sympathetic inclination or, more technically, "connaturality". Grisez[23] has replied that there is no non-conceptual intellectual activity for St Thomas, so that Maritain's account is partly distorted. Indeed, Aquinas himself makes this clear in the *Summa contra gentes*.[24] Whereas the acts of irrational creatures are directed to God by those natural inclinations which are identified with their essences, to men has been given law, by which they may direct their personal actions ("personal" being a technical term, meaning "what is proper to a subsistent rational being").

The neo-Thomistic tradition has lent itself to a deformation most notable in the romantics, by saying that the natural law is inscribed on the human heart. St Thomas remarks that the natural law in the hearts of some is corrupted so that they judge to be good things that are naturally bad.[25] For

Aquinas, moral reflexion is not purely speculative. There is always a consideration of the soul that actually makes a decision to do right or wrong.

In the last moment, decision is not a matter of pure calculation. Inclination always enters in, as Simon has stressed. On some occasions, we may sense or "smell" that something is wrong about a business deal, for instance, and have to reject it on that basis.[26]

But "inclination" in this context is something of a technical term. As Gredt reminds us, when neo-Thomists say that the natural law is manifested by natural inclination and promulgated because the rational being knows its natural inclination, he is talking about an ordering of the nature identified with it (hence, a transcendental relation), not some additional inclination acquired as a passion or a habit, which could even be contrary to the law of nature.[27]

As d'Entrèves says, the Scholastics have always come down on the side of the argument that law is an act of intelligence, rather than the side that says that law is an act of will.[28]

"Law" is one of those terms which neo-Thomists call "analogical", a group that encompasses most of the more significant philosophical notions – "good", 'cause", "being", etc. There are different senses of law – the laws of physics and the laws of Massachusetts. All kinds of law enunciate some type of normalcy. In the case of statute law, the normalcy is the pattern desired by the legislator, the form he wants our behavior to take; whereas the physicist is said to discover a pattern already operating in nature. The necessity of Newton's law and that of the 55-mile-per-hour speed-limit are different. Some hold that statute law is hypothetical; it says what we should do if we do not want to pay a penalty and then, the common complaint goes, the penalty is seldom enforced, especially against the rich and the strong. Despite this, the hypothetical analysis is surely wrong: the law states what we should do *simpliciter*; the penalty is not intended as an option.[29] Perhaps a confirmation of this point is made by those odd laws which do not carry a penalty: the law against smoking in supermarkets in Massachusetts, for example.

Normalcy has normative overtones here, as opposed to a statistical meaning. Thus, some children whose legs are of different lengths develop curvature of the spine and become hunchbacks. Orthopedic surgery can sometimes lengthen the short leg and correct the curvature (which is a compensation) and, hence, the hump. The child at that point achieves normalcy, which he or she has never before possessed. Again, one might say that normal teeth consists of a full set of healthy teeth even though in some places it has been and is still accepted that by a certain age one loses all his or her own teeth.

Hume's prohibition against deriving statements about what ought to be from statements about what is has heavily influenced analytic philosophy against natural law thinking – a grounding of morality in human nature; and would seem to apply as well to the Marxist use of scientific socialism to prove the injustice of capitalism.

Neo-Thomists respond to this challenge in two ways which are, at bottom, quite similar. It is possible to know through experience what a human might and should be. Ortega y Gasset, who was certainly neither a Platonist nor a neo-Thomist, remarked: "Let us be in perfection what we are imperfectly by nature. If we are capable of seeing it, each reality will teach us its defect and its norm, its sin and its duty."[30] This, at the same time, could be taken as a response to the Marxist critique that neo-Thomists mold life to fit eternal principles, independent of life.[31] To be sure, "The participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called natural law".[32] But the natural law can be known from the creature.

A different response is to concede that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' but to stress that the first principles of the moral order are themselves self-evident (as we noted above): good is to be done and to be sought, and evil is to be avoided. Thus, Grisez [33] who stresses that practical knowledge is of a different order from purely theoretical knowledge so that moral knowledge is not simply speculation plus will-power. C. S. Lewis makes the same point in his essay, 'The Poison of Subjectivism':

> ... the maxims of traditional morality must be accepted as axioms of practical reason which neither admit nor require argument to support them and not to "see" which is to have lost human status; it is perfectly futile, after having dismissed traditional morality with the question, "Why should we obey it?", then to attempt the reintroduction of value at some later stage in our philosophy. Any value we reintroduce can be countered in just the same way. Every argument used to support it will be an attempt to derive from premisses in the indicative mood a conclusion in the imperative. And this is impossible.[34]

Obviously, a whole metaphysics and epistemology underlies this position. We will attempt to explicate them below.

Jonsen and MacKinnon [35] take the autonomy of practical reason one step further and argue that since the ways of philosophically grounding the natural law are in conflict among themselves, they are not useful and indeed may discredit the concept. Without such anti-metaphysical overtones, Jacques Maritain made much the same point in a speech to the United Nations, where he urged practical cooperation on behalf of human rights between theoretically opposed factions. The trouble with this approach is that it is not so much an

abandonment of the attempt to ground the natural law, as of philosophy itself.

If the positive or statute law is different from the natural, moral law, in what relationship do they stand? No one would claim that the 55 mph law, or the requirement to drive on the right, etc. stem directly from the natural law; yet, on the other hand, everyone would see that there is some connection with the basic principles of respect for human life and safety. Indeed, traffic laws may be the paradigm of appropriate legislative and governmental activity. Aquinas notes that principles may follow upon the natural law not only as conclusions (which would be part of the natural law) but also as determinations (that is, positive acts of the law-maker).[36]

In fact, as DelVecchio points out: "In social relationships the observance of the technical rules of the various arts and professions is often assumed as the content of moral and juridical rules."[37] Morality condemns laziness, inconstancy, and incompetence. Furthermore, the State is not the only source of law; contracts duly made by private parties also have legal standing (and, of course, are morally binding).[38]

Lord Devlin has come to grips most boldly with the problem of morality and law: one of the purposes of law, he remarks, is to enforce morality. The law against suicide pacts, euthanasia, polygamy, gambling, drunkenness, and assorted sexual perversions confirm this.[39] The fact that the law is sometimes inconsistent – as in Great Britain, where prostitution is not illegal, but activities related thereto are – in no way alters this principle. It may be difficult for the legislature at a particular point to determine what can and should be repressed. But the notion that the law can simply ignore questions of morality is wrong, as indeed is the distinction between private and public morality, although there may be a private and a public concern with morality.[40]

In fact, the problem of law and interiority tends to be distorted by the liberal tradition. There is a legal principle going back to the Romans to the effect that the praetor does not judge internal things; this is obviously true in that only external actions can be known and judged. There is a sense, however, in which the judge must take into account internal things – intention, responsibility, malice – in determining the degree of guilt or liability for an action.

Granted that the positive law ought to reflect the moral order, which has been called "natural law" since the time of the Stoics, and granted that the very existence of the positive law responds to an imperative of the natural law, what are we to think of an unjust law? We have already noted that

there is more than one sense of law. When Antigone obeys a higher law and buries her brother, Polynices, disobeying King Creon who has wrongly had Polynices killed, is not her act illegal although praiseworthy? When the Chief Priests explain to Pilate that they have a law, according to which Jesus must be put to death for making himself equal to God, can we not assume that their interpretation of the law is accurate?

Oddly enough, St Thomas seems to say "no", that an unjust law is not a law. About human law, he tells us: "If indeed it is in disagreement in any way with the natural law, then it will not be law but the corruption of law."[41]

Now, this would make the phrase "an unjust law" meaningless. Perhaps it would be better in Scholastic terms to say that justice is not a constituent of the essence of law but a basic property (*proprium*). Thus, when we say that an unjust law is a bad law, we would not only be passing a moral judgment but proclaiming that the law is defective *qua* law. This may be all St Thomas really needs when he declares:

> And therefore, when the written law contains something against the natural law, it is unjust and has no force of obligation: for the positive law has a place (only) where according to the natural law it makes no difference whether things are done this way or that . . . [42]

although, here again, Aquinas repeats his assertion that such written laws are not laws but corruptions of laws.

The so-called transcendental Thomists are far more timid than more traditional members of the school in cautioning that cultural conditioning makes it difficult to be specific in social ethics.[43] It is only fair to insist, however, that the more rigorous neo-Thomists have also been extremely cautious in insisting that the natural law consists more of inclinations, largely negative, at that, than of specific norms.

In an earlier period, the laws seemed permanent – if not eternal, at least given by some larger-than-life figure (Solon) or past civilization (the Romans). For us – unlike most of the medievals – philosophy of law deals much more with what the judge does than with what is done by the legislator or the executive.[44] Yet, the very need to find what is the law introduces an element of reflexiveness. The juridical tools of precedent will certainly be used by a judge, who is not asked to profer a simply moral judgment. However, in the interpretation, notions of equity – extending goods, constricting burdens, etc – may influence the judge, who cannot, even if he wished, simply apply the law.

Natural law theory has been discredited, to some extent, because of its use to ground very specific and controversial doctrines[45]; as, for example, the Roman Catholic stand on marriage, or the strict libertarian defense of property rights. It is, however, inevitable that in controversial subjects the application of natural law theory will itself be controversial: the Nuremberg trials are a case in point. The trials are either an act of vengeance under *ex post facto* laws, or they suppose the existence of a natural law sufficiently clear for human reason to grasp. Since in the inevitable order of things, the victors in World War II did not try their own people except on specific offenses which were *inter alia* against orders, the scandal of the juridical positivists at the recrudescence of natural law theory was reinforced by the obvious lack of impartiality on the part of the judges. Yet, there was a widespread revulsion against Nazi power philosophy, a sense of moral indignation, and this can be conceptually articulated only in terms of some kind of natural law theory.[46] Similarly, it makes sense to raise the question of the relation between sex and procreation, at least to the degree that affirmation of the moral link between the two seems more reasonable than its contrary. Also, the theory of natural law need not work in a conservative sense. Kelsen has called it a force for anarchy; which is doubtless an exaggeration, but it points to its function as a critique of civil authority. Maritain or Mounier certainly believed that part of their social philosophy's role was to be a conscience.

Indeed, in the neo-Thomistic (or, more broadly, Scholastic) version of the natural law theory, property rights are emphatically not absolute (which is not the same as saying that when I do have rights, it is absolutely wrong – a moral sin – to violate them). The Patristic writers seem to have taken a somewhat dim view of property. Only God is absolute Lord; man is an administrator. Private property is a result of the Fall; and, while thrift is a means to exercise the virtues both of temperance and of charity, retention of superfluous goods puts one in moral danger. One basic title to property is work; but, in any case, private property is not an absolute right. The medievals took a more realistic view and pointed out that, in the normal courses of things (although original sin is still a consideration), there is more attention given to goods that belong to an individual than to common goods – indeed that confusion and instability would result if goods were not assigned to individual owners. It is, therefore, still true that there is not an absolute right to property and that, in case of necessity, goods are common.[47] As Aquinas says: "Those things which certain men have in abundance by natural law are owed to the maintenance of the poor."[48] In

cases of extreme and clear necessity, it would be licit to seize the property of another.

Certainly, even the Patristic reservations about the naturalness of private property fall far short of the Marxist view that private ownership, particularly of the means of production, is a theft. The neo-Thomists distinguish between ownership of the means of production and of personal property. They definitely have in mind, as legitimate and natural property rights, ownership of the family farm, animals, tools, etc. The coincidence might be stronger between some Patristic thinkers and the utopian "to each according to his need".

To keep some of the more specific applications of the natural law from distorting our perspective on the theory, it is helpful to recall that Aquinas distinguishes between primary propositions known to all, and secondary propositions derived directly from them and known to most people. There are, finally, fairly specific tertiary principles.

For instance, Aquinas says that rational creatures who can know God are ordered directly to Him both as a species and individually. Brute animals, on the other hand, are here for the service of man. Whence it follows that those who say it is immoral to eat meat are mistaken. On the other hand, it is wrong to be cruel to animals because such conduct could lead one to be cruel to humans.[49]

It is licit to kill someone who is a danger to the whole community, but this is not the prerogative of a private person, but only of whomever represents the whole community; that is, its leader. It is not licit to kill oneself: firstly, because this goes against the natural love that everything has for itself, which is manifested by each thing resisting what is dangerous to it; secondly, because each person is part of the community and by killing oneself, one injures the community; thirdly, life belongs to God, not to each person. One may, of course, defend oneself, but the intent must be just that, and not to kill; an action may have two effects, but one should not be trying directly to kill.[50]

The natural law is unchangeable. In practice, it can be developed and added to; but, no principle can be removed from it. Everyone understands its most basic principles, but not always the secondary conclusions. Such error may be due to lust or some emotion; and, we can make practical mistakes.[51] St Thomas mentions as an example of how there may be deficiencies in the understanding of the natural law, Caesar's report that the ancient Germans did not judge theft to be unjust.[52]

One may wonder what St Thomas would think about the changed attitudes about lending money at interest. Aquinas holds that, unlike a house or a

vase which has a use and which one may rent, money is just a medium of exchange and by charging for its use the usurer gets a price for something that does not exist.[53] Now, usury is not a matter of primary principles but a derived conclusion, although Aquinas takes seriously enough the prohibition to say that usury is a mortal sin and that restitution of the interest must be made. It may be argued that the function of money has changed between the thirteenth and twentieth centuries. To empathize with St Thomas, one must imagine someone in a non-inflationary economy with surplus money literally sitting in a bag. The owner of the money would usually have the right to refuse to loan (outside of emergencies); but, charging interest under such circumstances would be comparable to giving a friend ten dollars to make a purchase one day and expecting ten dollars and twenty-five cents back the next day.

The development of greater growth in moral principles and the specificity of the principles of the natural law have greatly interested recent neo-Thomists, largely as a reaction to those who would see morals as culture-bound. Also, much specific writing has been done over the years on topics like war, abortion, or marriage. We have, however, tried to set out clearly here what, as D. J. O'Connor has written, are likely to be the problem areas of natural law theory for contemporary thinkers: namely that it is intuitionistic in some sense, that it sees what is natural implying what is obligatory, that it distinguishes between primary and secondary precepts, and that it makes certain allowances for the variability of our knowledge of the natural law.[54]

The natural law theory is important as a non-subjectivist way of approaching ethics. Writing as someone who does not owe allegiance to neo-Thomism, Donagan comments:

> That the existing scholastic theory of natural law has an important contribution to make to any rational theory of morality is beyond question. A thoroughly reconstituted and purely philosophical theory of natural law could do even more. It could provide the foundation of that rational moral consensus which is the necessary cement of a pluralist society.[55]

THE COMMON GOOD

Goodness, Aquinas holds, has the *ratio* (the reason or intelligibility) of an end, a final cause.[56] This is the exact contrary of the position of the logical positivist, who denies that there is a rationality to judgments about goodness, because he holds that such judgments do not grasp anything outside of the subject that makes them. A. J. Ayer affirms:

But in every case in which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical judgment, the function of the relevant word is purely "emotive". It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertions about them.[57]

There is nothing said in moral judgments, according to Ayer. This radical development of the empiricist tradition contradicts not only the neo-Thomist position on ethical judgments, but also the existential-phenomenological approach – especially as espoused by Marcel or Scheler – as well as the Marxist view that there are real injustices in the capitalist system, even when they are not recognized as such by any of the parties involved.

For St Thomas, the goodness of any particular thing is its end, whether it be sun, soil, and water for a plant, or plenty of minnows for a medusa jellyfish. These are particular goods. The universal end or final cause is the universal good, which can only be what is good *per se*, by essence. Now, all creatures merely participate or share in goodness – for example, no philosopher is totally wise – so that the ultimate good is something extrinsic to the universe. On the other hand, there is goodness within the universe (and, of course, in society), but such goodness is not the last end (*finis ultimus*) of the universe.[58]

This distinction holds for the plant and the medusa, but is particularly necessary in the case of human beings for theological reasons, which create certain problems. The good of human life is ultimately in the beatific vision. It is a good first of the intellect although consequently of the will. The joy of the beatific vision, however, is only accidentally enhanced by the company of others.[59]

The final destiny of human life is served by membership in a society. Indeed, the instrumentality of other men is necessary to salvation. However, the ultimate happiness does not depend essentially on others in Heaven as it does on earth; or, to be more precise, the essential social life is that of the Trinity.[60] In contrast, the Communist Party acts both on the macro- and micro-cosmic levels. Participation in the Party ultimately gives meaning to actions outside the strict life of the Party itself.

As noted above, on earth our social nature makes men need each other for a truly human existence and also results from such needs. Ramírez recalls Aquinas' comment that the ruler should not entrust too many tasks to one person since a man can only do one thing well at a time.[61] We provide for each other's material needs. However, as Maritain has stressed, we also communicate spiritual goods; we are social on the level of our personality, not simply as biological individuals. Our sociability is not limited to that of the gregarious animals, even where – as in the case of bees – there is some

specialization of roles. We are dependent on one another in our intellectual and religious lives. Our knowledge and love suppose relations with others. Our generosity is expressed in communication. Our wisdom and virtue are largely hereditary as is our culture. We depend on others in the highest as well as in the lowest orders.[62]

This dependence becomes complicated. Each person is a totality and a part of the whole. As Maritain recalls, St Thomas says both: "The Whole man is ordered to the end of the whole community of which he is a part" and "Man is not ordered to the political community according to his whole being and all aspects (*secundum se totum et omnia sua*)."[63] Different social functions have different values. Neither police nor terrorists nor tradition seem to place the same importance on philosophy professors as on presidents and kings. However, unlike the member of the herd, gaggle, or school, each person at another level has absolute value, for if we are totally social, the social does not exhaust our personality.

Rather than dependence, the personalists speak of openness. Mounier has written, "We must not, then, undervalue the external life: without it the inner life tends to insanity, as surely as the outer life becomes chaotic without interiorization."[64] Mounier goes so far as to claim that the first condition of personalism as opposed to individualism is decentralization, the "open perspective of personal life".[65] Rather than openness, Maritain would emphasize independence. If individuality belongs to the material side of man, personality belongs to his spiritual side.[66] To give oneself (to be open), one must first exist or rather subsist in self-possession, one must constitute a little world: " . . . the metaphysical traditions of the West define the person in terms of independence."[67]

As Maritain remarks: "The common good is common because it is received in persons, each one of whom is as a mirror of the whole."[68]

The fact that the person transcends society and yet is a part of society creates a certain tension, a complexity. The neo-Thomist sees a finality in personal life which is higher than that of social life. Yet, human society is not a mere instrument of eternal salvation. It has its own good, its own end, though to be sure, it is a subordinate end. The traditional philosopher and canonist expressed this with the odd notion that both Church and State are perfect societies in that they each have what is needed to fulfill their goals in their own sphere. This latter standard would not, at first sight, seem to be met since, for example, the Church, like any organization, needs reasonable safety and peace to carry out its work (which would ordinarily be helped by the police). Conceivably, one could find some example in the inverse sense

where demoralization of persons involved in some secular pursuit is averted by the ministry of the Church. Maritain suggests that the idea of "perfect society" may well not correspond to anything that has actually taken place and indeed the common good of a nation is further from being the common good of the social group within the nation today than it was in Greek or medieval times since the drift of human society is toward a common good on a world scale.[69] Even Ramírez hedges in saying that the common good of a political society *ought* to contain perfectly all kinds of goods, which imperfect societies like the family contain imperfectly. The Church of Christ, by contrast, is a perfect society in the supernatural order.[70]

The question about the way the Church is perfect, completely self-sufficient, in its possession of all the means necessary to obtain its end, is paralleled by the question about how the Communist Party is the arbiter and source of political wisdom, even though some vital scientific work in society is done by non-Party members.

On the other hand, to say that Church and State are perfect societies means at least that their aims, their characteristic goods, are distinct, and that neither is to be understood exclusively in function of the other. As Christ told Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world."[71] Or, even more explicitly, as Christ told the Pharisees, "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's."[72] Although this retort must be read in the light of the earlier remark to the Apostles that one cannot serve two masters[73], the remark does distinguish between two spheres of obligation. This is worth stressing because the subject of these different spheres of obligation is the same, so that there is the possibility of conflict and even of confusion.

The notion that the goal of society is the common good might suggest that neo-Thomist social ethics is, in modern terms, teleological rather than deontological. For St Thomas, this dichotomy is simply not justified. Neo-Thomistic ethics, individual or social (general and specific, in more traditional terms), is both teleological and deontological, as the treatment from both the points of view of the formal natural law and the final cause or common good demonstrates. Vernon Bourke remarks: " . . . review of the meaning of right for Aquinas may help to avoid some of the established categories that seem to inhibit modern ethics. The difference between a 'duty' ethics and a 'consequence' ethics has been greatly exaggerated."[74]

As has been noted, in the Aristotelian view of the state (the city), a primary characteristic is that this society, unlike the family, serves the whole good of human life. It possesses a government which ensures the peace of

the community and organizes concerted activity for common purposes. Whereas, in the family, there is clearly a relationship of superiors to inferiors, in the measure to which the government really seeks the common good, it leads free men and equals.[75]

Laws are the expression of the attempt to achieve the common good. All of our actions are particular, not general, and some legal precepts are consequently particular, but only in order to the common good. The common good consists in the felicity or happiness of the whole community, and this is the ultimate goal of laws.[76]

Now, it is impossible that men be good unless they are "well proportioned" to the common good. So, in order to achieve the common good we need virtuous citizens and, vice versa, it is the intent of the law to make men good.[77]

Certain virtues are especially necessary for the common good. We speak of political prudence and legal justice in so far as the virtues mentioned are directed to the common good. The fortitude of the soldier or the temperance of the citizen who does without something the nation should not import also contribute to the common good, but justice and prudence as virtues that govern man's rational (as opposed to sensible) powers, are more directly aimed at the common good.[78] Certainly, these virtues are necessary for the common good. Men cannot live together unless they trust each other, so truthfulness must be cared for.[79] Indeed, Aquinas thinks that we owe not only truthfulness but cordiality, for society cannot exist without enjoyment, unless it is sometimes our duty to sadden others usefully (i.e., to scold).[80] It belongs to the virtue of magnanimity to trust others that they will be prompt to assist us in need.[81]

The common good of political society should thus contain the goods of body and soul, whether they be moral, utilitarian or pleasurable. The common good is that of society and of each of its members; it is not simply that of the individuals nor is it that of the collectivity. The perfection of the common good is in order and peace. This peace, of course, includes the absence of war but perhaps more importantly, a kind of social friendliness, and a sense of direction to get the most from individual efforts, as well as an adequate supply of goods, result and condition of the other characteristics of the social organization.[82]

The commitment to the common good is regarded as ordained and mandated by the highest authority. "He (the ruler) is a minister of God for good to you ... He is a minister of God, a wrathful judge upon him who does evil ... Therefore pay taxes; they are ministers of God, serving him in this."[83]

GOD

Aquinas regarded God as the Creator of human nature, and thus, in so far as human nature carries a natural law of morality, God is the cause of the natural law. Animals are different in nature and do not have moral obligations. A non-social intellectual creature would have different obligations.

It is written: "Every soul should be subject to authorities; for there is no authority except from God; those that are, are ordered by God, so he who resists authority resists the ordination of God; he who resists brings damnation on himself."[84] Does it work the other way? Do we need to believe in God to recognize a moral obligation to respect authority and to obey the natural law in general? Even within the Scholastic tradition, there are those who would say "no". Gabriel Vázquez (1551–1604) maintained that those who do not believe in God may grasp the natural law. Grotius remarks that from the capacity to weigh future joys and pains and what is conducive to them despite momentary impulse, and from the facility to follow general rules and the interest in preserving society, there is capability of understanding the law of man's nature. "And what we have just said would have validity, even if we granted what cannot be granted without great wickedness, that there is no God, or that He has no care for human affairs."[85]

In some sense, this is correct on neo-Thomistic terms: the natural law can be known through human nature. On the other hand, the neo-Thomists would certainly maintain that the natural law cannot be understood adequately unless it is seen as a participation of the divine law, just as human nature cannot be fully understood except as a participation in divine nature. God, as the Creator of man, is the efficient cause of the natural law. Dostoevsky and Sartre have maintained that once atheism has been assumed as a basic postulate, there is no possibility of justifying the natural law. This would not alter the possibility that knowledge of the moral law might itself be a way to God, rather than vice versa.[86]

This approach to God on the evidence of the moral law is frequently found among English thinkers who, like A. E. Taylor and C. S. Lewis, while sympathetic to what might be called perennial philosophy and to metaphysical concerns shared with neo-Thomists, are not professed neo-Thomists or even broadly Scholastic.

By contrast, it is typical that authors writing strictly within the neo-Thomist tradition do not develop this line of proof. The five ways of St Thomas's *Summa Theologica* (I, q. 2, a. 3) are based on change or motion in the things we find in the world, on their exercise of causality, on their

contingent existence, on the incompleteness of the perfections they possess, and on their purposeful behavior.[87] Josephus Gredt[88] adds a sixth way, based on the orientation of the human intellect to the Infinite.

Gredt, however, mentions in his scholion the argument that by knowing the moral law we also know God, the Supreme Legislator. Gredt maintains that explicit knowledge of moral law supposes in great part knowledge of God. The approach to God through those precepts of the natural law which can be known without explicit knowledge of God, can be reduced to the fifth way, where we discover God as the cause of the ends of things. Likewise, Maurice Halloway agrees that an argument from moral obligation is only a specific version of the fifth way, since we see obligation as a (peculiar) goal imposed on human nature.[89]

The English philosopher and theologian, E. L. Mascall, who works from a neo-Thomist perspective, mentions the argument for the existence of God based on moral consciousness as one which may be traced to Kant's notion that God is a postulate for the categorical imperative. Mascall sees the argument as new to traditional natural theology except as one can consider it an element of the fourth way, based on grades of perfection.[90]

However, Gredt remarks that the knowledge of the moral law may be merely implicit – in which case God is known in a confused way, without reasoning, and not distinguished from the world.[91] Maritain, following St Thomas, has expanded upon the notion of the importance of the first deliberate and explicit moral choice. There is a turning toward or a turning away from the whole order of goodness and thus toward or away from God. This does not suppose a conceptual knowledge of God, although there is a "vital" knowledge of God in the apprehension of moral goodness as the "formal motive" of the action (which may be minor). It is possible, says Maritain, that the person who makes the right choice considers himself as atheist, although incorrectly so, since the idea of God that he denies would be an erroneous one. The normal tendency would be for such existential knowledge to develop into a conscious awareness, a recognition of God, but this may not occur.[92] Of course, it does not usually occur in the works of Marxists and of a very sizable number of existentialists and analytic thinkers.

While one may point to theistic existentialists like Kierkegaard or Marcel or Scheler in his Catholic phase, or even to Norman Malcolm's revival of the ontological proof for the existence of God,[93] it cannot be denied that the anti-theistic philosophies of Sartre or Ayer are more typical of the mid-twentieth-century (not withstanding their being diametrically opposed to one another). Yet, it would not be unfair to say that even Sartre has his

theological preoccupations: the absence of God is not a matter of indifference for Sartre. The atheistic materialism of the Marxists is not an entirely simple matter. Bocheński [94] and Blakeley [95] have pointed out that the commitment of a Party member is essentially religious in nature. The Marxists can certainly be said to have a vision that transcends the existing Communist states. Indeed, in Mao's cultural revolution, his attempt to touch the souls of the Chinese people, he tried to devise a way of preserving his vision from the bureaucratic temptation to which the Soviets had succumbed; and this attempt has been viewed as an intuition of transcendence.[96]

Of course, a justification for such an intuition or for the quasi-theological character of some Marxist works, cannot be articulated in materialist terms.

CHAPTER 7

NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE

The neo-Thomistic theory of man, value and society teaches that we know man's social nature, made by God, to be patterned according to natural law to seek the common good. This theory has important epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions and implications, which were refined with the development of Scholastic precision and distinctions. The account is not philosophically innocent and one must try to see in more detail what is known, where we get knowledge, what shape it takes, what it is good for, and what we do to acquire knowledge.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

The most notable thing about the physical world for the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition is that it is full of change. Philosophy of nature, then, as Phillips notes, is a reflection on the material world, not so much *qua* material but *qua* changeable.[1] Snow and ice come and go; rocks are beaten down to sand; oil and coal are formed, then burned; seeds germinate, the plant flowers, then withers away.

Also, there are many things in the world around us; and these things fall into kinds or types: there are groups of cats or dogs, pieces of marble or iron. This world – animate or inanimate – can be basically understood in terms of two sets of notions: act and potency, and the four causes.

As we observe the cycles of life, we see developments. The rock which is solid and massive can be reduced to sand. It is not sand yet. We can directly know only actualities. The seed can germinate and grow into a blade of grass, although it is not yet a blade of grass as long as it retains the potentiality of becoming one. There is a negative sense to potentiality.

Change or "movement" (to use Aristotle's term), whether gradual or instantaneous is the actualization of some potentiality. If an object were suddenly created, we could not say it had changed (although we might talk about a change in the landscape) because the object would not have pre-existed. Change involved a pre-existing subject that changes. This emphasis distinguishes the Aristotelian view from that of some contemporary process philosophies. I acquire a knowledge of a foreign language or a deep tan; but

I pre-existed the lessons or the sun-bathing. Change can be superficial, as in the examples just given, or profound and substantial – one thing may disappear altogether and become another; e.g., upon being digested, hay becomes part of the cow.

In this last case the matter is conserved, although it changes its form. Underlying all change is prime matter, the subject of all physical change which is of itself amorphous and, hence, never exists in a pure state. As Adler points out [2], Aristotle's intuition is reinforced by the modern principle of the conservation of matter. On the other hand, as Scholastic writers like Reinhardt [3] point out, science presents some difficulties to the theory that at the root of change there is an amorphous matter which completely changes character. Spectroscopic analysis reveals that the radioactive properties of atoms are the same in a chemical compound. More to the point, one can recover from a chemical compound the same chemical elements that went into it originally. Of course, it is possible to destroy atoms, but this is not a component of ordinary changes as Aristotle or St Thomas believed. Reinhardt suggests that the theory is a metaphysical rather than a physical one, but it seems that Aristotle or St Thomas would not have agreed. They would certainly have agreed with Reinhardt that compounds – say water or sulphuric acid, not to mention a living being – have properties that their chemical elements certainly do not. And it is true that the crude physical theory of the Greeks and medievals recognized basic elements, if only fire, water, earth, and air.

Be that as it may, we have here two basic constituents of the physical world – matter and form. Individuals belonging to a species – say atoms of copper or cats – are alike; they have the same structure or form. Matter multiplies or individuates form. The form is what makes a thing be what it is: the difference between a cup and a saucer is, evidently, its shape. The vital principle of a living thing is referred to as its soul. Plato and Descartes are wrong to say that human beings consist of body and soul. The body is only a body because it is informed by the soul, even though, as we will stress below, the soul can exist separately.[4]

If matter and form explain how things in the physical world are constituted, they do not explain how they change. Take artificial production, which is the kind of change that we understand best: we find an agent who acts for a certain purpose. Consider a sculpture (Aristotle's own example): the artist is the agent or efficient cause who works on a certain material – bronze, wood, marble, plaster – to get a certain form in order to have a statue for a temple or to memorialize a famous leader, the final cause. In a sense, the form as

it exists in the sculptor's imagination is the final cause, although besides the goal of the action, there is also the goal of the agent which might be to earn a large fee or to get more clients.

Accordingly, there are four elements which must be taken into account in any complete explanation of an event in the material world, although often we only mention one cause since the others are obvious. If I want to know why the door is open, I do not need to be informed how it works (unless, perhaps, we are dealing with an archaic structure); I will want to know who opened it – the agent or efficient cause – or what their purpose or final cause is. We do not completely understand the appendix in human beings as long as we do not know its final cause.

Philosophy of nature includes philosophical (or "rational") psychology, which is not a part of metaphysics. Here neo-Thomist usage differs from what has become current since Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Carlo, for example, lists the body-soul relationship under the philosophy of nature.[5] This faithfully reflects the textbook tradition of Gredt[6], for example, whose treatise on the soul is the culminating section of natural philosophy, namely the part that deals with the essence of living things. That is not to say that man is explained by the matter-form relationships in exactly the same way as a piece of quartz or a tree. As Ramírez notes[7], for St Thomas the soul is not only soul strictly speaking – that is to say the animating principle of the vegetative and animal activities – but also spirit, non-corporeal and non-organic.

Now, philosophy of nature is possibly the most purely Aristotelian part of neo-Thomistic thought. Over the course of time, it has painfully competed with the natural sciences since it somehow deals with essences or natures in the physical world.

UNIVERSALS

The simplest description of the form that human knowledge takes is the old adage that science is of the universal. Individuals are not the object of science – which is why history was not considered a science by the Greeks or by anyone until modern times.

A universal is a general idea (or term): triangle, green, horse, electricity. The term "universal", which goes back to Aristotle's *katholou*, is perhaps unfortunate since it suggests the peculiar terms like "being" or "entity" which apply to everything and which in Scholastic terminology are referred to as "transcendentals". For centuries, the Scholastic textbook tradition repeated the doubtlessly incorrect etymology of "universal" as "*unum versus*

alia".[8] The message behind this medieval etymology is important: the universal is characteristically one that looks to others: it exists in them and may be predicated of them.

The mind, Aristotle saw, captures the forms of the things and possesses them. This is the result not of some passive reception by the senses but of an activity of the intellect. The form is taken out of things and becomes the idea.[9]

One can consider a nature (of chalk, or the mushroom or the squirrel) in three ways. As it is in itself; as it is in the mind; or, as it is in reality. Now, in reality there is not the squirrel but individual squirrels. In the mind the nature exists as a universal idea that may be predicated of all the members of the set – of all its "inferiors". The squirrel running along the telephone wire outside my window is an individual squirrel; his "squirrelness", of course, is only his and may not be attributed to others.

Science does not talk about an idea of squirrel; it talks about a thing. Yet, it does not directly talk about the squirrel who was run over yesterday or the one which taunts the cat today. It talks about the squirrel – neither universal nor singular: "The squirrel is a rodent"; 'The squirrel does not hibernate"; "The squirrel stores food for the Winter". As the neo-Thomists say, science deals with the *natura in se*, not *in mente* (the concept) or *in re* (the things).

The neo-Thomistic nomenclature in discussing the problem of the universals (which is more common in continental Europe) does not exactly correspond to that of many books written in English from other traditions.[10] It is customary to list three basic positions: extreme realism or Platonism; moderate realism or the position of Aristotle and Aquinas (which is never called conceptualism); and nominalism or the position of Roscelin and, more importantly, of William of Ockham, Hume, and Mill.

Conceptualism is less radical than nominalism, which looms large in the British empiricist tradition, in that the conceptualist, e.g., Kant, would admit that we have true concepts but deny that they correspond to something outside the mind, whereas the nominalist both denies that we have true concepts (by reducing them to a blurred composite of sense-images) and denies that the general terms correspond to some common nature in reality.[11]

Extreme realism would affirm that the idea was alone real or at any rate truly real and that individual things are real only in so far as they embody perfectly some principle – Plato and Hegel.

Moderate realism alone does justice both to the fact that ideas or natures exist only in individuals or in the mind (the human mind for purposes of

logic; but most importantly in God's mind – *universale in causando*) but that our ideas really capture these natures. Something really corresponds to our ideas. It should be remembered that C. S. Peirce defined his position as that of Scotist realism; and James is incorrectly seen solely as a nominalist.

The problem of universals is basic to any school that derives its inspiration from Aristotle. The hylomorphic theory of the physical world, the immateriality of the intellect, the very name of "realistic philosophy" all depend on and are implicit in the solution to the problem of the universals. Yet, from Boethius on, this problem has been dealt with in logic, and indeed Aristotle included it in his *Prior Analytics*. R. D. Phillips is untypical in devoting several chapters of the metaphysics volume of *Modern Thomistic Philosophy* to the question of universals which he considers (properly enough) epistemological. All this is natural, if one subscribes to the general principle that methodological questions (including logic) can be distinguished, but not (except in their strictly formal manifestations) separated from substantive positions.

The universal ideas that capture natures existing in the physical world around us and that are the building blocks of science are primarily univocal ideas; although, as we noted in the discussion of natural law above, we also form analogous concepts which are very important in philosophic reflection. It is worthwhile, however, to mention a rather different kind of idea.

DEGREES OF ABSTRACTION

John of St Thomas (1589–1644) remarks that the Thomists commonly explain the diversity of sciences, that is different kinds of knowledge, from the different ways of abstracting from matter.[12] Here, apparently, we are concerned with abstraction as an act of the intellect (the efficient cause) but even more with the formal property of abstractibility.

Commenting on St Thomas's *Summa Theologica* (I, q. 85, a. 1 ad 2), his fellow Dominican remarks that we may prescind from the singular matter of the individual, from sensible matter which makes a substance be the subject of accidents or qualities that are sensorially perceptible, and intelligible matter of a substance, quantity. This gives us three generic levels of sciences (though not the specific differences within the genera). First, there is what was called physics, which leaves out singular matter. For instance, zoology leaves out what actually makes my cat an individual, although it considers him as material. Second, there is mathematics, which prescinds from the sensible or sensorial matter (of cats or whatever) to consider only their quantity. Thirdly, there is metaphysics, which considers things (be they

cats, angels, or relationships) as beings. Immateriality is intelligibility; the more immaterial, the more intelligible. Hence, it is common in the line of neo-Thomistic thought that comes through Cajetan, Bañez, and John of St Thomas down to Maritain to talk about three degrees of abstraction.

The essential insight here is that matter is the source of diversity in things and that by abstracting or prescinding from it we get knowledge of the deeper and deeper unity in the world.[13]

Maritain insists that what we call physics does not have a place on the hierarchical line from truly empirical science to metaphysics. Indeed, to distinguish contemporary physics and mathematical knowledge from medieval and ancient physics is to distinguish between science and philosophy of nature. Modern science is a middle knowledge (*scientia media*) between mathematics and the empirical sciences. The medievals and indeed Plato were familiar with astronomy, optics and harmony as examples of the mixed type of knowledge. Although physical reality provides the matter that is measured, the conceptual tool – or formal object in Scholastic terms – is mathematical. We have a "science (which is) *materially physical* and *formally mathematical*".[14] For Maritain, this explains the ambivalence of what we call science toward physical principles and natural causes – reflected in the divergence between Duhem and Meyerson (denial and stressing of explanatory causality, respectively). Physical-mathematical science comes to be a kind of "wedge between pure empirical science and the philosophy of nature"[15] since it achieves scientific knowledge by renouncing a claim to know real causes and undertaking to co-ordinate measurements into a system of phenomena.

Whereas the ancients restricted the method of the intermediate sciences to a few special fields and envisaged knowledge of nature basically in ontological terms, the modern positivists consider that only empiriological knowledge is valid. Maritain feels that neopositivism cannot justify even the "empiriometric" use of the intellect, whereas the neo-Thomists who lay claim to other kinds of intellectual activity can also justify these empiriometric uses.[16]

Unfortunately, the doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction sounds as if there were three steps in the same direction. Wilhelmsen has challenged its neo-Thomistic authenticity and attributes its initial inspiration to Cajetan's use of a corrupted version of Thomas's commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate*. Wilhelmsen points out that the theory cannot distinguish between biology and philosophy of man and, indeed, cannot adequately account for a philosophy of human nature at all, if that philosophy deals with the spiritual soul. Wilhelmsen attributes the difference to a difference of method: philosophy

of nature is experiential whereas biology is experimental.[17] As Mortimer Adler would put it, philosophy and science are both empirical, but science is investigative whereas philosophy is not.[18] Philosophy uses common experience, whereas science is dependent on special data obtained through investigation or observation, arranged so as to test theories.

Wilhelmsen would further say, in the tradition of Gilson, that metaphysics, the knowledge of being, is not properly the fruit of an abstraction but a judgment – more precisely, a separation, since being is not captured by a concept.[19]

The commentators seem to have built a rigidity into St Thomas that was not originally there in his development. It seems odd to talk about a three-step progression in which we talk about real natures, then detour to beings of reason, then switch back to real being. Aquinas, at least, seems to say that different sciences result because reality permits the human intellect to attack it in radically different ways.

THE END OF KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge in the Scholastic scheme of things is either speculative or practical, either an end in itself or a guide for some action or production. "The practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth."[20]

Maritain recalls that there are three kinds of wisdom for St Thomas: wisdom infused by grace, the wisdom we attain through theology, and metaphysical wisdom. Philosophical thought culminates in metaphysical wisdom, where we reflect upon being without reference to images or sense experience and know God as the cause of being. This wisdom may become a tool of theology and therein come to know its own object better. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that metaphysics is put to work on revealed data and becomes theology.[21]

Aquinas attempts to incorporate the Aristotelian vision (in *Metaphysics* Bk. XII) that wisdom is God's self-knowledge:

> If God must be the highest activity in the world – the ideal fulfillment of the world's best possibility – an activity functioning at the highest level conceivable – then God must be pure *nous*, pure understanding. We can understand the world only as making possible the most perfect functioning of *nous*, of "understanding", of the direct intellectual vision of "why".[23]

Aquinas also seems to feel that Aristotle does not tell the whole story. In the measure that philosophy is a handmaiden or instrument for theology,

it has a practical use. Ramírez triumphantly declares: " . . . among all human studies, the study of philosophy is more honest, more pleasant and more useful".[23]

The wise person, St Thomas declares, commenting on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, loves and honors the intellect which is most loved by God among human things. Also, the wise person acts well and rightly.[24] Speculative knowledge is a kind of participation in true and perfect happiness, although this beatitude does not consist essentially in consideration of the sciences, since their basic principles are received through the senses, and the ultimate happiness of man is in something superior, above the human intellect.[25]

But, it may be objected, what about all of the necessary tasks that must be done, curing the sick, building houses, growing food? Or, to put the question as an *ad hominem* to Aquinas, may not the person who cares for the sick, the dying and the orphan be holier than the professor of philosophy or theology.

To put the answer in purely cognitive terms, in a sense the work of the person doing medical research is superior to that of the practicing physician, that of the architect is superior to that of the bricklayer, and that of the agronomist to that of the farmer. They are superior in that the first individual in each pair understands better the work in which both are interested and, hence, directs it, although we buy food from the farmer, not the agronomist and the bricklayer will certainly lay a better garden wall than the architect. (This apart from the fact that the bricklayer as an individual may be a better neighbor just as the teacher may be kinder to children than the educational philosopher.)

Experience is a great teacher. In practical operations it not only causes knowledge but habituates us to doing the task more easily. Hence, operative knowledge is more perfect in the measure to which it considers more specific cases of the type it treats.[26]

Intellectual capacity to understand that an operation is possible may help in practice. More importantly, from the viewpoint of knowledge, a science is superior in so far as its principles are evident (*per se notae*), and subordinate if it gets its principles from another, which must ultimately have evident principles.[27] "The understanding of principles is a more noble principle than the science of conclusions."[28] Science depends on intellectual intuition and both on wisdom, which contains under itself science and intellect so that it judges the principles and conclusions of the sciences. Wisdom attains what is known last to us but by nature is more evident. What men know last is of itself more knowable. Hence, wisdom judges all else.[29]

If one could ask Thomas whether he was a Baconian who believes knowledge is power or an Aristotelian who believes that knowledge is important for its own sake, the response might well be "both", that the disjunction is invalid. If science is sure causal knowledge or *cognitio certa per causas*, then it allows us both to see and also to predict and, hence, makes art possible. So Gredt defines art as a causal knowledge which deduces practical conclusions from universal, necessary rules, which are established in view of the goals of the art. Prudence is a sure causal knowledge applying moral science to particular cases.[30] Gredt here speaks too geometrically. The exercise of prudence is more than putting a machine or toy together according to the instructions: it involves an element of obscurity that comes from the individual, material conditions surrounding the action, like the diagnosis of a doctor, the plans of the engineer, or simply the moral choice of a person faced with two evils. As we noted in connection with law, the will and the heart are involved in practical decisions.

The difficulty, furthermore, is partly due to the fact that even speculatively, "We cannot wholly grasp the design, the archetypal pattern, of natural things."[31] Simon notes:

> . . . in this world of contingent occurrences there is an indeterminate discrepancy between the really normal and the factual, between that which would happen if essential necessities had their own way and what happens factually.[32]

In contrast, a pragmatist like James would certainly allow for the importance of the will and the heart, but he would reject a hard and fast distinction between the theoretical and practical (see Chapter 13, below).

The claim of neo-Thomists that philosophy attains some kind of wisdom is most nearly paralleled by that of Marxists. At the other extreme, logical positivists, like Rudolf Carnap in *The Logical Syntax of Language*, have reduced philosophy's legitimate role to that of formal comment on the material statements of the sciences.[33] The material use of philosophical terms would be better abandoned, even in epistemological or logical debate. Carnap and the members of the Vienna Circle would radically reject the notion that philosophy, or anything else, is wisdom.

CHAPTER 8

LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE

We have reviewed the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of a world governed by four types of causality. A complete account of anything (according to this theory) requires an explanation from the four different points of view. Our initial exposition of the neo-Thomist ethical theory of man, values, and society tried to embody this approach, as do our account of knowledge and of thought.

We have said that the types of knowledge are generically distinguished by different levels of abstraction. Intellectual knowledge is always formally universal. Some knowledge is sought for its own sake while other knowledge is applied. There is ambiguity as to whether the modern physico-mathematical sciences are merely practical. However, on the Aristotelian and Thomist view, speculative knowledge of the essences of things enhances our practical activity.

As we turn to philosophic analysis of mind, we find that our thoughts take on material existence as words. We relate these words together logically. The active human intellect captures both the truths and the essences of the world around us.

SIGNS AND WORDS

Our intellectual power (*potentia*) recognizes certain things as representatives and substitutes for other things. A sign may be natural or conventional. A groan is a natural sign of pain, and smoke is a natural sign of fire. These signs, it will be noted, are not images. The striped pole is a conventional sign of the barber shop as is the letter "B" of its sound.

Some natural signs are images. The Scholastics distinguish between an instrumental sign and a formal sign on the basis of whether prior knowledge is needed to recognize the sign as representative; thus, a statue would be an instrumental sign, although as an image, a natural one. (All non-images are deemed instrumental.) Only the image expressed in knowledge, the concept (technically, the formal concept), is a formal sign which does not have to be previously known to function as a sign.[1]

As Adler has pointed out, the basic fact to be explained by a philosophy

of language is that of communication. Men discuss not only tangible things, but intangibles as well, and understand each other.[2]

People communicate in so far as language has meaning. This type of meaning is not the same as that of a physical event – like clouds and a dark sky which mean rain. Indeed, the meaningfulness of words is not given by the particular combination of sounds and is distinct from the words' own character as physical events. Meaning is prior to the use of words and determines that use. (Here Adler rejects Wittgenstein's tendency to equate meaning and use, while a pragmatist like James would tend to uphold the Wittgensteinian position. See Chapter 13, below.) There are, to be sure, a class of words referred to as "syncategorematic" in medieval terminology which do not have a referential function but a logical one; they qualify or relate categorematic words which do have meaning in their own right.

The meaning of words is obviously conventional. There seems no particular reason why "canis" or "perro" should name dogs. Meaning, therefore, depends on an act of the will; not, however, on a blind act of the will, for words are attached to kinds of things, an operation which supposes prior activity on the part of senses, imagination, and intellect. Indeed, one may question whether there are any pure proper names, which merely indicate an individual (or which, in more modern terminology, refer but lack a sense). It is through our ideas that we impose names on things. We do not impose the names on the ideas; the ideas are the meanings of the names. In time, through repeated use, the word acquires a habitual and automatic reference to the idea.

It will be noted that this approach, as Adler stresses, avoids the dyslogistic use of the word "meaning" that has grown prevalent in English-speaking philosophy since Hobbes. There is not a certain class of words among the larger group in which people believe they communicate, which are held to be truly meaningful because they pass some test – usually one that directly relates them to the material world.

St Thomas refers to the concept variously as the "inner word", the "word of the heart", the "word of the mind", or simply the word (*verbum*). The inner word is contrasted with the outer word – spoken, written or even imagined. The inner word causes the outer word. Outer words mean the inner word. When we talk about abstraction, our outer word means not some Platonic reality, but our inner word. When we say something false, the word is a real sign of a false inner word. "Horses have wings" indicates not a situation but a mental word. This last example highlights the fact that a word (*verbum* or *vox*) may be simple or compound; that is, we may be talking about a concept or a judgment.[3]

The relation of the word to imagination is important, not only because the concept can be imagined, but because the concept is itself an insight into the phantasm, as Lonergan would term it. This is obvious in the discovery of geometrical principles: through an image one grasps the circle as a locus of points equidistant from a point, or the relation of the angles created by a line that crosses parallels. Completely abstract lines would not tell us anything.

The intellect stands to phantasm as a power to its object, just as sensible objects stand to sense. There can be no intellectual activity without phantasms, no matter what the pure concept is about. This is true whether or not we are talking about the act of gaining the insight or using the insight. The phantasm accompanies any knowledge, even our knowledge of God, St Thomas notes.

Whereas angelic knowledge is conceived as a complete insight into a limited area, human knowledge – because of its dependence on the senses, both as the original source of all knowledge and as source of the phantasm – is not an instant, complete vision. It is a step by step process. We make one memory out of many sensations, one experience out of many memories, and one universal principle out of many experiences, according to St Thomas. Rationality, as opposed to intuitive understanding, means precisely this kind of step by step process.[4]

LOGIC

Logic is rational science *par excellence*; that which deals with the act of reason. The primary object of logic is the act of the mind known as reasoning or argumentation. Logic also deals with the other two acts of the mind: the simple apprehension which produces concepts, and the judgment, in so far as they are ordered to reasoning.[5]

Relative to our reasoning, we can consider two factors: validity or correctness, and truth. To be more precise, our reasoning is valid if it accurately draws forth the consequences of our principles. The judgments which express these principles, the acts of composing or dividing concepts by affirming or denying, are what are true or false. Truth is something that follows upon the essential nature of the judgment – it is a *proprium* – because judgment makes the claim of enunciating things as they are. Under the heading of immediate inference within the logic of judgment, certain relationships between propositions are studied by the neo-Thomists, which are not considered true reasoning; for example, the relationship of conversion means that "No logician understands metaphysics" is equivalent to "No one who understands

metaphysics is a logician". In contrast, Dewey called for a logic of discovery, as opposed to a logic of demonstration (see Chapter 13, below).

Reasoning is related to truth in the sense that from known truths, the mind comes to know another truth. The essential part of the argumentation is that the consequent does indeed follow from the antecedents. The typical expression of formal logic in the tradition that starts with Aristotle is the syllogism; although, as the Kneales[6] and Bocheński[7] have commented, the logicians of the medieval faculty of arts had rediscovered or re-elaborated propositional logic; the latter was lost again by early modern philosophy and is mentioned in the Scholastic textbook tradition only by the brief discussion of the hypothetical syllogism.

Besides the formal logic of ratiocination, of the judgment and of the concept (for instance, the classification according to extension and comprehension), neo-Thomists have traditionally discussed material logic; the latter survives in fragmentary form in works of modern logicians as non-formal fallacies, methodology and philosophy of logic.[8] Material logic, however, included the discussion of logic itself as well as the consideration of general ideas and of the categories (or *predicamenta*). Demonstrative logic analyzes the nature of proof and of scientific knowledge. The theory of the relation of reason, known as a second intention, gives neo-Thomistic theory of logic a clear basis to distinguish logic from psychology (or, if one prefers, to distinguish logical processes from real ones). Hence, neo-Thomists see themselves as the forerunners of Frege and Russell's logicist interpretation of logic, and as opponents of the intuitionist theory of Brouwer and Weyl, which takes the somewhat Kantian approach of identifying conditions of intelligibility and conditions for mental construction or intuition. In this split, the neo-Thomistic view would be that Kant basically perpetuated a confusion between the laws of thought and the laws of logic, which originates in the school of Port Royale.

AGENT AND POSSIBLE INTELLECT AND THE SPECIES

Human knowledge is an operation which depends on the causality of the knowing subject. This operation is the production of the mental word, sometimes refered to as the *dictio*, in which the intelligent being makes its object be understood.[9]

St Thomas notes that our intellect does not always understand – it passes from potency to act – but also that we understand the natures of things in an immaterial way, although these natures of material things do not subsist

as immaterial or intelligible objects outside the soul. For this reason, he posits two distinct powers in the soul – the agent and possible intellects.[10] The agent intellect acts upon the possible intellect. The possible intellect receives a likeness or "species", obtained from the picture (or "phantasm") in our imagination. The phantasm stands to the possible intellect as the color to sight; the color is in the thing seen, while its likeness is in the eye. The intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm; something universal is made from particular conditions.[11]

The images or phantasms are shown to us through the body. The soul grasps its proper object through the body, although Aquinas insists that the soul can also understand when separated from the body.[12] On the other hand, the phantasms are not themselves the form of the possible intellect – a role played by the intelligible form abstracted from the phantasm.[13]

In other words, there are two really distinct intellectual powers in the human soul and two kinds of abstraction. The abstraction done by the agent intellect is prior to knowledge, a prerequisite. The abstraction as it is in the possible intellect is the act of knowledge.

The agent intellect is a non-organic power, a light, whose sole function is to abstract, not to understand. It is always in initial or first act, in which it is different from the possible intellect (which is what really understands) since the latter is only constituted in first act by the impressed species. The agent and possible intellect must be different since nothing can be its own efficient cause, nor be in act and potency in the same regard at the same time.

The phantasm could not affect the possible intellect, which is spiritual or non-organic. The intellect acts upon the phantasm, which is singular and material, and produces a universal species. The agent intellect is the primary efficient cause of intellectual knowledge and the phantasm is regarded as its instrument and, hence, possessed of a subordinate efficient causality. The image or phantasm, however, is a peculiar instrument, since it does not dispose of the possible intellect, which is of a different order, but rather modifies it. The phantasm is also the matter of the agent intellect. But, to be precise, it is the remote matter, in its modification of the act of the agent intellect. The impressed species is brought forth (educed) from the possible intellect which thus is the proximate material cause.

As Riera has recalled[14], for St Thomas the intellectual level is essentially distinct from the sense level, although it derives objectively from that level. There is nothing in the intellect that was not in the senses; but the intellect is not an organic potency and its activity cannot be reduced to perception.

The neo-Thomist diverges here sharply from that English-speaking philosophy that is inspired by Hume.

The result of this operation is that the knower becomes the known object. This is not an identity of the two beings – but an "information". The communication of the form can be direct or immediate – which is what, according to the theologians, happens in the beatific vision. Or, it may be mediate; that is, the object "in-forms" by a likeness of itself. This likeness is called the "impressed species"; it is a vicarious form (in Gredt's words) of the object. The impressed species actualizes the potency of the subject and determines it to know the object. The impressed species informs the cognitive potency materially or entitatively in that it is a real form.

Language does not strongly mark the differences between sensing and understanding for, as Klubertanz notes[15], seeing, tasting and so on, are active verbs which mask the receptive character of our senses. These verbs function grammatically like transitive verbs; e.g., breaking, fixing, holding. However, any knowing is an immanent activity. When I see or know a robin, it affects me, not the bird. Sensation occurs when the sensible object acts upon the sense, which is passive. It is true that putting one's finger in hot water affects the temperature of the finger in the same way as it would a stick thrust into the water; that is, the finger physically acquires the form of heat as its own. However, something else happens in the finger. The heat is received as a sensible species; it is a formal sign of something different.

Whereas the impressed species is the beginning of knowledge, the expressed species is its end, and is the likeness of the thing known which is produced in the knowing and in which the knower contemplates the known object. The Scholastics would say that the expressed species is the "*medium in quo*" while the impressed species is the "*medium quo*". (The expressed species is the formal sign of the thing described above.)

By contrast, the Marxist-Leninist explains knowledge along the lines of a copy-model rather than an identity theory. The phenomenologist (if not the existential phenomenologist) does not offer an explanation of knowledge in terms of philosophy of nature. The tendency in Husserl has been to ground knowledge in the subject.

American philosophers do not view knowledge as being so vivid – as involving the formal identity of the neo-Thomists – and, furthermore, they stress the creativity of knowledge, rather than the capturing of the structure of reality. Indeed, there is the serious question of whether the function of language is to provide an exact copy of reality.

The expressed species puts the knowing potency in full or second actualization. It is really distinct from the impressed species. The expressed species is not required for knowledge by the external senses (which otherwise, would not be different from the imagination). There is not a *medium in quo* in sensation. as there is in acts of understanding.

As Lonergan has stressed, insight, judgment and reasoning are psychological facts.[16] The notion of agent and possible intellect is part of the philosophy of nature of St Thomas. They are aspects of a real being, not just logical entities.

TRUTH

The neo-Thomist claims that his analysis of the process of knowing avoids the defects of both the empiricist and idealist explanations, because it neither reduces knowledge to sensation nor exaggerates the role of the intellect. Ideas are not independent of sensation; but, neither are they identical to sensation.[17]

Since knowledge is derived from the object and indeed is the intentional possession of the object's form, the object measures the accuracy of the intellect. Truth involves a conformity of the mind to the object. There is another kind of truth, ontological truth, where the relationship is rather that of the thing to the mind; the thing measures up to its own essence. But, this kind of truth is obviously not the truth at which science aims.

Truth is primarily in the mind and secondarily in things, according as the intellect is conformed to the thing understood. Conversely, the thing has a relation to the intellect upon which it depends for its being, the human intellect in the case of artifacts and the divine intellect in the case of natural objects. Whereas goodness is in the thing, truth is in the intellect.[18]

The intellect, according to Aquinas, first grasps being (*ens*) and then grasps the fact that it understands being, that is to say it conceives of truth (*verum*). Being and truth are thus distinguished because truth is primarily in the intellect. On the other hand, they are in themselves interchangeable, convertible.[19]

Although the first act of the mind, simple apprehension, is aimed at truth and contributes to our knowledge, truth is not in rigor a property of our ideas. To be sure, induction is sometimes understood by Aristotle to be the formation of a universal idea and, in general, for a neo-Thomist involves reviewing enough individual cases to be certain that we know the essence of the kind of thing under study, so as not to be misled by individual peculiarities.

However, the goal of the induction would then be the affirmation of a judgment. Truth is formally only present in the judgment, where the knower is aware in some degree both of the object and of his own act.[20]

The so-called transcendental Thomists, whose central figure is Maréchal, tend to emphasize a kind of *a priori* in the knowledge of truth. In its natural activity, the intellect imposes the form of the first principles on what it knows, on data that in itself is only potentially knowable. This is a sharing in the divine act of understanding. On the other hand, as Maréchal is careful to point out, the first truth reaches the finite intelligence only through the mediation of its objects. Even in the case of the universality of the intelligible which the intellect possesses by its constitution, the mind must find this universal intelligibility in objects. Here, too, the mind is measured by things.[21]

CHAPTER 9

IMMATERIALITY

We have noted that the acquisition of forms in knowledge is different from the acquisition of forms in the natural, material way. Immateriality may well serve as a touchstone to differentiate neo-Thomism from other twentieth-century schools. It underlines the differences with Marxism or the empiricist and positivist strain in analytic philosophy. In so far as the neo-Thomists reach the existence of positively immaterial entities by inference, they part company with the strict phenomenological limitation to study what is directly given. We could also emphasize parallels instead of divergences. Even a thinker like Jean-Paul Sartre feels that consciousness is so different from matter that he terms it non-being.

Accordingly, we will examine the role of immateriality in knowledge, and go on to see how the human soul is immaterial. Next, immateriality is viewed as a perfection in God. Finally, we see how metaphysics studies being without reference to matter.

The very subject of immateriality recalls the Marxist theme of alienation. God, in the tradition of Feuerbach, is regarded as an alienation of man from his true essence. In turn, the view that man has an immaterial soul would be regarded as an alienation of man from his physical reality, as well as a rationalization for religious alienation. The methodological root of these forms of alienation lies in the abstraction from material conditions regarded by Marxists as an essential guarantee of intellectual knowledge. Similarly, the view that metaphysics is characterized by a separation of being from matter is precisely what leads Marxists to regard traditional metaphysics as idealist.

IMMATERIALITY AND KNOWLEDGE

The root of knowledge is immateriality, in the Scholastic formula.[1] This is true for all knowledge, whether sensible or intellectual. In knowledge, the knower possesses a form of the known, not subjectively but objectively. When we feel hardness or softness, our hand does not itself become hard or soft. When an object physically acquires a form, say a piece of metal is hammered into a certain shape, that form becomes its own. If water is boiled,

the water acquires the form of heat. But, even in touch, the most material sense, the finger put into the boiling water, apart from being heated itself, perceives the heat as belonging to something else – in part because it is not itself as hot as the water. The knower of a signet ring captures the form of something else; when the ring is pressed into wax, the wax takes on that stamp as its own. In knowledge there is not the same kind of act (or actualization) as in physical change. The knower does become a composite (*per accidens*) when it receives the form objectively.

Aquinas distinguishes between intentional and natural being (*esse intentionale* and *naturale*),[2] in terms that will be revived in our day by Brentano. A student of Aristotle who possessed a background in Scholastic philosophy, Brentano stressed the difference between objectively grasped being and the being of a subject. Phenomenology thus gets off on an anti-idealistic note. Husserl's enduring anti-psychologism may be seen as partly a legacy from Brentano.

There is evidently a gradation of immateriality. Sight is less material than touch in that the former negates distance. Imagination negates physical absence. Intellectual knowledge abstracts from the material individuality of the essences it knows.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas teaches that our intellect understands only by abstracting from material conditions and making universal what is singular in nature. Matter itself is neither knowable nor has being. The human intellect, however, is by nature especially suited to grasping the forms of material objects. There is a kind of sympathy for these forms; it is "connatural" for man to understand them.[3]

The immateriality of all knowledge has sometimes been insufficiently emphasized. Deely points out that even Mortimer Adler, working in the Aristotelian tradition, tends to underplay the immateriality of all intentional being in his attempt to stress the immateriality of the intellectual potency.[4]

THE HUMAN SPIRIT

Pieper[5] declares that our capacity to know the truth is the most convincing proof that the human soul (and the angel) is imperishable or incorruptible (in the physical, not the moral sense). The human soul is capable of doing something which is above any material process and independent of it. Hence, the being of the soul is also independent of the body and survives it. Pieper hastens to add that it is impossible to imagine what the existence of the separated soul is like. Indeed, in the *Summa theologica*, St Thomas makes

the passing remark that "Angels and intellectual souls, by the very fact that they have a nature by which they are capable of truth, are incorruptible"[6] in the course of a discussion about whether angels are also eternal. Aquinas attributes to St Augustine the argument basing incorruptibility of the soul on its capacity for truth, so that the argument has a Platonic overtone.

The thrust of the argument, in more Aristotelian terms, is that because of the kind of operation the human mind performs, its nature is of a special type. Bocheński,[7] who is extremely cautious in his conclusions, signals five characteristics as distinguishing human mental processes from those of other animals: technology, tradition, progress, abstraction, and contemplation.

The relevant Scholastic theses are that in man alone of all the animals there is an intellectual soul; this soul is a substance which is spiritual and belongs to each individual human; and, this soul is naturally immortal.

The intellectual character of our soul is shown by its reasoning power, its use of universal concepts, the grasp of cause and effect, and the relation of means to end. Brute animals only know sensibles and cannot grasp the relation of means and end, or causality; we find monkeys able to imitate human actions or use a stick to reach fruit, but this may be explained as association of images. If we set aside the results obtained in special settings with chimpanzees and dolphins, animals lack language. Animals merely seem to plan in their instinctive actions, whereas we retain experiences and ideas across time.

The key concept here is that of spiritual substance. Substances are simple or composite; the composition can be in the essence, that is of matter and form, or in the quantitative parts that integrate a substance. A simple substance would lack essential and integrating parts; it would neither be composed of matter and form nor be extended. A composite substance is a body; a simple substance is what is called "spirit". The intellectual soul has the peculiarity of being spiritual because it is independent of the body in its being, but not a complete substance or pure spirit because it does have a natural relation to a body. The proof that the intellectual soul is spiritual is in the independence of the intellect regarding matter in its abstract knowledge of essences. The intellect prescinds from the concrete shape, position, and size which correspond to individual things.

Death is the loss of being of the living substance. Setting aside the possibility of annihilation by God, loss of being involves what is technically referred to as corruption. Corruption *per se* involves the dissolution of a composite; man (not the soul) is indeed corrupted at death – the dissolution of form and matter. *Per accidens* something is corrupted when what it depends on for

its being is corrupted; thus, the soul of the brute animal is corrupted when its body is destroyed. The soul separated from the body after death continues alive and in its intellectual operation, although it is not a complete person. Apart from references to the natural appetite for immortality, the basic principle here is that the soul is not corrupted. Composition of matter and form have a real potentiality to non-existence. While the existence of the soul is not necessary in the technical sense, that is identified with its essence, by nature it continues in being. The soul is not corrupted *per se* (by dissolution of matter and form) because it is simple, nor *per accidens* because it is spiritual.[8]

The soul of man informs man as the soul of the animal informs the animal. It is Cartesian to say man is composed of body and soul, for the body is only informed matter, so that there is no body without a soul. However, the human soul is not a form immersed in matter. Man has thoughts and volition on the spiritual level; the potencies that realize these acts are therefore spiritual; they are not the forms of bodily organs. Now, the potencies are technically accidents, but they must belong to a substance of their same type, that is a spirit. In our remarks about the conversion to the phantasm above, we observed that some type of image accompanies all thought. But, in pure formal logic, for example, the thought has no intrinsic dependence on the image. The way something operates shows what kind of being it is.[9]

As Adler has emphasized, the neo-Thomistic understanding of the universals is essential: universals exist as such in the knower but not as actual universals in the individual things. Indeed, they could not exist thus since they are the means by which – the *quo* – we understand the particular instances. The concepts grasping actual universals are not of the material type of percepts which exist in us as states of our nervous system. The concepts are not material at all The brain, a material organ, cannot explain our operation with universals.[10]

"It is only an intentionality that is universal in character and that is characteristic of conceptual acts, but not of perceptual acts, which warrants attributing immateriality to a cognitive power."[11] Both conceptual and perceptual acts are intentional (and, hence, immaterial in a sense) but "intentional" here is an analogical, rather than a univocal term.

The tradition of Averroes understood that there is one agent intellect for the human species and that individual immortality is not proven. St Thomas (and a different Aristotelian tradition, going back to ancient times) understands that the immortality of the soul can be proven and that the agent intellect is part of each soul.[12] It may be remarked that the immortality of

the soul is a philosophic thesis whose precise religious significance is not as simple as it might seem. Many of Aquinas' coreligionists would stress that resurrection of the body rather than immortality of the soul is at the heart and soul of their Creed.

GOD AS SPIRIT

One might expect that St Thomas would elaborate at great length on the subject of the spiritual nature of God; it is probably fair to say that he has more to say directly about angels than about God. Of course, St Thomas, following St John (4: 24), knows "God is spirit"; but, like his modern followers, he has very little to say on the subject, at least directly.

This is no accident. Aquinas notes pointedly at the beginning of his remarks on the simplicity of God that we cannot know how God is but rather how God is not, an attitude that is reflected in Pieper's *The Silence of St Thomas.*[13] Nonetheless, in the austere language of the articles of the *Summa theologica*[14] devoted to the simplicity and the immutability of God, the point that God is a spirit and the excellence thereof is abundantly driven home. The path is a series of denials.

In the *Summa* God's existence is reached as the unmoved mover, the first cause, the first being, the most excellent being; God could not be an inanimate body. But, the most noble part of the body is not the body itself, but the soul by which it lives.

Likewise, as pure act, God cannot be a composite of matter and form, for all matter has potency. Beyond this, the composite of matter and form participates in its goodness through its form. God, on the other hand, is good by essence, not by participation. Again, God acts *per se*; He is the first efficient cause. Hence, He is *per se* form, since anything stands to its form as it stands to its action.

Since there is no matter or other composition in God, there is no distinction between nature (or essence) and God. God is His deity, unlike a material creature, where individual matter is added to the form. Furthermore, God is being; there is no distinction between his *esse* or being (sometimes rendered as "existence") and his essence. What is outside the essence is caused by it; but that would mean that God is the cause of His being. Also, the actuality of a form or nature means that that form is, and in God there is no potency. Hence, His essence is to be. Again, anything that has a perfection, is that perfection by participation which would be as absurd in the case of the first being.[15]

It becomes apparent that God is not in any genus. A genus, properly speaking, stands in potency to its several species; there are differences outside of a genus but not outside of being. The composition of accident and substance also supposes potentiality, so that there are no accidents in God. Besides, what is *per se* is prior to what is *per accidens*; what is *per accidens* is caused, but God is the first cause.

Indeed, God is completely simple with no composition. There can be no quantitative parts, nor form and matter, nor distinction of nature and suppposite, nor of being and essence, nor of genus and difference, nor of substance and accident. Were there composition, God would logically be posterior to the components.

God as the first efficient cause cannot be the form of other things much less their matter which is potential. Neither the matter nor the form of other beings could be the first being like God since the form would be merely a participation and the matter's potency is posterior to some act.

As the first being and pure act, God is immutable. Anything that changes acquires something new.

By all accounts, then, God is a spirit.

BEING WITHOUT REGARD TO MATTER

The neo-Thomist vision of God is hardly universal, even among Christian thinkers. Within the Protestant tradition, thinkers like Karl Barth have denied that there is strictly philosophic knowledge of God; that is, rational theology cannot attain the God of Revelation. It is difficult to understand, as Farrer and Mascall have pointed out, how any kind of theology, as speculative knowledge, can be articulated if our intellect is as corrupt and limited as Barth thinks. For theology we need some capacity for conceiving the infinite or developing a theory of analogy, if only to conceptualize God's message.[16]

The neo-Thomistic tradition, as we have said, understands that God is true being, that God is total being. This intuition was developed under the impulse of God's word to Moses in *Exodus*, "I am who Am"[17], and helped to shape the rational science of metaphysics. Thus, for Aquinas, the Aristotelian teaching that the science of being in a way is theology, takes on special meaning.[18] To be sure, the Aristotelian notion of wisdom is not the neo-Thomistic one. The notion of first philosophy is tied up with a conception of the theoretical life as the highest form of good, requiring leisure and freedom not only as conditions for reflection but as imitations of the divine life, which is an activity which does not act upon anything outside of itself.[19]

In technical Scholastic terminology, metaphysics abstracts from all matter and deals with immaterial being. This immaterial being is common being, or being as such, that prescinds from any characteristics of individuality, sensibility, or quantity. Although the formal object of metaphysics excludes any mention of bodies, which are left to natural philosophy, it does not exclude potential or created being. Some recent Scholastics distinguish within metaphysics between ontology, the general study of immaterial being and created being, and natural theology, or the study of being which is positively immaterial.

The neo-Thomistic textbook tradition explains metaphysics as a result of the third degree of abstraction, explained above. As authors like Gardeil and Wilhelmsen have pointed out, abstraction does not mean the same thing in each of the degrees and the term *separatio* might be more authentically neo-Thomist than the "third degree of abstraction". In any case, metaphysics deals with being as such; for example, with the transcendental properties of all beings: goodness, truth, and unity; or with causality as such, particularly final and efficient causes.[20]

This knowledge of all beings is not only knowledge; it is claimed to be the ultimate knowledge on the purely rational level. However austere and limited, it is human wisdom.

CHAPTER 10

THE "PREDICAMENTAL" PERSPECTIVE

As an epilogue to the neo-Thomistic theory, it is helpful to explicate some of the meta-principles at work in the preceding explanations. Something like this reflection was traditionally included in Scholastic material logic under the rubric of "ante-predicaments" – the notions needed for understanding the functioning of the predicaments.

The predicaments are the ten basic categories of nature, the matter of our universal concepts. All finite beings are supposed to fall into these categories or supreme genera. Under each of the ten, the remaining genera and species may be arranged. The logician is interested not in the material or real being of these predicaments, but in their structuring, a second intention. However, the neo-Thomists tend to share the Aristotelian assumption that in different but felicitously parallel orders, the categories divide both terms and entities.

The categories are: substance, quantity, quality, relation, *situs* (or positioning of parts), *habitus* (or immediate surroundings), where, when, action and passion.

Analytic philosophers of the empiricist tradition take an extremely dim view of the theory of the categories both in principle and in its specifics. At the other extreme, Marxists can be more sympathetic to this kind of endeavor, whatever they have to say about the details.

The pre-categorials or ante-predicaments required to understand and discuss the predicaments involve several sets of distinctions. These include the distinction between univocal, equivocal and denominative terms.

ANALOGY

Being is said not univocally but ambiguously[1] of the ten predicaments. The most general predicaments, however, are predicated univocally of their inferiors. One predicament is denominated by another; that is, substance is denominated by a relation, and so on. A typical univocal universal term signifies that one and the same term applies in the same sense to many things. If the meaning is not identical, we have an equivocal or ambiguous term. A strictly ambiguous term occurs when there is no unity of sense but simply one name. An equivocal term may signify meanings which are in

themselves diverse but have some connection, in which case it is called analogous. The unity of sense *secundum quid* may be intrinsic – i.e., according to an analogy of proper proportionality; the essential characteristics involved in the two cases are different, but there is a structuring among those characteristics in the two cases that is similar. Thus, we have life applied to intellectual creatures and to plants, meaning something intrinsic, different, yet with the same kind of internal relationship in both cases. There are extrinsic analogies. The most common analogy, the metaphor, involves an accidental likeness between two individuals, of which only one is formally signified by the term – as when we call both the four-footed animal and the sloppy child "hog".

Also, an extrinsic analogy exists where the term is applied to two things, one properly in virtue of its own nature, and the other in virtue of a causal link to the first – as when we call both the carpenter and his piece of work "conscientious", or the person and his complexion "unhealthy", or an animal and its diet "healthy". This type of analogy is an analogy of attribution. At times, an analogy of proper proportionality contains an analogy of attribution, since sometimes the lower grades depend on higher grades in an order.

This latter coincidence is obviously of special importance in neo-Thomistic natural theology. However, the analogy of proper proportionality is a basic tool in metaphysics and comes into play in other areas such as the theories relating different kinds of law or different levels of knowledge.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

Causality is central both to the theme of science – "certain knowledge through causes", according to the Aristotelian tradition – and to the theme of God, Who is reached as first cause. A cause is a positive principle, from which something really proceeds and upon which it depends in its being.[2] As St Thomas puts it: "A cause is what we call that from which things depend in their being or becoming."[3]

Awareness of the different kinds of causality arises in the philosophy of nature, but the applicability of these notions is not limited to that area.

The Latin *principium* designates some kind of starting point and a cause is more than just the start of demonstration, although as cause it is that, also.[4] The starting point of a process has to be seen as the absence of the perfection which is gained at the end of the process. I can learn Chinese, since I am ignorant of Chinese, in a way I can no longer be introduced to certain other

languages. But, my ignorance of Chinese would not be the cause of my learning it.

The essence of causality, then, is dependence in being such that the cause somehow makes the effect be what it is. Even here, the positivity of the influence must be stressed. It may be a condition, even a *conditio sine qua non*, that the hunter get a clear shot at the deer for him to kill it, but the open terrain that permits the clear shot is a mere disposition, not a cause of the kill.

The English-speaking empiricist tradition after Locke has come to view causality in terms of mere succession. Hume correctly points out that this destroys the notion of causality. Some contemporary logic books are quick to insist that a typical inductive fallacy is the *post hoc, propter hoc* sophism.

Yet, a child discovers easily enough that flicking a switch turns on a light or a television set. He grasps the regular succession of events without understanding anything about electricity. On the other hand, the butcher or the veterinarian who wrings a chicken's neck or sticks a steer in the nape of the neck to slaughter it, probably understands more than just a succession of events, namely the way in which his actions bring about the death of the chicken or the steer.

Indeed, it might be argued that causality in its exercise does not involve a succession of events, although observing the succession of events helps us to pick up causal relationships. My pen is moved because and while I hold it and move it. The causing is simultaneous with the being effected.

One might argue that the final cause is a good example of the proposition that the cause is more perfect or at least as perfect as the effect. This is again obviously true in the case of the animal that engenders things of its species. It is frequently not true in the case of the instrumental cause; the pen is not of the order of the incisive thoughts written down by the philosopher. However, the material cause as such is not as perfect as the effect; the clay which the potter molds into a bowl, or the nourishment of a plant or an animal.

Matter and form, as intrinsic causes, are only inadequately distinct from the effect, since they are parts of it. Nothing is its own efficient cause. God is uncaused. Whatever exists contingently has an efficient cause. This is not an analytic principle: the relation to the cause does not enter into the definition of the caused being. But, that relation follows upon things which are of the essence, namely that the being is something by participation.[5]

The causes of the different genera – the difference between them makes the term "cause" analogical – influence each other. They are causes of one another. The end attracts the agent, who ultimately achieves or realizes a

goal. The form structures the matter and is brought out of it. The form is, in a sense, a goal – *finis operis* – even if not always the agent's subjective goal – *finis operantis*. The agent works on matter and is limited by its potentialities.

The neo-Thomist feels a certain pride in defending the possibility of causal knowledge against the positivists and instrumentalists, viewed by the neo-Thomist (and by the Marxist-Leninist) as being of the same ilk. As noted above, neo-Scholastics have been ambivalent about whether scientific knowledge is truly causal, as the Aristotelian tradition would have it. The move to consider scientific knowledge as not truly causal but as merely convenient for handling phenomena is partly a strategy to short-circuit controversies with science, but partly a reflection of the saving-the-phenomena view of science, found[6] as early as Poseidonius in the first century B.C., Simplicius in the fifth century, and Maimonides' controversies with Averroes, all of which are magnificently recaptured in Pierre Duhem's study of those who have seen science as saving phenomena. St Thomas's incursions into the philosophy of science in works like *In Boethii De Trinitate* reflect this attitude.

ACT AND POTENCY

A cause makes something happen which can happen.[7] Even God's creation brings possibilities into being. These possibilities are objective potentialities in Scholastic terminology, because the mind (especially the mind of God) finds no contradiction within the characteristics that make up a nature. Hence, we have a logical, as opposed to real, possibility; obviously, all existing objects are also possible, but other things that do not exist – say, the unicorn – are objective potentialities.

Real possibilities are those that reside in a subject and hence are called "subjective potentialities"; an example would be my capability of learning Chinese or growing old. Some potencies are operative: the power of someone silent actually to sing or talk. God is sometimes said to have operative potencies, which sounds less odd rendered as operative *powers*, since God is always in act and identified with his actions, as we have seen above.

Pure potency is passive – what something may suffer or receive, sometimes infelicitously termed "static potency", perhaps better rendered as entitative potency: what one may become. Matter in itself is in potency to all form of material objects.[8]

Potencies are for their acts, and differ as ordered to their different acts.[9] They are defined by their acts: the potency of an acorn to germinate and

become an oak or of a dog to become house-broken or of a tomato to ripen and become red. Acts, on the other hand, are in a way simple entities.

That which is in potency, at any rate passive potency, functions as material cause. The marble, which potentially is a bust of Socrates, is the material cause of the bust. The form is the act of that potency.

We initially know composites of act and potency, for all creatures – especially those known through the senses – are so composed. From changes and developments, we gain the notion of potentiality and actuality. Our understanding works in reverse with respect to the order of being: we grasp act as a potentiality is actualized. Really, a potentiality is only intelligible from act.

After we understand the act of a composite of act and potency, we may go further and conceive a pure act, a perfection not the result of becoming. There is no reason *per se* why an act should result from becoming or be limited by a mixture of potentiality.

An intuitively easy example of how potency limits its act is seen in material causality. For example, the perfection of a house is limited by the building materials.

Thus, the material cause is regarded in an almost negative light. The importance assigned material causality by Marxists or by certain exponents of the theory of evolution is deemed erroneous. What is metaphysically wrong is the idea that the lower predetermines and produces the higher.[10] There is a failure to realize that even though, when we consider the development of one thing, the imperfect stage precedes the more perfect, when we deal with things or with the nature of things, act precedes potency.[11] Hence, the correct answer to what comes first the chicken or the egg would certainly be the chicken.

The problem is not that, say, economic conditions influence religion, but whether they produce it. The debate is not whether living things come from inanimate matter – maggots were thought to develop from humid earth or wood under the potent efficient causality of medieval solar energy. The explanation of the maggots, however, is not primarily on the material side.

If one may adopt a Parmenidean stance of taking being in pure form, one must say, St Thomas teaches in his early *De ente et essentia*, that what characterizes God is that His essence is to be. Everything else might not have been and in the case of all material things, will cease to be. There is a real distinction between essence and existence. A lion cannot be other than carnivorous, but he can cease to exist. God is identified with His being. There is no real composition of *esse* and *essentia.*

Being (*esse*) is not some kind of accident which accrues to essence, although Avicenna – from whom St Thomas took the distinction – seems to have understood it this way. However, for Aquinas, if existence is outside the essence of creatures, essence is not outside of being or *esse*.

As Carlo and Wilhelmsen [12] have insisted, essence in creatures must be considered negatively; essence limits existence. Essence is potential with regard to being, *esse*. It is nothing without it.

Being is predicated analogically of God and creature, of substance and accident. Nothing is outside of being; no existing determination is other than a being. This, perhaps, is why metaphysics is so arduous to articulate.

MOSTLY ON FINALITY

Act is the goal of potency. The final cause is an essential part of any complete explanation.[13] An action without an end is irrational. Indeed, an action without a determinate end would be impossible. An end moves by attraction. It thus initiates the causal process. Now, nothing is desired unless it is known, although the important point is not simply that the thing be known, but that it be recognized as good, as attractive. That is to say, formal causality involves intelligence.

This relationship was acknowledged, at least in contrapuntal form, by Descartes, when (e.g., in the fourth of the *Meditations on First Philosophy*) he judges that the sciences of nature cannot know the purposes of things, because they cannot fathom why God has done things. This rejection of final cause by Descartes and Bacon was decisive for the philosophy of science in modern times. Modern science is largely mathematical and, as Aristotle might put it, abstract mathematical entities are not good (i.e., appetible).

St Thomas is quite clear about the universality of final causality: "Every agent acts for an end; otherwise from the action of an agent there would not follow this rather than that except by chance."[14] "An agent does not move except by intending a goal; if the agent were not determined to some effect, it would not do this rather than that. That it may produce a determined effect, it is necessary that it be determined to something definite, which has the character (*ratio*) of end."[15]

Aristotle tends to use examples like that of the heavy body which allegedly falls becaue it is seeking its natural place, which is down. More intuitively appealing to modern readers, might be the example of a compound (also an inanimate object) which behaves in certain definite ways – e.g., resists resolution into its components.

More difficult is the connection between intelligence and finality, since there are obviously agents which do not know their goal, just as there are agents who desire and know on the sensory level but do not recognize the object sought as an end. In these cases, the teleological rationality of such agents is engrained in them by their Creator.

Even in the life-sciences, we find mechanistic, non-teleological approaches in use. Yet, as Bernadete has pointed out [16], the use of machines to understand living things is precisely what can help illuminate the teleological character of living things: machines do have a purpose and, as their builders, we know it. Even Descartes and Darwin were unable (or unwilling) to abandon completely the kind of normative or value-laden view that is involved with saying that an organism should be this or that way, or that such and such an arrangement is good for some organ to do its job, or that an adaptation is better for survival.

The mechanistic view is not especially modern, and Aquinas knew it in its most trenchant form in Democritus and the Epicureans who, according to St Thomas, held that the world was made by chance. Aristotle, who accounts for chance as the product or intersection of two separate causal chains, simply observed that things normally occur in regular patterns. Dogs have puppies and cats have kittens. When things happen in the same way always or for the most part (for, Aristotle and Aquinas were profoundly aware that the world is imperfect), a purposeful behavior is exhibited.[17]

Among the major contemporary schools of thought, American philosophy emphasizes teleology in a somewhat different frame of reference, since it results in more than an understanding of an essence. In Marxism, the functioning of the dialectic – not to mention Lenin's voluntarism – adds elements of novelty to a world whose end is not completely predetermined. On the other hand, the Messianic strain in Marxism – particularly in the deterministic version of writers like Plekhanov – is thoroughly teleological. And there is an even greater emphasis in Marxist-Leninist ethical and political judgments on the idea that it is the objective and not the subjective direction of an act that counts, than there is in neo-Thomism.

PART THREE

THE CONCRETENESS OF PRAGMATISM

We are coming to see that philosophy cannot profitably be studied apart from the socio-cultural history of a people. Happily, so far as America is concerned, such a separation does not come easily, since philosophy in this country is obviously woven into the life-process of a new world in the making (Robert C. Pollock, 'Dream and Nightmare: The Future as Revolution' in *American Philosophy and the Future*, NY, Scribners, 1968, p. 60).

... to effect a comparison between the several generations, ostensibly committed to the same doctrine but operative in considerably different sociological contexts, is to subscribe to a "vicious abstractionism". A context is no separate thing or container in which doctrinal persuasions play themselves out, rather it is of the very structure of the doctrine itself and in changing such context, there is generated a like change in doctrinal meaning, although the mode of expression often hangs on (John J. McDermott, 'The American Angle of Vision', *Cross Currents*, Winter 1965, p. 79).

CHAPTER 11

CONTEXT

One can commence with two questions: Is there an indigenous American angle of vision?" and "Should all philosophy be done outside of a cultural context?" These two questions are mutually antagonistic. Each keeps us from answering the other facilely. The issue is of crucial importance to philosophy as a whole. Indeed, the very meaning of "philosophy" hangs on the way these questions are answered.

At stake is the meaning of "meaning" itself. Is understanding broader than meaning? Is meaning to be taken as indicating only the formal, logical significance of the subject under discussion? Or, is "meaning" to include intention and effects – supposedly the more psychological dimensions of life? A corollary will be the view of whether the human person is primarily or exclusively a rational animal or instead an *embodied* intelligence, *thrown* into a context or situation.

What relationship, if any, exists between a philosophical outlook and its cultural, its socio-anthropological context? Are the two mutually exclusive, mutually interdependent, or, does one depend upon the other? Does a philosophical system depend completely upon its geographical setting, its moment in history, etc.? Or is a cultural outlook predetermined by a given philosophical system? There are four possibilities here. On the one hand, we might say that a philosophical outlook which prescinds from historical context is merely an abstraction, logical gymnastics, "vicious intellectualism", to use a phrase of William James. On the other hand, opponents of the thesis that philosophy depends on context, will point out that the role of philosophy has always been to deal with the universal, to seek first causes, as Aristotle would say. Thomism, in a manner similar to that of Aristotle, would defend a doctrine of universally valid ethics, based on the claim that human nature has unchanging characteristics. (See Chapter 6, above.)

As extremes, neither of these alternatives is adequate. As a beacon, each gives off more heat than light. In between lies the hypothesis that philosophy and context interpenetrate, are interdependent. How this interpenetration takes place is a complex matter. American pragmatism suggests that philosophy arises from cultural contexts in such a way that the latter are necessary, but that, once arisen, philosophy may not only reflect its context but also

idealize it, in the sense of showing how to perfect its assumptions, and ultimately attempt to justify the context via comparison with other contexts. This in outline is Dewey's viewpoint, although it has obvious similarities to the Marxist exposition of base and superstructure and their complex relations. From a Deweyian perspective, it is important to see that "context" or "cultural context" is an extremely general term, inherently interdisciplinary. It does not make one discipline the base, the necessary condition. "Experience" could be substituted here for "cultural context". Philosophy then is not self-sufficient, but neither is it merely an epiphenomenon, totally dependent upon geographical conditions.

We would agree with Paul Weiss that a linear approach to philosophy is inadequate; "philosophy is a circular enterprise". However, one might go further and say that the relationship of philosophy to context is more precisely described as "spiral". As to the charge of arguing in a vicious circle, Weiss's reply seems quite apropos:

> It is a common mistake to suppose that there is something invalid in a circular argument ... What is wrong with a circular argument is that it is often uninformative, coming back to its beginning too quickly.[1]

The issue of the interpenetration of philosophy and context is best approached in the question "Is there an American angle of vision?" That is, is there a philosophical position native to the land of America? Even this question is too broad. One might decide that no such entity exists, or that there *was* an American philosophical point of view, but that it no longer exists, etc.

Here are four possible attitudes which will help to specify the issue:

(a) There was and still is an American dream. In a word, "my country right or wrong"; what we've done must have been right because we did it.

(b) There was an American nightmare and is now an American dream. This scenario usually sings a hymn of praise to technology, for moving America from a primitive culture to one that is unique, has made great scientific achievements and is able to manipulate and control its destiny, prolong life, etc.

(c) There was and still is an American nightmare. America was a lost cause from the beginning; fundamentally corrupt, it has contributed nothing to culture; it is parasitic.

(d) There was an American dream and is now an American nightmare. Something unique took place in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, but it was lost around the turn of the century.

Each of these scenarios is arguable, but we can most easily deal with issue of how philosophy in America arose out of a specific context by concentrating on the fourth, i.e., by asking whether philosophy still reflects the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century context or whether something has been lost. We shall argue that what was of prime importance in the American context – a sense of vagueness or mystery as important, not as a fall from grace or perfection – was lost around the turn of the century. Furthermore, this sense of the importance of the indeterminate or contextual is reflected in classical American philosophy proper. William James, for example, remarks in *The Principles of Psychology*: "It is, in short, the re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the attention."[2]

On the other hand, the history of philosophy contains many examples of cultures which assume that some form of objectivity is already attained. Since the time of Descartes, there has been a tendency to identify philosophy with epistemology and to see the latter as concerned exclusively with certainty. Indeed, Descartes himself specifically identified knowledge with certainty.[3] The empiricist tradition, while it rejected the rationalist doctrine of innate ideas as capable of attaining certainty, nonetheless kept the quest for certainty alive. Non-inference became a "back door" into certainty; whatever is known non-inferentially is known for sure. Immediacy becomes synonymous with certainty. The situation apparently culminates with Hume who showed that we really know very little non-inferentially or immediately. We say, "apparently culminated" because, although Hume's position culminated in a scepticism, his insistence on the immediately given seems to be a current cultural panacea (cf., Philip Slater's 'Toilet Principle' in *The Pursuit of Loneliness*, Boston, Beacon, 1970, p. 15f.).

At times people have hidden in the past, defining their particular form of certainty in terms of antecedent unquestionable conditions. At other times, cultures have hidden in the future, teaching either that the end justifies the means, or that the next, heavenly world will be the real one and that all is pre-ordained. If both of these variants are recognized as unsuccessful attempts to attain certainty, there is a temptation to conclude that neither the past nor the future, but rather only the present, is real. To the extent that this

conclusion is tacit or unrecognized, it is more dangerous than the other two alternatives, constituting as it does a *new* and *unacknowledged* form of certainty.

Often the quest for immediacy is viewed as a direct result of philosophy in America, and of pragmatism in particular. Pragmatism is viewed as a kind of sneaky, business ethic – take what you can get at the present moment. This interpretation seems fundamentally mistaken. About the most unpragmatic thing one can do is to ignore the consequences of one's actions. C. Wright Mills once called such an approach "abstracted empiricism".[4] Peirce, who invented the term "pragmatism" defined an idea in terms of its conceivable effects *in the long run.*[5] What an idea did for you and me personally at any moment did not interest Peirce at all. William James, who did believe that one ingredient involved in accepting an idea as true is its personal appeal, nonetheless did not forget that there are other ingredients.[6] For James an idea "marries" the present moment to the past so as to allow for the minimum of disruption and the maximum of continuity. If an idea does not do this, it simply is not true – whatever its personal appeal. To be sure, John Dewey was interested in the instrumental meaning of ideas. But by that Dewey meant the ability of an idea to promote more and more meaningful interaction between organisms and nature. Such interaction would optimally take place on a multi-dimensional fashion and cumulatively, not instantaneously. After all, it is Dewey who distinguishes between desire (an *immediate* want) and the desirable (estimating the pros and cons of one's desire by situating it in the broadest possible context).[7]

Thus, from any perspective, the pragmatic tradition seems to be against immediacy for the sake of immediacy. Pragmatism does demand that you deal with your present context, with the problems presently confronting you. You must begin where you are, as Peirce would say. But pragmatism will demand more than that; it asks that we deal with a "thick" context – as thick a context as possible, not controlled by any one discipline, nor cut off completely from the past. In short, pragmatism is a way of proceeding in an uncertain, inherently vague universe, where process, change, and time are the basic categories. Pragmatism then is inherently tied to a metaphysical position – to a post-Darwinian universe of process.[8] However, not all process is progress. Pragmatism attempts to avoid subjectivity in a universe where objectivity is admitted to be a fable or an abstraction. Specifically, pragmatism attempts a philosophy of interaction which rejects the subject/object dichotomy and which is not itself understandable by means of those categories. Without a process universe, pragmatism would make no sense; in a process

universe the question is not "Where is certainty or objectivity?" but rather "How do I avoid total subjectivity, the egocentric?"

Thus, two characteristics of pragmatism stand out: first it is not synonymous with stress on subjectivity or immediacy; second, as an epistemology it holds that knowledge is not self-grounding or self-sufficient. Pragmatism as a formal system asks that we not be over-dependent upon formal systems. It asks us to submit formal outlooks, including the pragmatic ones, to the constraints of experience. As Peirce would say, the test of whether or not I am truly following the method itself involves an application of the method.[9] Given such a stance, pragmatism inherently involves a metaphysical position – it assumes a universe in process. Let us now turn to a third claim: pragmatism as a formal philosophical position is itself a reflection/projection of the way people experienced their world in early American culture.

THE PAST CONTEXT – THE FRONTIER

Formal philosophy begins late in America; usually, Charles Sanders Peirce's famous articles in 1868 and 1878 are taken as the starting point. One could treat Ralph Waldo Emerson as the harbinger, the announcer of a specific American outlook. But Emerson flourishes only a few decades earlier: 1836, 1837, 1838 are the dates of *Nature*, 'The American Scholar', and 'The Divinity School Address'. More important, when US philosophy proper did begin, it constituted a formal outlook suspicious of formal outlooks, of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. It was suspicious of itself, open-textured and essentially so. One explanation of this trait is that pragmatism was a reflection and idealization of the way colonists, pioneers, and settlers in America actually *had* their experience. Many of them arrived in America with diverse sets of preconceived ideas – religious, economic, sociological, etc. America was regarded as a second garden of Eden. But the pressure of the environment, the wilderness, the frontier, ultimately made overly doctrinal stances anachronistic. Ideas were tested by experience; people developed a certain faith in the teaching powers of experience as a way of avoiding entrenched, dogmatic positions. American philosophy will instinctively be suspicious of neo-Thomism's relations to revealed religion (recall the opening remarks in Part Two, above) as well as of the Party's role as arbiter of knowledge (noted in the discussion of science and freedom in Chapter 3, above).

The philosophy of James and Dewey thus constitutes an empiricism, but a much more radical empiricism than the traditional model. Traditional empiricism pre-perceived, conceptualized experience as a set of atomic

molecules. "Radical empiricism", as James eventually called his philosophy, had two theses: first, that one pay attention to experience; second, that one pay attention to *all* aspects of experience, not just selected parts.[10] Analogously, Peirce harbored a deep distrust of the individual atomic unit, and was deeply influenced by Kant and Duns Scotus; his mature philosophy is very anti-nominalistic.[11] One of the main influences upon Dewey was Hegel – hardly an exemplar of traditional empiricism, unless, that is, one charges traditional empiricism with not being truly empirical. This is indeed the accusation brought by James. While conceding that we must pay attention to the lessons of empirical experience as checks on our flights of reason, James warns against assuming that experience comes with certain, clear-cut, primordial attributes, like 'permanence' and objectivity. James argues, as does Dewey, that if experience is to be used as the touchstone, then we cannot "fix the issue" in advance by asserting that certain things, learned in experience, are not really there at all. Experience must remain almost "unnamed", certainly not reduced to the logical, the atomic, or the sensory. Experience at the primordial level does not come parceled out into neat logical packets – sensory packets versus affective packets. Philosophers in the classic American tradition saw this clearly, as we shall see below, using James's doctrine of "pure experience" as an example. Further, precisely insofar as pragmatism, instrumentalism, etc. contain warnings against formal systems, they were reflections/idealizations of the way people in America had their experience before it was formulated in philosophy proper. In America, Boorstin has noted, "it took effort to avoid novelty".[12] In a formidable yet inviting, uncharacterizable yet pliant context, all opinions, all thoughts were experimental; all went to the marketplace. There were no sacred cows. If theological ideas, for example, were to be accepted as true, it was because they were useful. Window-dressing knowledge was not condoned. Even before there was a formal philosophic system proper in America, there was an attitude, a frame of mind, toward the teaching powers of experience. So long as experience was not taken in a preconceived fashion, experience could keep one from complacency. The thesis took hold that a person is rejuvenated through interaction with the context, with the land.

Admittedly, it is hard to get at this primordial experience. Language works against us. This is no new revelation – Socrates knew it and wrote nothing down. Plato knew it and chose a medium – the dialogue – wherein he would not be trapped by a view of language as an impartial description of reality. The American tradition also recognized the inability of language to grasp reality. Reality *is* becoming – a rich unfinished, pluralistic universe. The

American philosophers also used language in a more positive manner, not as impartial description but to lead, like a wedge, into the tissue of experience. In addition, they tried to formulate their philosophical systems in a manner commensurate with the way settlers had undergone their experience.

As an example of this prereflective American frame of mind, let us look at the pioneer sense of life on the frontier. The notion of frontier is reflective of the American experience. This term functions on at least two levels in American thought. First of all, it functions on a physical level, denoting a continuously shifting boundary – the "meeting place between savagery and civilization". It was Frederick Jackson Turner who suggested that any historical understanding of America was inadequate unless it included the notion of frontier or "west", as a seminal point. In Turner's opinion.

> What the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities, that the ever retreating Great West has been to the United States directly and to the nations of Europe more remotely.[13]

What is important about the frontier? Turner answers directly: "The most significant thing about the American frontier is, that it lies at the hinter edge of free land."[14] For Turner, land, freedom, and democracy are intertwined; so long as there is land, there is possibility, novelty; change is real. Already there is here the beginning of a "sub-text", a second level of meaning to the word "frontier". The word has a symbolic meaning as well as a literal one. Turner at times personifies the frontier; it becomes the "eternal feminine – symbolic of infinity". Several times the notions of rebirth and regeneration appear in his texts. One is rejuvenated through interaction with a context. This allows for novelty, which is continuous yet changing, never entirely the same, never entirely different. As Turner put it:

> Into this vast shaggy continent of ours poured the first feeble tide of European settlement. European men, institutions, and ideas were lodged in the American wilderness, and this great American west took them to her bosom ... she opened new provinces, and powered new democracies in her most distant domains with her material treasures ...[15]

As Henry Nash Smith remarks in his book *Virgin Land*, "Rebirth and regeneration are categories of myth rather than of economic analysis."[16] There are times indeed when Turner's idealization of the frontier seems to get out of hand, when his metaphors "threaten to become themselves a means of cognition and to supplant discursive reasoning ...",[17] rather than serving

as an aid to cognitive understanding. Nonetheless, Turner does not lapse completely into poetry, and does leave the reader caught up in unanswered questions. For , with all his mythologizing and emphasis on the frontier as a frame of mind, symbolic of growth through interaction, it is Turner himself who announces the close of the frontier.

> And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history.[18]

We would submit that Turner's hesitation as to whether the frontier was physical or mythic, or both, contains within itself the possibility of a historical-cultural outlook transcending its physical boundaries and becoming truly philosophical. If this is correct, progress can be made toward specifying more clearly the relationship of philosophy to its historical context.

THE RETURN TO THE BEGINNING

Turner's hesitation over whether the frontier is physical or mythic raises the question of whether he spoke only of the land, or was espousing the more general thesis that persons come into being through interacting with their contexts. In the second case, the context may well have shifted from an agrarian to an urban setting and the question arises: can an interactionist philosophy be developed with the city as context? Did Turner mean to say that the experimental dimension *per se* was gone, or that one historical instance of the experimental was gone?

The issue can be seen clearly in terms of the basic metaphors which we use to describe our cities. We speak of a "place to work" and mean by it a "pit" into which we have to descend five days a week. Cities have become urban mine shafts, which we appraise in terms of security and safety. The city like the mine is something to be stoically endured, not something to be transformed, and certainly not something to be aesthetically appreciated. Our attitude toward the city nowadays does not consider it to be in any sense a part of ourselves.

Are we, as John McDermott asserts, now "under obligation to develop an enriched understanding of the relationship between urban structure and urban person"?[19] Must we develop insight into the way space and time function in our cities, as we had previously understood how space and time stood for possibility and novelty when connected with nature? Is it the case that the " . . . city is now our home; in the most traditional and profound

sense of the word, it is our land?"[20] Can the importance of context, ostensively indicated by the historical frontier in America, be appropriated as a second-level concept, so that the true significance of the frontier is illustrative of contextualism in general? In that case, the historical American context would have global significance, not in the sense that other cultures reproduce American patterns, but rather in the sense that other cultures attend to context – their own in its present and past stages, and others via contrast. Perhaps this is what Dewey had in mind when he said:

> Many European critics openly judge American life from the standpoint of a dualism of the spiritual and the material, and deplore the primacy of the physical as fatal to any culture. They fail to see the depth and range of our problem, which is that of making the material an active instrument in the creation of life, of ideas and art . . . [I]f it is true, as some hold, that with the extension of machine technology and industrialism the whole world is becoming 'americanized", then the creation of an indigenous culture is no disservice to the traditional European springs of our spiritual life. It will signify, not ingratitude, but the effort to repay a debt.[21]

In sum, if American philosophy did anything, it placed the phenomenon of contextualism before world consciousness long enough for it to gain a momentum of its own, and in this sense to transcend its historical roots. In terms of the initial question, philosophical systems should be studied in and through their historical context. This is necessary but it is not sufficient. Philosophical systems, if they are adequate, must also be able to transcend the specific historical context in which they were born, transcend *not* in the sense of becoming acontextual, but rather in the sense of becoming highly contextual, of being applicable to other contexts, other settings, other epochs. Philosophy cannot transcend all contexts or contexts in general. However, it should be able to transcend the particular context which gave it birth.

From the above it is clear that the issue of context is at the very heart of the pre-reflective American experience. Furthermore, there exists today the danger of an uncritical acceptance of immediacy – precisely to the extent that thinkers do not preserve as thick a context as possible.

A question naturally arises concerning science and scientific procedure. Does scientific methodology preserve the thickness of contexts, or does it reify the primordial, lived experience to such an extent that the latter is unrecognizable, or worse, lost? Let us turn to this issue in some detail.

CHAPTER 12

SCIENCE AND PROGRESS

EXPLANATION, SCIENTIFIC AND/OR HISTORICAL: A TOTALLY MODERN PROBLEM?

The major objections to the view so far presented would center around the charge that it is subjectivistic, commits the genetic fallacy, is, in fact, anthropomorphic, is guilty of the intentionalist fallacy, and perhaps of a romantic "nature nostalgia". Against such charges from certainty-oriented philosophies like neo-Thomism, transcendental phenomenology, and some versions of Marxism, we would argue that explanations *as such* are partial, and the difference among philosophies is *not* that one of them has complete explanations and the others do not, but rather that one recognizes that explanations are partial and the others do not. This is but to reaffirm the importance of contextualism from another point of view.

Let us pursue the issue in detail by taking up the question "What constitutes an explanation, as opposed to a description?" More specifically, what makes an explanation "scientific", as opposed to "historical?" This question has been made famous by Carl Hempel in writings like 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation'.[1] For Hempel, science does go beyond mere description and explains phenomena. Scientific explanation consists in the sentence describing the phenomenon being deduced from the sentence(s) containing the laws and antecedent conditions. The *explanandum* must be a logical consequence of the *explanans*; the *explanans* must contain general laws, not just descriptive sentences. These general laws must actually be those required for the derivation. Note that this solves the problem of relevance in explanation but it does not limit relevance to a single law. The issue of how one selects among competing conceptualizations of the universe, when these are not distinguishable by reason alone, will resurface shortly. Finally, for Hempel, the *explanans* must have empirical content, i.e., it cannot be just a collection of tautological statements. If it were, it would not be capable of being *tested* by experimentation. It is essential that an explanation be testable if it is to be termed a "scientific" explanation. This requirement would, of course, render many of the so-called explanations in Thomism-Aristotelianism and Marxism inadequate, since they are compatible with any conceivable state of affairs.

Also, Hempel initially required that the *explanans* be *true*. However, he encountered the difficulty of how logically to say that a scientific law was *once* true and now is not true. This, remarks Hempel, does not accord with common usage; it seems illogical. Hempel decided that it is better to say that the law was never true. This avoids one problem but raises another. How is it that a law which was never true, was nonetheless used, and in some cases is still used, successfully? Hempel does not answer this in the article, though he later abandons the requirement that a law must be true.[2]

For our purposes, the important point to realize is that Hempel's logical model of scientific explanation is a very static model. The issue of truth becomes problematic because a correspondence theory is presupposed; truth is somehow supposed to be an antecedent. For the pragmatist, as we shall see, truth does mean agreement of an idea with reality, but agreement is not defined exclusively in terms of copying. Truth is not a relationship wherein a static idea copies a permanent, unchanging reality. As James will say, truth is *made*: the truth of an idea is its *process* of verification. For Hempel, on the contrary, time cannot appear in his logical model as an important item. The model applies equally well to predication and to retrodiction.

Hempel believes that his model of scientific explanation is *necessary*. For example, he says that the "observation of similarities has explanatory value only if it involves at least tacit reference to general laws".[3] Going further, Hempel believed that explanation outside of the physical sciences, e.g., in biology and history, and the social sciences, takes place only to the extent that it employs his model. Since many of the laws in these areas cannot be formulated with precision and generality at present, what one has is an "explanation sketch".

> What the explanatory analyses of historical events offer is . . . in most cases not an explanation . . . but something that might be called an *explanation sketch*. Such a sketch consists of a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial conditions considered as relevant, and it needs "filling out", in order to turn into a full-fledged explanation. This filling out requires further empirical research, for which the sketch suggests the direction.[4]

Going further, for Hempel, scientific explanation has nothing to do with empathetic understanding or with familiarity with the topic involved. This is clearly an attempt to separate the subjective and the objective dimensions of experience; psychological aspects of explanation are, in his opinion, neither necessary nor sufficient.

> . . . in history no less than in any other branch of empirical inquiry, scientific explanation

can be achieved only by means of . . . general hypotheses, or by theories . . . This thesis is clearly in contrast with . . . *the method of empathetic understanding* . . . [This empathy] does not in itself constitute an explanation; it rather is essentially a heuristic device; its function is to suggest psychological hypotheses which might serve as explanatory principles in the case under consideration . . . [This] procedure may sometimes prove heuristically helpful; but it does not guarantee the soundness of the historical explanation to which it leads . . . Nor is the use of this method indispensable for historical explanation . . . [A] "plausible" or "natural" . . . understanding . . . must clearly be separated from scientific understanding.[5]

On the one hand Hempel realizes that science has a more complex structure than was recognized by earlier positivists. All the terms of a theory cannot be operationally defined, and the strict sense of operationalism advocated by Bridgman is insufficient. Nonetheless, Hempel's position does reflect and further some of the basic tenets of the positivist position. Recall, for example, the basic position of A. J. Ayer in *Language, Truth, and Logic*[6]:

(a) if you know something you can put it into language.
(b) language can be neatly divided into (1) cognitively meaningful statements and (2) cognitively meaningless statements.
(c) a meaningful statement is one which has the possibility of being true or false.
(d) there are only two types of meaningful statements: (1) tautologies and (2) empirically verifiable propositions.
(e) all other statements are pseudo-statements, having only emotive, psychological meaning, as opposed to cognitive significance.

This position demands a clear division between objective and subjective statements and a further clear division between two types of "meaningful" statements. Language, then, has three isolated, insulated pieces: empirical statements, logical statements, and psychological statements. It is against just such a distinction, supposedly clean, clear, and distinct, that insistence on the importance of context argues. Several philosophers have argued that the lines between these linguistic domains are much vaguer than was initially thought, if indeed they exist at all. For example, in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine has held that the distinction between tautological, logical statements, and empirically verifiable statements cannot be adequately grounded or maintained; any statement, even an obviously empirical one, can be held as true come what may, if we are willing to make drastic enough changes elsewhere in our conceptual systems, if necessary by using *ad hoc* hypotheses.[7] The distinction between meaningful and meaningless has been questioned by Austin, who has shown that certain declarative sentences are not capable of being either true or false, yet appear to have meaning – for

example, the performative utterance: "I promise to be in class by 9:00" or "I baptize you in the name of the Father".[8] Frederick Waismann has shown us that language has "systematic ambiguity". "Statements may be *true* in different senses, *verifiable* in different senses, *meaningful* in different senses."[9]

We might well expect a parallel development to have taken place in the philosophy of science, and indeed we are not disappointed. Hempel's *logical model* of scientific explanation conceives of the philosophy of science in a narrow way as the *rational reconstruction* of the meaning of what a scientist did. In this outlook, science and the philosophy of science are completely distinct. Philosophy of science does not teach physics. Rather the philosophy of science deals with the meaning of a stated, written physical explanation. (By contrast, the neo-Thomist who does his philosophy of nature (see Chapter 7) in the Aristotelian tradition, would insist on the propositional content of his discipline.) For Hempel, "meaning" is restricted to "logical, formal significance". Two meanings of "meaning" which are excluded are (1) intention – what did the scientist want to say when he said "*X*?" (2) Effect – what was the result of the statement "*X*?" What did "*X*" mean in the long run, to me personally, to the world, etc.?

The most famous expression of this distinction was that of Hans Reichenbach. In *Experience and Prediction*, he distinguished between the "context of discovery" and the "context of justification".[10] The context of discovery includes social and psychological factors which surround the discovery of a scientific hypothesis. The context of justification, the domain of the philosophy of science, does not deal with these, but rather with logical relationships – deductive and inductive – between a given empirical statement and a scientific law from which that statement can be deduced.

Why was this distinction made? Once again to weed out the subjective from the objective. To show that philosophy, in this particular case the philosophy of science, was "respectable", because it dealt with objectivity, with certainty. Intention and effect have value-laden, emotive, perhaps even irrational dimensions. What role do dreaming, or imagination, or luck play in science? The waters are too muddy here. Prescinding from this set of problems, the logical reconstructionists hold that:

(1) meaning is formal, syntactical significance;
(2) the meaning of any scientific explanation can be rationally reconstructed as "*X*" is explained if and only if "*X*" is deducible from law *L* with antecendent conditions $C_1, C_2, \ldots C_n$.

This is narrow view of explanation. Proponents of the view would doubtless retort that it is the only meaningful view of explanation. We would submit that such a stance pays a high price for its achievements, namely a reification of the multi-dimensionality of the contextual situation; consequently, such a stance runs the risk of placing philosophy truly out of touch with reality. (Though some critics would argue that it never was in touch.) The view tends to preserve the same three distinctions found in Ayer and others, viz., the logical, the observational, and the psychological. More generally, this view is in its own way a perpetuation of the quest for certainty.

More recently, a reaction against this view has occurred in the philosophy of science. Philosophers have said that this first view, which I have termed the logical model, is too formal; that, like Bacon's spider, it spins its own theories out of itself, with little attention to the facts involved. Going further, these facts, when viewed in all their multi-dimensionality, are much less logical than they have been taken to be. This second model might be termed the *historical model*. It stresses the uncertainty of science, and its interpretative dimension. In an interesting article entitled 'Two Faces of Science', Ernan McMullin characterizes the difference in outlook in the following way:

> Where logical inference is discursive, interpretation is immediate, intuitive. Where inference is explicit, interpretation tends to be implicit, that is, cannot be reduced to explicit criteria. Where inference is formal, interpretation is material, dependent upon context, incapable of being expressed in a single abstract rule. Where inference is mechanizable, interpetation involves personal skills that do not lend themselves to mechanical simulation. Where inference is noncontroversial, interpretation can be very controversial indeed.
>
> The first point to note about interpretation, understood in this way, is that it is part of scientific *rationality*. The mistake of the logical positivists was to reduce rationality to logicality, in the hope of making scientific verification a simple and non-controversial affair, thus making possible a conveniently sharp line of demarcation between science and the fuzzier sorts of human activity.[11]

While the terminology employed is slightly different, it is clear the McMullin's interpretative "face" of science reintroduces a sense of ambiguity into scientific procedure, and explicitly rejects the subject-object dichotomy in science. One result of this will be also to reject any hard and fast split between science and history, or, better, between science and culture.

Such an outlook raises fundamental questions about the seemingly rational and inevitable "progress" of science, to which questions we now turn.

PROGRESS IN SCIENCE

By far the best known recent investigation of progress in the scientific tradition has been that of Thomas Kuhn. In the following pages we shall compare his view with that of Dewey, on the one hand, and of Marx, on the other. Each of these philosophers offers an illuminating contextualist outlook for science. However, Kuhn, James, and Dewey see their outlooks as contextualist. Going further, each of these philosophers advocates a different discipline as the primary one. James's outlook stems originally from his studies in psychology. But the results of his investigation require him to move into the area of metaphysics, and here his outlook is similar enough to Dewey so that we may concentrate on the latter in our comparison.[12] Kuhn upholds sociology as the primary discipline and Marx economics. Dewey, while advocating the importance of biology, ultimately argues for a contextual metaphysic in which the base remains indeterminate, and essentially so.

A rather different interpretation is found in some Soviet analyses of contextualism. Kuhn and Dewey are clearly recognized as contextualists; i.e., from the Soviet point of view they are subjectivistic and positivistic, unable to explain properly the changes which take place in reality. Marx, on the other hand, is viewed as a philosopher who saw the importance of different socio-economic contexts, but who ultimately advocated objective laws of historical progress.

The Kuhnian Model

In the *Copernican Revolution* Thomas Kuhn presents a lucid account of a scientific revolution; namely, the transition from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican worldview. His challenge to the philosophical tradition is in the mode of Wittgenstein: we have been bewitched by language. We have falsely assumed that "the Copernican revolution" referred to an instantaneous, univocal event. In opposing this outlook, Kuhn advocates two points again and again. First, he persistently refuses to adopt any version of what we might call "the subject/object dichotomy", i.e., clearly to divorce the psychological from the observational/logical. Secondly, Kuhn consistently maintains that the Copernican revolution was inherently interdisciplinary, that it was not the work of one man, did not take place at one time, and most importantly did not take place within one discipline, or even within the confines of science. The revolution had religious, astrological, and political dimensions.[13]

In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn generalizes his case study

into a theory about change in the history of science. His position can be summarized as follows. Science is not, as a whole, incremental; indeed, science does not exist as a whole. Rather it is to be divided into two types of science – revolutionary science and normal science.[14] Normal science is science based upon an assumed "paradigm", a term employed frequently and not univocally by Kuhn.[15] Apparently, a paradigm is a model or standard illustration or scientific achievement which includes law and theory and application and instrumentation together and is more basic than any of these.[16] Normal science is cumulative because progress is defined in terms of the already assumed paradigm. "Revolutionary science" describes what occurs as we move from one paradigm to another. Such movement is cataclysmic. We leap holistically from one framework to another by a process not capable of completely rational explanation. In some sense, a conversion experience is involved.[17] In other words, there is no meaning invariance (e.g., in terms of a common observation language) which endures the transition from one paradigm to another. It follows that science as a whole is not cumulative, since no transformation rules can be articulated which connect the various paradigms. We are left with a sort of social atomism, wherein one paradigm replaces another for reasons which are not completely clear. Objectivity is not to be found in this analysis, since normal science is ideological and revolutionary science is not completely rational. The fact that the transition from one paradigm to another is not deducible in any sense would seem to indicate that no one discipline occupies a position of meaning invariance.

In a postscript written seven years after the book, Kuhn attempts to defend his position against charges of vagueness and irrationality. The most important aspect of these charges concerns Kuhn's use of "paradigm". He has been accused of employing the term in so equivocal a fashion that it means everything and nothing. Kuhn recognizes an element of this charge as true; namely that the term was used circularly. "A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, *and* conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.[18] This gave rise to the question: does the discovery of a paradigm entail the discovery of a scientific community, or can one identify a scientific community *and then* look at its assumed paradigm? Kuhn's answer here is clear: "Scientific communities can and should be isolated without recourse to paradigms".[19] That is, via sociological research one can identify members of a specific scientific community in terms of similar education, professional initiations, the use of a common body of literature, conferences attended, common vocabulary, etc.

After the community has been identified, we can analyze what it assumes in common. Here Kuhn makes an additional distinction. One can sociologically identify "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on"[20] shared by members of an *already* sociologically identified scientific community. This is termed a "disciplinary matrix". A disciplinary matrix includes such items as formal structure, shared values (simplicity, consistency, etc.) and use of an "exemplar".[21] This last term is Kuhn's revised equivalent to paradigm, and refers to the "concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific education, whether in laboratories, on examinations, or at the ends of chapters in science texts".[22]

While this analysis is certainly lucid and interesting, one cannot help being surprised at the fundamental role now accorded to sociology. Not only will sociology play a fundamental role in explaining the disciplinary matrices of science, now it is accorded the honor of identifying the base, i.e., of articulating the foundation upon which the paradigmatic ideologies of science have been constructed. Clearly the interdisciplinary thesis has been rejected, or at least one discipline has emerged as much more important than others. Also, it seems that the identification of those communities is value free, i.e., does not involve the use of a paradigm.

Kuhn would, without doubt, reject this conclusion; he admits his argument is circular, but does not believe the circularity is vicious. "The consequences of the viewpoint being discussed are not exhausted by the observations upon which it rested at the start."[23] But the circularity is vicious to the extent that a reduction of the context has taken place. In the specification of the set of problems, Kuhn has arrived at a position where the indeterminate multidimensionality of the context has been reified to the stage wherein it is primarily sociological.

The Marxian Model

In the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx offers the reader a compendium of his basic position on the "materialist conception of history". In his opinion, legal relations, for example, are not self-sustaining or self-understandable; rather, "they are rooted in the material (economic) conditions of life".[24] In this, legal relations are typical of a whole series of disciplines, including politics and philosophy, which emerge as part of a superstructure, the latter being built upon the base which is economic. As Marx put it:

In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material [economic] powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society – the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material [economic] life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.[25]

Clearly, on this analysis, one discipline – economics – has emerged as value-free. The others are tinged with ideology. When the economic foundation changes, the superstructure is also transformed, though more or less rapidly. More importantly, in looking at changes from one economic structure or paradigm to another, one should always make a distinction between the material change of the economic base, "which can be determined with the precision of natural science"[26] and the superstructural parts, i.e., the legal, political, religious, or philosophic. The latter are the ideological forms "in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out".[27]

This position clearly gives priority to the economic base. Initially, it might appear that all the influence proceeds from the base to the superstructure. But such an interpretation was denied by Engels in his 1890 letter to J. Bloch. Here Engels insists on a weaker version of the materialist (economic) theory:

According to the materialist [economic] conception of history, the *ultimately* determining element is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I has ever asserted. Hence, if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the *only* determining one he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase.[28]

Engels here offers a more interactional version of the theory, wherein aspects of the superstructure can "turn around" so to speak, and influence the base. Politics, then, does have a role to play, but the economic assumptions and conditions are ultimately decisive.

While this version of the theory is more sophisticated and allows for consciousness to operate as more than an epiphenomenon, nonetheless it does not avoid the difficulties of specifying one discipline as constituting the base in a univocal fashion. As Richard DeGeorge has noted, economics does not come to us so neatly packaged as to allow any objective interpretation to the base/superstructure theory.

> . . . it is not clear precisely what it [the theory] means. How are "economic" conditions determined and how are they intelligibly kept separate from labor laws, ethical concepts, and the like, with which Marx seems to admit they interact?[29]

As a heuristic device via which to focus upon specific factors, the economic base/ideological superstructure thesis is useful. But to claim for it precision and scientific objectivity seems quite unwarranted.

> That the superstructure changes as the base changes is something of a tautology, for society as a whole seems to change and develop. But that one determines the other is something else.[30]

In sum, regarding the relations between a specific base and superstructure, there seems ultimately to be some latitude, and also some ambiguity. But the laws concerning the relationship or development from one base to another seem to be a different matter. As Marx says in the first preface to *Capital*:

> Intrinsically it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the material [economic] laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.[31]

It would seem that the transformation from one economic base paradigm to another is deterministic. Marx adopts a dialectical model wherein one base, after it develops to its greatest extent, is replaced by another. "No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed."[32] Marx designates the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal and the modern period as epochs in the progressive development of society.[33] These transitions are not merely processive; they are progressive; they point towards the ideal and inevitable post-capitalist state. This dialectical approach emphasizes the disjunctive transitions between one economic base and another. Economic interests are antagonistically interpreted. The cataclysmic interpretation of economic evolution is joined with a deterministic outlook, whose predictions are supposedly empirically testable. The two-fold claim for empirical testability and inevitability exposes this position to the charge of not being capable of falsification, and hence meaningless.[34] Such a result would not be damaging in a conventional outlook, but in one claiming necessity in history it is serious indeed. Thoug Marx claims scientific precision here, he seems to be both prescriptive and descriptive, though unconsciously so.

The major difference between Marx and Kuhn then, is two-fold. First, each singles out a different discipline which constitutes the base. Second, both have arguments that are circular rather than objective. However, Kuhn realizes that his argument is circular, but Marx does not, at least not clearly and not all the time. In neither case is the circular argument worthless, from a pragmatic point of view. For in both cases considerable light is cast on aspects of the human condition.

The Deweyian Model

Dewey's view of philosophy is intimately connected with his view of science, or more specifically, his view of scientific method. His charge is that philosophy has gotten out of touch with experience and can only be restored or recovered by extending the scientific method into areas of human concern like ethics, politics, and esthetics.[35] Let us examine Dewey's thesis in detail.

For Dewey, philosophy is not a self-subsistent study; it reflects and perfects via critical analysis the concerns and values of a specific community.

> ... the distinctive office, problems and subject matter of philosophy grow out of the stresses and strains in the community life in which a given form of philosophy arises, and ... accordingly, its specific problems vary with the changes in human life that are always going on and that at times constitute a crisis and a turning point in human history.[36]

From this perspective it follows that there is no such entity as a non-contextual philosophy. The attempt to find such an outlook is actually an attempt to find certainty. Such an outlook would transcend all contexts and as such would be relevant to none. When "context is taken into account, it is seen that every generalization occurs under limiting conditions set by the contextual situation".[37] Certainty must be rejected as a quest, for it fosters several false dualisms. The most important of these is the subject/object dichotomy, the ripping of an organism out of its specific environmental context so as to see him or her as an impartial spectator viewing experience or being in a detached objective fashion. Philosophy, when it offers such a view as optimal, is advocating the rejection of context; " ... the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context".[38]

This criticism has two prongs. First, what is the specific context of philosophy now? Second, how does this compare and contrast with other contextual situations?

For Dewey, Darwin's *Origin of Species* is a watershed in philosophy. It marks a turning point in human culture. Change in intellectual history takes place in two ways: usually, there is merely an advance in knowledge about old conceptions. At other times, however, intellectual change is qualitative; old ideas, old problems have not been solved, but they are no longer considered important; they are abandoned. Such qualitative change occurred, in Dewey's opinion, with the appearance of Darwin's thesis.[39] Prior to Darwin, the conception of "species" reigned supreme in philosophy and with it the notions of fixed form and of final cause. Change was viewed as indicative of defect and unreality. This was undermined by Darwin. The perfect is no longer identified with the fixed and absolute. As a result, a post-Darwinian world is a truly experimental world, where change and process are real. Transitions are at least as important as substances.

> The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and life. When he said of species what Galileo had said of the earth, *e pur si mouve*, he emancipated, once for all, genetic and experimental ideas as an organ of asking questions and looking for explanations.[40]

In such a context, a method must be employed which can deal with novelty, a method which identifies inquiry with discovery of the new rather than repetition of the old. Such a method can be found in the recent development of science. Dewey advocates that the *form* of this method, as opposed to specific content, serve as a model. The scientific method, whose origin began with Bacon's intuition that knowledge is power,[41] has the following characteristics: first, it is future rather than past oriented. Ideas, *qua* hypotheses, are to be tried out, not received uncritically. Second, it advocates the interpenetration of thought and action. To have an idea is insufficient; one must act upon it in the laboratory. Third, it is communal or cooperative. Individuals, left to themselves, will simply repeat the experiments of other scientists, or worse, fall into self-deception. Finally, the method is self-corrective. It does not demand certainty but recognizes the novel and the precarious. The method "learns from failures as from successes".[42]

While advocating this as a model, however, Dewey realized that old frameworks would not simply go away, and indeed the new outlook would be resisted for psychological reasons as well as logical ones.

> Men cannot easily throw off their old habits of thinking, and never can throw off all of them at once. In developing, teaching and receiving new ideas, we are compelled to use

some of the old ones as tools of understanding and communication. Only piecemeal, step-by-step, could the full import of the new science be grasped.[43]

So, while the disjunctive transitions must be articulated, thereby indicating a new context, this cannot be done in a totally cataclysmic manner, but rather must be approached dialectically, by indicating what the old context(s) were and how the new is continuous, how different. One reason this approach is necessary is because a philosopher cannot make a context a complete object of reflection.[44] He is involved with what he looks at. However, the philosopher can recognize the existence of a background, a context, and so at least refrain from making dogmatic, non-contextual generalizations. Subjectivity can be avoided by comparing the present specific context to others. This brings us to the second prong of Dewey's interpretation of philosophy. Here the focal point is his analysis of "experience".

For Dewey, there are three historic conceptions of "experience": the Greek, the modern (Locke), and the contemporary (still developing). For the Greek, experience was the "accumulated information of the past, not merely the individual's own past but the social past, transmitted through language and even more through apprenticeship in the various crafts".[45] Experience was basically a type of knowledge acquired via practice, or habit. As such, experience began to be contrasted with a higher type of knowledge; namely, causal analysis. " ... experience and empirical knowledge were set in very definite contrast with science, since science meant ... understanding or rational comprehension."[46] In sum, experience consists of information accumulated via repetition; as such it is not the final court of appeal. Experience is not self-sustaining; reason and science are self-sustaining.

John Locke's notion of experience reverses this outlook. Not reason but experience is self-sustaining. "What had passed for rational truths seemed ... infected with stale repetition and bland acceptance of authority. In contrast 'experience' suggested something fresh and personal ... "[47] There is a tendency to view the individual, the atomic, as the "really real", and the general, or the universal as an abstraction. For Locke, experience is observational; it proceeds through the senses. We see one "idea" at a time. These are immediately impinged on our retina and we are passive. "What characterizes sensation and observation, and hence experience, is, in Locke's thought, their coerciveness".[48] Here experience is the final court of appeal; it functions in a critical fashion. Experience serves as that to which thought is ultimately reducible. Our intellectualizations or constructed ideas are

subject to the check of experience. As developed in Locke's successors, the outlook became particularistic and nominalistic. Ironically, this "empirical" outlook is actually anti-scientific. Sensationalism cannot explain experimentation in science. "For all experiment involves regulated activity, directed by ideas ... "[49] Scientific theories are not merely descriptions of sensations or copies of observations. Therefore, either science does not depend upon experience or experience must be articulated in a different fashion.

The notion of experience in our present context is still more or less inchoate, because it is still in the making. It can be partially characterized as biological rather than introspectionist. Viewed in a biological context, experience is interaction, "an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment".[50] Experience is now seen as experimental, as "an effort to change the given; it is characterized by projection, by reaching forward toward the unknown; connection with a future is its salient trait".[51] As experimental, experience recognizes *both* the disjunctive and conjunctive transitions; viewed as an "undergoing of an environment and a striving for its control in new directions [experience] is pregnant with connections".[52] It is inferential. This outlook is a sustained attempt by Dewey to present a view of experience that is beneath the subject/object dichotomy and the thought/action dichotomy. These retrospective categorizations cannot do justice to the primordial event. That event is interaction, simultaneous doings and sufferings.[53]

Experience for Dewey then is considerably broadened. It includes the Greek notion of accumulated information and the Lockean notion of experience as the final court of appeal. But experience is not relegated to being a matter of knowledge. A complex interaction of the concrete organism with the environment is envisaged. Here we return full circle to Dewey's realization that a context cannot be a *complete* object of reflection.[54] Dewey has tried to avoid subjectivity by establishing *both* the disjunctive and the conjunctive transitions between the contemporary context of experience and its predecessors. He specifically tries to preserve as fact a context for the contemporary notion of experience as possible. Given that this current interpretation is experimental, no certainty claim can be made; but by preserving a multidisciplinary analysis Dewey wants to avoid having one discipline become the "ground", or turn into a new form of certainty:

Biology, psychology, including social psychology and psychiatry, anthropology, all

afford indications as to the nature of this structure [of experience], and these indications were never so numerous and so wanting for use as now. Those who try to interpret these indications may run the risk of being regarded by some older philosophers as not philosophers at all. They may, however, console themselves with the reflection that they are concerning themselves with that inclusive and pervasive context of experience in which philosophical thinking must, for good or ill, take place, and without reference to which such thinking is in the end but a beating of wings in the void.[55]

Soviet Interpretation of Kuhn, James, Dewey, and Marx

Soviet commentators often indicate keen awareness of the contextualism issue. However, they see the problem as much more important in Kuhn, James, and Dewey than in Marx.

B. Pružinin, for example, critically analyzes Kuhn's portrayal of the "tacit knowledge" utilized by members of a scientific community.[56] For Kuhn, issues are not settled in terms of logical appraisal, which can always be called into question, but by the concrete, scientific activities which function as paradigms. To learn science is to accept the predominant paradigm of the community. In such an outlook there is no logical comparison of the paradigm with experience. To the extent that an activity appears as anomalous or non-lawful, it leads to the destruction of the accepted paradigm of normal science.

Pružinin admits that Kuhn's analysis succeeds in unifying the social and cognitive aspects of rational scientific activity. But, in his opinion, Kuhn pays a high price for this achievement. The cognitive is dominated by the social. Kuhn's insistence that science is not a sphere of free application of cognitive aptitudes is accepted as correct. However, he is accused of interpreting scientific rationality simply as a way of logically organizing experience. This is rejected as unsatisfactory, as a continuation of positivistic empiricism rather than a new breakthrough. Kuhn is accused of making the rationality of science merely a problem of linguistic activity; therefore, Pružinin asserts, he has given us only a "postscript" to positivism.

In short, Kuhn is seen as a subjective contextualist; in addition, he is viewed as giving sociology the primary role in the specification of a context. However, he is accused of still not being able to explain transitions from context to context, but rather of only being able descriptively to organize experience like the positivists. Kuhn's analyses of sociology are regarded as perpetuating an old form of subjectivity instead of attaining a new form of objectivity. The Soviets are convinced that overemphasis on the sociological

dimension will not solve the profound philosophical issues raised by Kuhn in his analysis of paradigms.

John Dewey is also construed as a subjective contextualist. Mitroxin maintains that Dewey constructed and analyzed experience as the sole actual reality.[57] The external world exists only in so far as it forms the content of experience. He recalls Dewey's statement that things known are inseparable from the knowing subject. Going further, scientific entities for Dewey are constructs used in the "creation" of reality. Dewey strove to avoid the charge of subjectivism by describing the process of knowledge as the general, existential reorganization of a situation. But in the end, reality for Dewey is that which has practical meaningfulness. He views thinking as a biological ability which arises as a practical recourse in the war for survival. But, Mitroxin charges, "practical" for Dewey denotes only the needs and interests of the individual; the material-social context is excluded. For Dewey, Mitroxin asserts, logic is reduced to biology and science to the assembling of adaptive reactions.

Dewey, of course, is seen as a main proponent of the pragmatic theory of truth, which views scientific understanding, laws, hypotheses, etc. merely as instruments, created for the purpose of dealing with a given situation. Lenin is quoted as a major critic of this mode of American philosophy. Pragmatism allegedly ridicules the metaphysics both of materialism and idealism, praises experience and only experience and recognizes practice as the sole criterion. A. G. Spirkin reiterates the theme that pragmatism "considers all theoretical constructions from the point of view of their practical advantage for the individual, independently of their relation to reality.[58]

From the above, we can see that Dewey is held to be a subjective idealist, a person who describes the contents of various individual experiences. This is contextualism. Further, the biological aspects of Dewey's contextualism are taken to imply that he tended to reduce the specification of a context to its biological characteristics. But Dewey would never accept an analysis of his biological contextualism as individualistic; his entire philosophy, with its heavy Hegelian flavor, was extremely suspicious of isolated individuals existing in a "laissez-faire" manner. Furthermore, Dewey asserted that the cognitive mode is *not* the only way in which the subject stands in relation to experience.[59] The "really real" is broader than the known. Finally, Dewey does explain how we move from one notion of "experience" to another; his analysis emphasizes both the disjunctive and the conjunctive aspects of the transition. What he does *not* assert is that any given transition *had* to occur.

The Soviet analysis of Marx is much more difficult to unravel since it is inextricably interwined with Marxism-Leninism. On the one hand, the whole thrust of "party-mindedness" would seem to indicate the existence of some form of contextualism, i.e., each philosophical position is to be evaluated in terms of whose class interests it advocates. As Spirkin declares,

> any world outlook reflecting in one way or another nature and social reality is at the same time the reflection of the interests of definable classes and parties.[60]

In addition, the emphasis on concreteness, on actual practice in a situation, would seem to emphasize context.

> Dialectical materialism teaches that there is no abstract truth, that truth is always concrete, that any fact of natural and social reality must be approached historically . . . The only correct scientific criterion of truth is practice.[61]

On the other hand, whatever contextualism is to be found here is eviscerated by the Soviet position that the laws of history are inevitable.

> The Marxist-Leninist world outlook is all-powerful because it rightly reflects the general laws of being and thought, the objective tendencies of the progressive development of society . . . [62]

In the *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija* article on Marx, Lenin stresses the ultimately objective character of the analysis.[63] With the extension of a materialist conception of history into the area of social influences, previous historical theory was significantly strengthened. Prior to this, only the ideological motives of people were studied. The cause of these motives, i.e., the objective regularity of systems of relations, the roots of these relations in the rise of material production, were not considered. The activity of the masses was not properly comprehended. In short, pre-Marxist sociology consisted mainly in a mere accumulation of facts, gathered in bits and pieces, and descriptions of divided sides of the historical process. Marxism, by contrast, advocated a universal, all-sided study of the origin, rise, and decline of socio-economic conditions, looking at the totality of conflicting tendencies, removing any subjectivism or arbitrariness that would be involved in the selection of one idea or interpretation as the predominant one. People create their own history, Lenin teaches; but Marx turned his attention to the cause of their motives, to the objective conditions of material (economic) production, which create the basis of all historical activity of people, and to the laws of the rise of these conditions. Marx showed the need for the study of history as a united law-governed process, in all its many-sidedness and contradictions.

Though some contextualism is allowed in this analysis, the ultimately deciding factor seems to be the laws of history, and these are capable of objective elucidation. Whatever contextualism Marx exhibits is primarily economic or socio-economic. Any admission that Marx was a strong contextualist would, of course, have a direct effect upon the alleged inevitability of the historical process. In the final analysis, the contextual gives way to the non-contextual.

Each of the philosophers we have examined is greatly influenced by "science", though there is no agreement among them as to what science is. Each represents the context from which thought is derived as important. Different articulations of basically similar outlooks are given. Thought, including philosophy, originates in a wider, more primordial, life situation. Marx presents a different kind of philosophy from the traditional objective, self-justifying model, but sometimes seems to "relapse" into a form of economic determinism. Kuhn presents a similar, anti-objective model, but also seems sometimes to advocate a new form of objective base, namely sociology.

Dewey also presents a contextual model, again intentionally; at times biology seems to constitute the base. However, sometimes Dewey's model is more relativistic in that the base is occupied by different disciplines at different times. In other words, the base is indeterminate, and this remains its essential characteristic. Dewey, at times, showed too great a faith in the scientific method. He appears too optimistic about its extension into other areas of human endeavor. Kuhn shows that there exists an irrational dimension in science as well as in other disciplines. He keeps us from viewing the scientific method as another version of the quest for certainty. But Kuhn comes close to advocating his own version of certainty in terms of a sociological base. Here Dewey is more adequate, in terms of the model common to these three thinkers. Only with an indeterminate base is a contextualist outlook preserved in its full vigor.

The instance of science serves as an entrée into the more general issues of methodology, to which we now turn.

CHAPTER 13

MAKING LOGIC PRACTICAL

FROM LOGIC TO METHODOLOGY

In the American school, traditional logic was viewed as inadequate. Dewey, for example, calls for a "logic of discovery, not a logic of argumentation, proof and persuasion".[1] He agrees with Bacon that learning consists in the growth of knowledge, and as such cannot be accomplished by syllogistic demonstration of what is *already known*. Classic logic is inherently conservative, emphasizing and falling back on the authority and intellectual achievements of the past.

> . . . any logic which identified the technique of knowing with demonstration of truths already possessed by the mind, blunts the spirit of investigation and confines the mind within the circle of traditional learning.[2]

By contrast, Dewey's logic of discovery looks toward the future and does not assume inevitable repetition but rather is self-corrective enough to allow for novelty.

The old logic emphasized the eternal and the universal to the detriment of the changing, the specific, the concrete (cf. Chapter 8, above). With a new methodology, great store would be placed on the idea of progrees. The modern man of science "does not try to define and delineate something remaining constant *in* change. He tries to describe a constant order *of* change."[3] In short, Dewey calls for a new method which is future rather than past oriented, is flexible enough to be self-corrective, demands the interpenetration of thought and action, and fourthly, advocates a communal approach to the problems at hand.[4] Such an approach, he believes, can be found in the scientific method.

This is not to say that Dewey rejected logic *per se*. But he did hold that logic is an affair of practical moment, defined by its function or purpose. For Dewey " . . . formal conceptions arise out of . . . ordinary transactions; they are not imposed upon them from on high or from any external and *a priori* source."[5] Logic then is not to be viewed as essentially transcendental and intuitional; rather it is situated within the larger context, termed the

"pattern of inquiry". An indeterminate situation becomes a "problematic" one through the application of inquiry.

> Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.[6]

Once an indeterminate situation has been transformed into a problematic one, it is half solved; being able to specify the problem already puts one in sight of the solution. In this processive pattern, "Logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry."[7] Finally, the forms which arise from the situation themselves become " . . . formative; they regulate the proper conduct of the activities out of which they develop."[8] Dewey rejects traditional dualisms regarding logic versus empirical reality and, instead, attempts to demonstrate how logic is better seen within the wider context of the interaction of organism and environment. In such a portrayal, logic is necessary, but it is not sufficient.

For William James, also, logic has a function, but is not sufficient in and of itself. This can be seen most clearly in his scattered remarks on language, although he never worked out a theory of language in detail. His interpretation has to be carefully culled from many different texts. Furthermore, the situation is complicated because there are two levels to James' view on language.[9]

The first level is the one most familiar to readers of James. Several times throughout his works, James simply dismisses language as inadequate to deal with reality; "language works against our perception of the truth",[10] he says in *The Principles of Psychology*.

> We name our thoughts simply, each after its thing, as if each really knew its own thing and nothing else. What each really knows is clearly the thing it is named for, with dimly perhaps a thousand other things.[11]

When James took language "at face value" so to speak, he found it terribly inadequate; it froze the ongoing flux of experience. Most importantly, it bewitches by giving false certainty; it implies that the really real and the definitional are coextensive. As such, language is oppressive; it cuts us off from dimensions of experience. In this perspective, James rejected language.

However, James also realized (at least at times) that language, while insufficient, is also necessary. "If we lost our stock of labels we should be intellectually lost in the midst of the world."[12] Language cannot be rejected outright though it cannot itself contain the really real. What is to be done?

Obviously, language can be used in a good and a bad way, an insulating and a liberating way. On a second level, James, realizing that language is important though not to be taken for granted, gives hints as to how to use language in a positive fashion. Specifically, James recognized that meanings vary from context to context; he was cognizant of the intentional (or illocutionary) aspect of discourse, and he saw some sentences as essentially "directional" rather than merely descriptive.

To begin with, James emphatically opposes the notion that one word has one meaning, irrespective of contextual nuances. He suggests that if

> ... language must ... influence us, the agglutinative languages, and even Greek and Latin with their declensions, would be better guides. Names did not appear in them inalterable, but changed their shape to fit the context in which they lay.[13]

James gives some examples of contextual importance in his works. In *The Principles*, he says:

> When I use the word *man* in two different sentences, I may have both times exactly the same sound upon my lips and the same picture in my mental eye, but I may mean, and at the very moment of uttering the word and imagining the picture, know that I mean, two entirely different things. Thus when I say: "What a wonderful man Jones is!", I am perfectly aware that I mean by man to exclude Napoleon Bonaparte or Smith. But when I say: "What a wonderful thing Man is!", I am equally well aware that I mean to *in*clude not only Jones but Napoleon and Smith as well.[14]

This passage develops both the intentional and contextual aspects of language. In either case, a main point seems to be that language is not an objective copy of reality. It does not exist as an "object" at all: a much more subtle relationship, an overlapping one between subject, language, and reality, would seem more adequate. There is a sense in which man creates reality by naming it, by moulding it linguistically. This may pose new problems but it renders inadequate the doctrine that the only purpose of language is the impartial and complete description of events.

Another example is the text in *Pragmatism* where James tries to articulate the meaning of a statement like "The world is one":

> ... granting the oneness to exist, what facts will be different in consequence? ... Many distinct ways in which a oneness predicated of the universe might make a difference, come to view ... (1) ... [as] one subject of discourse ... (2) [as] continuous ... (3) ... Lines of *influence* can be traced by which they hang together ... (4) [in terms of] causal unity ... (5) [as] generic unity ... (6) [in terms of] unity of purpose ... (7) [as] aesthetic union, (8) [in terms of] one knower ... 'The world is One', therefore,

just so far as we experience it to be concatenated. One by as many definite conjunctions as appear. But then also *not* One by just as many definite *dis*junctions as we find. It is neither a universe pure and simple nor a multiverse pure and simple.[15]

The meaning of "one" is not univocal for James, nor is it simply equivocal; for there exist rather *concatenated* "family resemblances" among all of the above meanings of "one", but they cannot be reduced to one basic meaning. The way to ascertain the meaning of "one" is contextual. The emphasis is on richness as opposed to reductionism. (One may contrast the flexibility of James' approach with the sharpness of the Scholastic distinction regarding analogy and the predicaments (see Chapter 10).)

The importance of context is closely aligned with a second aspect of James' positive views on language – the fact that language has a leading function to perform, and more importantly, that the latter cannot be divorced from the word or sentence, as the case may be. "[N]ames are just as 'true' or 'false' as definite mental pictures are. They set up similar verification processes, and lead to fully equivalent practical results."[16]

James expresses this view in a slightly different manner in *The Principles*, where he notes the leading or directive function of language.

The feeling of an absence is *toto coelo* other than the absence of feeling . . . large tracts of human speech are nothing but signs of direction in thought, of which direction we nevertheless have an acutely discriminative sense, though no definite sensorial image plays any part in it whatsoever.[17]

Language then is directive, and it should be so viewed. Each word, each sentence points beyond itself. James quotes Joubert approvingly: "We only know just what we have meant to say, after we have said it."[18]

At this second level, then, James approaches language more positively. He realizes its inadequacy but also its necessity. Furthermore, he articulates some aids to keep from taking language for granted, viz., taking language as contextual, as unfinished, and pointing beyond itself.

From the above it seems clear that James viewed any language, including the ideal language of logic, as providing only a partial specification of the really real, as not being able to deal completely with the flux of experience. And indeed in *A Pluralistic Universe*, we find this view clearly stated.

For my own part, I have finally found myself compelled to *give up the logic*, fairly, squarely, and irrevocably. It has an imperishable use in human life, but that use is not to make us theoretically acquainted with the essential nature of reality . . . Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it. If you like to employ words eulogistically as most men do, and

so encourage confusion, you may say that reality obeys a higher logic, or enjoys a higher rationality. But I think that even eulogistic words should be used rather to distinguish than to commingle meanings, so I prefer bluntly to call reality if not irrational then at least nonrational in its constitution, – and by reality here I mean reality where things *happen*, all temporal reality without exception. I myself find no good warrant for even suspecting the existence of any reality of a higher denomination than that distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of reality which we finite beings swim in. That is the sort of reality given us, and that is the sort with which logic is so incommensurable.[19]

So, James realizes that logic and language are necessary even though sometimes insulating. Moreover, James was willing to ascribe a "primarily theoretical function to our intellect",[20] and not condone simple reductionism. However, he believes that the intellect as such cannot deal with the whole of reality, though it cannot avoid dealing with part of it.

Thought deals thus solely with surfaces. It can name the thickness of reality, but it cannot fathom it, and its insufficiency here is essential and permanent, not temporary.[21]

In this position, the really real is greater than the conceptual. More importantly, it is greater than the possibly conceptual. The really real cannot be completely put into thought, or more specifically into language. Yet James' own example shows that language is necessary to deal with the really real. It follows that the really real is only available through language, but the language user must transcend the limitations of language, must show the insufficiency of language itself.

Thus, both James and Dewey see logic and language as necessary but reject it as sufficient. Both emphasize the broad metaphysical context wherein logic is found. Both view the "really real" as broader than the logical. Finally, both articulate methodologies which try to reflect this ever-changing status of a process universe. That methodology is most commonly known as pragmatism, to which we now turn.

THE PRAGMATIC METHOD

Pragmatism is usually viewed as originating with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce, too, viewed traditional logic as inadequate. First of all, logic is not self-sufficient, but rather takes place within the doubt-inquiry-belief-action matrix Peirce made famous in the articles 'The Function of Belief' and 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear'. For Peirce, logical inquiry arises as an attempt to deal with the irritation of doubt; when a new belief is reached, inquiry terminates and a new habit of action is formed. In this scenario,

all thought is "purposive". "The object of reasoning is to find out, from consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know".[22] Peirce rejected any claims to validity based solely upon logical familiarity. Attempts to fix belief simply on personal preferences (tenacity), authority, or the supposed inconceivability of an alternative (the *a priori*) are also rejected. Peirce demands a way of fixing belief which is itself subject to the press of experience, of the really real. Such is the method of science, or pragmatism. "The test of whether I am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the application of the method".[23]

As noted above, the purpose of inquiry is to fix a belief. Going further, if two beliefs alleviate the same doubt by producing the same habit of action, then they are identical; here we witness the birth of pragmatism.

> Our idea of anything *is* our idea of its sensible effects; . . . Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[24]

Initially, Peirce presented a rather positivistic description of the pragmatic method. In the well-known example of the pragmatic meaning of calling a diamond "hard", he tells the reader that there "is absolutely no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test".[25] (Positivism would run counter to the spirit of Thomistic predicamental perspectives, which view qualities (see Chapter 10, above) as accidents inhering in a substance.) This position, if vigorously maintained, would ultimately commit Peirce to strict operational definitions, and furthermore, to nominalism. In such an outlook, "generals" would be viewed as mere abstractions and "disposition terms" in science would not be properly defined. Ultimately, laws in science would be seen as mere duplications of physical phenomena. As such, they would be expendable on pragmatic grounds as superfluous. Peirce, himself a trained scientist, could never accept such a position, so he eventually indicated that the pragmatic method was *not* to be taken in a neutral positivistic sense.

> . . . the question is, not what *did* happen, but whether it would have been well to engage in any line of conduct whose successful issue depended upon whether that diamond *would* resist an attempt to scratch it, or whether all other logical means of determining how it ought to be classed *would* lead to the conclusion which, to quote the very words of the article, would be the "belief which alone could be the result of the investigation carried *sufficiently far*".[26]

The above text is quite important because it clearly indicates Peirce's emphasis upon the subjunctive; pragmatism then is *not* a neutral epistemology; it is to be associated with a metaphysical stance of scholastic realism, wherein the reality of generals is asserted. Or as Peirce put it " . . . possibility is sometimes of a real kind".[27] Thus, at least in some of his later writings, Peirce presents a non-neutral pragmatic epistemology, one where the really real is not presently coextensive with the known, but a view wherein it remains possible that the really real would be coextensive with the know*able*.

William James goes even further. If Peirce attempts to articulate a pragmatic theory of meaning, James wants a pragmatic theory of truth. That is, James did not want to know what it means, in terms of conceivable possible effects, if I call this diamond hard, but rather what difference does it make if this idea is true. For James, those ideas are true which enable one to cope with the novel demands of the present moment, while at the same time preserving as much of the past as possible. Whatever hesitancy there may be in Peirce concerning the role of method, in James is cleared away. Pragmatism is meant to solve issues, not merely to describe them. James clearly found the old correspondence theory of truth insufficient: "To copy a reality is, indeed one very important way of agreeing with it, but it is far from essential."[28] Indeed, most of the ideas we term "true" do not admit of any direct verification with reality. Admittedly, an idea is true if it agrees with reality, but the Jamesian pragmatist wants to know what agreement actually means. The answer is, agreement is neither copying nor direct sensory verification. Rather the Jamesian notion of truth consists in

> . . . this function of *a leading that is worth while*. When a moment in our experience, of any kind whatever, inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the particulars of experience again and make advantageous connection with them.[29]

An idea for James is a hypothesis, a plan of action: it becomes true in so far as it enables a person to return to the on-going flux of experience, and furthermore to do so in a liberating and creative manner.

> There can *be* no difference anywhere that doesn't *make* a difference elsewhere – no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen.[30]

Obviously, in this there is emphasis on the personal, on what an idea will do for me here and now. But James is careful to point out that "Experience

. . . has ways of *boiling over*, and making us correct our present formulas."[31] Pragmatism is more aptly viewed as performing a marriage: "It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity."[32] Failure to take account of old truths is about the most unpragmatic action a person might undertake. While the processive universe is really malleable, and man engenders truths upon it, James is careful to warn the reader, "Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere or else make false connections."[33] Those ideas are pragmatically true which enable a person to cope with the present situation and still preserve as much of the past as possible.

Besides this, if two ideas seem equally able to perform this task, then we have the right, indeed the obligation to select one over the other for sentimental or aesthetic reasons; i.e., to exercise "the will to believe".

Our passional nature not only may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open" is itself a passional decision – just like deciding yes or no – and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.[24]

James thus broadens the term "pragmatism" to include more than the logical or the conceivable. One specific area where the affective counts in considering whether an idea is pragmatically true, is the issue of theism vs. materialism. For James, neither traditional empiricism nor traditional rationalism can deal adequately with the God issue (see *God* in Chapter 9). Going further, these traditional alternatives cannot deal with the question of God because they cannot allow for *possibility*, as pragmatism does:

. . . in the religious field . . . [pragmatism] is at a great advantage over positivistic empiricism with its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the abstract in the way of conception.

In short, she widens the field of search for God. Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most personal experiences.[35]

In the last lecture of *Pragmatism*, James takes up the question of religion and relates it to the idea of possibility. People who clash over the existence of God are fighting over this issue, so James applies the pragmatic test to the idea of possibility. An idea is true if it makes a difference, if it marries old truths to the novelty of the present situation, if it enables one to deal with

the present moment while preserving as much of the past as possible. If a person calls something "possible" what difference does this make? "It makes at least this difference that if anyone calls it impossible you can contradict him, if any one calls it actual you can contradict *him*, and if any one calls it necessary, you can contradict him too".[36] James has here spelled out the *logical* meaning of the term "possible"; so far the emphasis is on the cognitive dimension of the pragmatic method. But James is not satisfied with this definition. A merely logical definition is not sufficient:

> When you say a thing is possible, does that not make some farther difference in terms of actual fact?
>
> It makes at least this negative difference that if the statement can be true, it follows that *there is nothing extant capable of preventing* the possible thing. The absence of real grounds of interference may thus be said to make things *not impossible*, possible therefore in the *bare* or *abstract* sense.[37]

Here James is struggling to attain something *more* than mere logical possibility. To be sure, an idea which is "pragmatically possible", must contain "no essential self-contradiction". Note that this is a necessary condition: the idea must be "meaningful". But it is not a sufficient condition. Just being *logically* possible is *insufficient* for an idea to be *pragmatically* possible. James here adds a factual state of affairs as part of the pragmatic notion of possibility, or, more specifically, the non-existence of a particular factual state of affairs, i.e., those capable of preventing the occurrence of the possibility in question. Pragmatic possibility thus entails more than logical meaningfulness; it entails a factual situation.

Still James is dissatisfied. He has moved beyond logical possibility to a position where possibility entails negative existential situations, but wants something more:

> ... most possibilities are not bare, they are concretely grounded, or well grounded, as we say. What does this mean pragmatically? It means not only that there are no preventative conditions present, but that some of the conditions of production of the possible thing actually are here.[38]

If something is to be deemed pragmatically possible in the future, two states of affairs must *currently* exist now – one positive, one negative. If these two states of affairs do not exist in the present, then X is not *pragmatically* possible, even though it may be logically possible.

Applying this to the issue of salvation, we have something like the following: salvation as such is possible, but does not exist at the present. However,

the world is such that positive and negative factors exist regarding the possibility of salvation. If the positive ones were emphasized, salvation would become more probable. James puts it this way:

> Suppose that the world's author put the case to you before creation, saying: I am going to make a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each several agent does its own "level best". I offer you the chance of taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. It is a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the risk?[39]

Salvation here appears as a possibility, but in a stronger sense than that of logical possibility. For our purpose, the issue of salvation can be most easily stated as a contrary-to-fact conditional: if we were to do these things, salvation would exist (indicating we have not done them yet). Subjunctive conditionals present a difficulty to an empiricist. R. B. Braithwaite explains the problem in the following manner:

> The problem which they [subjunctive conditionals] present to a Humean is the following dilemma. The constant-conjunction analysis leaves two choices open for the analysis of "If a thing is A, it is B". One choice is "Every A is B" taken, as traditional logic would say, "existentially", i.e., understood in such a way as to assert the existence of at least one thing which is A. The other alternative is "Every A is B" taken non-existentially, i.e., understood as not to assert the existence of an A.[40]

The logical equivalent of the first, traditional formulation is "Nothing is both A and non-B" together with the assertion "Something is A". The use of a subjunctive conditional here will add these assertions to the assertion that there is nothing which is A. This will result in self-contradiction.[41] If we accept the second formulation, its logical equivalent is merely the sole assertion "Nothing is both A and non-B". The use of a subjunctive conditional would add the assertion that there is nothing which is A. It would then follow that, if nothing is A, nothing is both A and non-B. In this sense, the conjunction of the two assertions is logically equivalent to the first one taken by itself.[42] Thus we have at least an apparent dilemma: subjunctive conditionals are either self-contradictory or repetitive.

Important for our purposes is not Braithwaite's answer to this dilemma, but rather his presentation of the two alternatives open to an empiricist. We believe that James, as an empiricist, did *not* reject the contrary-to-fact conditional, but *did* reject that interpretation of it which viewed subjunctive conditionals as repetitive. In short, James gave up logic as completely capable

of dealing with possibility; he broadened the meaning of pragmatism to include more than the conceivable. Nowhere is this more evident than in the issue of God and/or salvation. For here James staunchly maintains actual possibility in terms of the contrary-to-fact conditional and he rejects the side of Braithwaite's empiricist dilemma which views possibility as repetition. James chooses the self-contradictory; his final interpretation of salvation transcends the formal boundaries of logic. James is quite explicit about this transcendence:

> In the end it is our faith and not our logic that decides such questions, and I deny the right of any pretended logic to veto my own faith. I find myself willing to take the universe to be really dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing out and crying "no play".[43]

Possibility, therefore, was existential for James, and that term includes more than the rational. A universe with possibility is not capable of complete rational analysis. The issue of God and salvation gives radical possibility to the universe, in a sense. Ultimately the issue compels action.

> Does our act then *create* the world's salvation so far as it makes room for itself, so far as it leaps into the gap? . . . Here I take the bull by the horns, and in spite of the whole crew of rationalists and monists, of whatever brand they be, I ask, *why not*? Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are the parts of the world to which we are closest, the parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate and complete. Why should we not take them at their face-value?[44]

Pragmatism uses logic to deal with God and salvation, but in so doing shows the inadequacy of logic to decide the issues. Logic remains necessary but not sufficient. James' purpose is to show that after one has pushed reason to its limits, there is something left over which can only be "pointed at", or "acted upon". Possibility remains actual for James, as opposed to merely possible, because it transcends logic:

> Talk of logic and necessity and categories and the absolute and the contents of the whole philosophical machine-shop as you will, the only *real* reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that *some one wishes it to be here*. It is *demanded* – demanded, it may be, to give relief to no matter how small a fraction of the world's mass. This is *living reason*, and compared with it material causes and logical necessities are spectral things.[45]

The idea of God, taken initially, is not self-contradictory. It has meaning. That meaning is primarily cognitive and involves logical possibility. James develops the idea of God to allow for actual possibility. Faced with the

choice between logical cohesiveness but repetition and logical incohesiveness but a deeper level of meaning, James chooses the latter.

In conclusion, the God issue is central for the Jamesian corpus. Analysis of James's statements in *Pragmatism* reveals that the God issue preserves actual possibility for him. Actual possibility is not acceptable to traditional empiricism; rather it appears as repetitive or irrational. James uses logic to show the limitations of logic. He allows for the importance of the empiricist approach. Indeed, for him "making a difference" is an empirical matter. *But* "making a difference" is not strictly compatible with or confirmable within, the bounds of logic. More is involved. The God issue enables James to point towards that "more".

While James finds fault with the empiricist model, he does not end in the camp of objective idealism. The Jamesian god is uncertain, finite, incomplete. (By way of contrast, the neo-Thomist views God as a positive, infinite immateriality; see Chapter 9, above.) As such, he is irrational from an idealist standpoint. James enlists in neither the empiricist nor the idealist camp. But the God issue enables him to preserve actual possibility, as opposed to mere logical possibility. Here, as in many other places in his writings, he is concerned with the "reinstatement of the vague to its proper place"[46] in our experience.

THE REALITY OF THE WORLD

As the last two chapters indicate, Peirce, James and Dewey advocate a method suspicious of itself, which points beyond itself towards the constraining grounds of the really real. What can be said about reality, the relationship between the really real, the known, and the knowable shall be our topic in the following section. Here, however, we must deal with the common prejudice that pragmatism, with its insistent espousal of the scientific method, involves a *replacing* of the categories of nature with those of science. Sandra Rosenthal has appropriately remarked:

> . . . when pragmatism accepts the natural scientific methodology, it is accepting a methodology which arises from an examination of what the scientist *does*, not what he asserts as his findings . . . What an examination of scientific methodology indicates, for pragmatism, is an end to the "passive spectator" view of knowledge and an introduction of man, the active agent who through meanings helps structure the objects of knowledge and who thus cannot be separated from the world which he knows.[47]

While pragmatism does not owe exclusive allegiance to the content of any

particular theory of science, this statement must be tempered by the consideration that an idea is true if it makes a difference, and that the epistemological outlook of pragmatism may have metaphysical prejudices, as seen in our interpretation of Peirce and James.

In his more sophisticated statements, James holds that physical phenomena can be dealt with scientifically only via the use of laws and theories not completely derivable from experience. He nonetheless apparently considered theories to be necessary as a precondition of science. He recognized the active role of the scientist, and, furthermore, refused to set up any single discipline – scholasticism, common sense, or science proper – as the final judge of making a difference. Furthermore, James insisted that a given empirical phenomenon might be explained by different theoretical formulations, yet he refused to reduce these several theories to a single one or completely to reduce the conceptual formulations to empirical data. He maintained that all those different formulations might be real in terms of their effects – their use. From this it would seem to follow that scientific entities do not simply replace the natural situations from which they "erupted", but that once scientific entities had been articulated, they in turn might exhibit a transforming character of their own. But any attempt to view the description of an event exclusively in terms of a particular scientific entity or formula, once and for all, would be criticized by James as a form of "vicious intellectualism".

The same view is found in the work of John Dewey. In *The Quest for Certainty*, Dewey delineates the relationship of scientific entities to those of the natural world. Scientific method does not deal with the changeless, but rather introduces "some change in order to see what other change ensues; the correlation between these changes, when measured by a series of operations, constitutes the definite and desired object of knowledge".[48] Far from fleeing change then, the introduction of change is intentional. Furthermore, experience *qua* experimental involves *overt* doing – that is the "making of definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it".[47] An object as it is originally experienced is baffling, but by the overt introduction of change, it is hoped that some previously non-perceived qualities will be elicited. This would result in the

> construction of a new empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another, and such that the *consequences* of directed operations form the objects that have the property of being *known*.[50]

Traditional Greek science was common-sense science, in the sense of passive

observation of phenomena. It did not try to use what it had or to transform reality as it was experienced. Greek science was "esthetic" in the sense of accepting the immediately given. In Dewey's view, modern science has substituted *data* for the *supposedly* immediately given objects of Greek science:

> By data is signified subject-matter for *further* interpretation; something to be thought about. *Objects* are finalities; they are complete, finished; they call for thought only in the way of definition, classification, logical arrangement, subsumption in syllogisms, etc. But data signify "material to serve"; they are indications, evidence, signs, clues to and of something still to be reached; they are intermediate, not ultimate; means, not finalities.[51]

So, the method of science attempts to modify the given qualities of experience so that new *additional* relations become apparent. But Dewey is clear that this does not signify the *replacement* of ordinary experience by new metaphysical entities.

> The relations a thing sustains are hardly a competitor to the thing itself. Put positively, the physical object, as scientifically defined, is not a duplicated real object, but is a statement, as numerically definite as is possible, of the relations between sets of changes the qualitative object sustains with changes in other things – ideally of all things with which interaction might under any circumstances take place.[52]

The supposed problem of reconciling the entities of science with those of ordinary experience is a false issue. All that is necessary, Dewey claims, is to realize that the problem arose *falsely* because of the *assumed* traditional notion that knowledge consists in "possession of the inner nature of things and is the only way in which they may be experienced as they 'really' are".[53] (Such traditional notions are expounded in the neo-Thomistic philosophy of nature (Chapter 7) and its account of agent and possible intellect (in Chapter 8).)

For both James and Dewey, accordingly, experience grows by its edges; a given object can "take on relations". Some relations arise as intentional change is introduced. Once arisen or formed, such additional relationships can themselves be formative, can lead to new experiences. For the pragmatist, there are several different ways of " ... thinking things in relation to one another; they are, as conceptions, instruments".[54] They have an epistemic value. But insofar as something exists if it makes a difference, the new relationships of science also *add* to the really real, but not in the sense of replacing the world of ordinary experience. Scientific inquiry does transpose a situation by giving it a new dimension, revealing new relationships, etc. But scientific inquiry cannot and must not replace the situation it analyzes. There is an

important difference between explaining a situation as "problematic", in Dewey's terminology, and explaining it *away*. To accord the entities of science *exclusive* ontological status would be to reify the original situation in a very non-pragmatic manner. On the other hand, the newly acquired relationships, arrived at through the intentional introduction of change, themselves transform experience and make it impossible simply to accept in an exclusive manner antecedent qualitative aspects of the universe as being the *only* dimensions of the "really real".

CHAPTER 14

NATURE AND THE NATURAL

FROM NATURE TO THE NATURAL

Thus far, the general thrust of the present interpretation of American philosophy has been one of emphasis on the context, on the situation, from which a particular philosophy arises. It remains to define the metaphysical stance involved in the thought of James and Dewey, as well as the relationship of consciousness to reality. We will first delineate James's notion of "radical empiricism" and "pure experience", and subsequently Dewey's portrayal of the relationship between "experience" and "nature". While it is fair to term the outlooks "naturalistic" as opposed to a transcendentalist perspective, we shall see that the naturalism advocated is extremely rich and multidimensional.

In *The Principles of Psychology* James adopts a functional dualism, between psychology and philosophy, or thought and reality. However, his description of consciousness as selective and intentional was a "nascent attack" on the subject/object dichotomy. Subsequently, James struggled for several years with the issue of how to overcome this dualistic division. His tentative answer is found in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. It is here that James introduces the notion of "pure experience". James explains exactly what "radical empiricism" is in the preface to *The Meaning of Truth*:

> Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion.
>
> The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience . . .
>
> The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.
>
> The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.[1]

In the *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, James asserts that reality is *richer* than we have realized; it contains not only substantive parts but also transitive

ones, and the latter may be of either a disjunctive or a conjunctive nature. At first glance it seems that James extends his analysis of the stream of consciousness (as found in *The Principles of Psychology*) to the stage where it describes reality in general. Indeed, there is some truth in this: a great deal that James has to say about consciousness as a continuously changing stream with all sorts of relational fringes, he also has to say about reality in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*. An overly hasty conclusion might well be that reality *is* consciousness or, less hasty but still wrong, that consciousness is the *foundation* for this description of reality.

James, having asserted that for anything to be considered in philosophy it must be capable of being experienced, now asks "How is consciousness experienced?" He gives a pragmatic answer. To the question "What difference does it make if I say '*A* is conscious of *B*' as opposed to '*A* is next to *B*'?", James replies *A* is conscious of *B* if and only if there are a series of intimate, conjunctive transitions between the intermediaries of *A* and *B*, through which *A* goes, saying "ah ha", "yes", "yes", "ah ha", etc., until he reaches the stage of having a vague intention fulfilled, of actually seeing that which he had in mind.[2] Consciousness, in short, is a function for James; it is not a substance. (On the other hand, Thomists consider the human spirit (see Chapter 9) to be capable of an independent existence, hence a substance, even if incomplete) James' consciousness is the function of an intimate, agreeable leading. Most importantly, it is not found as separate at the primary level of experience, but rather arises retrospectively as an addition. The present moment is not simply conscious; it becomes conscious insofar as it is affiliated with other moments in the past.

> . . . we must remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the experience *per se*. In its pure state, or when isolated, there is no self-splitting of it into consciousness and what the consciousness is "of". Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is "taken", i.e., talked of, twice, considered along with its two differing contexts respectively, by a new retrospective experience, of which that whole past complication now forms the fresh content.
>
> The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the "pure" experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet.[3]

This text carries several important points. First of all, the subject/object distinction, or the consciousness/content distinction, does not arise at the primordial level of experience, but can only be ascertained by turning from or bracketing reality, understood here as the present. When reality is so bracketed, then the relation between consciousness and its object can be

described, as above, in terms of intimate conjunctive transitions. Moreover, there is a relativism here: what functions as consciousness in one context might well function as the object of consciousness in another context. A given moment of experience can be counted twice over after it drops into the past; it can function as both consciousness and the content of consciousness. It follows that we are never immediately conscious *that* we are conscious or, in other words, that we are never immediately self-conscious. Consciousness of self, like consciousness of any other object-for-consciousness, is only retrospectively available.

So far the similarities between James and phenomenology might seem quite obvious. But let us return to the bracketing of reality. What of James' analysis of the situation? What of radical empiricism or pure experience itself? Has James given the transcendental conditions for consciousness, or is his own outlook *itself* retrospective, even at this level? And, if so, what does this mean?

The second alternative appears a more adequate portrayal of the Jamesian outlook. James sympathizes with Kierkegaard's statement "we live forwards ... but we understand backwards".[4] The situation is no different, and indeed is crucially important, at the metaphysical level.

The text cited above indicates that the subject/object distinction only arises when experience is *talked of*. Though language is necessary, language betrays. This occurs especially when we try to allude to the question of being, or in James' terms, to pure experience. With some suspicion of language, then, let us examine James' representation of pure experience. In 'Does "Consciousness" Exist?', James says:

> My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff "pure experience", then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter.[5]

Elsewhere in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, he tells us that the "principle of pure experience is ... a methodological postulate".[6]

The statement that there is one "stuff" of experience, was to cause James trouble, but even by the end of the article, he tells the reader that he had so spoken only for the sake of fluency and that "there is no *general* stuff of which experience at large is made. There are as many stuffs as there are 'natures' in the things experienced."[7] The intent seems clear, but the expression of it causes James difficulty. Pure experience is neither a "many" nor a "one", but is rather the state of the universe before these two emerge as

alternatives. In *Pragmatism* James encounters the same problem: he does not accept monism and so terms his own outlook pluralistic – almost by default. But actually, as he sometimes realized, his own outlook is neither monism nor pluralism, but rather the view that reality is "concatenated".[8] Similar difficulties arise with the attempt to describe pure experience as beneath the consciousness/content distinction, the percept/concept distinction,[9] and the past/present/future distinction, as we shall see below. Having asserted the existence of something beneath these dichotomies, James has difficulty putting it into words. On the other hand, he must say something; he must be careful not to let pure experience lapse into a supernatural entity or a transcendental category. A strong tenet of radical empiricism is that all things termed "existing" be experiencable. We return to this issue of describing pure experience below.

As his texts show, James terms pure experience a "thesis" and a "methodological postulate". His metaphysical outlook, therefore, is not foundationalist in tone and this non-foundational aspect is essential. There is no apodictic ground to the Jamesian outlook. *Even his own position* is to be taken as a hypothesis.

If no foundation can be claimed, should "pure experience" be taken as merely a heuristic device, as an upper case limit so to speak? This is, in fact, the approach of A. J. Ayer. While admitting that James probably did claim that pure experience is all that there is, Ayer holds that "interpreted in this way, the thesis is very dubious indeed. To begin with, it is not clear what a claim of this kind amounts to, outside the framework of a given system."[10] With this strong emphasis on meaning, Ayer asserts that

> ... it may very well be that the best course is to take no ontological decisions at all. If we adopt this policy, we shall construe questions about the reality of different sorts of objects only as asking whether the statements which figure in different types of theory are true ... [I]f we are able to determine which statements at each of these levels are true and how statements of different kinds are related to each other, there are no matters of truth or falsehood left to be decided ... In dissenting from James on this aspect of his thesis that experience is the primal stuff of the world, I have taken a pragmatic view of ontology.[11]

Whatever the merits of this outlook on its own grounds, James would surely have found it unacceptable. First, it implies the habitual positivist sharp distinction between the meaningful and meaningless; and indeed Ayer in other places divides James's writings into moral/theological on the one hand and epistemological on the other.[12] But in *Pragmatism* James specifically rejects such a dichotomy; he views his new method as a mediator between

the tough-minded and the tender-minded.[13] Furthermore, his positive views on language indicate a contextualist position where the line between meaningful and meaningless cannot be clearly drawn.

Another aspect of James's position which would argue strongly against Ayer's interpretation is his critique of "vicious intellectualism" in *A Pluralistic Universe*:

> The treating of a name as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition *fails positively to include, is what I call 'vicious intellectualism'*.[14]

James energetically rejects the reduction or reification of meaning to the stage where the meaning of meaning is constituted by formal semantics. In James' positive linguistic doctrine, meaning includes intention (what I want or need) and effect (the practical results of a given idea or statement). Usually he is criticized for not distinguishing them clearly, but it may be that James believed that no such distinction could be made, at least not in any complete sense.

For these reasons, James would not accept the notion that pure experience had meaning only insofar as it was considered true or false within the confines of some specific linguistic system. More and more James becomes suspicious of language, especially in its most abstract form – logic. So while it is necessary to point out that "pure experience" is not grounded on an apodictic foundation, it is also necessary to reject the interpretation of pure experience as merely a convenient device, necessary to posit but then eminently forgettable.

"Pure experience" is a postulate but, in a very *realistic* sense, it points beyond itself. Metaphysically speaking, the really real is broader than the known; pure experience represents an attempt by James to get at, or disclose, being. The latter is not an object, since pure experience describes an ontological situation which is prior to the subject/object dichotomy. "Pure experience" is a concept which refers to pure experience in the way that for Paul Tillich, "God" is a symbol for God.[15] The term "pure experience" is used in different overlapping ways by James. Let us flesh out some of its meanings.

"The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the 'pure experience'."[16] James often uses this description when he stresses the indeterminate given, existing prior to various dualisms which arise, such as the subject/object and consciousness/content distinctions. Similar statements are: "Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent"[17] and " 'Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories."[18]

Here James tries to portray what is *immediately* given, but the irony is, what is immediately given is not immediate – it is flux, and *qua* flux it is the "ground" of all future statements. The present moment is *really* the passing moment.[19] (The neo-Thomistic notion of *species expressa*, which is the end result of the work of the possible and agent intellects (see Chapter 8), tries to negate the possibility of pure experience.)

In *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, James gives a strong answer to the question "For whom is pure experience 'available'?"

> Only new born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a *that* which is not yet any definite *what*, tho' ready to be all sorts of whats . . . [20]

Here is a second sense of pure experience, one that described the world as it *was*, before consciousness arose. However, it is important to realize that "pure experience" as a descriptive term for either the present moment or the past is itself a conception, a second-hand experience.

"Pure experience" cannot be taken to refer exclusively to the past, because in such a formulation novelty would not be real; change would not take place. James would find that untenable. He also realized, though his statements are frequently not clear, that "pure experience" cannot be exclusively identified with the present – if the present is taken as immediately given – for exactly the same reason. He expresses this by saying that the present *is not present*, is a passing moment, or by saying that the present is an activity. The key to James' different descriptions of "pure experience" here is the realization that experience grows. "Experience itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges. That one moment of it proliferates into the next by transitions which, whether conjunctive or disjunctive, continue the experiential tissue, cannot, I contend, be denied."[21]

In this more processive sense of pure experience, consciousness arises as a relational transition between various moments, as these have dropped into the past, achieving "objective immortality", through "prehension" to borrow Whitehead's terminology.[22] In a third sense, then, "pure experience" refers neither exclusively to present nor past, but rather denies that dichotomy as exclusive. "Pure experience" refers to a continuously changing process in which the past enters into the present, and part of the latter's significance is as a positive or negative continuation of the past. In this formulation of pure experience, consciousness arises by way of addition *qua* relation. But once arisen it exhibits a curious stubbornness; it cannot simply be reduced to experience again. To do so would be to deny the reality of change.

> . . . *the separation of it* [*pure experience*] *into consciousness and content comes, not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition* – the addition, to a given concrete piece of it, of other sets of experiences, in connection with which severally its use or function may be of two different kinds.[23]

In this third sense consciousness has come upon the scene, with the result that "it happens relatively seldom that . . . [a] new fact is added *raw*. More usually it is embedded cooked, as one might say, or stewed down in the sauce of the old."[24] Pure experience is a continually changing process in which the very relation of consciousness itself *adds* to the really real. This formulation transcends the present/past distinction. Yet, consciousness is not all of pure experience, though for grownups, as opposed to babes, it seems that consciousness, and more specifically language, is the way toward pure experience. We find ourselves embedded in consciousness, so to speak.

Even this last linguistic formulation of pure experience is a conceptualization, though it refers to a level of reality beneath the exclusivity of concepts. James realized that not only is this final conceptualization inadequate, but conceptualization *as such* is inadequate. Still conceptualization is necessary.

Although specifically written on a religious theme *A Pluralistic Universe* contains ideas absolutely central to the Jamesian notion of pure experience. In *The Principles of Psychology* James had adopted a dualism. However, his description of consciousness ultimately renders his dichotomy inadequate. James begins to remedy this in the *Essays in Radical Empiricism* by rejecting the consciousness/content dichtotomy. He does so by discarding consciousness as a separate substance and retaining only a functional view. As James continued to specify the problem, he realized more clearly that not consciousness but language, and particularly ideal language – logic – was the "enemy". As we have seen, in *A Pluralistic Universe* he rejects logic for not being capable of dealing with the flux of experience. Thought can touch the surface of reality but cannot plumb its depths. The really real is broader not only than the known, but broader than the know*able*.

Initially, in overcoming his functional dualism, James says that pure experience is available only to newborn babes, persons under anaesthesia, etc., to unconscious persons. But in *A Pluralistic Universe*, James clarifies his problem and is more optimistic. The really real is "available" to those who use language in such a way as to transcend it, to those who are not trapped by the bewitchment of language, who realize that the word "activity" is not the experience of activity.

> As long as one continues *talking*, intellectualism remains in undisturbed possession of the

field. The return to life can't come about by talking. It is an *act*; to make you return to life, I must set an example for your imitation. I must deafen you to talk, or to the importance of talk, by showing you, as Bergson does, that the concepts we talk with are made for the purposes of *practice* and not for purposes of insight. Or I must *point*, point to the mere *that* of life, and you by inner sympathy must fill out the *what* for yourselves.[25]

The pragmatic overtones are obvious. Words are "indicators" or "signs of direction". The meaning of an idea is not just its formal significance but rather what it can do. Most importantly, there is more to language than its formal significance. Pragmatically used, language points beyond itself toward the really real, or is the vehicle toward the really real. Language is the house of pure experience somewhat much as for Heidegger, "Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Whoever thinks or creates in words is a guardian of this dwelling."[26]

Sometimes James terms the really real the "perceptual".[27] This is, at best, a bad choice of words. In 'The Function of Cognition' he tells us that treatment of percepts as the only realm of reality is inadequate. "I now treat concepts as a co-ordinate realm."[28] The conceptual, the linguistic, the logical, then, are all necessary but not sufficient. Language is the house of pure experience, but only when language is used to point beyond itself. The implicitness of language constitutes its pragmatic character, without which it would degenerate into "vicious intellectualism".

"Pure experience" then does seem to remain faithful to the demand set forth by radical empiricism that "the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience".[29] "Pure experience" can be "recovered" but this recovery is never complete. For one thing, pure experience is continuously changing; as such novelty is real and hence recovery is partial.[30] James' position is most aptly termed a "radical realism". The really real – pure experience – is not only *not* coextensive with the known; it is not coextensive with the knowable in the strong conceptual sense of the term.[31] But, there are moments when one can use language to transcend the limitations of language and have a glimpse of pure experience. These moments seem fairly numerous for James. They are not simply the reward of a privileged class of philosophers. No one group has exclusive access to reality. In *Pragmatism*, James refuses to erect any one discipline as judge of what makes a difference. "Common sense is *better* for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism for a third; but whether either is the *truer* absolutely, Heaven only knows."[32] Experience is rich enough to be available on many levels, each affording a

partial perspective. "Profusion, not economy, may after all be reality's key-note."[33]

Consciousness has a role in this outlook, but the role occurs in and through the matrix of experience. Also, while human understanding cannot fathom all of reality, it can make progress. But it cannot arrive at the stage where reality is *replaced* by *an idea* of reality. This relationship between "worked matter" and "the given" is perhaps best understood by looking at John Dewey's analysis of the relationship between "experience" and "nature".

EXPERIENCE AND NATURE: WORKED MATTER AND THE GIVEN

We have seen that Dewey is extremely interested in articulating a new notion of experience. He portrays experience in the Greek world as being constituted by the accumulated information of the past, by habit. In John Locke, experience is seen as self-sustaining, as a check on the flights of reason. Dewey calls for a post-Darwinian notion, where experience is to be seen as "experiential". In *Art as Experience*, Dewey articulates his interactionist model of experience. Life "goes on in an environment; not merely *in* it, but because of it, through interaction with it."[34] In life, man goes through a process of various tensions with his environment, to which he reacts. In experience, an organism fulfills itself, via its struggles and achievements.

> Experience is the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication.[35]

Dewey's new notion of experience caused many critics to term his outlook excessively anthropomorphic. In *Experience and Nature*, he tries to respond.

> . . . experience is *of* as well as *in* nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but nature – stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways *are* experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object – the human organism – they are *how* things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference.[36]

Clearly, there is more to nature than experience. "There is no evidence that experience occurs everywhere and everywhen."[37] Experience is rather a way of "getting at nature, penetrating its secrets".[38] Experience can reach down into the depth of nature and it can investigate some aspects of nature "in such manner as to render other of its precincts accessible."[39] In order to

explain how, precisely, experience relates to nature, Dewey begins to use the term "transaction" in a technical fashion, and to describe nature as an "affair of affairs". Richard Bernstein remarks that for Dewey nature " . . . consists of a series of overlapping and interpenetrating transactions".[40] Dewey's early work prepares for distinguishing three types of action: self action, interaction, and transaction. Self action, Bernstein notes " . . . designates the type of action where an entity is thought to act solely under its own powers, independently of other entities".[41] Such a notion can be found in Plato's doctrine of the soul, and in Aristotle's notion of those things which exist naturally, i.e., have within themselves a principle of motion. Interaction is the second type of action now distinguished by Dewey. Interaction is " . . . the type of action that takes place among entities that are themselves permanently or relatively fixed".[42] An obvious example can be found in the world of the atomists or in Newton's mechanics. In this view, the activity takes place among atomic units without the atoms themselves changing. Dewey's third notion of action is now termed "transaction". As Bernstein observes,

> transaction does not occur with an aggregate or combination of elements that have an independent existence. On the contrary, what counts as an "element" is dependent on its function within a transaction.[43]

In other words, the transaction has primary importance; it constitutes the elements, not vice versa. In *Experience and Nature*, Dewey divides transactions into three plateaus:

> The first, the scene of narrow and more external interactions, . . . is physical; its distinctive properties are those of the mathematical-mechanical system discovered by physics . . . The second level is that of life . . . they have qualities in common which define the psycho-physical. The third plateau is that of association, communication, participation. . . . It is marked . . . by common properties which define mind as intellect; possession of and response to meanings.[44]

It is important to stress that these are all *transactional* activities, where the objects are constituted by the activity. Secondly, the difference among the various levels of transaction is one of degree, not of kind. Here, then, Dewey pursues his naturalistic outlook. But Dewey also holds that human experience transactions and need/demand/satisfaction transactions could not be reduced to mass/energy transactions. Dewey

> . . . does not think that there is one type of transaction – the physico-chemical – which is the *only* real type of transaction and to which others are to be completely reduced.[45]

One must recognize both the disjunctive and conjunctive transactions found

within nature, without resorting to a transcendental philosophy. The different levels here run from the less complex to the most complex. The latter experience, specifically termed "human", is characterized as being able to deal with something which is not immediately present; in short, it uses language or signs. As Bernstein puts it, as

> ... a consequence of this ability to use language, the transactions characteristic of human experience are transformed and exhibit characteristics that enable us to distinguish this level of transactions from less complex transactions.[46]

As Dewey himself says

> ... qualities never were "in" the organism; they always were qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic things and organisms partake. When named, they enable identification and discrimination of things to take place as means in a further course of inclusive interaction.[47]

Human experience consists of one type of transaction with nature located within a larger continuum of physico-chemical and psycho-physical transactions. But human experience, while not self-sufficient, is *of* nature, in the sense that " ... it is a type of transaction in which the variety of other natural transactions participate".[48] Human experience can grow by its edges, so as inferentially to contain more and more of nature while still remaining within nature.

Going further, experience is not to be identified exclusively with the cognitive; " ... esthetic and moral experience reveal traits of real things as truly as does intellectual experience ... "[49]; and again, "What is really 'in' experience extends much further than that which at any time is *known*."[50] Philosophical theory deems it important to focus on the distinct, but one must never forget that the "dark and twilight abound".[51] Any transactional experience which becomes inferential leaves out dimensions of the situation. (Dewey's doctrine is much bolder than traditional attempts to articulate a notion of connaturality, usually in connection with the natural law (see Chapter 6) on interpersonal relations.) For Dewey not all the consequences of a situation can be immediately foreseen. Dewey is insistent here. Anything which we interact with in experience or, better, which is constituted through transaction in experience, can become the object of intellectual analysis. When this happens, the thing takes on an additional increment of meaning.[52] But neither experience *per se* nor nature *per se* is to be viewed as identifical with the cognitive.

> It is not denied that any experienced subject-matter whatever may *become* an object

of reflection and cognitive inspection. But the emphasis is upon "become"; the cognitive never *is* all-inclusive: that is, when the material of a prior, non-cognitive experience is the object of knowledge, it and the act of knowing are themselves included within a new and wider non-cognitive experience – and *this* situation can never be transcended.[53]

For Dewey, as for James, nature is unfinished, processive, and as such compels a constitutive response on the part of the human subject. Such a response may be liberating and rewarding, if the right method, i.e., pragmatism, is employed. But the human transactional experience with nature is one which grows, and further, which takes place in a broader context. The really real is broader than the known; furthermore, the really real is broader than the know*able*. Such an outlook is most aptly termed a contextualism.

CHAPTER 15

"CONTEXT" AS A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT

While it is impossible to list all the categories operative in the pragmatic tradition, nonetheless the following seem to be the most important.[1]

THE ATTACK ON DESCARTES

In Descartes, the person is a detached spectator; the cogito is pure thought, having nothing to do with action; optimally the cogito is not overly influenced by the will. The cogito peers out at a tidy geometric universe; only those things which can be quantified are real. A neat and strict "in here" – "out there" dualism is adopted, distinguishing clearly and distinctly mind and body, self and world.

The American tradition found this outlook abstract and misleading. Peirce rejects the Cartesian dependence on rhetorical doubt, exclusive individualism, and the dyadic structure of truth and self-awareness, with its atemporal view of man and the cosmos. He offers a view of the human being as cognitive via an interpretative triadic process, essentially communal. James sees man as "embodied", as a pilgrim on a journey, as a participator in the game of life and not a spectator. For Dewey, man is a creature who becomes conscious in the act to being confronted by experience and coming to grips with this confrontation in a satisfactory manner.

In place of the Cartesian view of the universe, we are given an embodied subject; in place of the finished and ahistorical universe of geometry we are offered an unfinished context. The dualism of self and world is rejected, and in its stead is posited a more involved picture of the human being as active in the universe.

THE NATURALIZING OF MIND AND THE MENTALIZING OF NATURE

As Max Fisch has shown, the American tradition rejects the bifurcation of experience into content and form[2], markedly different from neo-Thomism's philosophy of nature (Chapter 7) and notion of agent and possible intellects

(Chapter 8). Mind does not exist in spite of nature, as we have seen in the attack upon Descartes.

> Abandoning the Platonic dichotomy of knowledge and belief, they [American philosophers] have included knowing in believing, believing and thinking in acting, and acting in nature.[3]

All this is evident to Peirce's exposition of "the fixation of belief"; there exists a continuous interface between doubt, inquiry, belief and action. For James, thought is a hypothesis. Furthermore, consciousness is directly though inversely related to bodily habit. "Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent."[4] Dewey's similar view is evident in "the reflex arc" concept in psychology or in his instrumental theory of truth.

It should come as no surprise that if the mental is naturalized, the natural is also mentalized. In our analysis of Turner, we have seen that the frontier meant more than a mere physical place or piece of matter. For Peirce, matter is frozen mind. James's notion of "pure experience" is an attempt to posit a realist metaphysics, which is beneath the percept/concept, the self/other, or the mental/physical dichotomies. In articles like 'The Need For a Recovery of Philosophy', Dewey steadfastly refuses to identify experience exclusively with the subjective *or* with the past, *or* with the non-mental.

PROCESS OVER PERMANENCE

The American tradition abandons belief in a permanent, substantialist universe where the future necessarily repeats the past. The universe is no longer a tidy spot, as Dewey announces in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. No longer should one construct a theory of knowledge based upon the supposed givenness of the eternal antecedently and for all time. The future rather than the past dominates the imagination; there is a shift from the eternal to the temporal in Dewey's outlook. Experience is "experimental". For James, consciousness is most adequately described as a stream, a continuously changing flux, the very vagueness of which compels selectivity. Later he extended this view of consciousness to the metaphysical sphere. In his radical empiricism the disjunctive and conjunctive transitions of experience are both as real as the substantive parts. Indeed, the very classification of a particular substantive part depends upon the transitive relations it assumes. The universe is wild, "game-flavored as a hawk's wing. Nature was miracle all; and the same returns not save to bring the different."[5] Again,

Experience itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges. That one moment proliferates into the next by transitions which, whether conjunctive or disjunctive, continue the experiential tissue can not, I contend, be denied.[6]

For Peirce, the universe is an unfolding, evolutionary process, not quite necessary nor again completely fortuitous, but rather synechistic – moving toward agapasticism or a cosmology of love. Even the exact sciences merely serve to indicate the uncertainty of our knowledge, for they themselves do not possess it.

THE HUMAN BEING AS PARTICIPATOR

Rejecting the reified Cartesian subject opens the way for a new view of the person. In the American tradition, commitment is demanded on the part of each individual. A person does not find himself outside the sphere of the universe, but rather within the situation. It is precisely the unfinished, processive character of the universe which compels such active participation on our part. For James, there are some situations where belief in the outcome of a situation is itself part of the evidence for or against that situation. To have an idea is to have a plan of action. Consciousness for James is purposive; it is a fighter for ends. But ends are not pre-ordained. For Dewey also, the human organism is purposive. What we perceive takes place as the result of what we are trying to accomplish. In Dewey's basic metaphysical notion of "interaction" or later "transaction" the human person comes to be, is created in and through its involvement with a specific situation. Both organism and environment come to be as a result of the transaction. Nature is an "affair of affairs".

THE INTERPENETRATION OF THOUGHT AND ACTION

Since the universe is processive and the human being a participator, all thoughts become "plans of action". No *apriori* deductive system is deemed self-sufficient. Pragmatism is a formal system that urges us to be suspicious of formal systems. The meaning of an idea for Peirce consists of its conceivable effects, in the long run. James adds a twist to this, asking "what does it mean to call an idea 'true'?" and responding that an idea is true if it enables me to cope with the present moment *and* preserve as much of the past as possible. An idea becomes true insofar as it is incarnated in experience, insofar as it leads the person having the idea into better and better relations with experience. Dewey proposes the method – *not* the content – of science as optimal

because it is future rather than past oriented, has a logic of discovery rather than of demonstration, is essentially communal, and demands the interpenetration of thinking and doing. It is of utmost importance to recall that both James and Dewey wish to apply the method of "pragmatism" in a broad sense. Theological ideas can be pragmatically true for James. Dewey wishes to extend this flexible method of science to esthetics, ethics, and occasionally, even to religion (see *A Common Faith*). James, often accused of advocating simple subjectivity, admonishes the readers of *Pragmatism* to pay attention to their previous pragmatic decisions. For, while no pre-ordained law of activity exists, the decisions one makes now, or has made in the past, will cut off options for the future. Pragmatism, broadly defined, admits that those ideas are true which make a difference, but also subjects competing pragmatic truths to an ever-widening context.[7]

Objectivity has been rejected; subjectivity too has to be rejected – otherwise we end in a Pollyanna world of self-gratification. Subjectivity is rejected by placing pragmatism in a wide context. For precisely this reason the importance of context in all its multi-dimensionality has been stressed. One must work out the disjunctive and conjunctive transitions among contexts, interpretative as such an activity may be. One must also not allow a single discipline to usurp the privilege of the base position. Constraints should be placed upon too narrow a context.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME AND HISTORY AS POSSIBILITY AND CONSTRAINT

With the claim for objectivity rejected and the interpenetration of thought and action avowed, history assumes a vital role. Whereas Euclidian space is important to a Cartesian mentality, time for the American thinkers symbolizes possibility, the space of operation. Because time and process are real, the future will not repeat the past in every respect – at the very least the temporal dimension will be different. To recognize the reality of time is *eo ipso* to recognize the unfinished character of the universe and, hence, the importance of the human contribution. History stands as the achievements or failures of a person or country over time. As such it has fundamental importance. Peirce's entire theory of pragmatism is an attack upon the immediacy of the present as self-sufficient and an upholding of the temporal process in the long run. James, from the stream of consciousness theory to the world of pure experience, continually views both persons and the universe as "never the same, yet never completely different". As he was so fond of saying:

"ever not quite" travels along after each philosopher's statement, and there can be no final outlook on the universe until the last person has had his say. Whereas Aristotle's view of the historical process knew beforehand that the acorn becomes a certain tree (guided by the theory of matter and form (Chapter 7) and act and potency (Chapter 10)), Dewey's more radical view includes no pre-established tree. Change stands together with permanence as at least an equal partner in constituting the universe.

History assumes fundamental importance in this outlook because through history "constraining grounds" are placed upon the activity of the subject. Objectivity has been renounced but one cannot go through life from moment to moment, doing whatever one likes whenever one likes. This type of "subjectivity" would be as "timeless" as the objectivity it was meant to replace. Rather the pragmatist is to be seen as dealing with the novelty of the present moment, while preserving as much of the past as possible. For Peirce, all positive reasoning is of the nature of judging a portion of something in a whole collection by the proportion found in a sample. Accordingly, we cannot attain absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, absolute universality. But the scientific attitude, though essentially fallibilistic, is the study of the "useless" for Peirce. That is, it is the study of the meaning of a present phenomenon, whose meaning is specified as the kinds of characteristics it is liable to exhibit in the long run, to the scientific community of knowers. This process is essentially historical and communal. For James, old truths are important; one must remain loyal to as many of them as possible. Dewey talks of the human being as the animal who can preserve his funded experience vicariously – through symbols. In this way, the organism or culture can come to grips with the confrontation of the present moment by using funded experience. History then is an ever-widening spiral. But history is not inevitable, and is often logically opaque. In such circumstances one must be careful to articulate both the disjunctive and the conjunctive connections which are operative. A listing of only conjunctive transitions runs the risk of turning into a doctrine of internal relations and ultimately of not being history at all. A listing of only the disjunctive relations results in a radical pluralism wherein history is abandoned from the other side. As James noted in *Radical Empiricism*, the true empiricist will do justice to both types of transition.

COMMUNITY AS CONSTRAINT

When thoughts are hypotheses to be implemented by action, the thinking of one person is inextricably bound up with the thinking of others, because

they both have the same "space of operation". In general, the American tradition recognizes the importance of community as placing constraining grounds upon the subjectivity of the individual.

For Peirce, all meaning is triadic and communal; it involves the symbolic ongoing process of *A* (logical thinker) interpreting *B* to *C* (*qua* logical thinker). For Dewey, those works of art are best which can be reinterpreted again and again by a community of observers. Dewey also thought the scientific community to be essentially communal, since no scientist can do everything. Also, all discoveries must be made available to the community of knowers. James, too, though less emphatic in this respect, sometimes sees the self as essentially social and notes that

> No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a theory physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof.[8]

The community is important because it is the second type of "constraining ground" placed upon the individual (along with history). What the human being does is important in an unfinished global village, but everyone doing what he wanted would result in mere anarchy. Furthermore, there would be no sense of growth, of having gone from something to something else. The American tradition, taking its cue from the procedures of science, refuses to set up any individual as the final arbiter of the universe. Each individual tries out his hypotheses in an open communal forum. How other people interpret the universe is very important to each person, because other interpretations, *qua* experiments, could affect the status of the forum itself.

CONTEXTUALISM

This single most important category runs pervasively through our analysis. It surfaces initially in the question of the American frontier and the Puritan errand into the wilderness. It reappears in American philosophy proper, in Peirce's doubt-inquiry-belief-action syndrome; in Dewey's continual plea that inquiry consists in the specification of the problematic character of a situation; in James' pragmatism, with its emphasis on coping with the present situation; also, it is behind his reintroducing the "vague" to our experience. More generally, it appears as an attack upon self-justifying philosophies, upon the quest for certainty, upon the bifurcation of the subjective and the objective, upon the reduction of philosophy to logic. It is what is behind Dewey's plea that philosophy needs to be "recovered", that philosophy is in danger

of being reduced to chewing a historical cud, or simply dealing with the problems of other professional philosophers, instead of the "problems of men". Metaphysically, it stands for the thesis that the "really real" is broader than the known. (There would be some disagreement among American philosophers over the additional statement: "The 'really real' is broader than the know*able*.") Outlooks on experience for the American tradition are, in short, perspectival, and this includes metaphysical outlooks. The best one can do is to keep honest by not getting "bewitched by language or logic", by subjecting systematic analyses to the press of experience.

CONTEXTUALISM AS PRE-THEORETICAL AND META-THEORETICAL

Thus far, contextualism has been discussed in this chapter as the most adequate description of the American frontier and as characteristic of classic American philosophy. Does this contextualism render philosophy unimportant or inadequate? The beginnings of an answer to such a charge were indicated in our summary of the category of contextualism, viz., it is the *lack* of recognition of a particular context that has rendered philosophy inadequate. Let us elaborate, using Dewey's approach. Along the way we shall encounter the question "Did American philosophy merely reflect the nineteenth-century context or did it succeed in calling attention to the issue of contextualism itself as a meta-theoretical concept?"

John Dewey is keenly aware of the issue of context in both negative and positive implications. He sees philosophy as stemming from the most passionate beliefs and customs of a culture. But philosophy is no mere epiphenomenon. Once arisen, it is not reducible *back* into habits. Philosophy can show in which direction the perfection of a culture's traits and values lies. Dewey is aware that the contextual definition incurs the risk of weakening critical philosophic spirit. His foremost task, in fact, is to recover philosophy from just such an atrophied, academic position. Dewey's accusation is that philosophy now lives vicariously; it reflects the experiences of past generations. But experience in a post-Baconian, post-Darwinian, or American frontier context is *had* differently than before. People undergo their experiences differently and philosophy should reflect and perfect this change, in the areas of art, morals, politics, and religion. (Here even some neo-Thomists – as the notion of Christian philosophy underlines (see the opening remarks in Part Two) – would acknowledge a certain contextualism). For Dewey, experience no longer occurs nor is viewed as merely an affair of knowing; it is acting and reacting, or better, interacting. It is not subjective or private,

but rather contextual. It is not concerned with the past exclusively, but *qua* experimental, with the future. It is not made up of a group of "moth ball" particulars; rather each and every moment has leading qualities, transitional aspects, especially to him who looks at it through the method of intelligence, or science. From such a perspective, reason is part of experience, not something set off over and against it. Via reason we see something in a context or setting rather than isolated and immediate. Reason is therefore crucial – it is liberating when correctly used. Incorrectly used, it deals only with abstractions – it makes little difference whether of the transcendental or empirical kind.

From this perspective, the question arises "If one does philosophy out of a specific context, how does one know when that context has been changed?" Are there any connectives between an old context and a new one, or are they mutually exclusive? If exclusive, one can no longer talk of development in philosophy, and philosophy loses one of its traditional aims – universality. A second related problem would be: which comes first, the philosophy or the context, and, further, is the context identifiable beforehand? If identified beforehand, i.e., before the formal philosophic system arises, such an identification should *not* be equated with an objective sociological, or politico-economic analysis. The relevance of this for Marxism is obvious. But it would also hold against any attempt to establish theology as that base which predated a philosophic outlook. The pre-philosophic, pre-theoretical analysis of a culture would have to be *interpretative*. Past cultures are only vicariously available through literature; and the claim that a present culture not only undergoes experience but does so in such a fashion that it knows how it is doing the undergoing would seem to beg the very question at issue. In short, we are all beggars here, as James would say, and the best we would seem able to expect is a sort of dialectical development of philosophy and culture, with one mutually modifying and reinforcing the other – a sort of transaction, to use Dewey's term. This outlook then has affinities with some aspects of existentialism and with existential phenomenology, where the really real does not seem to be completely available in the present moment. That is, while the intentional, interpretative aspect of consciousness is necessary, not everything can be brought before the reduction. Differences arise over the degree to which the really real could be recovered.

The outlook has affinities with some interpretations of Marx, the "lag of consciousness", and the interaction between base and superstructure. It would differ over the supposed inevitable development of any such relationship.

Our present culture "prehends" or appropriates the past, in this case the

American cultural situation of the nineteenth-century – positively or negatively. A philosophical system emerges out of this prehended context. But the "identified" context is in the last analysis, only an interpretation, a guess at a riddle. One can offer arguments that are persuasive, but *not* completely objective. But the appropriated cultural background, though not objectively available, is nonetheless different (at least in degree) from the philosophical system which arises from it. The background is much vaguer, not describable in neat, linguistic terms, but often only via impacted argot. The background is a quiltwork, a quasi-chaos, prior to distinctions of thought vs. action, truth vs. meaning. It is an atmosphere, a *Zeitgeist*, if you will, but it can be pointed towards. Even though the pointing is interpretative, it is important. In the pointing we are closest to the really real. It is, in this sense, *pre*-theoretical.

Granted this much, how does one context replace another, and how can we best approach such a transition, given that we are looking at the issue through philosophic systems? One key is to cling tightly to the conjunctive transitions that James is always warning his readers about. Without them, we end in cultural atomism. While a series of instances have come together on several occasions to constitute a new quantum leap in seeing things, this "wholistic" sense must be placed within the ongoing stream. Philosophy must reflect, in the Greek sense of μίμησις, the values of a culture. But philosophy must do more than this. It most truly reflects and perfects a culture's values by comparison and contrast with the values and philosophies of other cultures. The comparison actually turns out to be crucial if one is to avoid subjectivity in the sense of being tied down completely to a particular place and time. This comparison may initially stress different approaches by different cultures; but at this level, too, philosophy is involved in idealizing the values of a culture. At this *meta*-theoretical level, the question to be dealt with takes the form: Did or do any of the philosophies which reflected and idealized their culture's values do a *better* job than the others? Can the whole job of reflecting and perfecting itself be perfected? An answer to this from American philosophy comes to mind in terms of Josiah Royce's (regulative) principle of "loyalty to loyalty".[9] Be loyal to a cause, but choose a cause to be loyal to which will further the principle of loyalty in general. Each philosophical system is loyal to a context, but is any philosophy loyal in such a fashion that *contextualism per se* is advanced, furthered? We would offer that, not only did philosophy in America reflect the frontier experience, but it did so in such a way as to call attention to the issue of contextualism itself. In this way, it can, and perhaps should, serve as a global model.

In sum, at the meta-theoretical level there are two questions to be asked

about the works of the classic American philosophers like James, Peirce, and Dewey. First, whether any specific outlook they had is usable in the twentieth century. Expanding this question, if we have moved from an agrarian to an industrial context, one might argue that statements about nature are just out of place. But there is, once again, a second-level issue: the American tradition not only called attention to the American context – it called attention to contextualism in general. As a model, therefore, *none* of its specific doctrines might be applicable, but its way of looking at *how* people have their experience – how interaction takes place – might actually be crucial. In this respect, there is strong similarity with that interpretation of Marx which de-emphasizes the particular content of his philosophy and emphasizes its form – base/superstructure; philosophy as perspectival, etc. Finally, it might be the case that only by studying a particular instance (model) of *how* a philosophy reflected its context (e.g., the early American context) that the importance of contextualism can be regained or reconstituted or recovered.

PART FOUR

THE TRANSCENDENTALISM OF PHENOMENOLOGY

CHAPTER 16

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT

The aim here is to discuss, in a manner similar to that in which the other phases of contemporary philosophy are described above, the contemporary problems of modern phenomenology. But there is a peculiarity of the phenomenological movement which should be indicated at once, since it will become apparent in the treatment of phenomenology in this and subsequent chapters. Although other forms of contemporary thought can be discussed topically, within an analytic framework designed to reveal their systematic approach to any and all facets of reality, a more historical approach is necessary with respect to phenomenology.

The phenomenological movement, to be sure, has frequently – and not entirely unjustly – been criticized precisely because it ignores the historical dimension in its search for non-relative truth. Although this is, in fact, an accurate description of some – but by no means all – forms of modern phenomenology, the relevance of an historical approach can perhaps be made apparent through a comparison with Marxism. Although it may come as a surprise to disciples of either Marxism or phenomenology – each of which tends to view its doctrine as *sui generis* and, hence, fundamentally unlike other intellectual tendencies – there is an important parallel between Marxism and phenomenology, which is not, of course, meant to deny that there are important differences. In particular, Marxism and phenomenology resemble each other in the following ways: each belongs to the short list of the central intellectual movements of our time; in each case, the name associated with the movement is practically or in fact a household word; in each movement there has long been a dominant concern, now fortunately waning, to maintain orthodoxy at any intellectual cost; and, finally, each tendency springs less from a collective effort or the interaction of a number of talented disciples – though these are not lacking – than from the dedicated work of a single, talented individual.

Although it would be interesting to develop the comparison adumbrated here since it would, one suspects, cast significant light on both movements in terms of an unsuspected and hitherto unexplored similarity, this is not possible. Rather, we must focus on the last named feature of the two movements, namely the fact that each springs entirely or nearly so from a single

intellectual forefather, although allowance has to be made for the manner in which, it has been argued, Engels significantly distorts the Marxian heritage and the establishment of the Marxist movement.[1]

The relations of Marxism to Marx and of modern phenomenology to Husserl are similar in a way that sets them off from, e.g., pragmatism which does not have a single dominant intellectual figure, at least not in the sense of *Urvater*. They differ as well from neo-Thomism if the latter is defined not in the narrow sense as that movement which issues from the thought of St Thomas, but rather more broadly as the philosophical and theological activity carried on in the medieval schools and continued to the present.

Although from this perspective Marxism and phenomenology are unlike the other philosophic tendencies discussed in this book, there is an important distinction between them which influences the way in which each movement can be and, in fact, will be discussed. For many years, the interpretation of Marx's position has been largely, and in fact necessarily, based on his later writings for the obvious reason that a number of crucial early texts – the *Paris Manuscripts* and the *Grundrisse*, for example – were unavailable. It is in this interpretative context that the view, widespread since Engels, of Marx's position as in some undefined and undefinable sense extra-philosophic – an argument explicit in *Anti-Dühring* (1878) and later works by Engels – and as a critical form of political economy arose. But, with the recent and tardy publication of several early texts, it has become apparent that, although the hitherto prevailing view of Marx is not entirely in error, there is an important problem of emphasis. More recently, as has been stressed in the writings of Henry and Kołakowski[2], it has become apparent that, as is the case for most thinkers, although there was, in fact, some development in Marx's position over time, the evolution here is minimal. But any complete interpretation needs to relate both the early, more philosophic, as well as the later, more political-economic, writings as complementary aspects of a single position.

The situation is, however, quite different with respect to Husserl. Unlike Marx's position, for whom the larger outlines of the view – including both its philosophical and political-economic aspects – are mainly and perhaps even fully apparent as early as the *Paris Manuscripts* (1844), there is no single text in Husserl's enormous corpus of printed and unprinted writings, in which all or nearly all the elements of his position are represented. To be sure, although Husserl did begin his career as a mathematician and philosopher of mathematics, there is the celebrated early breakthrough to phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901). However, although this work

remains of permanent value as an indication of Husserl's transition to phenomenological philosophy from his early subjective orientation, and valuable in itself as a source for some of the most delicate of his or anyone else's phenomenological analyses, it is no more than one stage on the road of his personal intellectual odyssey. For, the position he defended in the *Logical Investigations* is relevantly different in fundamental ways from that he later proposed in *Ideas* (1913), where he introduced the cardinal but never fully clarified methodological concept of the reduction, which he later regarded as the methodological keystone of the phenomenological arch. And, it has been argued, this later position differs basically from that described in his last major, never completed, study, the *Crisis*, where the concept of the life-world is explicitly introduced, though it may well be that this concept is implicit and indeed explicit in earlier texts.

It follows that, although a discussion of Marxism needs to make constant reference to Marx, whose position can be outlined in systematic form, a less systematic and more chronological approach is required with respect to Husserl, in whose thought at least three largely different versions of phenomenology can be discerned. Indeed, as will be seen in this and subsequent chapters, each of these versions of Husserl's position continues to have its advocates, so that – unlike the case of the differing and largely competing interpretations of Marx's thought, which are usually taken out of intellectual context – contemporary phenomenology can be largely viewed as a series of reactions to chronologically distinct portions of Husserl's intellectual evolution.

Therefore, in view of the continual evolution of Husserl's views, the present historical and systematic account will be divided into four sections. In the initial sections, a rapid chronological account of the evolution of Husserl's position will be sketched, prior to an account of what by implication in his view can be taken as the central contemporary problem. In later sections, the focus will be on post-Husserlian phenomenology, interpreted both as a restatement of his arguably central problem and as a restatement of his conception of method.

In virtue of the role of Husserl's central intellectual position in the modern phenomenological movement, which issues from his thought, it is not surprising that his own perspective provides a framework against which to view contemporary phenomenological intellectual concerns. Husserl's own reaction to contemporary life, late in coming, included both a problem or crisis he discerned as well as the ever more complex discussion of a method adequate to its solution. Although in Husserl's position the problem and the method

were conjoined, it is characteristic of post-Husserlian phenomenology that they have been dissevered. In this regard, post-Husserlian phenomenologists can be divided into two general types, according as their perception of the central contemporary problem concerns a development or restatement of Husserl's conception of crisis, on the one hand, or a further study and reformulation of the Husserlian conception of method, on the other. Accordingly, we shall now describe Husserl's conception of the contemporary problem facing philosophy, and then proceed to related accounts of post-Husserlian views of contemporary philosophical problems.

In one sense, it seems clear that Husserl's view of crisis was a constant theme in his thought from the early phenomenological breakthrough in the *Investigations* and the attempt to counter psychologism, and the later, related attack on naturalism in 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science'. However, the theme, which is important but implicit in these earlier works, only emerges into full view in its final reformulation in Husserl's last major work, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, where it forms the central theme. Indeed, here Husserl makes crystal clear, if there had, in fact, been any room for doubt, that in his view philosophy is not and cannot be an abstract science – since, as in the Platonic position, theory and practice are inseparable for Husserlian phenomenology.

Although the *Crisis* was written later (1935–1936) than and is clearly influenced at numerous points by Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927), both positively and negatively, the theme developed here – which only receives the name "crisis" in this final formulation in Husserl's last great phenomenological work – is, in fact, a constant concern throughout the phenomenological portion of his intellectual career. In this as well as in earlier works, beginning with the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl's view of phenomenology as an attempt to provide an impregnable bulwark for reason, a veritable fortress for the defence of rationality as such, remains basically the same, even if his understanding of its precise nature changes with each succeeding formulation.

In the initial appearance of this theme, in the *Logical Investigations* – at a time when Husserl's thought was perhaps closer to Kant's than it was later to remain, certainly after the development of the concept of reduction and the turn towards Descartes – Husserl elaborated his concept of the defense of reason in Kantian fashion.

In a manner similar to Kant, Husserl's early approach to the problem of knowledge is through an examination and defense of a form of quasi-Kantian, pure logic whose possibility serves to win back the concept of apodictic

knowledge. Now, Kant dealt with the problem of psychologism in a few sentences, although this topic was later to become an important concern of his neo-Kantian disciples. But, this theme – which Husserl correctly recognizes as the major threat to his goal of securing the foundations of philosophy, science and knowledge itself – becomes in his thought a major and explicit concern, which appears in no less than eight of the eleven chapters contained in the initial volume of the *Logical Investigations*.

Although the Kantian influence is clear, in this work Husserl defines his problem in terms of post-Kantian writers. Psychologism is defined as the attempt, for instance in the writings of Lipps or in Mill's criticism of Hamilton, to ground logic in the psychological operations of the mind. As Husserl points out in a thorough review of the problem, behind the fact that this tendency exhibits a predilection for naturalism, its consequence is to defeat claims for knowledge, if not through the introduction of scepticism, at least through the turn to sceptical relativism, namely, the doctrine of the contingency of knowledge. As Husserl explicitly observes, denying by anticipation the significance of the distinction between varieties of relativism which has recently become a topic for concern, especially in the philosophy of science:

> In our attacks on relativism, we have of course had psychologism in mind. Psychologism in all its subvarieties and individual elaborations is in fact the same as relativism, though not always recognized and expressly allowed to be such.[3]

Thus, like Kant, Husserl opposes psychologism in order to shore up the possibility of certain knowledge. Indeed, he himself explicitly draws attention to his relation to previous thinkers, although their authority is not invoked, especially Kant's distinction between pure and applied forms of logic, Herbert's stress on the objectivity of the concepts of pure logic, and finally Leibniz's desire to elaborate logic as a *mathesis universalis*.

The basis of Husserl's attack on psychologism concerns his reply to the Mill's criticism of so-called normative logic. In his summary of the psychologistic point of view, Husserl remarks:

> The argument only proves one thing, that psychology *helps* in the foundation of logic, not that it has the only or the main part in this, not that it provides logic's *essential foundation*.[4]

Otherwise stated, psychology does not and cannot found logic because, although logical operations, in fact, occur on the psychological plane – of which the foremost example is the operation of the human mind – logic itself cannot depend on psychology for its possibility. This latter must

accordingly be demonstrated apart from and prior to experience, if at all. (Here Husserl might be regarded by neo-Thomists as a healthy corrective to early modern psychologism culminating in Kant and as having regained a sense of the distinction between the factual workings of the mind and logic; see Chapter 8.) But, even though Husserl's approach is clear, it is considerably less clear that the actual demonstration was or, in fact, could be supplied. And, despite the importance and strength of his criticism of psychologism, the consistency of his own position has often been called into question. Heidegger, in this respect, speaks for many when, in a semi-autobiographical sketch, he describes the second volume of the *Logical Investigations* as a "lengthy description of the acts of consciousness necessary for knowledge", which means that "Husserl falls back with his phenomenological description of the phenomena of consciousness into the position of psychologism which he had just refuted."[5]

In subsequent writings prior to the *Crisis*, Husserl's analysis of the crisis of reason remained substantially the same. Husserl further developed his conception of philosophy as an alternative to the crisis of reason in 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science' (1911). Here the earlier emphasis on anti-psychologism is replaced by firm opposition to what Husserl views as romanticism and its contemporary representatives, as a result of Husserl's temporary shift at this point away from logic as such to a view of phenomenology as the fulfillment of the philosophic quest for certainty. Husserl's basic point in this text is that although philosophy has striven ever since its origins in Greek thought to deliver apodictic knowledge, this goal is, in fact, only reached in modern science and mathematics. Indeed, despite the important efforts expended in the modern tradition by such talented individuals as Descartes, Kant and Fichte, since the Romantic School and especially Hegel, whose position lacks a genuinely self-critical epistemology, philosophy has turned away from its traditional goal. Examples of this abandonment can be found in the movements of naturalism, scepticism, as well as historicism, which Husserl regards as the form of relativism associated with Dilthey.

Although this text is perhaps more programmatic than the *Investigations*, the fundamental analysis of the nature of the crisis confronting reason is not altered at this point. A similar claim can be made about the *Cartesian Meditations* (1929) which contains numerous interesting insights that result from a determined effort to understand transcendental phenomenology as the necessary and, in fact, completed version of the Cartesian philosophy, and hence of the philosophic quest. And although he also provides an interesting but perhaps incomplete analysis of the problem of solipsism, which

some phenomenologists have continued to regard as the necessary consequence of any attempt to assume the transcendental standpoint[6], the problem of reason is still seen in a similar manner. Indeed, the continuity in Husserl's thought at this point with the original formulation of his position can be further brought out through his publication, at the same time, of his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), in which a "transcendental logic" is depicted, much in the manner of the *Logical Investigations*, as "an ultimate theory of science, an ultimate, deepest, and most universal, theory of the principles and norms of all the sciences"[7] in an investigation which, according to Husserl, originates not in Kant but in Plato.

Another, in some ways novel view of the crisis of reason appears in Husserl's last great, but incomplete, work, the *Crisis*, where the problem finally becomes a central theme, as is apparent in the choice of the title. In order to appreciate the revised form of Husserl's view of the crisis of reason, it is helpful to know something about the circumstances surrounding the composition of the book. After the electoral victory of National Socialism, Husserl – who was Jewish – was driven from his chair of philosophy at the University of Freiburg and forbidden to teach in Germany. In these circumstances, he was understandably eager to accept invitations to speak outside the country. The immediate occasion which later led to the composition of the manuscript was an invitation to speak in Vienna on May 7, 1935, which arrived too late for Husserl to prepare his text in advance. His extemporaneous talk, which was well received, was repeated in Vienna and then twice, in somewhat modified form, in Prague in November of the same year. Although he was unable to bring the manuscript to completed form, Husserl worked on it during 1935–1936, and on the general topic during the period 1934–1937, in what were evidently most trying circumstances.

The change in his conception of reason can further be related to the history of philosophy. As has already been shown, in his writing prior to this time, Husserl was concerned above all with the crisis of reason which is unable to and increasingly disinterested in a defense of the traditional claim to apodicticity. Here for the first time, writing in the wake of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Husserl brusquely abandons the previous approach to the problem of knowledge as an abstract, theoretical question, although this is undoubtedly the form it has most often assumed in the philosophic tradition, to raise the related and, it has been argued, more immediately important issue of the relation between knowledge and history.[8] Although the former sense of the problem of reason in the rigorous sense is still present in this final formulation, the emphasis has shifted from the more technical difficulties associated

with the fulfillment of the quest for certainty – correctly identified by Husserl with the names of Plato, Descartes, and Kant – to topics associated with the relation of knowledge to human life.

This shift in emphasis is the apparent result of a change in Husserl's conception of knowledge itself. In previous writings, especially in 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science' and the *Cartesian Meditations*, the major, perhaps exclusive, stress was placed on knowledge in the sense that it assumes since the *Republic*. In the sixth book of the latter work, Plato describes philosophy as the science of sciences which founds and hence fully justifies the claim of all other disciplines to knowledge in the full sense as well as itself. It is this conception of philosophy as science in the fullest and deepest sense as the sole and final adequate safeguard, and indeed unique source of all claims to epistemological apodicticity, which is the dominant strand in the philosophic tradition at least until the rise of German Idealism and which continues unabated in Husserl's earlier writings.

Although the most important impulse to the conception of philosophy as the science of certain knowledge lies in Plato's thought and its origin even further back – it has been argued – in Parmenides,[9] the proximal sense in which it dominates the later tradition derives from Aristotle. In particular, it was Aristotle who introduced the influential conception of theory as knowledge for its own sake and not for another end, as witness his distinction between pure sciences – such as physics, mathematics, and theology or metaphysics, which aim at knowledge as such through contemplation – and practical sciences – such as ethics, politics, and economics, in which knowledge is a guide to action in order to maintain and improve life. Aristotle thus breaks with the Platonic view, whose origin lies in Socrates' unwritten doctrine on the inseparability of knowing and doing. According to Socrates, as Plato depicts him, all knowledge – and not only that which results from practice-oriented theory – has a practical or ethical import. This position is further followed up by Plato, particularly in the *Philebus*, where ethics is described as an exact or pure science, whereas in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* it is represented as a approximative and practical discipline, even if since Jaeger the details of this question have been shrouded in controversy.[10]

It is the quasi-Aristotelian distinction between pure or disinterested and practical or interested forms of reason which dominates the subsequent tradition, as witness the equation of certainty and science by St Thomas[11] and the efforts of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel to demonstrate the possibility of certain knowledge. To be sure, Kant does return timidly to a kind of Platonism in his claim that the science of ethics is wholly adequate to an

apriori analysis of any and all forms of experience, in his much-neglected article on practice,[12] although he maintains the Aristotelian position on this point in his own distinction between fundamentally dissimilar forms of reason.[13] In the *Crisis*, Husserl, on the contrary, comes back to the pre-Aristotelian, Platonic conception of reason as such as inherently and necessarily, not contingently, practical, in which the justification and role of philosophy is that it is the source of knowledge needed to guide our lives. It is this explicit stress on the ethical dimension in Husserl's last full discussion of the problem of reason – in which the problem of the crisis comes under explicit study – which distinguishes it from his accounts in earlier writings, where the primary and perhaps only important emphasis lay on mere certainty, and where the ethical concern was present at best implicitly. This distinction is visible now in the turn, perhaps for the first time, to the social context and history.

The discussion of Husserl's later concept of crisis is rendered difficult by a conceptual continuity between this and earlier discussions, where the idea of the problem of reason in an attempt to ground itself, so prominent earlier, is still present, although in muted form. For instance, on the first page of the *Crisis*, Husserl recalls his earlier emphasis on this problem, when he writes

> The crisis of a science means nothing less than that its authentic status as a science, namely, its whole way of posing its problem and in consequence developing its method, has become questionable. It is appropriate that philosophy in our time is threatened with scepticism. To the extent that psychology still raises philosophic claims and does not want to remain only one among the positive sciences, this is also the case for it.[14]

In this passage, we already find the familiar themes concerning the relation of science and method, the contemporary rise of scepticism and other forms of non-absolute epistemology, and the problem of psychology – themes familiar from the preceding discussion. But, as the work proceeds, the importance of these ideas tends to recede into the background as Husserl focuses his attention on a series of other meanings of the concept of crisis. In the book itself, beyond the sense already referred to, the concept of crisis has at least four novel and distinguishable, although obviously interrelated meanings, none of which has been the object of direct study by Husserl in his writing until this point.

In part, Husserl's use of the term "crisis" here is semi-autobiographical, since there are at least two senses in which it refers to a personal crisis. An initial, obvious sense of the term here is provided by Husserl's situation as

an aged thinker, perhaps Germany's most important living philosopher, who suddenly, for political reasons relative to his religious heritage, is denied access to the university chair he had hitherto graced with exceptional distinction. In this context, the term in question has a pathetic ring, as somehow inadequate to what it is meant to convey, which defies translation into mere language.

A similar comment can be made about the second sense of the word here, in its association with the pathos of Husserl's effort singlehandedly to ground knowledge as such. This effort, if successful, would have brought to a close one of mankind's greatest and most enduring intellectual projects. stretching over more than two millennia since the dawn of Western philosophy in ancient Greece; that is, the search for a defense of the claim to certain knowledge. Now, at the twilight of his career, aware of his personal mortality, although Husserl is as unwilling as he has ever been to renounce the goal which animates his entire intellectual enterprise, he is nonetheless aware of the hopelessness of his own effort to complete it within his lifetime or by his own unaided efforts: "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science – the dream is dreamed out."[15]

Both of the forms of crisis distinguished above as novel in Husserl's latest treatment of this theme concern Husserl's own subjectivity, which is an important clue here to more general problems. In particular, it is evident that forms of personal crisis point beyond themselves to the problem of subjectivity. Husserl now turns to this question in a third sense of the term "crisis", in which subjectivity itself becomes a problem. Now, it might be thought that this topic would arise within the domain of psychology which is, after all, that science most centrally concerned with the various facets of man. But Husserl is less interested in psychology as such than in the relation of this science to other, less subjective concerns. In particular, he maintained that the question of subjectivity, which apparently belongs to psychology, unavoidably arises as the result of attempts to shore up the foundations of the so-called exact sciences, the science of nature and mathematics which, according to Husserl, "all lead to the riddle of the psychological theme and method (which are) altogether inseparable".[18]

The claim concerning the necessary relation of the exact sciences to the problem of subjectivity might initially appear tenuous and even mistaken. It is well-known that a feature common to such sciences is the concern to eliminate entirely, or at least to reduce to a practical or theoretical minimum, the role played by subjectivity as a condition of the maximalization of the possible claims to objectivity. Indeed, this feature has often been thought

to be in some sense identical with scientific status. Now, Husserl's attention here is directed less towards the question of objectivity as such, the central theme of his earlier discussions of rationality – although it is not entirely absent from his mind at this point – than at the relation of so-called objective knowledge and objective science to man's life. For, although in Plato's analysis theory is a guide to life worth living, the kind of knowledge which is made available by those supposedly most impregnable, since rigorous, sciences seems largely irrelevant to primary human concerns, such as those generated by the rise of National Socialism. In a rare direct allusion to the surrounding historical context, Husserl writes:

> Purely factual sciences result in purely factual people. The change in the public view was in particular unavoidable after the war and has, as we know, become a hostile mood in the young generation. In our time of need – so we hear – this science has nothing to say to us.[19]

Unlike his German philosophic colleagues who, especially in the twentieth century, have so often been distinguished by an impressive grasp of the length and breadth of the history of philosophy, Husserl's knowledge of the tradition was considerably more restricted, although by no means negligeable. Indeed, he knew the history of philosophy considerably better than has often been recognized. His analysis of the problem of subjectivity as a crisis here owes much to prior treatments of this topic by Dilthey, who is elsewhere criticized as a leader of modern historicism, and Heidegger whose epistemology borrows largely from Dilthey.

Husserl's dependence on Dilthey is apparent in two related ways. In his own thought Dilthey distinguished two kinds of science; namely, those whose goal is to explain (*Erklären*), such as the so-called exact sciences, and those whose aim is to understand (*Verstehen*), such as the so-called *Geisteswissenschaften*. But if, as Dilthey implied, the realm of objective knowledge is circumscribed in such a way as to exclude in principle the problems relative to the understanding of man, then the source of Husserl's claim that objective science points to the problems of subjectivity becomes apparent. Dilthey's approach is further apparent in the order, already noted, of Husserl's discussion. Like Dilthey, who maintained that the so-called *Geisteswissenschaften* which seek to understand, are at least basically autobiographical, Husserl proceeds from his own personal crises to the larger problem of subjectivity. Similarly, there is an unmistakable echo of Heidegger's early language when, in the sentence following that just quoted, Husserl continues:

Immediately, those questions most significant for us in our time of the most fateful upheavals are excluded – the questions concerning the sense or senselessness of man's entire concrete existence.[18]

But, although Husserl's question and even its language is indebted to these two thinkers, there is nonetheless an important difference to be observed. In Dilthey's thought the fundamental distinction results in two sharply separated forms of science as such, each of which seeks to understand the world and to gain knowledge from a basically different viewpoint. In Heidegger's position, one finds the paradoxical situation where, on the one hand, a concerted attempt is made to overcome the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, especially in the theory of truth as revealing that which lies concealed, and, on the other hand, subjectivity is stressed as that which lies below, at a more primitive level than objectivity, as in his analysis of the relation of *Daseinsanalyse* to the domains of anthropology, biology, and psychology in *Being and Time* (paragraph 10). On the contrary, Husserl's concern with subjectivity is neither with the problem as such, nor because of its separation from objectivity, but rather because, as he maintains, the attempt to gain knowledge on the objective plane, which is the traditional epistemological approach, necessarily leads back from objectivity to subjectivity. Otherwise stated, the sense in which Husserl's analysis differs from those of Dilthey and Heidegger is not that, as the former holds, the two forms of knowledge are separable and separate or, as the latter asserts, because subjectivity is deeper than objectivity. Rather, if philosophy is to achieve its role as the central guide for man's life, there must not only be objective knowledge but knowledge, which is by definition excluded from the exact sciences, of human being.

But, it is only if such knowledge is possible at all that philosophy can fulfill its traditional role, clearly apparent in Husserl's simple statement, which expresses so well the responsibility of the philosopher to his fellow man as constitutive of the philosophic activity itself: "We are therefore – how could we ignore it? – in our philosophical activity representatives of mankind."[19]

The preceding kind of crisis concerned the relation between so-called objective knowledge and subjectivity, and raised the problem of scientific knowledge for man in any fundamental sense. Now, in a fourth meaning of the term, Husserl poses the question of the claim of objective science to yield knowledge. Unlike the other senses of the word "crisis", which have so far been mentioned and whose treatment in the work is mainly implicit and confined to the opening pages, this final meaning of the term is the acknowledged central theme of the book, as is evident in the full title, which reads:

The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy.

The final form of crisis marks a distinct departure from Husserl's earlier discussion. In previous writings, the sense of crisis was confined to the defense of reason, historically undertaken by philosophy, although the claim of other, "objective" sciences to knowledge was freely acknowledged without further discussion or attempt at clarification. For instance, in the programmatic text, 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science', Husserl comments that the sole fruit of the modern reflection on method was to ground and to make transparent the sciences of nature and society, although this effort was unavailing with respect to philosophy:

> In fact, the dominant theme of modern philosophy is that, instead of naively submitting to the philosophic instinct, it rather desires to constitute itself through the means of critical reflection, in ever deeper study of method ... But, the sole ripe fruit of this concern has been the grounding and self-clarification of the rigorous sciences of nature and culture, and of the new, rigorous mathematical disciplines. For philosophy itself is lacking, now as before, the particular sense of rigorous science that has now been raised.[20]

In this historical moment, for the first time the scientific status of the previously privileged non-philosophical sciences becomes a matter of concern. But, it should be noted that the problem here is not the sense in which objective science is said to speak to or, what is the same thing, to be relevant for, human life. Rather, Husserl's concern is with the sense in which such science can make the claim to provide knowledge at all.

The mere fact that Husserl raises this question at all at this time shows the persistence in his later thought of an earlier Kantian tendency, which has often been held to disappear progressively in favor of an ever greater interest in Descartes. As is well-known, Kant had as one of his primary epistemological goals, the vindication of the claims of modern science, particularly in its Newtonian form, with which he was deeply familiar, to which he himself contributed, and whose intrinsic legitimacy he never doubted. Kant's procedure, equally widely known but not always understood, was to show that mathematics and science were possible if and only if there could be synthetic *apriori* judgments. In this way, he offered a transcendental argument in which the conditions of experience whatsoever could be fully specified on a prior and non-experiential plane. On the contrary, Husserl's procedure is not to attempt to specify the abstract conditions of any and all knowledge in general, but rather to describe from the phenomenological perspective what, in fact, occurs. His investigation of this question and, in particular, his brilliant study

of Galileo's role in the rise of modern science, constitutes perhaps the most striking example of the application of phenomenology in the entire phenomenological literature.

The discussion centers on Galileo, since the latter's insights alone, according to Husserl, made possible mathematical physics and modern physical science in general. The idea of rigorous science was, of course, known to the Greeks and is further a central theme in modern philosophy; for instance, in Descartes. But, in post-Cartesian thought this concept undergoes a fundamental transformation through the application of this science, not to a realm of reality lying beyond experience, but to experience itself. "The previously unheard of novelty is the concept of a rational, unending universe (in relation) with a systematic, rational science of it."[21] In this way, exact knowledge is to be sought, not in the contemplation of reality, whose existence is no longer a necessary postulate, but rather in the thoughtful study of the experiential world.

Although apparently simple, the complexity of the problem can be seen in the difference, not in kind but in degree, between the geometrically precise and descriptively simple, ideal entities which are the subject of modern physical sciences, and the very different kinds of entities met with in experience, laden with rough edges and complex beyond any simple account. The solution, it is clear, is to apply mathematics to experience. But, the way in which this can and should be done is not at first sight clear. The contribution of Galileo in this regard was to understand that through a method of approximation, the world as experienced could be converted into simpler, ideal models, whose more elementary structure permitted description and study with exact techniques of mathematics and yet retained a link with the world of experience. For instance, in the famous experiment with the inclined plane, the simplification of the conditions which in fact obtained, enabled Galileo to transform immediate experience into an ideal case whose description could then be undertaken in precise, mathematical terms. In this way, as Husserl notes, the concept of exact science, through Galileo's genius, "leads to the development of pure mathematics as a pure science of the idea".[22]

Husserl's discussion of the crisis of objective knowledge clarifies and perhaps even resolves the problem in an important sense. It is apparent that the claim to knowledge within the various non-philosophical sciences is not factitious, but is based on the relation between the "real" as experienced and the "ideal" which is the topic of scientific study. This relation is not a mere unsupported assertion, since it is grounded in the proper employment

of mathematical techniques, first undertaken by Galileo. As Husserl writes:

> Just as the empirical and severely restricted statement of the tasks of technical practice originally motivated pure geometry, so conversely, afterwards and for a long time, geometry was "applied" as a means for technology, for its help in the understanding and carrying out of a task – a means of measurement for the systematic production of objective representations, in continued progression as "approximation" to geometrical models, the limiting forms.[23]

But, although the validity of claims to knowledge within such sciences can be accepted, the result of Husserl's phenomenological clarification of the problem is to attach at least two significant conditions to their epistemological pretensions. First, if we recall the Platonic distinction between reality and appearance, it follows that experimental or theoretical study on the scientific plane is indeed concerned with the real or, in Husserl's terminology, the ideal, and not with the lower realm of appearance, which we in fact experience. But, and this is the second point, the knowledge offered by objective science on the plane of reality so-called only has meaning for us because it is the result of an abstractive process whose original material is firmly located in the experiential world, in terms of which the objects for scientific study are "produced" by a process of mathematical approximation.

Since each of these basic strategies has its defenders as well as detractors, a full discussion of the problem cannot be undertaken here. But, it should be noted that, although Husserl's treatment is couched in a different idiom and occurs in a different tradition, his basic point – to wit, that the "world" of physical science is a simplified and idealized form of the experiential world, from which it derives its meaningfulness – is remarkably close to Whitehead's analysis of this problem.

In Husserl's later writings, especially in the *Crisis*, the word "crisis" plays a prominent role. This is not the case for Heidegger's thought, in whose texts, as far as one can see, the term is not prominently employed – perhaps never at all – and certainly never in the sense of a fundamental concern. Nevertheless, a conception of crisis does figure prominently in Heidegger's understanding of the current problems of philosophy. The crisis is not, however, acute in the sense that it has arisen recently or suddenly, but is rather chronic and constitutive of philosophy over the past two thousand years, i.e., subsequent to the highpoint reached in Greek thought, following which it has been in a protracted state of crisis. Nor is the crisis historical in the sense that it can be related to a single event, although the existence of the crisis continues to make its presence felt in later history and is, Heidegger

feels, at the root of much of the hollowness that infects modernity. Thus, the crisis that Heidegger discerns is fundamentally unlike that discussed in relation to Husserl, for whom it is specifically modern and even contemporary, and associated with specific historical occurrences. There is, further, a difference in kind. For, whereas Husserl – as we have seen – is concerned with critical problems that arise out of the epistemological view of science which arises in Greek thought and dominates modernity and in particular the relation of science to philosophy and life, Heidegger's attention is focused on ontological issues which follow, not from the completion or attempted completion of the philosophic quest, but from the perceived need to return to the sources and to rethink the portion of the philosophic heritage which follows its first flowering in ancient Greece.

Although not connected to any single historical occurrence, Heidegger's conception of the crisis of ontology is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy. The central question of all philosophy, according to Heidegger, is that of the meaning of being (*Seinsfrage*). This question arises in pre-Socratic thought, but since Plato and Aristotle (and, of course, philosophies directly inspired by them; see Chapter 9) it has been held to be almost or entirely devoid of meaning. And, from this time until Hegel, no substantive progress has been made toward its solution. Philosophy has not only failed to make progress in this direction; it has further lost its way since in that portion of the tradition which occurs later than Greek thought a series of false analyses of the concept of being have come to be enshrined in the history of philosophy. Heidegger's project can hence be summarized as an attempt to return to and recapture the original Greek intuition concerning the fundamental question of all philosophy, that is, the problem of the meaning of Being, in an effort to provide continuity with and, in fact, finally bring to a close the basic concern of all thought.

Neither Aristotle, who is Heidegger's most important influence in the Greek tradition, nor indeed any other predecessor ever specifically identifies the problem of being as the fundamental problem of philosophy, the question of the meaningfulness of this problem must be raised.

Although the *Seinsfrage* is arguably not the central problem of philosophy as such, but merely a central problem, it is clearly the central concern in Heidegger's position. Heidegger pursues this problem in a number of writings but especially in the main, but unfinished, early work, *Being and Time*, which is significantly, in view of later events, dedicated to his teacher, Edmund Husserl.

Now, Heidegger's position is notoriously difficult and its interpretation is

a matter of continuing controversy. But, in general terms, at least as regards the initial discussion of this problem in *Being and Time*, it seems possible to distinguish three basic aspects in his approach to the question of the meaning of being. These include a preliminary analysis of the concept of being, which precedes and makes possible a later, more developed discussion toward which the entire enquiry points, but which was, in fact, never given in final form, although reasons for its absence as well as concerning Heidegger's later view of the *Seinsfrage* are scattered throughout his subsequent writings; a critical discussion of the purported decline of philosophy after Greek thought, in order to reveal the sense in which the later philosophic tradition was led astray from its original problem by an uncritical acceptance of an inadequate concept of being; and an analysis of man through whom the *Seinsfrage* is, in fact, posed and through whose efforts a response is to be uncovered.

According to Heidegger, all investigations of whatever kind must necessarily begin with a preliminary, average and, hence, vague concept which is then refined as the result of further discussion. In similar fashion, Heidegger initiates his inquiry into the *Seinsfrage* by drawing a series of preliminary distinctions which provide the conceptual framework in terms of which the study can proceed. To begin with, he differentiates between beings (*seiende*) or existent things – literally all those things whose existence makes up the ordinary world as experienced – and Being as such (*Sein*). The latter, which is made manifest in and through beings, differs from and makes possible all existent things. The aim of Heidegger's inquiry is not to understand being, but rather to discuss or, in his own language, to uncover, the meaning of Being which lies beyond and is prior to any particular existent thing, although the inquiry cannot wholly be separated from the study of beings.

Heidegger's initial series of distinctions recalls Greek ontology, although there is a significant difference. In the positions of Plato and Aristotle an ontological dualism underlies and makes possible the claim to epistemological apodicticity, which for Greek thought was the definition of knowledge in the full sense. This is most obviously the case for Plato in his distinction between appearance and reality, which enables him to make the claim that, after undergoing a proper apprenticeship, a philosopher becomes able to grasp reality through direct intuition. Despite Aristotle's criticism of Plato and claim that the forms are immanent, not transcendent, a similar distinction is implicit in his own thought, namely in his argument for the "existence" of primary being (*ousia*); without which knowledge of the unchanging objectivity, that is of that which is that it is and of that which is not that it is not, would not be possible. But, as will be made clear in a later chapter, for

reasons concerned with the intrinsic and unavoidable circularity of the knowing process – as witness the need to appeal to an average understanding (*Vorverständnis*) in order to start the epistemological process at all – Heidegger maintains an ontological dualism. But, it should be noted that he declines to make the traditional claim for epistemological apodicticity which has often been the ground on which the dualistic ontology was invoked.

Heidegger's critical account of the history of philosophy is only adumbrated in *Being and Time*, but is later developed in greater detail in numerous, specific studies. In this book, Heidegger does at least give us a series of basic points relative to his approach to the history of philosophy insofar as it relates to his conception of the *Seinsfrage*, three of which can be mentioned here. To begin with, this problem has suffered from neglect for several reasons – both because it has been deemed unimportant, but also because it has long been felt that in originally asking the question, it was somehow resolved. So, Heidegger writes:

> On the basis of the Greeks' initial contributions toward an interpretation of Being, a dogma has developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect.[24]

Second, the further development of the philosophic tradition has tended to hide rather than to make plain or to uncover the original Greek conception of Being, and this is done in several ways. One way is related to the concept of tradition itself. In a comment about the concept of tradition in general, Heidegger states that "what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed". Thus, merely because the Greek views – including that concerning what was to become the *Seinsfrage* – were so widely disseminated is no reason to think that they were widely grasped. This argument concerns a general problem of all traditions. But, not content to rely on the general nature of traditional thought, Heidegger further points to what he regards as specific mistakes in the later tradition as a result of which the original Greek has been concealed from us.

Although this point is suggested briefly in *Being and Time*, it is elaborated more fully elsewhere in a rich series of historical studies in which Heidegger attempts – as his approach has been described – to dialogue on the same level with some of the great thinkers in the philosophic tradition. Two examples should suffice here to give a sense of the kind of complaints which Heidegger raises against previous views in the history of philosophy, views which have later been widely disseminated by the philosophic tradition.

(1) In a discussion which turns on the intimate relation in Greek thought

between being and activity, particularly in Aristotle's position, Heidegger remarks that, for reasons relative to differences in the Greek and Latin languages, in the translation of *energeia* as *actus*, although the aspect of fulfillment of a process was retained, the other fundamental dimension of this concept – that is, the sense of development and unfolding of an intrinsic potential which is expressed or manifested in being – was lost. As he writes,

> Since the basic definition of Being as actuality henceforward was conveyed by history ... for this reason all later Western history is in multiple senses Roman and no longer Greek.[25]

In brief, for linguistic reasons, later consideration of the problem of being in the Greek meaning of the term has become impossible and, in consequence, all discussions later than those of the Greeks are fundamentally in error. Heidegger may well have in mind the kind of discussion of act and potency included in Chapter 10.

(2) In a discussion of the Cartesian philosophy and its consequences, Heidegger comments (in *Being and Time*) in Husserlian terminology that Kant naively took over the Cartesian conception of the *ego cogito* as the basis of his own view of the transcendental unity of apperception. But, the error is not an innocent one. Although the point is controversial, in a later essay, Heidegger relates what he perceives as a tendency towards philosophical anthropology that mistakenly dominates modern times since Descartes' invocation of the subjective principle as the ground of knowledge, and his own interpretation of the *Seinsfrage*, when he writes, in a description of the anthropological approach: "It signifies that philosophical interpretation of man which serves to explain and evaluate things in general."[26] According to Heidegger, beyond its loss of the original Greek impulse, all post-Cartesian philosophy is further vitiated by a regrettable turn towards the anthropological approach which follows from the Cartesian cogito. Although the results are somewhat different, the American pragmatic tradition also sharply criticized the Cartesian position (see Chapter 15, above).

It is not easy to understand Heidegger's basic intention, in part because his choice of terminology suggests that his intent in dealing with the tradition is exclusively negative. For instance, his term for the critical assessment of prior theories of being is "the destruction of the history of ontology", which he characterizes in the following manner: "We understand the task as one in which, by taking *the question of Being as our clue*, we are to *destroy* the traditional content of ancient ontology ..."[27] But, it should be noted that although his aim is to uncover what he regards as mistakes in the post-Greek

history of ontology, in another sense, like Hegel, he intends to preserve those elements of the history of philosophy which are intrinsically worth preserving and, even further, to remain within the limits of that tradition. Thus, after the next sentence, in which he disclaims his interest in relativism, Heidegger continues:

> But this destruction is just as far from having the *negative* sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its *limits*.[28]

Heidegger's approach to the *Seinsfrage* is through the analysis of *Dasein* (*Daseinsanalyse*). As with other key Heideggerian terms, there has been much discussion about the meaning and proper translation of *Dasein*. Although the word does pose some problems, it is not an unprecedented locution in the history of philosophy, since it also occurs in Hegel. Further, much of the discussion about its meaning could have been avoided through closer attention to the passage in which Heidegger – always a careful writer – introduces it:

> Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of *Being*; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about – namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "*Dasein*".[29]

Although there has been some confusion on this point in the literature, it seems unquestionably the case that in this statement Heidegger employs the concept of *Dasein* to refer to man. Two further inferences should be noted at this point. First, Heidegger is careful to point out that a prior understanding of *Dasein* must be attained in order to approach the *Seinsfrage*. This priority is present in at least two senses. On the one hand, since Being only manifests itself through being, we must turn to being in order to know Being. On the other hand, since it is *Dasein* which raises the *Seinsfrage* to begin with, the problem of Being can only be approached through man. It is this double sense of the priority of man as the clue to the meaning of Being which Heidegger refers to in his demonstration that *Dasein* is "ontico-ontologically prior".[30]

Second, Heidegger further insists on the importance of the fact that *Dasein* poses the question of the meaning of *Being* as significant for its own way of Being. This raising of the *Seinsfrage* is not a sign of a basic curiosity, nor is it merely one question among others that we raise in order to understand

ourselves and the world. It is rather a defining characteristic of human being that it is concerned with the *Seinsfrage*. Heidegger accordingly signals his acceptance of the Greek approach, which has since dominated philosophy, in which man is to be understood as a rational being or, in Aristotle's formula, as a *zoon logon exon*. But, here at least two differences between the positions of Aristotle and Heidegger should be observed. In Heidegger's thought the emphasis lies less on the capacity of reason as such than on the concern with certain basic problems and, above all, the *Seinsfrage*, which is not the case for Aristotle and the later tradition. Further, Aristotle also insists on the fact that man is a political animal – an aspect which is largely absent not only in the later tradition prior to Hegel, although there are exceptions, but in Heidegger's thought as well. The neo-Thomist vision of man as a social animal (Chapter 6) attempts to carry on Aristotle's view.

Heidegger further develops a rich and detailed analysis of *Dasein* which occupies most of the remainder of *Being and Time* and which can be sketched here only in briefest form. Heidegger's account of human being begins from the supposition – for which he is probably indebted to Dilthey – that man cannot be explained in the sense that this is possible in various sciences or mathematics. Rather, *Dasein* is to be interpreted from a phenomenological perspective which Heidegger – here recalling the theological term for Biblical interpretation – calls "hermeneutic" (*Hermeneutik*). The hermeneutic of *Dasein* has three distinguishing dimensions which can be summarized in rapid fashion. In the first place, an aim in the study of man is to use the results as a clue to understand other, non-human forms of Being, which Heidegger refers to when he writes that in this way "we may exhibit the horizon for any further ontological study of those entities which do not have the character of *Dasein* ... "[31] In other words, through the study of man we can have access to man's world. Further, beyond the knowledge of the contents of experience, Heidegger also stresses that all investigation on the ontological plane must pass through the understanding of human subjectivity, in quasi-Kantian fashion, in the statement that this "hermeneutic" has the aim of "working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends".[32] Otherwise stated, we can never escape from the need to understand the possibility of all knowledge from the perspective of the subject, but from the study of man the conditions for other kinds of understanding in general can be formulated. Finally, the hermeneutic of *Dasein* has the sense of an understanding of man as concretely existing being or, in Heidegger's language, the "sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence".[33] Thus, as he also states in a sentence which occurs twice in

identical form in the book and which can serve as a summary of his intentions:

> Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its point of departure from the hermeneutic of *Dasein* which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it *returns*.[34]

It is perhaps not out of place to conclude this chapter with a remark about the wider significance of the theme discussed here. Although the concept of crisis has been considered solely within the sphere of contemporary phenomenology, it could just as easily have been extended to include existentialism, where related concepts of crisis are important themes in the thought of such writers as Sartre – especially in his later, Marxist, phase – and Jaspers, and perhaps others as well. More generally, it seems fair to say that despite the real differences in phenomenology and existentialism which follow from the respective decisions to study experiences from a variably transcendental perspective or as immersed within it, both of these intellectual currents are similar in their concern with forms of crisis.

CHAPTER 17

AN APPROACH TO SOCIAL CONTEXT

Contemporary phenomenology has not had much to say about the twin themes of science and technology. Although there are exceptions, most major phenomenological writers have preferred to concentrate on the more general problem of culture as such. Speaking broadly, with the exception of Husserl's discussion of the rise of modern physical science, comparatively little attention has been directed to science as such. On the contrary, there has been wide discussion of the social context, although not from the quasi-Marxist perspective in which the phenomenon is to be understood in terms of its genesis. Examples here are Husserl's later study of the life-world, which has been influential both within phenomenology – for instance, in Schutz's discussion of multiple realities – and in Marxism – e.g., in the theory of the everyday world associated with Lefèbvre as well as the members of the Budapest School (Markus, Heller, Feher, *et al.*). Culture has further been studied in a more concrete sense in terms of the problem of freedom, where related, but largely divergent, analyses are to be found in existential phenomenology, tinged with Marxism to a variable degree, in the thought of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. From another perspective, perhaps the most specific approach to technology among the major phenomenological writers has been Heidegger's complementary discussions of instrumentality and technology, whose concrete nature largely differentiates them from the generality of other contemporary phenomenological discussions of cultural themes.

Husserl explicitly considers the general realm of human culture under the concept of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) in the *Crisis*. The discussion occurs in Part 3 of the book, which is devoted to 'The Clarification of the Transcendental Problem and the Related Function of Psychology', Part 1 of which is entitled 'The Way into Phenomenological-Transcendental Philosophy in the Further Inquiry Proceeding from the Already-Given Life-World'.

Interestingly enough, in view of Husserl's habitually sparing attention to the history of philosophy, he claims to find the concept of the life-world implicit in Kant.

> Of course, the Kantian manner of putting the question presupposes beforehand the ordinary life-world as being, in which we all – even the philosophizer – consciously

exist, and not least the sciences as cultural facts in this world with their scientists and theories.[1]

Otherwise stated, implicit in the Kantian position and, indeed, in all other forms of philosophy and science is the crucial presupposition that all epistemological claims refer to the world in which philosophers and scientists, in fact, live and attempt to know. But, although this concept is implicit in Kant's position as well as others, it has never yet been made the object of systematic study.

Uninterested in the possibility of arguing from the authority of a great predecessor, Husserl quickly abandons the terrain of the Kantian theory to elaborate the concept of the life-world in independence of it. One of the few clear statements of his view is found in a passage concerning the conceptual horizon, which is implicitly presupposed as the basis to all scientific or philosophic claims to knowledge of experience, as the object about which such claims are to be made. In a description of the ordinary, everyday world which is, in fact, met with in experience, Husserl draws an implicit contrast with higher levels of philosophic or scientific "reality", which are the object of such study but which are never, in fact, experienced as such, or at least not in any ordinary sense.

The already given world is the horizon which already implicitly includes all our goals, all our aims (be they) transitory, or lasting, or continually streaming, as an intentional horizon of consciousness. In our normal, uninterrupted, unified life, we the subjects, do not know any goals which extend beyond (it), since we have no concept that any other one is possible. We can also say that all our practical and theoretical themes lie within the normal unity of the life-horizon of the "world". World is the universal field which includes all our acts, be they experiential, cognitive or productive. From it emerge all the given objects and affects which on occasion can become activities.[2]

Although the concept of life-world remains difficult – indeed so much so that even the best commentators are hesitant in their interpretation of it – this passage is helpful in providing a number of fairly explicit hints at Husserl's interpretation of it. To begin with, all knowledge presupposes an object and a context in which it is given to us. The objects of knowledge are ultimately given only in immediate experience, even if for purposes of scientific or philosophical discussion it is sometimes necessary to abstract from experiential immediacy. It is this world which is constantly presupposed, even by science and philosophy which introduces a conceptual distinction between levels of experience and knowledge. It is further this same world of experience which provides the horizon of life for scientists, philosophers

and the ordinary, average man. Finally, it is constantly assumed that all the experience we have, of whatever kind, originates in the surrounding life-world in which each of us lives his life.

Although Husserl's view of the life-world by no means answers all the questions which have been raised about it, its usefulness in the context of his thought is manifest. In writings previous to the *Crisis* he continually insists on the need for philosophy, in fact, to become science in the Greek sense and, in particular, to be really capable of sustaining claims to certain knowledge. But, like Kant who in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was concerned to alleviate doubts about the realism of his position by insisting on its relation to empirical experience, so Husserl is concerned to retain the relation between philosophy and life in order to make good on the Greek concept of philosophy as the guide for man. But, since morality and knowledge are inseparable, in the *Crisis* Husserl further raises the question of how so-called exact sciences can, in fact, make out their claims to objective knowledge. In this context the value of the concept of the life-world is that it both provides a way of relating philosophy to life, on the one hand and, on the other, affirms that natural science is rooted in the ordinary experiential world, thereby suggesting a single "realistic" solution to two of Husserl's deepest theoretical concerns.

Despite the important function played by the concept of the life-world in Husserl's later thought as well as the space devoted to it in the *Crisis*, it cannot be said that he succeeds in fully clarifying it; nor does he provide a full study of the concept – although that is his announced intention. But, among those who have worked on or around this concept, probably no one has gone further in elucidating Husserl's original understanding of the term than the Viennese-American phenomenologist, Alfred Schutz. Unlike Husserl – who in his initial and only presentation of the concept, seems to suggest that it is the counterpart to the only other possible attitude to experience, that of objective knowledge – Schutz, although otherwise following Husserl, widens the analysis to include possibilities apparently compatible with but not explicitly considered by Husserl.

Schutz attacks this problem, among others, in his well-known book, *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (1967) (*Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie. 1932*), largely focussed on Husserlian concepts of intersubjectivity, intentionality, and the life-world. This work, which provides an interesting and fruitful attempt to unite Husserl's transcendental phenomenology with Weber's *verstehende Soziologie*, begins with a quasi-Husserlian analysis of the structures of inner

experience before proceeding to a quasi-Weberian analysis of the intersubjective social structure. Schutz further treats the problem of the life-world in briefer compass in a later article, 'On Multiple Realities' (1945), which –as it represents the final and richest formulation of his approach – will be considered here.

The relation between James and phenomenology has been the topic of much discussion in the literature [3] and Schutz begins the paper in question with a reference to James' discussion of our sense of reality in his *Principles of Psychology*. According to James, as Schutz understands him, there are an unlimited number of possible "sub-universes", each of which focusses on reality from a different perspective. Accordingly, Schutz' aim here is defined as an attempt to develop further James' reflections "with the special aim of clarifying the relationship between the reality of the world of daily life and that of theoretical, scientific contemplation".[4]

Although Schutz is here attempting to develop certain insights of William James, it is manifest that the basic problem with which he is concerned is that already raised independently by Husserl. Further, like Husserl, Schutz begins with a descriptive analysis of the life-world. Schutz' perspective, which he helpfully summarizes, reveals both Husserlian influence – evident in the basic problem as well as in specific detail – as well as input from other sources. As might be expected, the resultant view is basically compatible with Husserl's, although there are significant differences of detail and emphasis.

In his summary of the "specific cognitive style" of the "social structure of the world of daily life", Schutz helpfully distinguishes six traits, concerning consciousness, *epoché*, spontaneity, self-experience, sociality and time-perspective. In the context of the present discussion, the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth characteristics are less important, since they can be considered as Schutz' restatement, in his own terminology, of distinctions already made by Husserl. In particular, in his original treatment of the life-world, Husserl insists strongly, as we have seen, on the fact that it is experienced directly and in an immediate way. This is further the case for one's self-experience, as well as the specific form of sociality, that is, the common intersubjectivity which is shared by all of us as members of the natural social context. Husserl's lectures on the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* finally cover this topic in greater depth and detail than Schutz does here, although this subject is discussed at some length in portions of his book, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau.*

With respect to Husserl's position, the two most original points are the second and third on Schutz' list. An interesting claim is made in Schutz'

observation that the natural attitude presupposes a specific existential stance. Husserl, of course, insists through the concept of phenomenological reduction – which is introduced in *Ideas* (1913) and remains central to his understanding of appropriate methodology thereafter – that a necessary condition of phenomenological knowledge and, hence, of descriptive knowledge *tout court*, is suspension of any and all belief in the existence of the object of experience in favor of its analysis, unprejudiced by prior commitments of any kind. But, if the belief in existence needs to be suspended, it is because this belief, in fact, exists. In his discussion of the *epoché* specific to the natural attitude – that is, the suspension of doubt – Schutz makes us aware that in the world of ordinary life we normally, and as a matter of course, suspend all doubt concerning the existence of that world. In fact, the problem of the existence of the ordinary world or of the objects in it, whether they be people or things or events of some kind, only arises on a further, philosophic plane, but not in everyday existence.

Schutz' emphasis on work is equally original, but on the whole rather less successful – at least if compared to the Marxist view.

Within the Marxist perspective, the insistence on the relation of work to the arguably fundamental, economic dimension of reality provides an important tool to focus the discussion. Schutz, on the contrary, evidently desires not to limit the concept merely to the economic dimension, so that the latter can be viewed merely as a form of a more general phenomenon which, however, is still a dominant aspect of the ordinary social world. This is evident, for instance, in his definition of work as "a meaningful spontaneity based upon a project and characterized by the intention of bringing about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements gearing into the world".[5] Here the reference to any form of economic activity is conspicuously absent. Rather, the description could fit any and all forms of freely undertaken, conscious activity which is by definition intentional, although it is not at all clear that the adjectives "free" or "spontaneous" are apt to characterize the form of social activity that Marxists designate as "work".

Since his view lacks the focus imparted in the Marxist tradition by the emphasis on economic activity, Schutz must seek it elsewhere. In practice, he turns to Heidegger for an innovative effort to provide a central theme. Heidegger's analysis of death as the unavoidable or non-relative event which conditions all life is familiar. In similar fashion, Schutz now suggests that the anticipation and fear of our own individual death, which he calls the "*fundamental anxiety*",[6] plays a central role in terms of the further organization of all other attitudes and actions within the natural attitude.

From the fundamental anxiety spring the many interrelated systems of hopes and fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite man within the natural attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, to draft projects, and to realize them.[7]

The difference, of course, in Schutz' position in relation to Heidegger at this point is that, whereas for the latter stress is placed on taking up the proper stance towards and in acceptance of biological death, Schutz emphasizes, as is evident from the passage just cited, the positive function of this event within the everyday business of daily life. But, it is important to realize that, although in Schutz' position death functions – unlike Heidegger's view – to spur us on to do things, this is possible only within the framework provided by the world of working.

The relative success of Schutz' discussion can perhaps be brought out through a comparison. As is often the case in a disciple or, indeed, in any writer who can build upon the thought of a conceptual pioneer, Schutz provides a more systematic and indeed richer analysis of daily life than does Husserl. In particular, he goes beyond the Husserlian tendency to assimilate all ordinary, unreflective forms of experience to a single model, by introducing further distinctions. As Schutz points out, although the social structure of the world of daily life is characterized by a specific tension of consciousness – that is, being awake with respect to one's surroundings, including other people and oneself – this is by no means always the case. In fact, it is a frequent occurrence of ordinary people, confined neither to fools nor madmen, that they are not consciously wide-awake – or at least not in the ordinary sense of the word.

Schutz' observation that wide-awakeness is not a necessary criterion of the social structure of the everyday world, although its denial does not transport us to the scientific plane, enables him to distinguish two other levels within the sphere of ordinary experience, which he designates as the "world of phantasms" and the "world of dreams". The former, which is in fact multiple, embraces such phenomena – each of which can be differentiated from other forms of fantasy – as fairy tales, myths, day-dreams, play, etc. Although fantasy may, on occasion, be put to later use within the consciously wide-awake level of the everyday world, the distinguishing feature of this level is that on it we are freed from the obligations of pragmatic accomplishments, such as those exemplified within the world of working, and we are further liberated from the shared bonds of intersubjectivity characteristic of daily life. The world of dreams, unlike the everyday world, is characterized by a relaxation of the tension of consciousness in the turn away from daily

life specifically associated with the phenomenon of sleep. Schutz here recognizes the achievement of Freud and his followers in elucidating a form of communication which is not manifest, but latent, and suggests in passing that there is an analogy between it and Kierkegaard's view of indirect communication.

So far, the discussion of Schutz has focused on novel and partially novel aspects of his analysis of the everyday world, which he enlarges beyond Husserl's rather narrow concept of the life-world, to include dimensions of fantasy and dreaming. If we turn now to Schutz' view of the world of scientific theory, we should immediately note a fundamental difference in emphasis with respect to Husserl's view. As we have seen, throughout his writings, Husserl stressed a difference – not in degree but in kind, to wit, a fundamental rupture – between the life-world and the scientific plane, which enabled him to support his claim to apodictic knowledge for mathematics, natural and social sciences, and eventually for transcendental phenomenology. Schutz, who restricts his attention mainly to social science (*Geisteswissenschaften*), is largely unconcerned with problems of apodicticity, and stresses instead the relative continuity to be observed between the planes of science and everyday life.

Schutz' analysis of the world of scientific theory is both flexible and rich in nuances. He immediately recognizes that the activity required for scientific theory is merely one form of contemplation, as distinguished, for example, from contemplative thought about another job or a change in lifestyle, of which the wider class is characterized by a disinterest in or separation from the working world. This claim is made because a basic feature of scientific theory is that it fails to serve any purpose. To be sure, the results of scientific theory are frequently utilized for one end or another; for instance, to win a war, fight disease, or develop a new product-line. But these and other such practical uses of scientific theory are extrinsic to science itself, whose end is immanent, not external, and which is not meant for application. By the same token, the non-pragmatic outlook of the scientific theorist means that he is immune to all problems of relevance that arise within the ordinary world, including that which arises from fundamental anxiety. In this regard we should recall James' position that scientific concepts and theories are derived from, yet no longer completely reducible to, everyday experience.

Schutz further remarks that insofar as the individual rises to the scientific plane, he stands outside ordinary social relationships. To be sure, scientific activity requires other, different forms of social interaction, although it is removed from the kinds of interaction most commonly encountered in the

social world. This point, according to Schutz, leads to two problems. To the extent that the scientist fails to participate in the social world, it must be shown how this level of experience is amenable to scientific analysis. And, it must further be shown how results obtained from a position outside the ordinary world can be communicated. As might be expected, Schutz' answers here reflect his belief in the fundamental continuity of the scientific and everyday worlds. We can understand the ordinary world from the scientific perspective according to Schutz – here following Weber – through application of ideal types or models, which we literally abstract or derive from experience. We communicate our results on the scientific plane by returning to the ordinary level of experience.

The discussion so far of the various phenomenological approaches to the social context has emphasized Husserl's concept of the life-world and Schutz's subsequent eclectic formulation of it in his own view of the social structure of everyday life. As has already been indicated in the preceding discussion, the Husserlian idea of the life-world, which only emerges in incomplete fashion in his last writings, nevertheless continues a general train of thought begun much earlier, by providing an analysis of the ordinary plane of experience, about which knowledge is to be sought on the further remove of science and philosophy. For instance, when Husserl, in the initial pages of the *Crisis*, again sounds the traditional epistemological theme in the statement of his concern to defend the ancients' distinction between *doxa* and *epistémé*, the implication follows that unless and until a view of the realm of experience has been provided in which *doxa* is possible – namely the Platonic world of appearance, to which his own *Lebenswelt* corresponds – it is not fully possible to defend a claim to *epistémé*. It is because Husserl's later emphasis on the life-world is already implicit in and continuous with his earlier thought that treatment of Heidegger's chronologically earlier view of the social context, which also influenced Husserl's idea of the life-world, will come after it.

If we turn now to Heidegger's analysis of the social context, it should immediately be noted that his view differs in important ways from that of Husserl and Husserl's disciple, Schutz. Now, it is not easy to analyze the relation of Schutz to Heidegger since the former's eclectic position, although more heavily indebted to Husserl and Weber, among other thinkers, also leans heavily on Heidegger's position at certain points; for instance, in his restatement of the latter's analysis of death as fundamental anxiety, as already noted. But, if we restrict the discussion merely to Husserl and Heidegger, the difference in emphasis is clear. Although both are concerned with the social context in relation to epistemology, their views of the latter problem

differ radically. For Husserl, from the *Logical Investigations* until his last writings, the major emphasis lies on the traditional problem of the possibility of knowledge whatsoever in a quasi-Kantian sense.[8] Heidegger, on the contrary, rejects the traditional search for certainty, as will be made clear below in the discussion of epistemology, in favor of the more restricted – but, in his view, central – problem of the meaning of Being; and it is only in relation to this specific Heideggerian problematic that the analysis of the social context arises at all.

Heidegger's discussion of the social context is a major theme, although in different ways, in both his early and later writings. Rather than attempting to give a complete outline of his complicated view, which would be exceedingly difficult in a restricted – or, indeed, even an unrestricted – compass, it seems more fruitful here to concentrate on what may arguably be taken to be his two major contributions in this domain – his theories of instrumentality and of technology. Although there are few references in later writings to instrumentality and, surprisingly, none at all to technology, or its Greek root (*technē*) in *Being and Time*, suffice it to say – without embarking on a lengthy defense of this claim – that beyond shifts in emphasis, especially after the celebrated *Kehre* in Heidegger's thought, the two concepts are related as aspects of the analysis of instrumentality in relation to man and as such.

The main theme of Heidegger's discussion of instrumentality in relation to *Dasein* is his original analysis of the tool (*das Zeug*), for which the translators of *Being and Time* offer the linguistically permissible but conceptually awkward rendering of "equipment". Heidegger's analysis of the tool – occuring in Part One, Division One of *Being and Time*, 'Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of *Dasein*' – forms part of a systematic argument and some summary is needed to situate it.

The discussion in this section begins with the general theme of the analysis of *Dasein* in terms of temporality, and follows up with consideration of Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*). According to Heidegger, the primary mode of Being of *Dasein* is as Being-in-the-world, that is, embedded in a social and material context. *Dasein* is further characterized by concern (*Sorge*), a technical term in Heidegger's philosophy, referring to "the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world",[9] which is roughly the manner in which man exists within his context. In the third section, the 'Worldhood of the World', Heidegger focuses on the concept of the world. The initial paragraphs in that section concern the environment as one commonly encountered sense of world.

Heidegger here turns his attention from world as surrounding to the items met within that context. He suggests that things encountered in the environment are met with most closely, not through perception, as has long been urged in accordance with the epistemological tendency of the Western philosophic tradition, but rather through the concern to manipulate or to use them for some purpose or some end. He designates such entities as "tools" since inherent in them as they are experienced by us is their function with respect to an end in view. The end is not, however, determined in theory prior to use, but becomes visible to us in the use itself. As Heidegger helpfully notes in an example, "The hammering itself uncovers the specific 'manipulability' of the hammer."[10] The kind of Being which things have which are present to hand (*Vorhandenheit*) is that they can be utilized in this way to solve problems, perform tasks, carry out solutions, etc. – all of which Heidegger designates by the technical term "readiness-to-hand" (*Zuhandenheit*). Although the manner in which an object is for us is determined by the use to which it can be put, the use itself is a function of the general situation or work, which provides the referential totality in terms of which a given entity can have meaning.

Heidegger's view is anti-materialistic in the sense that it shifts attention from the materiality of things as encountered within our environment, which is no longer a primary characteristic, to the use to which these entities can be put. To be sure, a thing must be either possibly or actually present as a physical object in order for it to be utilizable at all. But, the suggestion is clear that the physical properties of entities – which in Marxist materialism have been held to be their primary features – are demoted in Heidegger's analysis to a secondary role in which they serve to provide the potential that determines the way in which an object appears to a person as a function of the kind of task to which the object as a tool can be applied.

A further distinction between Heidegger and Marxism is perceptible in the relation of theory to practice. In his analysis of entities as tools, Heidegger follows the general Marxist emphasis on the precedence of practice with respect to theory. But there is a significant difference, since for Marxism reference is continually made to practice in terms of its effect in the amelioration of the life of the individual and all mankind. But, in Heidegger's view the problems of life – living better, or living well – are not major themes. There is, further, little notice of the role played by man's needs or desires in shaping his perception of the surrounding world, in favor of emphasis on the influence of the situation itself – that is, the work to be done – as the factor which determines how a particular entity can and will appear to me. If anything, in the later discussion of technology, the stress on the

practical consequences of the objective situation, as opposed to the role of the subject, increases as Heidegger shifts the focus of his discussion to the effects of instrumentality on man.

The concern with technology looms large in Heidegger's writings subsequent to the *Kehre* in his thought, where it is discussed as a major or minor topic in numerous essays. In the well-known article, 'Letter on Humanism', written in response to questions posed by Jean Beaufret, Heidegger explicitly calls attention to the relation between his view of technology and Marxism. According to Heidegger, Marx's understanding of alienation means that his grasp of history is more profound than that of all his rivals. Apparently adopting a form of the general Marxist interpretation of Marx's position as materialism, Heidegger states that the essence of materialism lies not in a claim that everything is matter, but rather in a metaphysical view that everything can function as the material basis for work, an idea which is perhaps more familiar from its recurrence in Sartre's Marxist phase than from Marx's writings. Heidegger then relates his own form of phenomenology to Marx's view, when he comments that "The essence of materialism is hidden in the essence of technology . . . "[11], which he further defines as "a way of being true (*aletheuein*)".[12]

Additional light is shed on Heidegger's view in a later essay, 'The Question Concerning Technology', which he included in two later anthologies, *Die Kehre und die Technik* (1954) and *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1962). This difficult article is an example of Heidegger's later views on the topic, as well as a representative sample of the ever more allusive form in which his later thought took shape. Unlike the earlier discussion, where attention is drawn to the relation of Heidegger's view to Marx and materialism, neither of these topics is mentioned here. But both this and the earlier essay have in common Heidegger's persistent attempt, already apparent in *Being and Time*, to interrogate language itself – in a manner not unlike that of such analytic philosophers as Austin[13] – as a clue to the recovery of forgotten or hidden meanings.

Heidegger begins by drawing a distinction between technology and its essence which enables him to suggest that technology is instrumental in a new manner. The usual concept of technology is as a means to an end, which functions to bring something about, as engineering carries out scientific projects. But, the causal analysis of technology does not exhaust the concept. For, it is not only or even primarily a means for man, but further acts on him as a way of revealing. As Heidegger writes obscurely, "Modern technology as an ordering revealing is . . . no merely human doing."[14]

Although the suggestion has been made as to what technology is not, Heidegger has not so far told us where its essence lies. His answer is that the essence of technology is "enframing" (*Gestell*). Apparently, he is here employing an ordinary German word, which is difficult to render precisely into English, to suggest that technology confers a structure on what it reveals, in a manner similar to the frame on a picture, which is not, however, to be identified with the various technological tools. As Heidegger writes, "enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological".[15]

Heidegger now makes use of the revelatory character of technology to argue for a revisionary interpretation of its function. We are familar with analyses of modernity which identify technology as a danger to modern man. Marxism since Marx, for instance, has long argued that the progressive introduction of technology, and in particular automation, during and after the Industrial Revolution has increased the division of labor and in consequence heightened individual alienation. Heidegger, on the contrary, asserts that the danger is not technology itself, even though its essence is mysterious. Although there is indeed a danger, technology has a positive role to play in that regard. "Thus, the coming to presence to technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power."[16]

But, the manner in which technology saves is unclear. Now, turning once again to etymology as a clue to reality, Heidegger notes that the Greek root of the word "technology", *techné*, means literally "art" and that art was once a way of revealing the truth. On the basis of this argument, he suggests that technology, like the fine arts, can reveal the truth and that, in any case, the essence of technology and of art are inseparable.

This review of the phenomenological analysis of the social context has so far concentrated on Husserl, Schutz, and Heidegger. As interesting as Schutz' account is, and it may ultimately be that phenomenological discussion which is richest and most tenable, it remains tributary to Husserl's position, although its differences with respect to Husserl and Heidegger are real. In particular, unlike the latter thinkers, Schutz is relatively less concerned to study the social context in the light of the problem of epistemology. To be sure, there is an ethical dimension in Husserl's later work, as can be seen by his tardy insistence on the ancient relation between knowing and doing, but this is not the focus of his thought, either early or late. On the contrary, a radical difference in the phenomenological approaches of both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to the social context is their respective emphases on morality, in particular on the problem of human freedom.

In his important study of the *Transcendance of the Ego*, Sartre insists on realism at all costs and realism has elsewhere long been one of the hallmarks of his thought. Nonetheless, his view of human freedom, which can be described only briefly here, has been criticized by a large number of commentators, including Soviet and Western Marxists, as well as representatives of the orthodox Western philosophical tradition[17] – including, more recently, Sartre himself[18] – as a kind of romanticism which most imperfectly conveys the relation of man to his environment and other men. It is thus not surprising that in more recent writing, especially starting with the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Sartre has begun to put increasing distance between his present and former positions, although it is not clear to what extent the later Marxist position is merely a further development of his earlier existentialism or, on the contrary, a wholly new perspective.[19]

It is no surprise that the publication of *Being and Nothingness* (1943) in occupied France during World War II, with its lengthy emphasis on total human freedom, rendered Sartre virtually world famous almost overnight. But, it should be observed that although the brilliant literary formulation he gave to that doctrine in his writing is indeed his own, the doctrine itself is implicit and even explicit in Western philosophy in various forms for many centuries, beginning with the Stoics. It is further strongly implied by the consistent tendency over more than two thousand years, fully consistent with the emphasis in the philosophic tradition on absolutely certain knowledge, to define man as a thinking being. This is a doctrine which achieves an early peak in Plato, and is repeated in ways consistent with their respective positions by a long and distinguished line of thinkers – virtually identical with the rollcall of major Western philosophers, including St Augustine, Descartes, Erasmus, Pascal, Kant, and most recently, Husserl and Heidegger.

Sartre's view of freedom is built into his definition of man. In an argument which owes as much to Kant as it does to Descartes – despite Sartre's criticism of Kant's view – Sartre observes that there are only two possibilities; either man is wholly determined or he is wholly free. But, man's freedom, according to Sartre, is intrinsic to his very being and coextensive with his will. For, it is above all by means of and through the will that the individual, despite his circumstances, can always at all times choose to be what he desires; and, conversely, since the will can, no matter what the circumstances, never be restricted or limited in any way, man is constantly required to exercise his choice of what he wants to be. "Freedom is nothing but the *existence* of our will or of our passions in so far as this existence is the nihilation of facticity; that is, the existence of a being which is its being in the mode of having to be it."[20]

Human freedom, Sartre insists, is expressed in a variety of ways. Now, Sartre sees three fundamental results as following from his analysis. In the first place, a person "temporalizes" himself, which in Sartre's terminology means that through the constant introduction of a temporal perspective one separates oneself from one's past, in terms of which one is never constrained. Otherwise stated, my actions in the present are totally divorced from any constraint through the past. Second, human freedom is demonstrated by and through the continuous possibilities of consciousness and self-consciousness. Here Sartre, perhaps following Fichte, maintains that the possibility of consciousness is grounded in self-consciousness. Third, it belongs to the nature of man that he is a teleological being or, as Sartre writes, "a being which is originally a project – i.e., which is defined by its end".[21]

The ethical significance of Sartre's conception of freedom is clear, for if we are never restrained by anything other than ourselves we are fully responsible for all that we do and attenuating circumstances can never be adduced. For those of us who are accustomed to the insights of Freud and Marx, this assertion may appear paradoxical since one could point to the restraining effects of the unconscious or the economic process. But, Sartre is at least consistent, if not especially convincing, when he writes that "success is not important to freedom".[22] It follows that it is not because I am incapable of carrying out my intention, and hence in successfully completing my project, that I am not free.

Although man is defined by his freedom in Sartre's view, freedom is limited in at least two important ways. In particular, man is dependent upon a situation or context in which to exercise his freedom. Further, as Sartre reminds us at length – especially in his brilliant phenomenological analysis of the look (*regard*) – although a situation represents for me a field of possibilities, the mere presence of a person who, as it were, objectifies me with a glance, a Sartrean visual interpretation of the concept of alienation, converts a situation fraught with possibility into its objective form and hence deprives me of my freedom. As he writes:

> The true limit of my freedom lies purely and simply in the very fact that an Other apprehends me as the Other-as-object and in that second corollary fact that my situation ceases for the Other to be a situation and becomes an objective form in which I exist as an objective structure.[23]

In other words, for Sartre the true limit to personal freedom lies not in the objective external world, which is a realm of pure possibility, but in the encounter with other people.

The romantic dimension of Sartre's view of human freedom has, as mentioned, been the source of much controversy. The problem is not wholly in his conception of man as an intrinsically free being, since opinion is divided on this point. But, few have agreed with his claim that freedom is restrained only by other men's conception of me, but not by the surrounding world, which both inhibits as well as makes possible my accomplishments. Sartre, to his credit, apparently modified this view in his later writings – especially in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* – by attempting to substitute a more dynamic analysis of the social interaction of individuals within a mutable social context which is, in turn, related to history, as if in response to Heidegger and his other critics.

The relation of Merleau-Ponty to Sartre is complex – even as recounted by Sartre himself – and still not entirely clear.[24] Merleau-Ponty was both a close friend and enthusiastic and critical student of Sartre's thought, which was heavily influential in the formulation of his own, highly original, form of existential phenomenology, as well as the source of considerable influence in the later reorientation of Sartre's thought towards contemporary political problems and political theory. In Merleau-Ponty's own position, freedom – which was the topic of the concluding part of his well-known *Phenomenology of Perception* – was a permanent concern, no less so than for Sartre. But, he was willing to acknowledge, as Sartre apparently was not – at least in his early phase – that success is not unrelated to freedom.

The point of Merleau-Ponty's argument in *Humanism and Terror* (1947) is that since history is inscrutable, revolutionary claims to know the objective direction of the drift of history cannot be advanced as justification of revolutionary terror. His later *Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955) can be regarded as an attempt to turn Trotsky's criticism of Leninist theory against Trotsky's own theory of permanent revolution. Just as Marx observes that Hegel's reliance on the Estates as the mediation between government and civil society is inadequate to guarantee the happiness of the latter – since the Estates tend to become a self-interested special interest class[25], so Merleau-Ponty reasons that a dictatorship of the proletariat, directed against the bourgeoisie, will transform the revolutionaries into a bourgeois class. The Bolshevik revolution and all other similar attempts are bound to fail since the concept of a successful revolution is merely a myth of the revolutionary mind. As he writes in an incisive phrase, "The revolution and its failure are identical."[26] But, although the argument is clear, the conclusion does not necessarily follow, since the presence in history of such exceptional individuals as Trotsky himself – whose revolutionary fervor was never swayed by such contingent

conditions – is warrant of the possibility of revolutionary success, in terms of which, as elsewhere in the historical process, if Merleau-Ponty's basic point is correct, there is no historical closure.

CHAPTER 18

PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY

In the discussion of phenomenology to this point the focus has been on the concept of crisis as a central contemporary concern and on the analysis of social context as the phenomenological equivalent or counterpart to more specific approaches to science and technology in other contemporary philosophic movements. But, phenomenological study of the concepts of crisis or social context are motivated by, proceed from, and are justified in terms of an underlying perspective. This latter can be broadly designated as the "phenomenological conception of methodology" – a term which will here be used to include a related series of broadly phenomenological views, principally as related to epistemology, but also in such conceptually contiguous areas as logic, language and the relation of method to social context. Accordingly, it is the purpose of the present chapter to outline the nature and relation of the principal currents of the various phenomenological discussions of these topics in relation to the origins of the modern phenomenological movement in Husserl's thought.

The controversy between Hegel and Marx with respect to the separability of method and content is a fundamental concern within Husserlian phenomenology. Although it would be necessary to introduce qualifications in any general statement about Husserl's position, in view of the widespread belief that there is a basic change in his last writings, certainly until that period he continually insisted on phenomenology as a method, which he endeavored to state, develop and finally to bring to completion in an extensive series of texts. The concentration on method, as opposed to content, within the Husserlian position clearly presupposes the Kantian distinction between method and content and accordingly stamps Husserl, at least in this respect, as a follower of the critical philosophy. But, although for Husserl phenomenology literally is methodology, in later writers the question of methodology has become a leading issue from another perspective. In particular, succeeding phenomenologists, who have criticized the adequacy of Husserlian methodology as well as the possibility of in fact carrying out his conception of the phenomenological task, have been implicitly attacking his presupposed distinction between method and content and hence arguing for a turn to the Hegelian view of their interrelation.

Husserl's view of methodology can perhaps be made most plausible in relation to his understanding of the history of philosophy. In 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science' Husserl contrasts phenomenology with modern philosophy in order to suggest that his own position represents the adequate fulfillment of a concept that dominates modernity, but which has its origins in Greek thought. Modernity is, according to Husserl, dominated by the concept of science, which penetrates throughout the structure of modern life. The specific form of this idea has been shaped by Galileo's application of mathematics to natural phenomena, and beyond natural science in the form of naturalistic philosophy, which is typified by a naturalization (*Naturalisierung*) of consciousness and ideas, where the "non-natural" is to be understood solely in "natural" terms. The idea that philosophy is necessarily a rigorous science is, of course, not a recent conception. Although it dominates the modern philosophic tradition, its origins lie much earlier. Indeed, in this sense, modern philosophy is continuous with the Greek tradition. In an important passage, Husserl writes:

> An analogous, fully conscious desire for rigorous science dominates the Socratic-Platonic turn in philosophy and in the same way, in the beginning, the various scientific reactions against scholasticism, in particular the Cartesian turn. This impulse traverses the great seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophies, undergoes a radical renewal in Kant's critique of reason, and still dominates Fichte's philosophy.[1]

But, although this lengthy effort to transform philosophy into rigorous science dominates modernity, it has never, in fact, been carried out. Hence, philosophy has never reached the level demanded by its concept of itself. "I do not say", Husserl comments, "that philosophy is not an important science. I say simply that it is so far not a science at all, since as science it has not even begun . . ."[2] Thus, beyond its effort to carry out and fulfill the task which has been undertaken again in modern philosophy, phenomenology must further begin anew in a finally adequate manner to construct the philosophic science of which the ancients dreamed.

Although the problem of the formulation of philosophy as a rigorous science originates in Greek antiquity, Husserl's approach to it is similar to that found elsewhere in the modern tradition. In modernity, the effort to achieve science is undertaken through the study of methodology, that is, a method adequate to justify the claims to epistemological apodicticity. Indeed, the conscious concern with the discovery of a method of this type, in order to permit the constitution of philosophy as rigorous science, is the central theme of modern times. In other words, to paraphrase Sartre's view

of Marx, find the method and constitute the science if it is to carry out the aim of rigorous philosophy.

The significance of methodology for phenomenology has been widely perceived, although it is all too often accompanied by an error – frequent even among phenomenologists – in which phenomenology is regarded merely as a method – which is, of course, to take the part for the whole. The importance of methodology for phenomenology, implicit in the *Logical Investigations* and suggested explicitly in 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science', is that it represents the means to justify the claim advanced on behalf of phenomenological knowledge and, more generally, for the general possibility of knowledge from experience. In *Ideas*, Husserl's second major phenomenological work, an attempt is made to provide the necessary means in the concept of reduction, which Husserl continued to view in later writings – no doubt correctly – as the conceptual linchpin of his entire position, upon which the claims of phenomenology to constitute a rigorous science and, hence, to complete the philosophic quest must rest. But, despite numerous efforts to define "reduction", Husserl was never able to state his case for it in a manner to which he personally could subscribe, and the concept itself has continued to remain a bone of contention among phenomenologists even to this day. In this regard, a statement of creed – published by the editors of the phenomenological *Jahrbuch*, all of whom were closely associated with Husserl, at the same time as his *Ideas* appeared in it – is significant in that it fails to mention reduction:

> It is not a system that the editors share. What unites them is the common conviction that it is only by a return to the primary sources of direct intuition and to insights into essential structures derived from them that we shall be able to put to use the great traditions of philosophy with their concepts and problems; only thus shall we be in a position to clarify such concepts intuitively, to restate the problems on an intuitive basis, and this, eventually, to solve them, at least in principle.[3]

The Husserlian theory of reduction is far from clear. An index of how difficult it is to describe this idea is provided by the fact that even close students of his thought differ among themselves as to the number of its identifiable subforms, with at least one observer claiming to perceive no less than half a dozen sub-varieties. Further, although this concept is "officially" described in the regrettably brief, but also diffuse sixth chapter of *Ideas I*, in another sense a fuller account is scattered *passim* throughout the book. But at least the following seems clear. If, for present purposes, we follow the prevalent practice of simplifying Husserl's account, two basic, interrelated

forms of reduction can be identified. In phenomenological reduction – which occurs first as a prior and necessary condition of the eidetic reduction – the natural attitude or ordinary, uncritical standpoint is suspended or, in Husserlian terminology, bracketed, through the technique known as *epoché* (a Greek term which literally means "abstention") in order to attend to the pure and unalloyed contents of direct intuition. Not surprisingly, in view of the importance Husserl attaches to this stage, he makes the claim that any science which is, in fact, suspended at this point – in practice, all those other than phenomenology – is necessarily dogmatic. In the second, or eidetic, reduction the transition is made from facts, which are particular, to essences, which are general. Recommended here is the important technique of free variation, in which through alternation on the level of imagination – to which free rein is now given – the phenomenologist voluntarily entertains different perceptual possibilities in order to liberate generality from particularity.

The Husserlian emphasis on reduction was intended, as has been repeatedly emphasized, to provide the methodology adequate for claims to apodictic experiential knowledge. But in post-Husserlian phenomenology – beginning even within his lifetime – there has been a noticeable shift away from the traditional concept of philosophic knowledge, as interpreted within Husserl's position, both with respect to the strength of epistemological claims offered for phenomenological analysis and the attitude towards the concept of reduction. The post-Husserlian turn to an in general weaker form of epistemology can be represented by Heidegger's characterization of the validity of phenomenological analysis, in a felicitous phrase, as proximal and for the most part (*zunächst und zumeist*). Further, in the post-Husserlian phenomenological tradition the concept of reduction almost becomes an issue – either through what is said about it or, in some instances equally significantly, what is not said. Heidegger, for example, addresses himself to the problem of methodology, one of the major concerns of *Being and Time*, in a manner which must have been largely disconcerting for Husserl. It is highly significant that in this work – which was, however, dedicated to Husserl – the term "reduction" never appears at all, although from another perspective it could plausibly be maintained that the concept is present in the mode of absence as a major target of Heidegger's novel view of phenomenology, which rejects in large part the Husserlian model, to strike out on its own. But, it seems fair to say that Merleau-Ponty speaks for many other phenomenologists when, in a celebrated passage, he suggests that "The greatest lesson of reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction."[4]

The ambivalent attitude of post-Husserlian phenomenologists towards the concept of reduction is reflected in the fortunes of the phenomenological movement that continues to claim allegiance to his thought. Although Husserl's personality and thought continue to exert enormous sway in contemporary philosophy – as is evident in their impact on some of the leading thinkers of the day – it should be noted that even in the period of his greatest direct influence, a pluralistic attitude arose within the phenomenological movement, in a manner not unlike the disintegration of the Hegelian school into rival movements in the period immediately following Hegel's death in 1831.[5] In reference to contemporary phenomenology, at least three tendencies can be identified and correlated to different periods in Husserl's own development. One current, perhaps that most widespread at the moment among current phenomenologists, remains attached to Husserl's initial characterization of phenomenology as pure description in the *Logical Investigations*. Adherents of this tendency include such writers as Nicolai Hartmann, well-known for his extension of phenomenology to the realm of ethics and his pellucid phenomenological descriptions of the moral virtues, and John Findlay, who remains attracted by what he regards as the quasi-Aristotelian character of the subtle and rigorous analysis present in Husserl's early phenomenological writings. Second, there are students of Husserl's middle period, with its emphasis on reduction. An important representative of this current is Iso Kern, who contests Husserl's later efforts to apply phenomenology to temporal concerns. Kern holds philosophy to be irrelevant in this area, thus echoing from a divergent perspective a frequently heard Marxist view. It is significant that although Kern – who is a close follower of Husserl – continues to insist on the importance of method as such, he traces his own view of reduction not to Husserl but to Kant's *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*. Finally, there is a group influenced by the later emphasis on the life-world, a concept which finds a fruitful echo not only among phenomenologists – including in this country perhaps most notably John Wild – but also among such Marxists as Henri Lefèbvre in France and the so-called Budapest School, including writers close to Lukács. In the latter respect, a turn to the social world is found in Lukács' last work, *Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins*, and – in terms of an influence further derived from Husserl as well as from Heidegger – in the writings of Markus, Heller, and Feher.

The tendency within post-Husserlian phenomenology towards a relativization of epistemological claims and a rejection of the concept of reduction is also evident within a related philosophical movement – existential

phenomenology. Although existentialism has often, but mistakenly, been viewed as a mere tributary of phenomenology, this is a significant oversimplification – as is apparent to anyone acquainted with either movement. For, the formative influences on existentialism are not only phenomenological – although the phenomenological dimension should not therefore be neglected. Further, with the exception of Sartre – who has, at least in some early writing made "existentialism" virtually synonymous with his thought – this term cannot be applied without further qualification to the positions of Jaspers and Marcel, and especially to that of Heidegger who, in part to avoid the conflation of his own views with those of Sartre, has explicitly repudiated it.[7] But, despite the difficulties inherent in the employment of this term, it can aid us in understanding the post-Husserlian reaction.

It is well-known that the existential movement as a whole arose during World War I as a return to and reinterpretation of Kierkegaard's thought, which is in itself a reaction to absolute idealism.[8] Although since Jean Wahl[9] there has been a tendency to interpret Kierkegaard's position as a reaction to Hegel's understanding of the unhappy consciousness, in view of the modern phenomenological stress on epistemology, one can also understand Kierkegaard's position from the perspective of an effort to respond to a perceived lacuna in Hegel's theory of knowledge.

In the opening arguments of the *Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel suggests that, in view of its concern with universals, reason is incapable of grasping particularity. Further, developing this same point, Kierkegaard maintains that concrete existence, including human being, slips through the holes in the conceptual netting at the disposal of speculative reason, although it can be grasped through faith. The individual, which is a category central to Kierkegaard's thought, is defined not in the traditional manner as a rational being, but as the self which can and will be itself, and which is grounded transparently in God. Life itself is absurd and man is subject to despair, which can be overcome in the leap of faith towards God, Who cannot, however, be the object of rational knowledge. Forms of life – including the esthetic, ethical and religious – are further distinguished; and Kierkegaard suggests that through the religious commitment, in which the ethical stage is surpassed, a reconciliation of the finite and the infinite, which is in principle impossible, can in fact be attempted and even carried out.

Taken as a whole, existentialism can be understood in terms of three main formative influences. First, there is the impact of so-called life-philosophy, including as its major representatives Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Bergson, each of whom has influenced the resulting movement to a variable extent. The

second influence is in Kierkegaard's thought. Sartre, for instance, has written a study of the Danish thinker, and many of his important themes, including those indicated above – especially the insistence on existence as both a basic concern and beyond the grasp of traditional reason – recur as central ideas in the thought of leading existentialist writers. Third, there is a complex relation between existentialism and phenomenology, especially its Husserlian variety, of which the closest but most ambiguous instance – which has often attracted the attention of Marxist critics – is the relation of Heidegger's allegedly pro-fascist existentialism to Husserl's later, supposedly subjective, idealism.

If we turn now to a comparison between Husserlian phenomenology and post-Husserlian existential phenomenology, it can be said that existentialists typically make weaker, usually relativistic, epistemological claims. This follows from their general stress on the realm of existence, bracketed through Husserlian reduction. It is, however, overly simplistic to view the difference between existentialism and phenomenology merely in terms of their respective appreciations of reduction, although this element should not therefore be neglected. On the whole, the phenomenologists who remained closest to Husserl tended to object to this concept, since it apparently required them in fact to carry out a task which was in principle of infinite length.[10] Existentialists, on the contrary, are critical of this concept because to carry out the reduction, even in the course of an infinite series of stages, is – from the perspective of the neo-Kierkegaardian emphasis on existence – in principle to eliminate, through the operation of bracketing, the major existential topic of concern.

There is a further contrast with respect to the permissible strength of epistemological claims. Husserl, as already noted, invokes reduction in order to achieve, in fact, the traditional philosophic goal of epistemological apodicticity. But, the existentialists tend to renounce this goal, even as they reject the means in terms of which this claim is to be fulfilled. Marcel, for example, distinguishes primary and secondary forms of reason. It is the latter which, he suggests, leads to the mystery which is the concern of philosophy. Although what Marcel calls "problems" can be handled through traditional kinds of responses, this is emphatically not the case for the mysteries of existence. Sartre's early writing includes little direct discussion of the problem of epistemology, although in his later, self-described Marxist phase, he distinguishes – in a manner which also recalls Marcel's position – between analytic and synthetic, or dialectical, forms of reason. The inference follows that for both Marcel and Sartre (and even for James and Dewey) the kind of

reason utilized for authentic philosophical problems cannot yield the certain knowledge which has traditionally been regarded as the main philosophic goal, most recently by Husserl. From another perspective, a similar point is made by Jaspers, who remains close to Kant, in his criticism of the intrinsic limits of human reason and, in particular, of its inability to grasp rationally what Jaspers designates as the encompassing (*das Umgreifende*) or limit-situations (*Grenzsituationen*).

The discussion of existential phenomenology as one of the instances of the post-Husserlian turn away from epistemological apodicticity has so far been quite general, in part due to the difficulty of bringing a series of such highly diverse positions under any single rubric which would permit their description in more detail. But, although general description is occasionally adequate to convey the outline of a theory and more frequently useful to pick out common features shared among otherwise different views, of all those positions lodged uneasily in the conceptual space between Husserlian phenomenology and existentialism Heidegger's would seem most in need of special mention. Several reasons for this need can be cited. In the first place, it is of interest that much attention in the Soviet discussions has been focussed on the specific relation between the views of Husserl and Heidegger. Secondly, although the imprint of Kierkegaard is largely evident in his own thought, in view of his specific criticisms of existentialism – alluded to above – Heidegger can at best be regarded as a corresponding member of this movement. Finally, unlike other phenomenologists and existentialists – who so often describe where an argument would seem due, an attitude Heidegger increasingly adopts in his later writings – Heidegger is concerned to defend his rejection of epistemological apodicticity.

Heidegger's use of the term "hermeneutic" for phenomenological analysis suggests an association with a long-standing tradition, arising out of the problem of the interpretation of Biblical texts, especially since Schleiermacher.[11] Although the extent of Heidegger's awareness of this tradition need not be discussed here, the proximal source of his conception of hermeneutics lies in Dilthey's thought. The latter, as we have seen, distinguishes sharply between natural and social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and the associated forms of reason, which he designates as explanation (*Erklären*) and understanding (*Verstehen*). He further suggests that there is a necessary and unavoidable circularity in all interpretations since the analysis of the parts of that which is to be understood presupposes a concept of the whole, which can only be derived from the partial conceptions afforded by study of its parts.

In paragraph 32 of *Being and Time*, entitled 'Understanding and Interpretation', Heidegger attempts to carry Dilthey's epistemological position further within the context of his own discussion of *Daseinsanalyse*, by combining the concepts of understanding and interpretative circularity. Interpretation, according to Heidegger, is not independent of, but necessarily arises from, understanding, whose development is what is meant by "interpretation". Now, interpretation is not presuppositionless. On the contrary, as has already been shown in the analysis of tools, any such discussion necessarily presupposes a prospective utilization in terms of which they have meaning. More generally, interpretation of all kinds necessarily presupposes a prior acquaintance or anticipatory understanding as the basis in terms of which the analysis is to be carried out.

> Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us.[12]

In order to grasp Heidegger's argument concerning the circularity of understanding, two errors must be avoided. In the first place, it must be realized that the kind of circularity in question is emphatically not a mere logical mistake, of the kind which is known as *circulus vitiosus*. Nor is it a failure to reason rigorously which results in the circularity of the understanding, since the circle is constitutive of the understanding as such. It follows that the attempt to remove or circumvent this circle is not only doomed to failure, but further betrays a misunderstanding as to the nature of understanding.

> *But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just "sense" it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up.*[13]

Second, it would also be an error to infer that because of its non-linear structure, the interpretative form of knowledge is either non-rigorous or indeed significantly less rigorous than other, more linear forms. In the history of Western thought the paradigm of intellectual rigor has long been mathematics, especially the geometrical model adopted by Descartes and invoked by Spinoza, in which reasoning proceeds in linear fashion from premises to conclusions which follow necessarily from them. But, although the strength of such reasoning is clearly evident, the interpretative form of knowledge is not less rigorous; it is fundamentally different, but this should not be taken as implying that interpretation is the result of mere fancy or habit. On the

contrary, interpretation can be equally stringent with respect to intellectual standards if every effort is made to avoid popular conceptions or fancy by working out the fore-structure in a rigorous manner consistent with that which is to be understood.

If and to the extent that interpretation is circular, although arguably rigorous, it must nevertheless forfeit all claim to the epistemological apodicticity long sought as the standard of knowledge, especially by Husserl. But, Heidegger, who is primarily interested in this book with the analysis of man in relation to the problem of Being as such, does not concern himself here with the consequences of his epistemological argument. He does, however, at least mention one of the results in a later work, concerned with the nature of thought itself.

Referring above all to Descartes, he comments that philosophy, at least in the modern tradition, has tended to adopt as its strategy for certain knowledge the appeal to a ground or Archimedean point which is initially certain, as a *fundamentum inconcussum*, and whose certainty is imparted by transitivity to all propositions which follow strictly from it. But, in order for there to be a ground to philosophy, the philosophical enterprise must be fully transparent. But, this is an evident impossibility for at least two reasons. On the one hand, by virtue of the fact that it is a ground, the ground or foundation must necessarily remain unthought, since this can only come about in terms of the very intellectual structure which follows from it. As Heidegger writes, "All metaphysics leaves something essential unthought: its own ground and foundation."[14] Further, Heidegger points out within the structure of his own position that knowledge presupposes a subject which knows and that which is to be known. But, since subject and object are already to be encountered within the subject-object relation, a ground or *fundamentum inconcussum* cannot be attained through separate and complete knowledge of the subject as a prior condition of proceeding to interpret the object.

> No way of thought, not even the way of metaphysical thought, begins with man's essential nature and goes on from there to Being, nor in reverse from Being and then back to man. Rather, every way of thinking *takes its way* already *within* the total relation of Being and man's nature, or else it is not thinking at all.[15]

Hence, in view of the necessarily circular structure of the understanding, the interpretative knowledge furnished by phenomenology in its encounter with experience can at best be rigorous, but cannot hope or pretend to be apodictic – a view that could easily be attributed to James and Dewey.

Heidegger's view of the necessary circularity of interpretation has been

widely influential in the most recent or hermeneutic phase of phenomenology, especially in the writings of Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Dufrenne, which although still within the wider Husserlian tradition, is apparently more immediately subject to Heidegger's influence. Although the three positions of these writers are in many ways diverse, they share in common a relative unconcern with the Husserlian effort to provide an apodictic description of the contents of consciousness from the further remove of the transcendental plane in favor of detailed consideration of how to achieve an adequate discussion of experience from a position within it. These writers further share a tendency to return to the original literary function of hermeneutics and thus to weaken the separation between philosophy and literature – most prominent in the writings of Derrida – through their treatment of the field of experience as a literary text.

The manner in which this phase of phenomenology has so far developed is different on either side of the Rhine. The two French authors have tended mainly to apply hermeneutics in a variety of ways – for instance, by Dufrenne to forms of art, including pornography, and by Ricoeur in an important essay on Freud, and to a lesser extent, in a multi-volume essay on the problem of the will. In addition, Ricoeur has also written a large, if disjointed, study of interpretation as such. Gadamer has so far tended more towards the general theory of hermeneutics and its history throughout the philosophic tradition. His major study, *Wahrheit und Methode*, is so far the most ambitious and detailed theoretical and historical account of the concept of interpretation and its possible range of application among these thinkers. Further, Gadamer – who wrote his dissertation under Heidegger's direction – has on the whole tended to stay closer to Heidegger's original position than the others, although it would seem that the most important impulse to his own view lies less in contemporary German philosophy than in the Greek tradition.

If, for present purposes, we confine ourselves to Gadamer's view, the conceptual distance between his conception of the hermeneutic endeavor, which remains loosely within the Husserlian tradition, and Husserl's own position, is striking. Somewhat surprisingly in view of his historical predilection, largely on display in this book, Gadamer has little to say about Husserl directly. His immediate sources in modern philosophy are the writings of Dilthey and Heidegger, which are studied in detail. He is explicit in his declaration that his own position arises out of his desire to develop further the radical questioning found in Heidegger's thought. But, the single most important influence on his position is Greek not German. Although the current discussion

is interesting and insightful, the most profound contribution is to be found at the inception of the debate, in Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* or practical wisdom, for which the *locus classicus* is the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Note the explanation of Aristotle's hierarchy of types of knowledge in the opening remarks to Chapter 7.) It is this concept, or so Gadamer believes, which can serve as a model for contemporary discussions.

> If we now pull together Aristotle's description of ethical phenomena and in particular the virtue of ethical knowledge with respect to our problem-cluster, it can be seen that the Aristotelian analysis is a kind of *model for problems in the hermeneutical model.*[16]

If for the moment we bracket the question of the precise relation of Gadamer's position to those to be found in the philosophic tradition, we can quickly note some of its more salient features. In the history of modern philosophy the problem of method has been closely intertwined with the search for apodictic knowledge. This problem does not arise in Gadamer's position, at least in its traditional form. In the first place, Gadamer rejects the view that the hermeneutic approach must imitate traditional philosophy in seeking a unique starting point in order to ground its epistemology when he writes "that the hermeneutic cannot pose any *problem with respect to the beginning* . . . "[17] Indeed, whereas other forms of philosophy, including phenomenology, have in the modern period been preoccupied with methodology as a major – or, in the case of Husserl, nearly exclusive – concern, for Gadamer there is paradoxically no such problem since there is no privileged method. To be sure, he does not thereby renounce the claim to truth; but, since it is the nature of observational experience that its claim to truth is such that an accurate description cannot fairly be doubted by any unprejudiced observer, a unique methodological procedure to guarantee the epistemological claim to know is clearly superfluous.

> In the final analysis, I am not proposing *any* method, but I am describing what is. That it in fact is as I describe it, in my opinion, no one can seriously deny . . . In other words, I believe that it is only scientific to *recognize what is* instead of beginning from what ought or should be.[18]

The discussion of the contemporary phenomenological concern with epistemology can be summed up in the statement that the period since Husserl has seen a change from the quasi-Cartesian concern with method adequate to guarantee traditional claims to apodictic knowledge of experience to the abandonment of both the method and the goal. Although Husserl tended to associate adequate method with the possibility of certain knowledge, this

association has disintegrated in the course of the battle waged within the post-Husserlian phenomenological tradition. In the course of this battle, the idea of the completion of the reduction, in practice, was rejected as was the concept of apodictic or wholly unprejudiced knowledge from experience, and the concept of a specific method as such. In this sense, most of what remains of the original Husserlian link between certainty and method is the emphasis on description, although all further specific Husserlian claims for the epistemology and methodology of such description have mainly been abandoned within the phenomenological movement itself as a result of the post-Husserlian discussion.

This point regarding the evolution of post-Husserlian phenomenology is further significant in the context of the present discussion, in terms of the implicit comparison between Marxism and phenomenology. As already indicated in part above, Marx apparently abandons the attempt for philosophy to become the science of certain knowledge, although not necessarily philosophy as such. But, Marxists, following Engels, have tended to abandon philosophy in any form – viewing it as ideology – in order to make claims for Marxism which they regard as non-ideological science and, further, as a source of rigorous extra-philosophic knowledge. It follows, if these accounts are accurate, that there is an interesting parallel between Husserl's position and Marxism in that, in each case, the goal is rigorously scientific knowledge. But, there is perhaps an even more interesting parallel between Marx's position and post-Husserlian phenomenology in that, in both cases, the attempt to secure apodictic knowledge in the traditional philosophic sense is abandoned, for epistemological reasons, in favor of claims for experiential knowledge, which is no longer apodictic, but limited by time and place.[19]

CHAPTER 19

AN ONTOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY?

Problems of nature, matter and motion are typical concerns of ontology and have been widely discussed on this plane in the contemporary philosophic tradition. Phenomenologists, however, with some notable exceptions, have had little to say about ontological issues. The reason is not that they are, in general, unaware of the problems posed by this philosophic domain. On the contrary, several phenomenologists, notably Heidegger, are deeply interested precisely in this topic, which is even central to their thought. But, as the domain of ontology is not wholly separable from other regions of philosophy, other factors – in particular the form of epistemology defended – strongly influence what can be said on the ontological plane. For Aristotle, of course, ontology or metaphysics was not only a permissible but a necessary area of study. But, other forms of epistemology would seem to prohibit any explicit claims about the nature of what is.

This point can perhaps be made most forcefully in terms of a perspectival choice which arises in the modern concern with knowledge and experience in general. Prior to the end of the eighteenth century, the problem of knowledge was mainly if not always approached from an a-perspectival, or third person viewpoint, easily illustrated by the Cartesian position. In the latter, we are asked to study the cognitive relation of mind, or thinking substance, and matter, or extended substance, from the external vantagepoint of the philosopher outside the world looking in; that is, from the angle of vision of one who is not part of the relation under study. To be sure, this philosophic version of the attitude of the writer or artist as alienated from the world he wished to describe [1] has the advantage of freeing the situation under study from subjective contamination at the same time as he is isolated from it. The result is a helpful simplification of a practical difficulty to a merely theoretical problem. But, despite the apparent gain to be derived from the employment of this third-person perspective, it has, in practice, proved inadequate to permit a general solution of the problem of experiential knowledge, as Kant attempts to make clear in his justification of his so-called Copernican Revolution.

Although Kant does not himself draw the conclusion of his own efforts to relativize the relation of subjectivity and objectivity in order to demonstrate

the possibility of knowledge, since he endeavors throughout to remain on the plane of pure possibility or transcendental inquiry, one of the consequences of his Copernican turn is to undermine the a-perspectival approach to knowledge and experience. Now, Fichte represented his own thought as the carrying out of Kant's philosophic revolution to its logical consequences, even when it was necessary to go against the letter – although never against the spirit – of Kant's own texts, which Fichte on occasion claimed to understand more fully than his illustrious predecessor. His own theory is, however, significantly different from the critical philosophy at several points, not the least of which is the transformation of the perspective from that of the uninvolved external observer to that exhibited by the individual who, in fact, undergoes or entertains the experience in question.[2]

This perspectival change has at least two immediate consequences. It is evident that if the experience to be explained is not experience in general, but rather that of which I am myself the subject, what has often been a purely theoretical question of how knowledge in general is possible is immediately transformed into the more practical problem of how I myself can and indeed do know. Secondly, when Fichte restricts the problem of the explanation of experience to the explanation of the contents of my consciousness – as a result of his change in epistemological perspective – he renders it impossible to make the kind of ontological claims about the nature of the world which are routinely made in the philosophic tradition before him. To be sure, a species of ontological claim can still be made – i.e., those permissible from within the standpoint of the conscious perception of the external world. But, this is quite different from the more usual concern of philosophers to offer definite descriptions, not of experience as it appears to them, but of nature as it is in itself and independent of us, of matter from a similar perspective, etc. Although Fichte's first person epistemological perspective was quickly criticized by Schelling – who attempted to supplement its transcendental idealism with his own philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*) – something of his epistemological attitude and, consequently, restricted form of ontology reappears in later forms of phenomenology.[3]

A similar comment can be made in respect to phenomenology, all of whose representatives, broadly speaking, share what has here been called the first-person perspective, although differences in their respective interpretations of it are reflected in their various ontological commitments. (For William James' struggle with this issue, see Chapter 14, above.) It is fundamental to the Hegelian form of phenomenology – or science of the experience of consciousness, as it is called in the *Phenomenology of Mind* – that experience

is to be understood only from the perspective of the experiential subject. But, as Hegel characteristically is loath to exclude any viewpoint entirely, he here attempts to combine, although with dubious success, the first-person viewpoint of immediate experience – which apparently restricts the admissible kinds of ontological claims – with a general, third-person form of ontology. The Hegelian reluctance to distinguish clearly between epistemology and ontology is apparent in his position at a number of points. A first one is to be found in his suggestion in the *Phenomenology* that the experiential *wir* is also substance which gradually and finally becomes conscious of itself as subject. There is also the argument – most explicit perhaps in the early *Differenzschrift* – in which he suggests that the epistemological condition of the identity of subject and object which must occur if knowledge is to be possible is an underlying ontological distinction between subjectivity and objectivity.[4] But, Husserl – who in the programmatic text on rigorous philosophy, describes Hegel's thought as epistemologically naive – tends to remain within a more narrow first person perspective which forbids ontological claims. In other words, the business of philosophy, for Husserl, is emphatically not to make assertions about existence, since that possibility has been eliminated by reduction, in which this as well as all other prejudices are supposed to be bracketed. Rather, the rigorous use of the phenomenological method, as Husserl understands it, would apparently – although not entirely so – restrict phenomenology merely to pure description of the content of consciousness, about which no explicit ontological claims are to be made.

The contemporary phenomenological approach to ontology is loosely comprised within the extremes represented by the positions of Husserl and Hegel. As can be expected in view of the controversial nature of the Husserlian concept of reduction within the phenomenological movement itself, there has been a movement away from Husserl's own restricted form of phenomenological ontology towards a more liberal association of ontology and epistemology. But, there has been little attention devoted to ontology from a specifically phenomenological perspective. The aim of the present chapter will, accordingly, be to describe in brief compass the kinds of ontological commitments which can be found in the positions of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre – three among the leading representatives of what might be called, in contrast with Hegel, Husserlian phenomenology, and who are also concerned with ontological questions.

Turning now to Husserl, it can immediately be noted that – as might be expected from his resolute emphasis on the problem of knowledge – he,

in fact, devotes little direct attention to the question of ontology, beyond the distinction between formal and material ontology in *Ideas*. Further, as has already been stated, his particular interpretation of the phenomenological perspective severely limits the kind of ontological claims which can consistently be made in his position. But no theory of knowledge can be wholly divorced from ontological claims of any kind whatsoever, if only for the evident reason that all knowledge, of whatever kind, is knowledge of something that is held to be known. Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in spite of the relative disinterest in ontology manifested by Husserl in his writings, there is a definite ontological dimension implicit in his position.

In view of the infrequent mention of ontological themes in Husserl's writings, it is helpful to proceed immediately to the relation between Husserl's position and the philosophic tradition. The form of ontology implicit in Husserl's thought is, as could perhaps be inferred from the preceding discussion and from his rare allusions to the history of philosophy, resolutely dualistic. From an historical perspective Husserlian ontology combines dualistic elements either drawn from or reminiscent of Plato, Descartes and, to a lesser extent, German Idealism which, however, is basically monistic.[5] In Plato, one finds what may be called a vertical form of dualism as exhibited in the distinction between appearance and reality. A similarly vertical form of dualism, closely similar to the Platonic model, occurs in Husserl's position in his distinction between the everyday or life-world, in which we in fact live, and the transcendental standpoint to which we accede through reduction. But, beyond the evident similarity, there is a significant difference to be observed in the two forms of vertical dualism. Although, according to Plato, knowledge in the full sense can only be had on the level of reality, in his view reality has a double relation to appearance: from the ontological perspective, as the source of mutable or temporally existent things; and, from the epistemological perspective, as that which is recognized in the form of acquaintance or opinion possible on the everyday plane. But, although Husserl similarly restricts knowledge to the realm of reality or, in his language, transcendental plane, in consequence of his emphasis on reduction he is obliged to deny that reality affects appearance, despite his perhaps inconsistent claim of their basic parallel. Thus, whereas Plato's vertical dualism is, so to speak, "dialectical" – although not in a Marxist sense – in that he draws a distinction between two ontological levels only to relate them, the vertically dualistic aspect of Husserl's ontology is static since, despite the claim for their parallelism, the relation between them is never made clear.

There is, further, what might be called a horizontal form of dualism in

Husserl's position, in his account of the constitution of the object, as can be seen in such texts as *Ideas, Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, and especially the *Cartesian Meditations*. Although in the last text Husserl voluntarily adopts a quasi-Cartesian terminology in order to suggest an analogy between his position and that of Descartes, there is also another debt, which should not be obscured either by Husserl's understanding of his own position or the language in which it is stated, to German Idealism. In the Cartesian position there is a well-known ontological distinction between two forms of being – thought and extension – which differ in kind, and whose cognitive relation is explained through the spectator theory of knowledge. To be sure, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl does travel part of the way down the Cartesian road, despite the latter's putative failure to make the transcendental turn,[6] due to his attempt to come out of the cogito in order to regain the level of the experiential world. Here, especially in the 'Second Meditation', Husserl provides a quasi-Cartesian analysis of knowledge in terms of a similarly quasi-Cartesian ontology, for instance in the distinction between the subject or *ego cogito* – which is to be taken in the "broadest Cartesian sense" – and perceptual object or *cogitatum* – which is composed of the "manifold *cogitationes*, the flowing conscious life in which the identical Ego . . . lives . . . "[7]

The basic dualism in the relation of subject and object is, of course, Cartesian, although Husserl's use of it is not. A fundamental aspect of the Cartesian position is that the epistemological subject, or knower, finds the known as already fully constituted and, hence, independent. But, beginning with the Kantian relativization of the subject-object dichotomy, which is followed in different ways, consistent with their respective positions, by all the later members of the German Idealist tradition, the ontological distinction between subjectivity and objectivity takes an anti-Cartesian turn.

Three aspects of the anti-Cartesian stance, characteristic of German Idealism are relevant here. First, Kant – in his Copernican revolution – and all succeeding idealists, emphasize the activity of the subject, which is no longer passive, as a necessary condition of knowledge. In other words, subjectivity constitutes objectivity, which is no longer independent of it. Second, objectivity only exists for the subject insofar as it is present to mind on the level of consciousness – in the language of Fichte and the early Schelling, as a presentation (*Vorstellung*). Third, and perhaps most important in the present context, the contents of consciousness refer beyond themselves, so that the epistemological unity which is the necessary condition of knowledge,

is possible only on the basis of an ontological difference – a point which is perhaps made most clearly, as mentioned, by the early Hegel.

Despite the rationalist tone of his discussion in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the ontological character of the position Husserl describes there is, in fact, largely anti-Cartesian and idealist. In a manner similar to the post-Kantian German Idealists, Husserl confines his account to the description of the contents of consciousness, as revealed in the flow of *cogitationes*. Despite the neutrality of the *ego cogito* – which is won through the reductive move to the transcendental plane, the subject is active in constituting the object as known. As Husserl points out, there is an important difference between what, to follow Hegelian terminology, is sensed and what is perceived. Perceptions are multiple and various – although it is through the mind's synthetic combination of them that the object as perceived arises and persists.

> For example, if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection that "this" die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of subjective processes. Rather, they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them "one and the same" is intended as appearing.[8]

In sum, what in fact appears at any given moment is merely the aspect of "shadowing forth" (*Abschattung*) of the object which is constituted through the synthetic activity of the mind of the perceiver.

According to Husserl, the contents of consciousness refer or point beyond themselves. This basic dualism, in terms of which Husserl's position closely resembles German Idealism, can be brought out in terms of his related doctrines of objectivity, intentionality, analogical perception, and the parallelism of transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology. Husserl follows his teacher, Franz Brentano, who held that a fundamental characteristic of psychic phenomena with respect to consciousness is that it is consciousness of something, either real or ideal. Accordingly, the *cogitatum* – which is composed of the flux of experiences called *cogitationes*, is further described, from different angles of vision, as either noematic or noetic, with respect to the modes of the subject as meant or the modes of consciousness which occur within the *ego cogito* itself. In other words, Husserl, reasoning solely from the contents of consciousness, suggests that there is a basic parallel, in terms of the doctrine of intentionality, between the object as it appears to my mind and as it is. In the same way, Husserl attempts to defuse the problem of solipsism – which, as mentioned above, some have seen as inevitably

and unavoidably arising within his position – by suggesting that from my perception of myself I can argue by analogical apperception to other people.[9] Further, this view is the basis of his claim – in the Preface to the English edition of *Ideas* and elsewhere – that there is a thorough-going parallelism between the sciences of transcendental phenomenology and empirical psychology. "To each eidetic or empirical determination on the one side there must correspond a parallel feature on the other."[10]

It has already been noted several times that Husserl does not devote more than passing attention to the problems of ontology. A similar comment cannot fairly be made about Heidegger, where ontological concerns are obviously central. In view of the extended nature of Heidegger's comments on various aspects of ontology, as well as his repeated criticism of various representatives of existential phenomenology, a tempting – but ultimately misleading – categorization of his position would be the term "phenomenological ontology", a term he uses himself. But, the generally forbidding and novel nature of his writings makes it difficult to offer generalizations of this type, which tend to utilize for describing his position, without prior scrutiny, terms such as "ontology" which in his thought have undergone basic change, if they continue to apply at all. Perhaps for this reason, there is considerable confusion in the discussion about Heidegger as to the ontological dimension of his thought.

Much of this confusion can fairly be laid at the doorstep of Heidegger himself. For instance, as already observed in a previous chapter, in the course of *Being and Time* Heidegger twice describes philosophy in identical terms: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of *existence*, has made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical enquiry at the point where it *arises* and to which it *returns*."[11] But, although the suggestion is plain that philosophy has as its task the phenomenology of Being, which begins only with the phenomenology of man, in fact Heidegger never moves beyond the latter task. *Being and Time* thus does not offer a universal phenomenological ontology, but only a regional ontology, that is, the phenomenological ontology of *Dasein*, which is the task of fundamental ontology (*Fundamentalontologie*).

What is fundamental ontology? Although this concept is – if the present interpretation is correct – that which most closely describes the actual philosophic business transacted in *Being and Time* but not its ultimate aim, a possibly clearer description of Heidegger's understanding of this idea than any given in this book is contained in another work by the same author, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. This latter work can be helpful in

shedding light on the former in view of their dates of composition. *Being and Time* was initially published in 1927; the book on Kant was, as Heidegger informs us in the preface to the first edition, originally given as a series of lectures in 1925–1926, prior to the appearance of *Being and Time*; and the lectures were later repeated in essentially unaltered form in 1929, when they were brought out as a separate work.

In the first sentence of the Introduction to *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger informs us that his goal in this book is to interpret Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in terms of the problem of a fundamental ontology. In the immediately succeeding sentences, he defines this concept:

> By fundamental ontology is meant that ontological analytic of man's finite essence which should prepare the foundation for the metaphysics "which belongs to human nature". Fundamental ontology is that metaphysics of human Dasein necessary if metaphysics in general is to be possible.[12]

This statement is interesting here from at least two perspectives. In the first place, it is important as a counter to those who argue that Heidegger's position is not to be understood as a philosophic anthropology, since he here seems to suggest that – albeit in a restricted sense – this is precisely his intention. For instance, further in the same paragraph, he indicates that the analysis of the idea of fundamental ontology means to grasp how to put the perennial question, what is man? This passage is further interesting as a comprehensive indication of what in fact is accomplished in *Being and Time* which is, from this angle, nothing other than the phenomenological ontology of *Dasein* and its world from the perspective of man as preparation for the never to be completed phenomenological description of Being itself.

If, in terms of this understanding of fundamental ontology, we now return to *Being and Time*, we can use this concept in order to throw light on the ontological dimension of Heidegger's position. Speaking generally, his position contains a regional ontology, focused largely on the phenomenological analysis of man's existence as the key to the understanding of the question of the meaning of Being. The task of ontology is to explain Being itself, which is only possible through phenomenology, which is defined in non-Husserlian fashion as the sense of the Being of entities. Fundamental ontology, which aims at the phenomenological analysis or hermeneutic of *Dasein* (*Daseinsanalyse*), is the task undertaken in *Being and Time*.

Within the fundamental ontology actually carried out in *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes three levels of ontology. At the risk of some repetition, we can recall that Being as such (*Sein*) is differentiated from beings

or things (*seiende*). The former is defined in elemental fashion as *transcendens* pure and simple, which remains hidden within beings and which it is the never completed and perhaps in principle impossible task of phenomenology to uncover. In the discussion of things (*seiende*), Heidegger further distinguishes presence-to-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) from readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*) which previous philosophers – notably Descartes in his doctrine of *res extensa* – have tended to conflate. In so far as something is just there for man, it is said to be present-to-hand. In so far as it is determined by the use to which it can or in fact will be put, it is ready-to-hand. Heidegger is particularly concerned to insist that it is not presence-at-hand which underlies readiness-to-hand but, on the contrary, the former is merely a special and deficient mode of being of the latter.

Heidegger's discussion of *Dasein* or man – which is developed at great length as the central topic of *Being and Time* – can only be summarized in barest fashion here. Unlike other beings, *Dasein* is distinguished by its ontological dimension – which here means that Being is an issue for it. This doctrine corresponds to Heidegger's anti-Aristotelian view that possibility is higher than actuality. While for Aristotle philosophy begins in wonder, Heidegger is not merely translating this view into his own terminology, since the kind of Being about which man is most concerned is his own. In other terms, the essence of man lies in his existence, in terms of which his essence must be conceived. But, it follows from this that man's way of Being is not definable as mere properties of a given thing, but in terms of its ownmost possibilities – potentialities which it, in fact, has or does not have and in terms of which it acts. Hence, it follows that man's own potential for activity is in every case and at all times, an issue for him, since "That Being which is an *issue* for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine."[13] It further follows that to the extent that *Dasein* is what it can be in terms of its own potentials, it can be either authentic or inauthentic with respect to itself, an analysis which some have seen as an attempt to rethink within a phenomenological framework a basically Marxian or Marxist analysis.[14]

In preceding chapters, implicit mention has already been made of Being-in (*In-Sein*), which can be roughly characterized as the formal existential term for the Being of *Dasein*, which in turn finds expression or is manifested in man's way of Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*), that is, *Dasein*'s basic state of finding itself already there in a context or, in Heideggerian language, in a state of thrownness (*Geworfenheit*). In the interests of brevity, only a few words can be devoted to the concept of care (*Sorge*), a major Heideggerian concept which refers to the manner in which the Being of *Dasein* unveils itself (*enthüllt sich*).

Speaking generally, care can be defined – through the liberal or even over-liberal use of hyphenated terms – as the forward-leaning, existentially-rooted, context-committed character of *Dasein* which, in a quasi-Marxian sense, ought not to be taken in abstraction from the social conditions which define man and in which he is a definite person. Heidegger further distinguishes three basic aspects of care, consisting in the collective unity of its existentiality (*Existenzialität*), facticity (*Faktizität*) and fallenness (*Verfallensein*). The existence of *Dasein* has to do with the way in which man in fact is. The facticity of *Dasein* is the term which designates the matter of fact actuality or reality of man as an existent. *Dasein*'s fallenness refers to the sense in which man turns away from his possibilities for authentic modes of existence, that is, the way in which he can or could become his most intimate or closest potentials through their manifestation in the world, and instead flees towards inauthentic ways of Being with others – which Heidegger designates by such *termini technici* as curiosity, idle chatter, and ambiguity. Heidegger's point is, of course, that the most frequent way in which we are in a social context with others involves the turning away from ourselves as particular possibilities in preference for an average, undistinguished and hence, with respect to our own individuality, false form of social being, whose origins in Kierkegaard and perhaps also in Marx are palpable.

Heidegger further insists on temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) in relation to care in a complex discussion, in which he develops an original theory of time which serves as a standard in order to criticize other views in the tradition, with special attention to those of Aristotle and Hegel. His position is that temporality is inseparable from *Dasein* or, more precisely, that it is the inner meaning of care. He goes on to emphasize the ecstatic structure of temporality in terms of the three protensions of past, present and future. Of interest for the present discussion is Heidegger's claim that man's disclosure (*Erschlossenheit*) takes place always in terms of his possibilities for being himself within a temporal framework, the non-relative limit of which is constituted by the phenomenon of man's own and unavoidable death.

The basic thread of Heidegger's ontology is, as has been emphasized, the approach to being in the most general sense, which should not be confused with particular beings or things, through the interpretation of man or human being. A similar task recurs in Sartre's thought – especially in his existentialist phase – as is clear in the subtitle of his *Being and Nothingness, A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology* (*Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*). But, as might be expected concerning a writer whose credentials to be called a philosopher at all have frequently been doubted,[15] the reaction to Sartre's phenomenological ontology has been widely diverse. In a brief but good

account of Sartre's position, Bocheński defends Sartre's claims to be, in fact, a rigorous philosopher and further suggests that, among the existentialists, he is "the one who comes nearest to having a philosophy of being".[16] Bocheński further remarks, correctly so, that Sartre's position at this point is in fact an anthropology which rests upon an ontology [17] – which provides an interesting hint as to the putative continuity of Sartre's existentialist and Marxist phases.

From another angle of vision, Natanson – in what is still the only full-length study of Sartrean ontology, though concerned only with the earlier phase of his thought – comments that Sartre's failure to develop an adequate methodological alternative to the Husserlian approach which he rejects undermines his ontology:

> Our basic criticism throughout this work has been that Sartre's failure to make use of true Husserlian phenomenology deprives his work of the method necessary to a successful ontological investigation. We have gone so far as to assert that this methodological failure basically invalidates Sartre's ontology.[18]

Focussing now on Sartre, we can state that his ontology reveals traces of his wide knowledge of the philosophical tradition, including Descartes, but especially three important phenomenological predecessors – Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger, whose views are discussed critically in an important section of *Being and Nothingness* [19] the theme of which is Sartre's defense of realism against various forms of idealism, a point already made in his earlier critical study, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1937). In view of Sartre's obvious indebtedness to the wider philosophic tradition, it would be tempting and fruitful to use this avenue to study his own thought as a reaction to the history of philosophy. However, in the present context, a historical enquiry will not be necessary as Sartre is above all a consistent thinker who is not afraid of drawing the often unusual conclusions which follow from his clearly stated – but, perhaps, indefensible – premises.

The ontological basis of Sartre's existential phenomenology is contained in the Introduction, entitled 'Pursuit of Being'. Sartre here criticizes previous views of being – including correlative forms of phenomenological ontology – and sets out the basis of his own position. Neither the Kantian duality of being and appearance nor the Aristotelian duality of act and potency can be defended. Actuality is everything and there is no potentiality – a point which further counts against Heidegger's belief that possibility is higher than actuality. Sartre now proceeds to substitute for the standard problem of the reality of the thing, the problem of the objectivity of the phenomenon. Apparently

following Heidegger, ontology is defined as "the description of the phenomenon of being as it manifests itself; that is, without intermediary".[20] But, Sartre diverges from his phenomenological predecessors, including both Husserl and Heidegger, in his assertion – which is, in itself, a further example of the streak of realism which traverses his thought – that the being of an existent cannot be reduced to any specific appearance which, in turn, leads him to deny the Berkeleyan thesis that *esse* is *percipi*. On the contrary, the series of appearances of any single thing is not solely dependent upon the perceiver, although relative to it – since, to take his own example, a table as perceived is not reducible to our perceptions of it. In other words, the being of the existent, which is revealed as a phenomenon, is itself transphenomenal. (see James on "pure experience" in Chapter 14).

Sartre's definition of ontology as the phenomenological description of being presupposes a dualistic form of ontology, including a knower and known or – in his palpably Hegelian terminology – the for-itself (*pour soi*) and in-itself (*en soi*) which are united in consciousness. Denying the view, which he calls "creationism", that being is in any sense dependent – for instance, on divine subjectivity – Sartre defines the phenomenon of being in terms of three basic characteristics. To begin with, being is – which Sartre interprets to mean that being is neither passivity nor activity, since it neither comes into being nor passes away; nor is it subject to affirmation or negation, since it is changeless. Second, being is in-itself, which indicates that it cannot, as do human beings, arise out of itself through the reference to the world contained in intentional consciousness. In Heideggerian terminology, one can say that in this way being is deprived of an ontological dimension and is merely ontical. Thirdly, being is what it is – which, according to Sartre, teaches us that being is unrelated to either possibility or necessity. The latter refers to the ideal, although not to the real; and the former is, one might say, a form of category mistake since it is appropriate only in reference to subjectivity. On the contrary, being is not necessary, but radically contingent. Sartre sums up his exposition in the following dark phrases:

> Being is. Being is in-itself. Being is what it is. These are the three characteristics which the preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being allows us to assign to the being of phenomena.[21]

Sartre explicitly warns us against conflating his preliminary analysis of the phenomenon of being, as revealed in the description of the being of the phenomenon, with the in-itself which, like the for-itself, is not an appearance.

This is not yet the examination of the *in-itself* – which is never anything but what it is – which will allow us to establish and to explain its relations with the for-itself.[22]

However, in the remainder of the book, Sartre does not, in fact, establish the relation between these two basic modes of being since, as he states in part in the Conclusion, "the *passage in fact* from one to the other and their reuniting cannot be effected".[23] Nor does he add much to the description of the in-itself, beyond the fascinating discussion of the revelation of the world to us – plainly indebted to Bachelard's view of the psychoanalysis of things – through the account of the viscous (*visqueux*, also translatable as slimy or sticky).

Take for example that particular quality which we call "slimy". Certainly for the European adult it signifies a host of *human* and *moral* characteristics which can easily be reduced to characteristics of being. A handshake, a smile, a thought, a feeling can be slimy.[24]

A bit later, we find:

This means that the apprehension of the slimy as such has, by the same stroke, created for the in-itself of the world a particular mode of giving itself. In its own way it symbolizes being.[25]

In a manner similar to Heidegger's account of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*, in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre's discussion of the for-itself, or man, occupies a large portion of the book. Sartre distinguishes three forms of ecstasis, which are roughly ways in which the for-itself is "separated" from itself. In the first case, the for-itself is constituted by its capacity to bring about nothingness, or to negate both itself and other beings – as is revealed in the phenomena of consciousness and freedom, two often criticized but only infrequently understood Sartrean doctrines. The former view reflects the influence of Fichte and perhaps also of Schelling, neither of whom are named in the course of the book. Like Fichte – who suggested that self-consciousness underlies and makes possible consciousness, Sartre maintains that all forms of awareness are, in fact, accompanied by a kind of non-reflective, non-cognitive self-awareness, which he labels variously as non-thetic or non-positional, as distinguished from reflective forms of consciousness which can be either pure or impure.

Sartre's view of freedom is modelled on his view of consciousness. Like consciousness, which is constitutive of human being and to which it is perhaps identical in the final analysis, so freedom, according to Sartre belongs

to the being of man as such. Reasoning in typically dualistic fashion – where he opposes the for-itself to the in-itself but totally excludes all gradations – Sartre writes:

> The being which is what it is cannot be free. Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is *made-to-be* at the heart of man and which forces human reality *to make itself* instead of *to be*. As we have seen, for human reality, to be is *to choose oneself*.[26]

Sartre here is emphasizing in quasi-Cartesian fashion the concept of radical self-determination and responsibility as the unavoidable consequence of man's freedom of the will.[27] His doctrine further has a quasi-Stoic aspect, already mentioned, in that he ignores the possibly utilitarian consequences of my activity, or even whether I am able to act at all, because of the restriction of the dimensions of my freedom solely to the ineliminable level of the mind. "Freedom is nothing but the existence of our will or our passions in so far as this existence is the nihilation of facticity."[28] Indeed, this minimal, non-utilitarian view of freedom allows Sartre to disregard the criticisms from a Marxist perspective that man is limited by his social condition. This is so because at the time he wrote *Being and Nothingness* this kind of limitation did not appear significant to him as, come what may, consciousness and, by analogy, freedom (which here may be identical to consciousness) is always possible. But, it should be noted that more recently, since the publication of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Sartre has revised his understanding of freedom. Recognizing that in the earlier work his discussion was limited to a description of the interior of consciousness unrelated to external reality, he now defines freedom negatively as a refusal to accept behaviorism or total social determinism.

> I believe that a person can always make something of what one has made of him. This is the definition that I would now give for freedom: it is the little movement which permits a totally conditioned social being not to retransmit the totality of the social conditioning that it has received.[29]

Secondly, the for-itself is a being for others. The revelation to the for-itself of its being for others is analyzed by Sartre under the heading of a number of phenomena, such as shame, which requires – as a constituent element of the emotion – my feeling towards myself in terms of another's possible evaluation of me. Sartre further attacks the problem of solipsism in his brilliant, extended discussion of the look (*le regard*), through which the other objectifies me in his glance as a thing. Indeed, according to the master-slave relation, it is essential to our relations to others that each person try

to transform others with whom he comes into contact into things, to freeze them as an object in much the same way as a *voyeur* discovered looking through a keyhole. For instance, in sexual relations it is ultimately not the body of the other that one desires, but the other as such, whom one strives unsuccessfully to appropriate, not as a person, but as an object through sexual activity.

The adversary relationship which Sartre seems to understand as an unavoidable and indeed constitutive dimension of human being is further reflected in a third ecstasis. For, to seek to transform others into things is comprehensible if it belongs to the nature of man to seek being. But, according to Sartre, it is not mere facticity that man seeks since, although we reify others in our relations with them, we do not ourselves seek to become things. On the contrary, man – who is finite – strives constantly to throw off his finitude and become infinite. Hence, by his nature, man desires to burst his mortal bonds in order to become, in fact, an infinite being, or a being which is its own foundation. For example, in a description of what he calls "the project of being", namely the manner in which man desires to be self-subsistent, Sartre writes:

> The fundamental value which presides over this project is exactly the in-itself-for-itself; that is, the ideal of a consciousness which would be the foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of itself. It is this ideal which can be called God. Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God.[30]

Although man desires to be a wholly self-subsistent being, this is in fact not realizable; and, it follows that, in terms of this basic project – as Sartre observes – man is a useless passion.

CHAPTER 20

META-PHENOMENOLOGY

In the preceding discussion of phenomenology, as in those of other contemporary philosophic movements, the main concern has been accorded to descriptive and thematic analysis of related positions within a wider theoretical framework. In turning now to evaluation, it seems unnecessary to review in detail what we have examined above. It can merely be noted that in the concrete consideration of such basic phenomenological themes as crisis, social world, method, and ontology, there was in each case a shift – in post-Husserlian positions and perhaps even in that of Husserl as well – from the original Husserlian concern to protect philosophy from any contamination by subjectivity to subjectivity as a central problem. Indeed, this shift in emphasis will be an important clue in the evaluation of the phenomenological enterprise. It should be immediately noted that, although still concerned with Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology, this chapter will differ from what has previously been said in two ways. In the first place, the earlier stress on concrete description – necessary in order to set out the main lines of a position or series of positions – will be replaced here by a more abstract discussion of the philosophical adequacy of the phenomenological approach to philosophy. Second, as the post-Husserlian form of phenomenology is largely, although not solely, the result of a series of reactions to Husserl's own position, major emphasis will be laid upon Husserl's views.

In order to evaluate the success or failure of the Husserlian phenomenological movement – if indeed such terms are relevant at all for philosophic positions – we need a standard by which to measure it. In the present instance, the relation of theory and practice will be invoked as helpful in the evaluation. Beyond an early comment to the effect that theory could not be reduced to practice (*Praxis*), Marx rarely mentions the latter term, with the exception of the celebrated but brief *Theses on Feuerbach*, in the second of which he suggests, somewhat obscurely, that "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical question.*"[1] The suggestion is obscure since it is not at all clear that thought can ever be wholly isolated from practice; for, he elsewhere indicates, theory itself is a form of practice. Nor is it evident in what way practical success in and of itself – which is a frequent misreading

of pragmatism, based mainly on some loose statements by William James – can serve as the criterion of truth.[2] In this regard it is significant that Popper, for example, has argued that on the level of scientific theory, a claim about the natural world cannot be confirmed through experiment, even if its disconfirmation is possible.[3] But, for generations, Marxists of all persuasions have held that the relation of theory and practice is basic to the evaluation of any claims made in the theory. The following statement by Stalin is typical:

> Theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if it is not illuminated by revolutionary theory.[4]

The purpose of the present chapter is not to provide the definitive evaluation of phenomenology – which will have to await the twilight of the movement – but to come to grips tentatively with it in terms of its own self-image. In particular, it will be suggested that – both historically and systematically – Husserlian phenomenology – which is not coextensive with phenomenology as such – must necessarily fall short of its goal for reasons that are intrinsic to its approach. But, it will further be suggested that, despite its intrinsic theoretical inadequacies – which have in part been recognized by post-Husserlian phenomenologists and perhaps even by Husserl himself – this form of phenomenology represents, from the historical perspective, a qualified renewal of the Greek conception of philosophy.

The unavoidable initial step in the evaluation of Husserlian phenomenology is to set it into the historical context, at least in approximation. Just as the relation of Marx's position to the history of philosophy has often been obscured through the purported distinction – not in degree, but in kind – between it and philosophy, as a result of which it incorrectly appears as *sui generis*, so in recent phenomenology one finds the historically dubious assertion – even among those who should know better – that phenomenology arises with Husserl. Sartre, who has been decisively influenced by another, Hegelian form of phenomenology, has written: "It is by reaction against the insufficiencies of psychology and psychologism that about thirty years ago a new discipline, phenomenology, emerged."[5] But, Husserlian phenomenology is at best another, different form of phenomenology in general which, like the Hegelian position, also belongs to the philosophical tradition. Nor is it entirely unprecedented within the tradition. For, in one form or another, the phenomenological inspiration has been part of philosophy ever since Plato's suggestion that in the world of appearances one can at best be acquainted with an imitation of the forms, but not with the forms as such.[6]

Accordingly, we shall begin with the historical perspective, before turning to a systematic characterization which will then be supplemented by a fuller, but still incomplete, description of the modern phenomenological movement from its inception in Husserl's thought to the present day.

As early as the late eighteenth century, one begins to find theories of the object of sensory experience formulated in terms of Greek-influenced terminology, which rapidly spread throughout German philosophy.[7] This view probably starts with J. H. Lambert's use – in his *Das neue Organon* (1764) – of the term "*Phänomenologie*" to designate a theory of appearance, supposedly fundamental to all empirical knowledge. For Kant, phenomenology was a form of propadeutic to metaphysics, as a sort of negative science. In a letter to Lambert (September 2, 1770), he refers to the need for a *phaenomenologica generalis* which will precede metaphysics in order to determine the validity and limits of sensory knowledge. In another, later letter to Marcus Herz (February 21, 1772), he indicates that the theoretical part of the projected work, which later became the *Critique of Pure Reason*, will contain a general phenomenology (*die Phänomenologie überhaupt*) as well as metaphysics. This phenomenological role was later assumed by the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, where the term "phenomenology" does not, however, appear. It should also be noted that in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in a passage omitted in the second edition, Kant further specifies that appearances are phenomena in so far as they are "objects according to the unity of the categories" (A 249) in order to distinguish them from non-sensible objects of intuition.

Hegel, however, immediately took issue with the critical philosophy on a basic level. In particular, he denied the fundamental Kantian distinction between appearances and noumena, or things-in-themselves, which can without contradiction at least be thought of as the cause of which the phenomena similarly can be considered as the effects (B 566). An immediate result of this denial is to cement an ontological link between appearance and essence, which now appears; this, in turn, brings Hegel closer to Aristotle's doctrine of immanent form. In the Hegelian position, phenomenology can be characterized as the study of the simultaneous, dialectical development of consciousness on three interrelated levels – the individual, the human race, and substance becoming subject. This development proceeds in stage-wise fashion from sense certainty, through various intermediate phases, to its final culmination in full – or, in Hegelian language – absolute knowledge (*absolutes Wissen*). In the *Phenomenology of Mind* – his first full-scale and, arguably, major work – Hegel studies the movement of knowledge from two intrinsically

parallel perspectives: historically, as a series of contingent appearances in the realms of space and time; and, conceptually, as the necessary, self-developing articulation of appearing knowledge in the science of experience.[8]

Turning to comparison, there is a similarity between the conceptions of phenomenology in the writings of Kant and Hegel. Kant's employment of the term is nearly co-extensive with the investigation carried out in the *Critique of Pure Reason* into the nature and limits of experiential knowledge, not unrelated to the similar study later performed by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Mind*. A theme common to both inquiries is that experience must be understood as it presents itself to the subject's awareness. Both Kant and Hegel hold that knowledge in the full sense of the word must be insulated from any taint of dogmatism or scepticism, associated with the positions of Descartes and Hume.

But, there is a significant difference in their respective conceptions of the relation of epistemology and ontology. Kant is correct when, in his letter to Marcus Herz, he indicates that the *Critique of Pure Reason* contains both phenomenology and metaphysics, if the latter is understood in an Aristotelian or ontological sense. For, his epistemology rests upon an ontological basis, even if – as a result of his sharp distinction between *noumena* and *phenomena* – things-in-themselves, which can without contradiction be thought of as the ultimate source of sensory input in experience, cannot, in principle, be given in experience or otherwise known. Hence, Kant adopts the peculiar posture – which betokens a basic tension in his view – of denying any knowledge of the ontological foundation of his epistemology, which he must nonetheless at least postulate in order to make the epistemology plausible at all. Hegel, on the other hand, is explicit in conjoining epistemology and ontology, perhaps most visibly in the early, but much neglected *Differenzschrift*, where he maintains, as noted above, that the ontological separation between subject and object is the condition of their eventual epistemological coincidence in consciousness.

Although Husserl suggests that the first systematic sketch of pure phenomenology can be found in Hume's *Treatise*, in terms of the analysis of the relation of epistemology and ontology, the Kantian and Hegelian positions represent two basically different forms of phenomenology, a difference whose roots lie in the Greek tradition. From the phenomenological perspective, the Kantian position is a reformulation of the Platonic distinction between the worlds of appearance and reality, or acquaintance with appearance and knowledge of the forms, which here takes shape as knowledge of phenomena, although all experience of noumena is, in principle, excluded. The

Hegelian position, on the contrary, is a restatement of the less familiar Aristotelian view that experiential knowledge requires an epistemological coincidence – which presupposes however an ontological difference. For example, in *De Anima* he remarks that in order to know the stone it must in a sense be in my mind, even if that is absurd [9] (see Chapter 8). In Hegel's position we find substantially the same view, with the difference that Hegel places greater stress on the historical process, in which the ontological difference is sublated in the form of an epistemological unity.

The Husserlian view – despite its claimed and undoubted resemblance to the Cartesian philosophy – is, in other respects, close to the Kantian form of phenomenology. Husserl, in particular, follows Kant's claim that knowledge arises from study of *phenomena* apart from the "underlying" *noumena*. In his own position, Husserl puts the implicit noumenal reference out of bounds through the operation of bracketing, which has as its result the revelation of an uncontaminated field of direct experience. But, unlike Kant, who resolutely adheres to the view that things-in-themselves cannot be known, although he eventually has much – perhaps too much – to say about them, Husserl explicitly claims that knowledge on the transcendental level is parallel to that arrived at on the ordinary plane of the everyday world.

Husserl's argument on this crucial point is made in different language in numerous texts but, beginning with the *Ideas*, his view of it remains substantially unchanged. If, for present purposes, we take as a representative statement of his position the Preface he wrote especially for the English translation (1931), his position on this point can be summed up as follows: the phenomenological approach requires a double reduction – from the life-world to the level of transcendental experience through phenomenological reduction; and then, through the eidetic reduction, to "the realm of pure eidetic 'description', that is, to the realm of essential structures of transcendental subjectivity immediately transparent to the mind".[10] In the initial reduction, I attain, as Husserl states, "an original and pure descriptive knowledge of the psychical life as it is in itself"[11], to wit, uncontaminated in any way – and in the latter reduction I elicit, through the utilization of appropriate techniques, the essence of the phenomena of consciousness. The phenomenological approach does not deny the "positive existence" or reality of the world.[12] It rather clarifies the meaning of the world from a rigorous or transcendental perspective in which, rather than founding logic in psychology – which would be psychologism – all other sciences are founded in transcendental phenomenology. The latter is not in need of further justification, since it is self-justifying:

There lies embedded in its meaning a philosophy, a radicalism in the matter of foundations, an absolute freedom from all presuppositions, a securing for itself an absolute basis.[13]

In this manner, the phenomenological approach is able to provide, from a transcendental perspective, a clarification of ordinary experience: "To each eidetic or empirical determination on the one side there must correspond a parallel feature on the other."[14] In other words, the *aposteriori* study of experience in empirical psychology is made clear through the "*apriori* science" whose role is to give an *apriori* analysis in terms of pure possibility of that also known in factual experience on the *aposteriori* level.

Turning now to criticism, it seems obvious that criticism can be raised from different viewpoints. All criticism of whatever kind necessarily presupposes implicitly or explicitly a standard in terms of which it is formulated. But, as already noted, there is a significant distinction to be observed between objections raised in terms of another position, external to the view in question, and those which arise – as it were – from within the theory under study, in response to criteria it, in fact, does or arguably ought to accept. The Soviet critique of phenomenology is mainly of the former stripe. Soviet philosophy is, in fact, a philosophic school possessing its own series of basic philosophic beliefs, which are accepted as the frame of reference by its members and which function for it as the standard to which all other positions external to it are held accountable. From the perspective of Soviet thought, phenomenology and existentialism of any form whatever can be reduced to one or another variety of idealism. More instructive, however, will be a critique of Husserlian phenomenology in terms of concepts which it itself recognizes as constitutive of its own position.

Reflecting on the above discussion, it would seem that the Husserlian position includes at least three fundamental propositions: these regard (1) the technique of reduction, (2) the parallel between transcendental and ordinary experience, and (3) the status of phenomenology as non-hypothetical or self-grounding. Through reduction, the transition is made from ontology to the plane of pure epistemology. The claimed parallel between the transcendental and everyday levels of experience is the basis of the belief that the former perspective is relevant to the latter. The science of phenomenology must be self-justifying if pure epistemology is to be a source of knowledge in the full sense. Although a combination of the three assertions is insufficient to permit satisfactory reconstruction of the Husserlian position, each of them must be true in order for it to hold. Accordingly, to demonstrate that any one of them cannot be defended, means that the original position cannot be

made out as formulated, although it does not therefore follow that another version of it is also indefensible.

(1) As has often been stressed in the preceding discussion, the concept of reduction was regarded by Husserl as the coping stone of his position, from its initial formulation in *Ideas* through the entire course of his later writings. There has been, to be sure, some doubt expressed about the role of this concept in his last phase, especially in the *Crisis*, where it would seem less prominent. But, in response, it should be noted that in that text the amount of space accorded to the concept is not proportionate to its importance in Husserl's thought. For instance, in the following passage, in a manner fully reminiscent of other statements in earlier writings, Husserl states: "*Epoché* creates a special philosophic unity which represents the basic methodological condition of any really radical philosophy."[15] It would, therefore, be an error to infer that in this final expression of his position, Husserl's view of the role or importance of reduction underwent any basic change.

Although Husserl's fundamental view of reduction did not alter, it should be noted that almost from the initial formulation of this concept, it was beset with two basic difficulties. On the one hand, Husserl never was able to formulate it in a manner he could accept. His many formulations of it, therefore, retain a provisional character which was not rendered obsolete by a definitive statement. On the other hand, as has been indicated, almost none of his followers accepted the concept with which Husserl was wrestling, even in principle. Rather, the suggestion – most clearly uttered by Merleau-Ponty – that it is in the nature of the case not possible to carry out the reduction, has never been satisfactorily answered, if at all. It follows that, although the concept of the reduction can function as a regulative idea, to guide the phenomenological inquiry, it cannot be constitutive of phenomenology, since its full performance requires one to complete, in a finite span, an infinite task. The result is that phenomenology, deprived of the method of reduction, reduces to a form of "*apriori* psychology", as Husserl clearly foresaw.[16] But, phenomenology is perhaps not therefore less interesting. Fruitful examples of this edulcorated or weaker form of Husserlian phenomenology can be found in such widely disparate thinkers as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Gadamer.

(2) Husserl's claim for the parallel of the transcendental and non-transcendental levels of knowledge and experience, also maintained in the *Crisis*,[17] reflects a difficulty at the heart of his position. As he says, the aim of his

form of phenomenology is emphatically not to deny the reality of the world. Rather, in the retreat to the transcendental level, a vantage point is supposedly reached, from which we can better understand and further ground ordinary or non-transcendental experiential and epistemological claims. But, there is a tension and perhaps even an outright contradiction in his position between the desire, in order to attain absolutely pure and unalloyed knowledge, to make abstraction from all possibly prejudicial factors – including any form of ontological commitment – and the further desire to describe the real world from that exalted position. For, although it may indeed be possible to reach the transcendental plane – even if this claim has clearly been placed in jeopardy by the criticism of the Husserlian view of reduction – once the tie that binds subjectivity and objectivity has been severed it cannot be re-established. (See Chapter 14 for the contrast between this position and that of William James.) More precisely, it is inconsistent both to bracket the life-world and to claim that a relation to it – in this case, a cognitive relation – can be maintained. If the existence of the life-world can be put out of bounds, then nothing further can be said about it because one is then restricted to the level of the contents of consciousness. Indeed, for this reason, Husserl himself criticizes Descartes's own self-misunderstanding, through which he attempted to return from the *ego cogito* to the world. On the other hand, if a complete reduction is not possible, as the critics of Husserl have often urged, then statements can be made which have an existential force, although not from a fully transcendental perspective. But, it is in any event impossible both to bracket existence and to make cognitive claims about it once it has been put out of bounds.

(3) The Husserlian claim that phenomenology is not a theory, but a presuppositionless science reveals both his concern to carry out in fact the construction of a truly scientific philosophy, which has been the dream of philosophy since Plato, as well as a serious misunderstanding of his own accomplishment. As emphasized in the Platonic position, philosophy has supposed to be presuppositionless science which grounded itself and all other sciences and served as a source of apodictic knowledge. Although this view is almost as old as philosophy itself, it would seem to have lost little of its attraction, even for the contemporary and supposedly critical mind. We are used to the frequent appeal of philosophers to experience but, then as now, it would seem that philosophic theories remain ever immune to an *experimentum crucis* of this type. Although there are notable exceptions

in the pragmatic turn which seems widely characteristic of contemporary thought after the beginning of the nineteenth century, it seems fair to say that most philosophers of whatever persuasion, continue to believe that philosophy is or should be a source of historically non-relative knowledge, true now and forever, or in Spinoza's felicitous phrase *sub specie aeternitatis*.

If we attend to the philosophic tradition, it would seem that there are, in fact, only two strategies through which philosophy can or indeed even might yield apodictic knowledge. Either philosophy can employ a ground, or initial proposition, which can be shown to be necessarily true; or, it can be presuppositionless. The first strategy is utilized by Descartes and the second by Plato. Husserl's position, from this perspective, represents a return to the Platonic position, although it lacks the Platonic dimension, where to know and to know that one knows – i.e., self-validating knowledge – were supported by a subjacent ontology.[18] Husserl thus is in the peculiar and perhaps impossible position of having to make the kind of claim for knowledge based solely on epistemology, like Descartes, but without the appeal to a first principle or ground, in the manner of the Platonic position, and lacking also the Platonic ontology. He cannot maintain his claim to apodictic knowledge because his strategy, which is an attempt to mediate between the other two possible strategies already present in the philosophic tradition, has either not been sufficiently thought through or is an attempt to take up an impossible middle ground – in effect, a *tertium non datur*.

It would further seem that Husserl misunderstands the nature of his own position. Despite his claims to the contrary, there is no possible doubt concerning the theoretical status of transcendental phenomenology. It is a theory of how to achieve certain knowledge through the correct application of the phenomenological method to conscious experience. Although Husserl evidently prefers to maintain that transcendental phenomenology is free from presuppositions, this is clearly not the case. Among his presuppositions are the belief that apodictic knowledge is possible and that such knowledge can, in fact, be attained through the phenomenological approach. Now, according to Husserl, full clarification of the premises of a theory will enable us to discard those suppositions upon which it cannot rely. But, the further assumption – namely, that it is possible to render a theory presuppositionless as a result of examining its presuppositions and rendering them transparent to reason – seems dubious, for philosophy cannot pull itself up by its bootstraps. Indeed, Popper's view of critical rationalism notwithstanding, it is a misunderstanding of the concept of a presupposition to think that its examination from within the confines of a theory somehow frees that theory from dependence

on it. Hence, presuppositionless theory, at least in the Husserlian mode, seems impossible.

It is important to be clear about the aim of the present discussion. The end in view is not indeed to refute all forms of phenomenology; nor is it to disprove the possibility of phenomenology as such. Husserl's view of phenomenology was, however, singled out, since it has been the dominant influence in the contemporary phenomenological movement. But, rather than criticize it for an extrinsic reason, the attempt has been made here to suggest that, viewed in its own terms, as the theory which corresponds to a conceptually prior, implicit meta-theory, Husserl's view in fact fails to carry out the goals he himself sets for it. But, other – less strictly Husserlian forms of phenomenology – which are not subject to these objections or their variants, may well be valid. Indeed, in a sense, Husserlian phenomenology has now become an historical force in the growth of the philosophical tradition, for no one – and this is further true with respect to the views of other major thinkers, like Kant or Plato – probably continues to defend the theory in its original form. To be sure, the position cannot stand as originally formulated, if even one of the objections raised can be sustained. Nevertheless, the Husserlian phenomenological impulse retains its importance as merely the latest manifestation of the Greek philosophic concern to name reality – which lives on in the Husserlian desire to provide rigorous and unprejudiced descriptions of experience.

PART FIVE

CONCLUSION

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The intent of the above, parallel discussion of a series of concerns from four distinguishable and distinct perspectives was to detect the basis for possible interaction among them by revealing some of the ways in which they resemble each other on specific points. To be sure, it would be interesting to bring these different views together in a single grand synthesis, although it would seem that a result of this kind cannot, in fact, be obtained without doing violence to the ideas themselves. But since our aim is not agreement as such, but interchange when possible, it seems preferable not to undertake a synthesis here, but rather to initiate, albeit briefly, the work of comparing and contrasting the several perspectives – a project that only the reader can complete. This comparison can perhaps best be carried out through the choice of a central position in the evolution of the modern philosophic tradition, whose author cannot, however, reasonably be regarded as either a member or, more distantly, as a conceptual patron, of the other positions studied here.

It has often been held that Descartes' position marks the inception of modern philosophy. Recent research, to be sure, has tended to emphasize the continuity of his thought with the tradition from which it emerged in at least two senses, concerning the dependence on Augustinian doctrine and the importance to it of the reintroduction of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The effect therefore is to deny that the Cartesian view marks a wholly new beginning through an abrupt break with the past. But it is undeniable that the Cartesian position has exercised a major influence on the succeeding philosophic tradition, both in terms of those who accepted and developed its main lines, as well as those who attempted to burst through its conceptual framework. And since it can also be noted that, despite its novel features, the Cartesian worldview is solidly anchored in the Platonic tradition, which it endeavors to complete, it can serve here as a standard to compare and contrast, albeit briefly, the four contemporary tendencies we have discussed above.

In summary form, Descartes' position can be characterized in terms of four main, interrelated doctrines. In the first place, he remains close to Plato as concerns the felt need for philosophy in fact to become the science of

other sciences, which grounds both itself and all other legitimate claims to knowledge. Secondly, Descartes preserves the Platonic belief that knowledge in the full sense is necessarily apodictic, which is reflected in his own concern to overcome scepticism. The Cartesian ontology, and this is the third point, marks the introduction of a novel and historically important distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Finally, whereas Aristotle argues that the permissible approach to knowledge is determined by what is to be known, which implies the need for a plurality of methods as a function of the objects in question, Descartes invokes the concept of a single method which, when correctly applied, is held to be adequate to secure any and all forms of knowledge.

If we turn now to the comparison, we can immediately notice that a consequence of the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century was to render controversial the Greek identification of science and philosophy. Now in view of the often cited analogy between Marxism and Christianity, it is interesting to note that they are sharply at odds on the proper conception of the relation of philosophy and science. The central issue, which divides these tendencies into two camps, concerns the problem of whether philosophy in fact can or even ought to attempt to be science. On this issue, neo-Thomists and phenomenologists are perhaps most closely aligned, since in each case philosophy is understood in a quasi-Cartesian and even Platonic sense as the basic cognitive discipline underlying and validating all others. Neo-Thomists here follow Aristotle, as reinterpreted by St Thomas, and phenomenologists follow the early Husserl, although it must also be observed that some existentialists tend to deny the interest of science for life. But neo-Thomists and phenomenologists disagree in that for the former science is viewed through the machinery of the Aristotelian analysis of causality, as a philosophy of nature. On the contrary, in Husserlian phenomenology, which here differs from its Hegelian form, any indirect or law-like discussion of the contents of experience, which is not immediately and repeatedly verifiable in individual consciousness, must in principle be excluded.

Here neo-Thomism is perhaps closer to Marxism-Leninism, which also employs a quasi-metaphysical, in this case dialectical, framework to encompass the plurality of natural and social sciences. The difference is that while neo-Thomism, from a traditional perspective, is ready to acknowledge philosophy's claim to be science, Marxism-Leninism pretends that non-ideological science and ideological philosophy are exclusive alternatives. Thus, rather than attempting a synthesis of both philosophy and science, it opts instead for a purely scientific, or in its terms, materialistic view, consisting of historical

materialism, which replaces philosophy, and dialectical materialism, which subtends and unifies the various sciences.

The quasi-positivistic rejection of philosophy in the name of science by Marxism-Leninism separates it from phenomenology, neo-Thomism, and pragmatism. But, in another sense, Marxism-Leninism and some forms of pragmatism do share an interest in the amelioration of the social context, perhaps most apparent in the latter in Dewey's interest in the alleviation of social problems. From a further perspective pragmatism differs from Marxism-Leninism and stands alone in its regard for the conceptual priority of a method able to function critically in an uncertain, unfinished universe. Indeed, here pragmatism seems to have genuinely liberated itself from the Platonico-Cartesian model and represents a genuinely post-Cartesian form of philosophy.

The ontological distinction in the Cartesian position between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* results in related concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. In various ways, each of the contemporary movements under consideration rejects the Cartesian spectator theory of man in favor of the alternative actor view, although a qualification must immediately be introduced with respect to phenomenology. Indeed, in important ways, Husserlian phenomenology and various forms of existentialism remain Cartesian in that the world as experienced is already fully constituted and can only be known, although this is perhaps less clearly the case for Heidegger. This is so even if, as for Husserl, the subject must constitute the object of knowledge. But, in another sense, each of the movements in question regards man as active rather than passive.

To illustrate, for Marxism-Leninism and perhaps for Heidegger as well, man humanizes nature through the tool, which is the principal means of his relation to it. An active, voluntarist approach to man is emphasized in the Leninist theory of the party, although elsewhere denied, for instance by Luxemburg and other opponents of Bolshevism. From the pragmatic perspective the very indeterminacy of the universe seems to demand the participation of the human person in its evolution. Similarly, existentialists typically see man as creating himself in and through his response to one or another situation, a point close to some forms of Marxism. In his post-existentialist, self-proclaimed Marxist phase, Sartre, in particular, has emphasized that real unity can be achieved through specific events, such as the taking of the Bastille. Finally, in neo-Thomistic theology, which both shapes and is shaped by neo-Thomistic philosophy, man is regarded as a co-creator who fashions a place for himself in a universe fraught with potentialities for both good and

evil. Furthermore, theoretical knowledge is not fully separated from practice since, as for Aristotle, it finds its origin in practical and often active contact with the external, physical world.

In different ways, each of these four philosophic currents can be seen as refusing the Cartesian spectator view of subjectivity in favor of a concept of man as an active being. But there is considerable difference of opinion as concerns the ultimate importance of human action. For the neo-Thomist, man's activity is not the final value, since God's will and knowledge take precedence. Again, in the human order St Thomas holds to the view, widespread in Greek thought, that pure thought is the highest form of activity. A similar idea would seem to be present in Husserlian phenomenology where, until the final phase, the relation between knowing and doing in the Platonic sense remained unclear. From another perspective, although Marxism insists on the importance of action – for instance, in order to bring about revolutionary change or to create the new Communist society in a post-revolutionary situation – the frequent stress on economic determinism or its sister concept, historical inevitability, tempers the role in fact to be played by man. Further, there is perhaps an even clearer stress on activity in the pragmatic camp, more in James and Dewey than in Peirce.

The concept of alienation is closely related to that of activity. It is only because man is active that he can be alienated, since alienation in all its forms is the consequence of the diversion of human activity from its natural goal. Alienation is, of course, a prominent theme in Marx's early writings, although there is considerable controversy about the relevance of this theme for his later position. But this concept does not come into the cultural tradition with Marx. Others who anticipate this interest include such varied writers as Fichte and Hegel, Diderot and Milton, and even St Augustine, although he does not use the term, in his analysis of man's fall from grace.

Alienation in the neo-Thomist position derives from the condition of sin. The world is our natural place, wherein we remain ever ill at ease since its potential for good or evil both provides opportunity and creates a situation of moral peril. The theme of alienation as backwardness or primitiveness with respect to opportunity is also an important conceptual dimension in nineteenth-century Slavophile thought, and this emphasis carries over into the Leninist form of Marxism, in which it is combined with the belief in the fundamentally a-social distribution of the means of production in a way which divides the social context into competing classes. A similar theme recurs in pragmatism, which tends to view America as another version of the quasi-dialectical battleground that results from its double status as a wilderness and

as a second Garden of Eden. Finally, within various forms of existentialism – perhaps most clearly in Sartre, here influenced by Kierkegaard, – alienation of man from other men is present in man's inability to relate meaningfully and in non-hostile ways to other people and to life itself.

The Cartesian view of matter as extension is not developed by Descartes into a full-fledged ontology. But, some progress in this direction, within the limits of the respective positions, is apparent in the four movements studied above. It will be helpful here if we distinguish between theories about the nature of being, which are roughly concerned with problems about what is in the most general sense, and the philosophy of nature, or view of the conditions and nature of *a posteriori* knowledge.

From the perspective of pragmatism, it is difficult even to raise the question about the nature of reality as such, and hence not easy to state ultimate ontological concerns. The question as to whether the "real" can be directly or even indirectly known pales before the problem of the use to which our experience and, in particular, our command over it, can be put. But such ontological modesty is not characteristic of the other positions studied here, which vary widely in their positive ontological views. Marxism-Leninism, for instance, is explicit in its claims regarding the nature of matter, which derive ultimately from Engels' views of this problem. There is further an inherent and necessary assumption in regard to an independent and prior, but wholly cognizable, reality – a point which is a necessary presupposition for the Leninist reflection theory of knowledge. Phenomenologists vary widely in their reaction to ontological concerns. For Husserl, in almost Berkeleyan fashion, to be real is to be given in consciousness and conversely, claims regarding what is, as opposed to what is perceived, cannot consistently be made. Heidegger's position, with its emphasis on being as such in what he believes to be the classical Greek sense clearly marks the other extreme.

In view of the widespread difference of opinion concerning ontology, it is not surprising that there is disagreement as concerns the appropriate form, or even possibility, of the philosophy of nature. Not surprisingly, Marxism-Leninism, through Schelling's influence on Engels, comes the closest among the four contemporary philosophic tendencies to a traditional concept of the philosophy of nature. Although the term is not employed, the correlative concept within this position is dialectical materialism, which can roughly be defined as the science of matter in motion. Although the two doctrines do not agree on content, there is a close analogy here between the Marxist-Leninist view and the neo-Thomistic view, the latter being derived from Aquinas' reworking of the Aristotelian analysis of nature on such topics as

hylomorphism, potency and act, and causality. From a different perspective, which prescinds from making ontological affirmations, within the American tradition there is a rich philosophy of nature which is integrated with our experience of it. But since for pragmatism, there is no ultimate final cause operative, the total domination sought in the Marxist concern to reintegrate nature into man in the course of social progress is lacking here. Finally, phenomenology differs from the other forms of contemporary philosophy in that there is not much explicit attention paid to nature as such.

There is an obvious connection between the relation of the knower to the context in which he knows and the claim for knowledge. In the Cartesian position the claim for epistemological apodicticity is supported by the spectator status of the subject, in which his purely passive evaluation of the contexts of consciousness forms the sole source of knowledge. But, as soon as the spectator view is denied in favor of an analysis of man as immanent to his context, other approaches to experience can take precedence in the consciousness of the individual subject.

This is well-illustrated by the four approaches we have been considering here. Husserlian phenomenology, which remains closest to the Cartesian view of the subject as an isolated spectator, further defends the traditional view of the epistemological superiority of individual consciousness as a source of knowledge. But the other approaches, which insist on the immanent status of man in the context in which he lives and of which he has knowledge, stress in different ways the relative primacy of one or another scientific discipline as an explanatory tool to comprehend both the world and man. Perhaps over-simplistically, one could say that for neo-Thomism revealed religion is prior to philosophy, which is the handmaiden of theology. In Marxism-Leninism. as in classical Marxism, economics – or perhaps better a combination of both economics and politics – takes explanatory precedence over all forms of culture, including philosophy. And in pragmatism biology is the single most important explanatory science.

Although these tendencies, with the exception of phenomenology, are inclined to place another science in the role traditionally played by philosophy, each of these perspectives is eager to avoid the possibility of reductionism. Among these philosophic trends, Marxism-Leninism has long been the most reductionistic in view of the often deterministic interpretation of the superstructure as following with quasi-logical necessity from the politico-economic base. But since Stalin's 'contribution' to linguistics, precedence has been accorded to an interactionist interpretation, as a result of which such social sciences as sociology have been given increasing weight.

Similarly among the pragmatists both Dewey and James for the most part, adopt an "organic" approach to experience. And although neo-Thomism has always insisted on the conceptual priority of faith over reason, or at least the inability of reason to be completely self-sufficient, it has made conscious efforts to integrate all forms of experience and approaches to it within the wider systematic approach.

Although the view of the nature and the relation of the basic explanatory discipline to philosophy differs among the different tendencies, there is wide agreement on at least one point. In continuing to represent philosophy as the fundamental form of science, Descartes implied that, ultimately, philosophy was a self-sufficient form of knowledge, beholden to no other. On the contrary, in the revolt against the Cartesian worldview, this point has been denied precisely in the appeal to extra-philosophic forms of science in all positions other than phenomenology. And it is further significant that with the exception of Husserlian phenomenology, the claim for the fundamental role of philosophy, as opposed to all other forms of knowledge, which is first clearly made in Plato's thought, is no longer raised.

The problem of method is a topic which tends to divide rather than to unify the tendencies under discussion here. In view of their mutual distrust, it is interesting to note a convergence between Marxism-Leninism and phenomenology on this point. Marxist-Leninists, perhaps most prominently Lukács, have long argued that Marxism is not a series of beliefs, but essentially a method adequate for the solution of any and all problems. This formulation by Lukács is perhaps unwittingly close to the Cartesian position, which is further reflected in the early Husserl's conception of phenomenology, not as philosophy, but as a method for the generation of absolute and unimpeachable experiential knowledge. Later phenomenologists and the existentialists, have been nearly unanimous in renouncing the attempt to define a single method valid in all spheres of knowledge. They have thus moved conceptually closer to the neo-Thomists who, ever mindful of Aristotle, have long held that method is in all cases a function of the topic under study. It follows that, with the apparent exception of Marxism-Leninism and Husserl, although not necessarily of Marx's position, an important, albeit limited area of agreement exists in the rejection by neo-Thomism and post-Husserlian phenomenology of all variants of the concept of a universal method as such.

The contextual character of philosophy, so insistently invoked by the American tradition, is a source of some of these complications in dialogue. Is it the case that Leninism in Russia, Maoism in China, and Eurocommunism are appropriately contextual variants of Marxism, and thus not mutually

opposed? Such might be the interpretation of the Eurocommunist but certainly not of the Marxist-Leninist. Just as the optimism of American philosophy may be attributed to the frontier experience, so, many observers regard post-World War I pessimism as the spur to existentialism. Yet, do these contexts rather simply make it easier for certain philosophic doctrines to get a hearing? The scientific-technological revolution challenges Soviet philosophy, but the ensuing set of problems is not *ad hoc*; it has a claim to universality, even though specific circumstances have forced the issue.

Also, is it not possible that philosophic disputes are rather disputes about the context? Marxists claim that economics is a privileged context; they would doubtless find that the historical role of the frontier is a context in a superficial sense, on the level of superstructure.

The notion of base and superstructure specifies the role of context. Indeed, it points out that the notion of context is at least analogical. Theology may be the context of neo-Thomistic philosophy, but it is certainly not the base. Theology, or better Revelation, serves as a kind of touchstone or scientific control; it provides issues and directions – according to the account of the Christian philosophers.

Not only neo-Thomism, but other philosophic outlooks work within a context at the level of superstructure. Marx, but also the phenomenologist Brentano and the American John Dewey, were influenced profoundly by Hegel – positively or negatively matters little; their thought would have been radically altered without the Hegelian backdrop. Indeed, Marx writes not only a critique of capitalism but a critique of the British economists. The neo-Thomists were fairly successful in turning their backs on the context of recent philosophy, but have come to feel profound misgivings about the wisdom of such an attitude. The phenomenologists have struggled perhaps most against the contextual influence; their reductions include putting the theoretical into parentheses.

The transcendental phenomenologists' insistence on presuppositionless philosophy can be viewed as an opposite and equally valuable contribution to philosophic self-understanding, compared to the American tradition's insistence on context. In general, philosophic schools are ambivalent about context. Neo-Thomism may acknowledge subalternation of philosophy to theology, but, traditionally, it has pretended to universally valid knowledge of natural law. Similarly, Marxism grants itself a kind of plenary indulgence from the vitiation by class outlooks that are said to corrupt other philosophies. Perhaps this can be explained by the claim that Marxism is the ideology of the class that can suppress classes, but the tension exists.

In the last analysis, however, the obvious fact remains that context, or the economic base, does not explain why (for example) bourgeois French society should produce at the same time MM. Maritain, Sartre, and Garaudy. Hence, the properly philosophic dialogue with its pitfalls and complexities seems to remain inescapable.

On the other hand, perhaps this final, meta-theoretical dispute about context, i.e., about which context is more important and which form it should take, perhaps this *in itself* constitutes a prima facie case for the importance of contextualism in philosophy.

In conclusion, the aim of this book has been to foster exchange among several of the positions now competing for the central role on the philosophic stage. Although, in principle, philosophy is concerned with all forms of reality, of whatever kind, few philosophers are even interested in all forms of philosophy. This attitude of mutual disdain is neither fortuitous nor without consequences for the possibility of interaction. It is almost inevitable that partisans of one or another view, who regard their own perspective as the sole and unique road to philosophic knowledge, find it difficult and even impossible to look with favor on other points of view, and, hence, equally difficult to engage in conversation with them. But such discussion is indeed a real possibility since, as has been shown here, in a variety of ways, positions as different as Marxism-Leninism and neo-Thomism, phenomenology and pragmatism, overlap on different issues. But now that this point has been established, at least one obstacle to interchange between positions which often think they have little to say to one another has been eliminated, or at least reduced.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

ACPA	American Catholic Philosophical Association
FE	*Filosofskaja enciklopedija* (Philosophic Encyclopedia)
FN	*Filosofskie nauki* (Philosophic Sciences)
Gt.	Gospolitizdat (Government Political Publishing House)
IF	Institut filosofii (Institute of Philosophy)
Izd.	Izdatel'stvo (Publishing House)
L	Leningrad
LGU	Leningrad State University
M	Moscow
MGU	Moscow State University
SCG	*Summa contra gentiles*
Soč.	*Sočinenija* (Collected Works)
SST	*Studies in Soviet Thought*
ST	*Summa theologica*
UP	University Press
VF	*Voprosy filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy)

CHAPTER 1

[1] G. L. Smirnov, *Sovetskij čelovek* (Soviet Man), M., Gt., 1973, 414 pp. cf. pp. 114 ff.

[2] Richard T. DeGeorge, 'The Soviet Concept of Man', *Iris Hibernia* (1964), 14–28; and *Soviet Ethics and Morality*, Mich. UP, 1969, 184 pp.; and 'Soviet Ethics and Soviet Society', *SST* 3 (1963), 206–217. Peter Ehlen, *Die philosophische Ethik in der Sowjetunion*, München, Pustet, 1972, 461 pp; and 'Emancipation Through Morality: New Paths of Ethical Thought in the Sovet Union', *SST* 13 (1973), 203–217. Philip T. Grier, *Marxist Ethical Theory in the Soviet Union*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1978, 276 pp.

[3] A. F. Šiškin, *Osnovy marksistskoj etiki* (Fundamentals of Marxist Ethics), M., IMO, 1961, 527 pp. Here: pp. 219 f.

[4] Cf., among others, V. P. Tugarinov, *Teorija cennostej v marksizme* (Theory of Values in Marxism), Izd. LGU, 1968, 122 pp.; and *Ličnost' i obščestvo* (Person and Society), M., Mysl', 1965, 191 pp.

[5] O. G. Drobnickij, *Mir oživšix predmetov*, M., Gt., 1967, 349 pp. For other works of Drobnickij, cf., Grier, *op. cit.* (n. 2) p. 262.

[6] Cf. G. A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, N.Y. Praeger, 1959, 609 pp., and L. Kołakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Oxford UP, 3 volumes.

[7] Cf., Patrick Schena, 'From a Dictatorship of the Proletariat to a State of the Whole People', *SST* 19 (1979), 155–164.

[8] Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, New Haven, Yale UP, 1957, 556 pp.

[9] For a thorough discussion of the intelligentsia, both Soviet and Russian, see two issues of *SST*, the final ones for vol. 19 and 17, respectively.

[10] The history of this period is to be found in Wetter, *op. cit.* (n. 6) and in J. M. Bocheński, *Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1963, 174 pp.

[11] For reports on the on-going discussion, see the writings of Kurt Marko in *SST*, including 'The Soviets and Other Marxists in 1976', *SST* 17 (1977), 243–246, and 'Real Communism or Eurocommunism? Quo Vadis, Europa?' *SST* 18 (1978), 235–244.

[12] Cf. *KPSS o formirovanii novogo čeloveka* (The CPSU on the Formation of the new Man), M., Gt., 1976. 455 pp.

[13] Cf., David Zilberman, 'The Post-Sociological Society', *SST* 18 (1978), 261–328, and Yuri Glazov, 'The Soviet Intelligentsia, Dissidents and the West', *SST* 19 (1979), 321–344.

[14] *Osnovy naučnogo kommunizma* (Fundamentals of Scientific Communism), Izd. MGU, 1969, 461 pp.

[15] Zilberman, *op. cit.* (n. 13).

[16] Cf., N. Lobkowicz, *Theory and Practice*, Notre Dame UP, 1967, 442 pp.

[17] Cf., Eugene Kamenka, *Marxism and Ethics*, NY, St Martin's, 1969, 72 pp.

[18] Henri Desroches, *Marxisme et religions*, Paris, PUF, 1962.

[19] Cf., Julius Carlebach, *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism*, London, Routledge, 1978 (cf. Gary Orgel's review in *SST* 21 (1980), 239–252, and Norman Levine, *The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels* Santa Barbara, Clio, 1975, 259 pp.).

[20] Cf., the notion of QUAL in the *Holy Family* as quoted by S. Landshut, *Karl Marx. Die Frühschriften*, Stuttgart, Kröner, 1953, 330. Kołakowski gives a good account of the rich influences at work (in Vol. I of his *Main Currents of Marxism*, pp. 17 ff.)

[21] Cf., T. J. Blakeley, 'Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique* and the Opacity of Marxism-Leninism', *SST* 8 (1968), 122–135.

[22] See, for example, the last section of Herbert Marcuse's *Soviet Marxism*, NY, Columbia UP, 1958, 271 pp. The Soviets have never been able really to settle on the nature of the relationship between esthetics and production; cf., Edward M. Swiderski, *The Philosophical Foundations of Soviet Aesthetics*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1979, 225 pp.

[23] Cf., T. J. Blakeley, *Soviet Theory of Knowledge*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1964, 203 pp. Here pp. 38 f.

[24] Cf., for example, Friedrich Rapp, *Analytische Technik-philosophie*, München, Alber, 1978, 226 pp.; and Erik P. Hoffmann, 'Soviet Views of "The Scientific-Technological Revolution"', *World Politics* XXX (1978), 615–644; and Arnold Buchholz, 'The Role of the Scientific-Technological Revolution in Marxism-Leninism', *SST* 19 (1979), 145–164.

[25] Cf., *Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija i obščestvo* (The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Society), M., Mysl', 1973, 480 pp. Here: pp. 97 ff.

[26] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Frankfurt, EVA, 1954, 1094 pp. Here: p. 584.

[27] Peter Paul Kirschenmann, *Information and Reflection. On Some Problems of Cybernetics and How Contemporary Dialectical Materialism Copes with Them*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1978, 276 pp.

[28] V. G. Afanas'ev, *Naučnoe upravlenie obščestvom* (Scientific Control of Society), M., Gt., 1968, 383 pp. can be taken as a standard presentation.

[29] A textbook prepared for the War Ministry puts it as follows: "Social life is a complex of interactions and of peoples' wills, driven by certain interests; it is a complex of productive, political, and ideological relations. Control of all these processes under socialism is the control of people, at the level of the whole society, the co-ordination of their strivings, interests, and wills, pointing them toward one channel of correctly understood class and national interests. The relations between people, between production collectives and social groups, among classes, nations and peoples within the state, and between states – this is politics ... The greater the extension of the control situation, the greater the need for political control. If we take the whole of socialist society as a single control-system, then scientific control coincides with (*sovpadaet s*) political control by the Communist Party". (*Osnovy naučnogo kommunizma* (Fundamentals of Scientific Communism), M., Voenizdat, 1968, 525 pp. Here: pp. 432–433). See also Afanas'ev, *op. cit.* (n. 28) pp. 109 ff.

CHAPTER 2

[1] Karl Marx, *Mašiny. Primenenie prirodnyx sil v nauki (Iz rukopisi 1861–1863 gg. "K kritike političeskoj ekonomii")* (Machines. The Application of Natural Forces in Science. (From the 1861–1863 Manuscripts "Toward a Critique of Political Economy")), reprinted in *Voprosy istorii estestvoznanija i texniki* (Questions of the History of Science and Technology) **25** (1968), p. 75.

[2] F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, M., Foreign Languages Publ. House, 1954, 496 pp. Here: 263 f.

[3] *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* (Philosophic Encyclopedia), M., Sov. encik., 1960–1970. 5 volumes. Here: *FE* **3**, p. 562.

[4] The importance of science for "scientific atheism" has been stressed from the beginning of the Soviet period. See, e.g., Pierre J. Beemans, 'Scientific-Atheism in the Soviet Union: 1917–1954', *SST* 7 (1967), 234–242; and Russell P. Moroziuk, 'Status of Research on Scientific Atheism', *SST* **13** (1973), 89–91. The extent of Soviet writings on the subject can be judged from the bibliographies which appear, e.g., in *SST* 4 (1964) and 5 (1965).

[5] For a complete account of the discussion on this, see Siegfried Müller-Markus, *Einstein und die Sowjtphilosophie*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1960, 2 volumes.

[6] Cf., T. J. Blakeley, 'Soviet Philosophical Method: The Case of B. M. Kedrov' and 'The Philosophical Works of Bonifatij Mixajlovič Kedrov', both in *SST* 6 (1966).

[7] *FE* 3, 581. See, also, B. M. Kedrov, *Predmet i vzaimosvjaz' estestvennyx nauk* (The Object and Interconnection of the Natural Sciences), M., AN SSSR, 1962, 409 pp.

[8] *FE* 3, 583.

[9] David Joravsky, *Soviet Marxism and Natural Science 1917–1932*, NY, Columbia UP, 1961, 433 pp. and Kołakowski *op. cit.* (Ch. 1, n. 6).

[10] Marx, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 75.

[11] Kołakowski, *op. cit.* (Ch. 1, n. 6).

[12] Joravsky, *op. cit.* (n. 9); Müller-Markus *op. cit.* (n. 5); Loren R. Graham, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union*, NY, Knopf, 1972, 584 pp.; Bernard Jeu, *La philosophie soviétique et l'Occident*, Paris, Mercure, 1969, p. 556.

[13] G. M. Štraks traces this notion to its highest source: "Of course, under certain conditions, the reactionary class can be interested in what is new. But, they use it for impeding

the development of society as a whole, inducing further sharpening of the contradictions and conflict, which, in the end grab the new from the grasp of the reactionary class. 'Imperialism uses technological progress mainly for war. It turns the accomplishments of human reason against mankind', we read in the CPSU Program" (G. M. Štraks, *Social'noe edinstvo i protivorečija socialističeskogo obščestva* (The Social Unity and Contradictions of Socialist Society), Izd. MGU, 1966, 143 pp. Here: p. 19).

[14] I. V. Stalin, *Marxism and Linguistics*, N. Y., International Publ., 1951, 63 pp. (Medvedev suggests that Vinogradov was the real author.)

[15] "One widespread idealist view on the role of technology is the following: the machine frees man from labor (meaning from all labor). This is fundamentally false since the machine frees man only from mechanical labor . . . But, the machine does 'not free' man from fundamentally human forms of labor – from the highest forms of creative labor which, in the end are the essence of social man." (N. V. Markov, *Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija: Analiz, perspektiv, posledstvija* (The Scientific-Technological Revolution: Analysis, Perspectives, Results), M., Gt., 1971, 221 pp. Here: p. 172.

[16] Kołakowski, *op. cit.* (Ch. 1, n. 6), pp. 523 f. and Glazov *op. cit.* (Ch. 1, n. 13).

[17] "The scientific-technological revolution in socialist society, i.e., the construction of the material-technological base of Communism and of its culture, establishes the objective conditions not only for an increase in wealth but also for making of man an all-round developed and harmonious person, forming this social system" (*Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija i obščestvo*, 1973, p. 258).

"As a result, the cultural development (*duxovnoe razvitie*) of the person emerges as a factor which immediately and decisively increases the productive power of labor, geometrically raising its efficacy. Concrete research in our country over recent years has shown how the cultural level of the workers influences their productive and social activity, their professional status, their rational and practical creativity, and their ability to assimilate new technology and to change with changes in the productive process." (*Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija i social'nyj progress* (The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Social Progress), M., Gt., 1972, 365 pp. Here: pp. 73–74).

"In the application of new technology the worker is obliged to possess far greater knowledge than was required earlier for less qualified manual labor. For the transition to mechanized work he has to make mathematical calculations and know how to use diagrams and schemata. Elevation of the workers' qualifications also follows from the objects used in production. The metal-worker has to know not only the necessary manipulations; he is obliged to know the properties (*svojstva*) of the objects with which he works" (*Naučno-texničeskaja revoljucija i soveršenstvovanie obščestvennyx otnošenij* (The Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Perfecting of Socialist Social Relations), Izd. LGU, 1976, 183 pp. Here: p. 33 (article by I. A. Emel'janova)).

[18] "It is important to note that the future objectively belongs to the working class because it is the principal productive force and the principal subject of the technological practice of contemporary society, and because the practical life of society ever more progresses in the form of technologization. This flows from the essence of historical materialism and is very prominent under the developing scientific-technological revolution" (*Problemy istoričeskogo materializma* (Problems of Historical Materialism), Izd. LGU, 1973, 94 pp. Here: p. 15).

CHAPTER 3

[1] T. J. Blakeley, 'Recent Soviet Works on the Scientific Method of Marx' *Capital* and Related Topics', *SST* 14 (1974), 167–172.

[2] Cf., V. S. Bačmanov, *Methodologičeskie voprosy formal'noj logiki* (Methodological Questions of Formal Logic), Izd. LGU, 1969, 122 pp.; and Karl G. Ballestrem, 'Dialectical Logic', *SST* 5 (1965), 139–172, as well as his bibliography at pp. 237–239 of the same issue.

[3] Cf., *FE* 3, 216.

[4] Cf., T. J. Blakeley, 'Christian-Marxist Dialogue and the Otherworld', in F. J. Adelmann (ed.), *Demythologizing Marxism*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1969, pp. 184–233; and V. R. Bukin, 'Social'naja psixologija i religija' (Social Psychology and Religion), in *Problemy obščestvennoj psixologii* (Problems of Social Psychology), M., Mysl', 1965, pp. 345–373.

[5] Cf., E. M. Swiderski, *op. cit* (Ch. 1, n. 22).

[6] Cf., *Logika*, Moskva, Vyšaja škola, 1967, 258 pp., especially the first chapter on the strict logic of the "classics" and the *partijnost'* of logic.

[7] Cf., E. A. Xomenko, *Logika*, M., Voennizdat, 1971, 190 pp. especially p. 11.

[8] "Only with the help of a basically class, socialist ideology can the proletariat free itself from the influence of bourgeois ideology, from bourgeois and petty bourgeois psychology. Only with the help of the socialist ideology is made possible the formation of a basically class-psychology of the proletariat, serving as means of social orientation of this class for the fulfillment of its world-historical role of builder of Communist society" (V. V. Šaronov, *Psixologija klassa* (Psychology of Class), Izd. LGU, 1975, 143 pp. Here: p. 142).

[9] Cf., I. M. Bocheński, *Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden*, Bern, Francke, 1954, 150 pp.

[10] T. J. Blakeley, *Soviet Scholasticism*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1961, p. 69.

[11] Cf., M. N. Alekseev, *Dialektika form myšlenija* (Dialectic of the Forms of Thought), M., 1959, and *Dialektičeskaja logika* (Dialectical Logic), M., 1960.

[12] "Marxist 'philosophical psychology' exists and will continue to exist along with experimental psychology in particular because it provides the researcher a greater understanding of reality ... The task of philosophical psychology is to make explicit the presuppositions (of empirical psychology) and to evaluate them on the basis of contemporary science" (*Problemy social'noj psixologii* (Problems of Social Psychology), Izd., Tbilisi GU, 1976. Here: p. 19).

[13] E.g., R. Samsonov, *Social'naja psixika i ideologija* (The Social Psyche and Ideology), Erevan, Ajastan, 1970, 219 pp.; Ju. M. Serov, *Obščestvennoe i individual'noe soznanie* (Social and Individual Consciousness), M., Mysl', 1964, 92 pp.; A. G. Spirkin, *Soznanie i samosoznanie* (Consciousness and Self-Consciousness), M., Gt., 1972, 302 pp.; I. S. Ladenko, *Intellektual'nye sistemy i logika* (Intellectual Systems and Logic), Novosibirsk, Nauka, 1973, 171 pp.

[14] Cf., *Analiz razvivajuščegosja ponjatija* (Analysis of Developmental Concepts), M., Nauka, 1967, 438 pp.

[15] Cf., Tom Rockmore, *Against Marxism, Essays in Marx and his Tradition* (forthcoming).

[16] Cf., T. R. Payne, *S. L. Rubinštejn and the Philosophical Foundations of Soviet Psychology*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1968, 184 pp.

[17] M. V. Popovič, *Filosofskie voprosy semantiki*, Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1975, 299 pp.: Cf. also: Petrov, Matematičeskaja logika i materialističeskaja dialektika (Mathematical Logic and the Materialist Dialectic), Izd. MGU, 1974, 191 pp.; *Semantičeskaja struktura slova* (The Semantic Structure of the Word), M., Nauka, 1971, 215 pp.; M. V. Popovič, *O filosofskom analize jazyka nauki* (On the Philosophic Analysis of the Language of Science), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1966, 222 pp. and many, many others.

[18] L. O. Reznikov, *Gnoseologičeskie voprosy semiotiki* (Epistemological Questions of Semiotics), Izd. LGU, 1964, 303 pp.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 29 (in italics in the original).

[20] Ju. S. Stepanov, *Semiotika*, M., Nauka, 1971, 166 pp.

[21] S. Vylegžanina, 'K voprosu o social'nom aspekte znakov' (On the Social Aspects of Signs) in *Semantika i social'naja psixologija* (Semantics and Social Psychology), Frunze, Ilim, 1976, p. 108.

[22] B. D. Parygin, *Osnovy social'no-psixologičeskoj teorii* (Fundamentals of Social-Psychological Theory), M., Mysl', 1971, p. 343.

[23] J. M. Bocheński, *The Logic of Religion*, NY UP, 1965, pp. 121 f. and *Was ist Autorität?*, Herder, 1974.

[24] *Logika i ontologija*, M., Nauka, 1978, 260 pp.

[25] Popovič, *op. cit.* (n. 17), p. 92.

[26] B. G. Kuznecov, *Cennost' poznanija* (The Value of Knowledge), M., Nauka, 1975, 165 pp. Here: pp. 142 ff.

[27] Cf., J. Habermas, 'Exkurs über Grundannahmen des historischen Materialismus' in Habermas-Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozial-technologie*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1971, pp. 285–290.

[28] *Dialektičeskij materializm i estestvenno-naučnaja kartina mira* (Dialectical Materialsim and the Scientific Picture of the World), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1976, 390 pp. Here: p. 68.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 341.

[30] *Filosofskie osnovanija estestvennyx nauk* (Philosophical Foundations of the Natural Sciences), M., Nauka, 1976. Here: o. 134.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[32] *loc. cit.*

[33] B. G. Kuznecov, *op. cit.* (n. 26), pp. 163–164.

CHAPTER 4

[1] Cf., I. L. Jurova, *Ob otnošenii marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii k estestvoznaniju* (On the Relation of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy to Natural Science), Izd. MGU, 1970, pp. 5 f.

[2] See V. V. Lazarev, *Šelling*, M., Mysl', 1976, 197 pp. E. S. Lin'kov, *Dialektika sub'ekta i ob'ekta v filosofii Šellinga* (The Dialectic of Subject and Object in Schelling's Philosophy), Izd. LGU, 1973, 111 pp.; *Istorija dialektiki. Nemeckaja klassičeskaja filosofija* (History of the Dialectic. German Classical Philosophy), M., Mysl', 1978. pp. 151 ff.

[3] Alfred Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, London, NLB, 1971, 251 pp.

[4] Armin Wildermuth, *Marx und die Verwirklichung der Philosophie*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1970, 2 vols.

[5] Schmidt, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 27.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[7] For some recent Soviet studies of substance, see D. I. Širokanov, *Dialektika poznanija i kategorija substancii* (The Dialectic of Knowledge and the Category of Substance), Minsk, Nauka i texnika, 1974, 207 pp. and A. K. Maneev, *Filosofskij analiz antinomij nauki* (Philosophic Analysis of the Antinomies of Science), Minsk, Nauka i texnika, 1974, 219 pp.

[8] "The history of scientific knowledge shows that at a given moment science cannot successfully proceed except from the position of the dialectical-materialist methodology" (I. N. Smirnov, *Materialističeskaja dialektika i sovremennaja teorija evoljucii* (The Materialist Dialectic and the Contemporary Theory of Evolution), M., Nauka, 1978, 286 pp. Here: p. 10.)

[9] Cf., the articles in *Filosofskie problemy teorii tjagotenija Einštejna i reljativistskoj kosmologii* (Philosophic Problems of Einstein's Theory of Gravitational Attraction and of a Relativistic Cosmology), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1965, 330 pp.

[10] Cf., *Filosofija estestvoznanija* (Philosophy of Natural Science), M., Gt., 1966, 413 pp.

[11] Cf., G. A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, pp. 406 f. and J. B. Bocheński, *Diamat*, p. 70.

[12] See the bibliography in *FE* 4, 172.

[13] Kirschenmann, *op. cit.* (Ch. 1, n. 27).

[14] Friedrich Rapp, *Gesetz und Determination in der Sowjetphilosophie*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1968, 174 pp.

[15] Cf., I. B. Novik, *O modelirovanii složny sistem* (On the Modeling of Complex Systems), M., Mysl', 1965, 334 pp. Here: pp. 317 f.

[16] V. A. Štoff, *Vvedenie v metodologiju naučnogo poznanija* (Introduction to the Methodology of Scientific Knowledge), Izd. LGU, 1972, 191 pp. Here: p. 104.

[17] D. P. Gorskij, *Problemy obščej metodologii nauk i dialektičeskoj logiki* (Problems of General Methodology of Science and of Dialectical Logic), M., Mysl', 1966, 373 pp. Here: p. 253.

[18] "While saying that a structure is conservative and invariant within the organization of the system, we should not forget that the stability of the structure is relative" (L. A. Kulikov, *Ponjatie determinizma v marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* (The Concept of Determinism in Marxist-Leninist Philosophy), Moskva, Vyssšaja škola, 1973, 112 pp. Here: p. 99.

[19] Cf., K. M. Jensen, *Beyond Marx and Mach. Aleksandr Bogdanov's Philosophy of Living of Experience*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1978.

[20] Cf., N. F. Ovčinnikov, *Principy soxranenija* (Principles of Conservation), M., Nauka, 1966, 329 pp. Here: p. 302.

[21] Cf., George L. Kline, *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, 190 pp. and Helmut Dahm, *Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1975, 324 pp.

[22] "Creatively employing the rich heritage of past generations and carefully analyzing and generalizing the accumulated trends in the development of science and society, there is going on in the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the elaboration of a humanist strategy for conservation of nature ... and rational use of resources ... which has been going on since Lenin's time" (V. Vasil'ev, V. Pisarev and G. Xozin, *Ekologija i meždunarodnye otnošenija* (Ecology and International Relations), M., Meždu. otno. 1978, 236 pp. Here: p. 219.

CHAPTER 5

[1] Cf., F. A. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, Berlin, 1846.
[2] See G. Planty-Bonjour, *The Categories of Dialectical Materialism*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1967, 182 pp. and *Social'no-istoričeskie i mirovozzrenčeskie aspekty filosofskix kategorij* (Social-Historical and Worldview Aspects of Philosophic Categories), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1978, 329 pp. and A. N. Loj, *Social'no-istoričeskoe soderžanie kategorij "vremja" i "prostranstvo"* (The Social-Historical Content of the Categories "Space" and "Time"), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1978, 133 pp. and L. I. Ščekina, *Ponjatija "dviženie" i "razvitie" i ix rol' v izučenii fizičeskix processov* (The Concepts of "Motion" and "Development" and Their Role in the Study of Physical Processes), Izd. MGU, 1970, 145 pp.
[3] See H. Bonitz, *Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles*, Vienna, 1853, and Trendelenburg *op. cit.* (n. 1).

CHAPTER 6

[1] Etienne Gilson, *The Philosopher and Theology*, NY, Random House, 1962, pp. 46–49.
[2] Martin Grabmann, *Thomas Aquinas, His Personality and Thought*, NY, Russell & Russell, 1963, pp. 19–21.
[3] Etienne Gilson, *The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, NY, Random House, 1955.
[4] Cf., *La philosophie Chrétienne*, Journée d'études de la Société Thomiste, Sept. 1933.
[5] Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, NY, Scribner, 1940.
[6] "In fact, the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* completely overthrew these tottering tenets of liberalism which had long hampered effective interference with the government" (p. 29). "It is true that the actual state of things was not always and everywhere as deplorable as the liberalistic tenets of the so-called Manchester School might lead us to conclude ... " (p. 40). " ... on account of the evil of 'individualism', as we call it, if things have come to such a pass that the highly developed social life which once flourished in a variety of prosperous institutions organically linked with each other, has been damaged and all but ruined, leaving thus virtually only individuals and the state" (Pope Pius XI, *On Social Reconstructions*, Boston, St Paul, n.d.). "It gradually came about that the present age handed over the workers, each alone and defenseless, to the inhumanity of employers and the unbridled greed of competitors" (Leo XIII, *On the Conditions of the Working Class*, Boston. St. Paul, n.d.).
[7] Pius XI *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 49: "Hence it follows that the [capitalist] system itself is not to be condemned and surely it is not vicious of its very nature".
[8] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, NY, Humanities, 1961, Prop. 4.003: "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical".
[9] Mortimer Adler, *The Conditions of Philosophy: Its Checkered Past, Its Present Disorder, and Its Future Promise*, NY, Atheneum, 1965.
[10] E. Gilson, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 186, 219, 228.
[11] David Ross, *Aristotle*, London, Methuen, 1923; University Paperback, 1968, pp. 238–240.

[12] *ST* I, q. 96, a. 4 c. Aquinas here remits to Aristotle's *Politics* Bk. I, Ch. 2.
[13] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII, 12, *ST* I, q. 92, a. 2 c and II–II, q. 154, a. 2 c: "For we see, in all animals among whom the care of male and female is required for the education of the offspring, that there is not a vague concubinage among them ... And thence it is that there is naturally a sollicitude about the certainty of offspring in males of the human species, since upon them weighs the education of the offspring."
[14] I. M. Bocheński, *Philosophy*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1963, pp. 75–76.
[15] " ... the relation of the individual to society must not be conceived according to the atomistic and mechanistic type of bourgeois individualism which suppresses the social organic totality ... " Jacques Maritain, *Challenges and Renewals*, Cleveland, World Publ., 1968, p. 303.
[16] Jacques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, NY, Scribner, 1947, p. 38.
[17] Desmond Fitzgerald, 'Is There an Unchanging Human Nature?' in *Philosophy and the Future of Man*, Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. XLII, 1968.
[18] G. K. Chesterton, *The Everlasting Man*, NY, Doubleday, 1955, especially chapters 2, 3, 4.
[19] *ST* II–II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1.
[20] E. T. Gelinas, 'Right and Law in Thomas Aquinas' in *Myth and Philosophy*, Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. XLV, 1971, p. 137, seems to place too much epistemological weight on this remark.
[21] William Temple, *Christianity and Social Order*, NY, Seabury, 1977, p. 80.
[22] *ST* I–II, q. 94, a. 1 & 2; II–II, q. 57, a. 2.
[23] Germain Grisez, 'The First Principle of Practical Reason', in *Aquinas, A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Anthony Kenny, pp. 340–382.
[24] Aquinas, *SCG* Bk. III, Ch. 114.
[25] *ST* I–II, q. 94, a. 5 ad 1.
[26] Yves Simon, *The Tradition of Natural Law*, Fordham UP, 1965, p. 129.
[27] Josephus Gredt OSB, *Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae*, Barcelona, Herder, 1959, Vol. II, p. 388, par. 939.
[28] d'Entrèves *op. cit.* (n. 37), p. 122.
[29] D. J. B. Hawkins, *Man and Morals*, London, Sheed & Ward, 1960, p. 76.
[30] José Ortega Y Gasset, *Espana invertebrada*, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1921, p. 113.
[31] Raymond G. Decker, 'A Quest for a new Jurisprudence', in *Philosophy and Civil Law*, Proceedings of the ACPA, 1975, p. 62, acknowledges the substance of the Marxist criticism in the works of Cathrein, Maritain, Rommen and so on, as ascribing to law an existence independent of real social life.
[32] *ST* I–II, q. 91, a. 2 c.
[33] G. Frisez, *op. cit.* (n. 23), pp. 378–382.
[34] C. S. Lewis, 'The Poison of Subjectivism', in *Christian Reflections*, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1967, pp. 75–76.
[35] Albert Jonsen and Edward MacKinnon, 'A Reinterpretation of Natural Law Ethics', in *Philosophy and Christian Theology*, Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. XLIV, 1970.
[36] *ST* I–II, q. 95, a. 2.
[37] Giorgio DelVecchio, *Man and Nature*, Notre Dame UP, 1969, p. 68.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 140.
[39] Patrick Devlin, *The Enforcement of Morals*, Oxford UP, 1970, pp. vi, 2, 6, 7, 9, 25.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[41] *ST* I–II, q. 95, a. 2. Curiously enough, however, A. P. d'Entrèves (*Natural Law*, London, Hutchinson, 1970, p. 190), following H. L. A. Hart, misquotes St Thomas at this point, attributing to him the phrase "*lex iniusta non est lex*", which does not appear in this article, although Aquinas does quote St Augustine's *De libero arbitrio* to the effect that "*non videtur esse lex, quae iusta non fuerit*". d'Entrèves cites the non-existent phrase as the first half of a sentence, the second part of which actually occurs as a separate sentence later in the paragraph. d'Entrèves observes that this position of Aquinas is correctly taken to be the strongest in contrast with legal positivism.
[42] *ST* II–II, q. 60, a. 5 ad 1.
[43] Gerald McCool, 'Social Authority in Transcendental Thomism', in *Philosophy and Civil Law*, Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. XLIX, 1975, pp. 16, 18.
[44] Jude P. Dougherty, 'The Finding of Law', in *ibid.*, p. 2. He recalls Bishop Hoadly's remark that the interpreter (at any rate, "he who has absolute authority to interpret") is the real law-giver, rather than the original legislator.
[45] "Now it is certain that both by the law of nature and of God this right and duty of educating their offspring belongs in the first place to those who began the work of nature by giving them birth ... " (Pope Pius XI, *On Christian Marriage*, Boston, St Paul, n.d., p. 11). There have been similar Papal pronouncements on the indissolubility of marriage and on the evil of artificial contraception. Donagan ('The Scholastic Theory of Moral Law in the Modern World' in Anthony Kenny (ed.), *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1969) singles out the natural law argumentation against artificial contraception as a source of discredit for the whole notion of natural law. Also, part of the irritation of philosophers may be due to the authoritative (i.e. non-philosophical) use of a notion which is supposed to be philosophical.
[46] The point that only a natural law approach could ground a critique of fascism was made by Mortimer Adler in 1939 in 'Liberalism and Liberal Education', reproduced in *Reforming Education*, Boulder, Westview, 1977. C. S. Lewis made the same point with regard to the Nazis in 1943 in the 'Poison of Subjectivism', in *Christian Reflections*, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1967.
[47] José Corts Grau, *Curso de derecho natural*, Madrid, Nacional, 1974, pp. 361–368.
[48] *ST* II–II, q. 66, a. 7: "*Et ideo res quas aliqui superabundanter habent, ex naturali iure debentur pauperum sustentationi*".
[49] *SCG* Bk. III, Ch. 112, 113.
[50] *ST* II–II, q. 64, a. 1 to 7.
[51] *ST* I–II, q. 94, a. 5 & 6.
[52] *ST* I–II, q. 94, a. 4 c.
[53] *ST* II–II, q. 78, a. 1.
[54] D. J. O'Connor, *Aquinas and Natural Law*, London, Macmillan, 1967, p. 64.
[55] Donagan *op. cit.* (n. 45), p. 339.
[56] *ST* I, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1, 2, 3; I, q. 48, a. 1 ad 2.
[57] A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, NY, Dover, n.d., p. 108.
[58] *ST* I, q. 103, a. 2.
[59] Jacobus Ramírez, *Opera Omnia* III, 3: *De hominis beatitudine* Madrid, CSIC, 1972, pp. 258, 213.
[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 462–463.

[61] Santiago María Ramírez, *Pueblo y gobernantes al servicio del bien común*, pp. 107–108, refers to Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* Bk. II, lect. 16.
[62] Maritain, *op. cit.* (n. 16), pp. 37–38, 42–43.
[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61. The phrases of St Thomas are from *ST* II–II, q. 65, a. 1 c and I–II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3.
[64] Emmanuel Mounier, *Personalism*, Notre Dame UP, 1952, p. 44.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[66] Maritain *op. cit.* (n. 16), p. 22.
[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 30.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[70] S. Ramirez *op. cit.* (n. 61), pp. 40–41, 49–52.
[71] *John* 18: 36.
[72] *Matthew* 22: 21.
[73] *Matthew* 6: 24.
[74] Vernon J. Bourke, 'Aquinas and Recent Theories of Right', in *Thomas and Bonaventure*, Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. XLVIII, 1974, p. 194.
[75] Mortimer J. Adler, *The Common Sense of Politics*, NY, Holt, 1971.
[76] *ST* I–II, q. 90, a. 2.
[77] *ST* I–II, q. 92, a. 1, especially ad 3.
[78] *ST* II–II, q. 47, a. 11, ad 1, 2, 3.
[79] *ST* II–II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1.
[80] *ST* II–II, q. 114, a. 2, ad 1.
[81] *ST* II–II, q. 129, a. 6, ad 1.
[82] S. Ramírez *op. cit.* (n. 61), pp. 85–88.
[83] *Romans* 13: 4–6.
[84] *Romans* 13: 1–2.
[85] Grotius, *The Law of War and Peace*, NY, Roslyn, 1949, p. 5.
[86] Yves Simon, *op. cit.* (n. 42), pp. 62–63.
[87] Gerard Smith, *Natural Theology*, NY, MacMillan, 1951.
[88] Gredt, *op. cit.* (n. 43), pp. 221–227.
[89] Maurice R. Halloway SJ, *An Introduction to Natural Theology*, NY, Appleton, 1959.
[90] E. L. Mascall, *He Who Is*, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966, p. 179. Mascall apparently thinks the argument runs into difficulties because of the problem of evil and does not include it in his less historical and more systematic *Existence and Analogy*, London, Darton, 1966.
[91] Gredt, *op. cit.* (n. 43), p. 227.
[92] Maritain, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 15), pp. 168–174.
[93] Norman Malcolm, 'Anselm's Ontological Argument', in *Knowledge and Certainty*, Englewood, Prentice Hall, 1964, pp. 1, 41, 162.
[94] I. M. Bocheński, *Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1963, pp. 52–53.
[95] T. J. Blakeley, *op. cit.* (Ch. 3, n. 10), *passim.*
[96] Malachi Martin, *The New Castle: Reaching for the Ultimate*, NY, Dell, 1974, pp. 91–101.

CHAPTER 7

[1] R. P. Phillips, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy*, Westminster MD, Newman Press, 1962, Vol. I, p. 23.
[2] Mortimer J. Adler, *Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy*, NY, MacMillan, 1978, p. 37.
[3] Kurt F. Reinhardt, *A Realistic Philosophy*, NY, Unger, 1962, pp. 62–63.
[4] Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, Notre Dame UP, 1970, par. 75, 86.
[5] William E. Carlo, *Philosophy, Science and Knowledge*, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1967, p. 66.
[6] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. 1.
[7] J. Ramírez, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 61), Vol. 3, p. 191 and Vol. 2 pp. 173 and 328.
[8] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, p. 108.
[9] Adler, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 134.
[10] For terminology, see, e.g., Kurt Reinhart *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 252.
[11] Phillips, *op. cit.* (n. 1), Vol. II, pp. 85–97.
[12] *The Material Logic of John of St Thomas*, Chicago UP, 1955, pp. 550–570, especially pp. 554–555.
[13] Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge or Distinguish to Unite*, NY, Scribner, 1959, p. 35.
[14] Maritain, *ibid.*, pp. 41–42 (emphasis in original).
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 45. See, also pp. 42–44.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 199–200.
[17] Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *El problema de la transcendencia en la metafisica actual*, Madrid, Rialp, 1963, pp. 34–35.
[18] Adler, *op. cit.* (n. 2), pp. 95–119.
[19] Wilhelmsen, *op. cit.* (n. 17), pp. 34–35. Cf. also by the same author, *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence*, Dallas UP, 1970.
[20] *ST* I, q. 14, a. 16 c.
[21] J. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*, London, Geoffry Bles, 1940 (1955), pp. 22–25.
[22] John Herman Randall, Jr., *Aristotle*, NY, Columbia UP, 1960, pp. 141–142.
[23] Jacobus M. Ramírez, *De ipsa philosophia in universum*, Madrid, CSIC, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 763.
[24] *Loc. cit.*
[25] *ST* I–II, q. 3, a. 6 c.
[26] *ST* I, q. 22, a. 3 ad 1; I–II, q. 40, a. 5 ad 1.
[27] *ST* I, q. 1, a. 2.
[28] *ST* I–II, q. 51, a. 2, ad 3.
[29] *ST* I–II, q. 57, a. 2.
[30] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, p. 205; cf. also pp. 204–206.
[31] Joseph Pieper, *The Silence of St Thomas*, Pantheon, 1957, p. 94.
[32] Simon, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 42).
[33] Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, Patterson NJ, Littlefield, 1959, SS. 77–80.

CHAPTER 8

[1] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, p. 17.

[2] Mortimer J. Adler, *Some Questions About Language*, Lasalle IL, Open Court, 1976, pp. 5, 16–17, 21–22, 25, 29–30, 44–47, 55, 62, 65.
[3] Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum, Word and Idea in Aquinas*, Notre Dame UP, 1967, pp. 1–4.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–33.
[5] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, p. 13.
[6] William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford UP, 1962, pp. 274–297.
[7] I. M. Bocheński, *A History of Formal Logic*, Notre Dame UP, n.d., pp. 189–209.
[8] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, includes induction and the sophisms in formal logic, incorrectly in our view.
[9] For the standard neo-Thomist account of the efficient cause of knowledge, one may consult Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, pp. 391–399, 489–492, 497–501, and B. Lonergan for an explanation of the intellectual phase of this activity.
[10] *ST* I, q. 54, 4 c.
[11] *ST* I, q. 44, a. 3 ad 3; I, q. 57, a. 2 ad 1.
[12] *ST* I, q. 70, a. 3 c; I, q. 75, a. 3 c.
[13] *ST* I, q. 77, 2 c.
[14] Agustin Riera Matute, *La articulacion del conocimiento sensible*, Pamplona, Navarra, 1970, pp. 145–146.
[15] George P. Klubertanz SJ, *The Philosophy of Human Nature*, NY, Appleton, 1953, pp. 113–116.
[16] Lonergan, *op. cit.* (n. 9), pp. 94–95.
[17] Cf., Phillips *op. cit.* (Ch. 7, n. 1), Vol. I, pp. 264–266.
[18] *ST* I, q. 16, especially 1 c, 2 c, 3 ad 1, 4 c and I, q. 21, a. 2 c.
[19] *ST* I, q. 16, a. 4 ad 2, and a. 8 ad 2.
[20] Reginald O'Neill SJ, *Theories of Knowledge*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1959, pp. 10, 63–65. For St Thomas's view, *ST* I, q. 16, a. 12.
[21] Joseph Maréchal SJ, *A Maréchal Reader*, NY, Herder, 1970, pp. 101–102.

CHAPTER 9

[1] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, pp. 383–388.
[2] *ST* I, q. 56, a. 2 ad 3.
[3] *ST* I, q. 15, a. 3 ad 3; I, q. 12, a. 4 c; I, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.
[4] John N. Deely, 'The Immateriality of the Intentioned as Such' in *The New Scholasticism* Vol. XLII, No. 2 (Spring 1968), especially pp. 296–303.
[5] Josef Pieper, *Muerte e immortalidad*, Barcelona, Herder, 1970, pp. 197–200.
[6] *ST* I, q. 61, a. 2, 3 and ad 3.
[7] Bocheński, *op. cit* (Ch. 6, n. 14), pp. 75–77.
[8] Gredt, *op. cit* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. I, pp. 432–436, 455–458. In St Thomas, see especially *ST* I, q. 75, a. 6; I q. 75, a. 2; I, q. 29, a. 1 obj. 5; I, q. 50, a. 2 ad 3; I, q. 50, a. 5 ad 3.
[9] Klubertanz, *op. cit.* (Ch. 8, n. 15), pp. 304–309; *ST* I, q. 54, a. 5 c; I, q. 76, a. 1 c.
[10] Mortimer J. Adler, 'The Immateriality of Conceptual Thought', *The New Scholasticism* **XLI**, No. 4 (Autumn 1967). See also his 'Intentionality and Immateriality', in *The New Scholasticism* **XLI**, No. 3 (Summer 1967).

[11] Adler 'Intentionality and Immateriality' (vide, n. 10), p. 344. Cf. also pp. 334, 329 and 332.
[12] *SCG* II, Ch. 76 and 77, claims to represent authentic Aristotelian doctrine against Averroes, Avicenna, and Alexander of Aphrodisias.
[13] Cf., Pieper, *op. cit.* (Ch. 7, n. 31).
[14] *ST* I, qq. 3 and 9, respectively.
[15] *ST* I, q. 13, a. 11 c.
[16] E. L. Mascall, *The Openness of Being*, London, Darton, 1971, pp. 142–143.
[17] *Exodus* III: 14.
[18] Etienne Gilson, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 5), pp. 49–51, 64–65.
[19] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. II, pp. 3–4.
[20] H. D. Gardeil, *Introduction to the Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas*, St Louis, Herder, 1967, pp. 16–25; Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *The Paradoxical Structure of Existence*, p. 41.

CHAPTER 10

[1] *The Material Logic of John of St Thomas*, pp. 152–183, part III, q. 13, a. 3–5.
[2] Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), p. 167, and, in general, pp. 167–275.
[3] *In I Phys.* Lect I, No. 10. Cf., Gardeil, *op. cit.* (Ch. 9, n. 20), pp. 215–233.
[4] *ST* I, q. 33, a. 1 c.
[5] *ST* I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1.
[6] Yves Simon, *The Great Dialogue of Nature and Space*, Albany, Magi, 1970, pp. 4–7.
[7] On act and potency, cf., Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. II, pp. 43–50, and Gardeil, *op. cit.* (Ch. 9, n. 20), pp. 183–200, 264.
[8] *ST* I, q. 66, a. 2 c.
[9] *ST* I, q. 66, a. 2 ad 4.
[10] Cf., Joseph Donceel, 'Causality and Evolution', in *The New Scholasticism* **XXIX**, No. 3 (July 1965), pp. 295–315.
[11] *ST* I, q. 83, a. 3 ad 2.
[12] William E. Carlo, *The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1966, *passim*. Wilhelmsen, *op. cit.* (Ch. 9, n. 20), pp. 35–54, especially pp. 47–48.
[13] On finality, cf., Gredt, *op. cit.* (Ch. 6, n. 43), Vol. II, pp. 199–205, and Phillips, *op. cit.* (Ch. 7, n. 1), Vol. II, pp. 245–259.
[14] *ST* I, q. 44, a. 4 c.
[15] *ST* I–II, q. 1, a. 2 c.
[16] José A. Bernadete, 'Mechanism and the Good', in *The Philosophical Forum* **VII**, 3–4 (Summer 1974).
[17] *ST* I, q. 22, a. 2 c.

CHAPTER 11

[1] Paul Weiss, *Modes of Being*, Southern Ill., UP, 1958, p. 84.
[2] William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, NY, Holt, 1890, 2 vols. Here: Vol. 1, p. 254.

[3] See René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1951, p. 17.
[4] See C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, Oxford UP, 1959, especially Chapters 2 and 3.
[5] See, for example, Justus Buchler (ed.), *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, NY, Dover, 1955, pp. 30, 48, 265, 300–301.
[6] See William James, *Pragmatism*, NY, Longmans, 1908, pp. 61 ff.
[7] See John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, NY, Capricorn, 1960, pp. 260 ff.
[8] See, for example, John Dewey, 'The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy', in *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*, NY, Holt, 1910, pp. 1–19.
[9] See Peirce in *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 20.
[10] See James, *The Meaning of Truth*, NY, Longmans, 1909, pp. xii–xiii.
[11] See Peirce in *op. cit.* (n. 5), pp. 228 ff., 258 ff, 300–301.
[12] Daniel Boorstin, *The Americans: The Colonial Experience*, NY, Vintage, 1958, p. 163.
[13] Frederick Jackson Turner, 'Problems in American History', in Allen Billington (ed.), *Frontier and Section: Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson Turner*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1961, p. 36.
[14] Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier', in Billington *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 38.
[15] Turner, 'Contributions of the West' in Billington, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 96.
[16] Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth*, NY, Vintage Books, 1950, p. 297.
[17] *Loc. cit.*
[18] Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier', in Billington, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 62.
[19] John J. McDermott, 'Nature Nostalgia and the City: An American Dilemma' in *The Culture of Experience: Philosophical Essays in the American Grain*, NY UP, 1976, p. 199.
[20] *Loc. cit.*
[21] John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New*, NY, Capricorn, 1962, pp. 126 ff.

CHAPTER 12

[1] See Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation', in Baruch Brody (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1970, pp. 8–27.
[2] See Carl Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1966, p. 55.
[3] Hempel and Oppenheim, in Brody, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 12.
[4] Carl Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in History', in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, NY, The Free Press, 1965, p. 238.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 239–240. The Soviets would hold that history, when correctly viewed, also proceeds "with iron necessity".
[6] See A. J. Ayer, *Language Truth and Logic*, NY, Dover, 1952, especially pp. 33–45, 102–120.

[7] See W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in Harold Morick (ed.), *Challenges to Empiricism*, Belmont, Wadsworth, 1972, pp. 46–70.
[8] See J. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford UP, 1962, p. 13.
[9] Friedrich Waismann, 'Language Strata', in Antony Flew (ed.), *Logic and Language*, NY, Doubleday, 1965, p. 242.
[10] See Hans Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction*, Chicago UP, 1938.
[11] Ernan McMullin, 'Two Faces of Science' in *The Review of Metaphysics* **XXVII**, No. 4, June 1974, pp. 670–671.
[12] For an analysis of James' views on this topic, cf., W. Gavin, 'William James' Philosophy of Science', *New Scholasticism* **LII**, No. 3 (Summer '78), pp. 413–420.
[13] Thomas Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution*, NY, Vintage, 1957, pp. 14, 38, 74 ff, 96 ff, 106 ff.
[14] Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago UP, 1964, pp. 10–34, 92–110.
[15] One commentator lists 21 different senses of the term. See Margaret Masterman, 'The Nature of a Paradigm', in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Cambridge UP, 1970, pp. 61 ff.
[16] Thomas Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions, op. cit.* (n. 14), p. 10.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 151.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[19] *Loc. cit.*
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 182 ff.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 208. There is some evidence that Kuhn sees a continued need for a broad, multi-dimensional context; e.g., in the postscript: "The men who experience ... [paradigm] communication breakdowns must ... have some recourse ... Except in a small, if all-important, area of experience even their neural programming must be very nearly the same, for they share a history, except the immediate past. As a result, both their everyday and most of their scientific world and language are shared" (p. 201).
[24] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. by Lewis S. Feuer, NY, Doubleday, 1959, p. 43.
[25] *Loc. cit.*
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[27] *Loc. cit.*
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 398.
[29] Richard T. DeGeorge, *Patterns of Soviet Thought*, Michigan UP, 1970, p. 73.
[30] *Loc. cit.* It should be noted that Marx need not necessarily be interpreted in a reductionist manner. Melvin Rader, in his book, *Marx's Interpretation of History* (NY, Oxford UP, 1979) presents a lucid and persuasive argument that the base/superstructure model, while necessary, is insufficient as an explanation of Marx's thought, Rader prefers an organic model because the latter is more dynamic and allows for greater differentiation. If one is persuaded that Rader's anti-reductionist account is correct, then the thought of Marx appears much closer to that of Dewey.
[31] Marx and Engels, *op. cit.* (n. 24), p. 135.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[33] *Loc. cit.*

[34] See Richard DeGeorge *op. cit.* (n. 29). p. 74.
[35] See John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Boston, Beacon, 1957, p. xxiii.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. v–vi. In 1928 the Soviet Commissar of Education invited a delegation of American educators to visit Russian schools. Dewey was included in the group selected by the American Society for Cultural Relations. George Dykhuizen, in his biographical work *The Life and Mind of John Dewey*, points out that the specific context of Russia and of its educational system impressed Dewey. "What most attracted Dewey's attention about the Russian schools was that they were made to serve the needs and interests of a Communist society. The curriculum, he found, stressed the central role of work in human life, relating it on the one hand to materials and natural resources and on the other to social and political history and institutions. Classroom methods and procedures were designed to develop habits and dispositions that would lead people to 'act cooperatively and collectively as readily as now in capitalistic countries they act "individualistically" '. Rules governing the school activities of the children were not regulations externally imposed upon the children by teachers and authorities so much as natural outgrowths of 'the carrying on of some line of work needed in the school itself, or in the neighborhood'." (Southern Illinois UP, 1973, pp. 237–238)
[37] John Dewey, 'Context and Thought', in Richard Bernstein (ed.), *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom*, NY, Bobbs-Merrill, 1960, p. 95.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[39] See Dewey, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 8), pp. 1–19.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
[41] See Dewey, *op. cit.* (n. 35), p. 29.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. xxx.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 75.
[44] See Dewey, *op. cit.* (n. 37), p. 100.
[45] Dewey, 'An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms', in *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom*, pp. 71–72. For an excellent analysis of Dewey's article, see John Smith, 'Three Types and Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in *Themes in American Philosophy*, NY, Harper, 1970, pp. 42–60.
[46] Dewey, *ibid.*, p. 72.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[50] John Dewey, 'The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy', in John J. McDermott (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, NY, Capricorn, 1973. Vol. I, p. 61.
[51] *Loc. cit.*
[52] *Loc. cit.*
[53] See *ibid.*, p. 63.
[54] See above, p. 253.
[55] Dewey, *op. cit.* (n. 37), p. 110.
[56] See B. I. Pružinin, 'Problema racional'nosti v anglo-amerikanskoj "filosofii nauki" ' (The Problem of Rationality in Anglo-American 'Philosophy of Science'), *VF* 6 1978, 135–146.
[57] See L. Mitroxin, 'Dewey', *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija*, Vol. II, pp. 92–94. For a Soviet analysis of James, see L. Mitroxin, 'James', *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija*, M., Gosudarstvennoe Naučnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960–1970, 5 vols, Vol. I, pp. 470–471.

[58] A. G. Spirkin, 'Dialectical Materialism' in James Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary Barbara Zeldin (eds.), *Russian Philosophy*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965, 3 vols., Vol. III, p. 499.
[59] See, for example, Dewey's article 'The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism' in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, Vol. I, p. 242: "By our postulate things are what they are experienced to be; and, unless knowing is the sole and only genuine mode of experiencing, it is fallacious to say that Reality is just and exclusively what it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower . . . Or put more positively, knowing is one mode of experiencing . . . as compared with things experienced esthetically, or morally, or economically, or technologically."
[60] Spirkin, *op. cit.*, p. 493.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 503.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 502.
[63] See V. Lenin, 'Marx', *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija*, Vol. III, pp. 300–312.

CHAPTER 13

[1] Dewey, *op. cit.* (Ch. 12, n. 35), p. 31. While Dewey clearly advocated a logic which could deal with novelty, he did not accept a complete divorce of the "logical" and the "psychological". This for Devey would be another version of the subject-object dichotomy. Hence, no one logic, dialectical or otherwise, persists throughout nature and/or human understanding.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 61.
[4] See *ibid.*, chapters 2, 3 *passim*.
[5] John Dewey, 'The Pattern of Inquiry in *op. cit* (Ch. 12, n. 50), p. 224.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 226.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 223.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 224.
[9] See William J. Gavin, 'William James on Language', *International Philosophical Quarterly* XVI, No. 1, March 1976, pp. 81–86.
[10] James *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 2), Vol. 1, p. 241.
[11] *Loc. cit.*
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 444.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 472. See also James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), p. 240: "The question 'what is *the* truth?' is no real question (being irrelative to all conditions) and . . . the whole notion of *the* truth is an abstraction from the fact of truths in the plural, a mere useful summarizing phrase like *the* Latin language or *the* Law."
[15] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), pp. 132 ff.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 213.
[17] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 2), Vol. 1, pp. 252–253.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 280.
[19] James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, in *Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Pluralistic Universe*, ed. by Ralph Barton Perry, NY, Longmans, 1943, pp. 212–213.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 249.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

22 *Op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 5), p. 7.
23 *Ibid.*, p. 20.
24 *Ibid.*, p. 31.
25 *Loc. cit.*
26 *Ibid.*, pp. 300–301.
27 *Loc. cit.*
28 James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), p. 213.
29 *Ibid.*, p. 205.
30 *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.
31 *Ibid.*, p. 222.
32 *Ibid.*, p. 61.
33 *Ibid.*, p. 205.
34 James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, NY, Longmans, 1897, p. 11.
35 James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), pp. 79–80.
36 *Ibid.*, p. 283.
37 *Loc. cit.*
38 *Ibid.*, pp. 283–284.
39 *Ibid.*, pp. 290–291.
40 R. B. Braithwaite, 'Laws of Nature and Causality' in Baruch Brody (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, Englewood, Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 57. He defines a subjunctive conditional as follows: "We shall use the term *subjunctive conditional* for an assertion of the form: 'Although there are no *A*'s, if there were to be any *A*'s, all of them would be *B*'s . . . '" (*Ibid.*, p. 57).
41 See *ibid.*, p. 57.
42 See *loc. cit.*
43 James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), p. 296.
44 *Ibid.*, p. 287.
45 *Ibid.*, pp. 288–289.
46 James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 2), Vol. I, p. 254.
47 Sandra Rosenthal, 'Recent Perspectives on American Pragmatism' (part one), *Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society* X, Nos. 2 and 3, 1974, p. 80.
48 Dewey, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 7), p. 84.
49 *Ibid.*, p. 86.
50 *Ibid.*, pp. 86–87.
51 *Ibid.*, p. 99.
52 *Ibid.*, pp. 130–131.
53 *Ibid.*, p. 131.
54 *Ibid.*, p. 135.

CHAPTER 14

1 James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 10), pp. xii–xiii.
2 See James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, in Ralph Barton Perry (ed.), *Essays in Radical Empiricism and a Pluralistic Universe*, NY, Longmans, 1943, pp. 57 ff.: "Whenever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their terminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one

process fulfilled, the result is that *their starting point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known.*"

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[4] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), p. 223.

[5] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 14, n. 2), p. 4.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[8] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), p. 148 f.

[9] The percept/concept distinction is particularly troublesome since James sometimes terms the "really real" the "perceptual", even though in other places he has admitted that reality includes the conceptual. See below and also William J. Gavin, 'William James and the Indeterminacy of Language and "The Really Real"', in *Proceedings of the ACPA* Vol. L, 1976.

[10] A. J. Ayer, *The Origins of Pragmatism*, San Francisco, Freeman Cooper, 1968, p. 318.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 322–323.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 191, 323–324. Ayer makes a three-fold distinction: "The criteria by which we have to assess a belief which relates to a matter of empirical fact are different from those which apply to a belief which is concerned only with relations between ideas: and these are different again from the criteria which apply to beliefs whose function is to satisfy our moral and emotional requirements. These distinctions are implicit in James' writing, but he does not draw attention to them" (p. 191).

[13] See James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), pp. 33 ff.

[14] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 13, n. 19), p. 60.

[15] Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith*, NY, Harper & Row, 1957, p. 46.

[16] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 14, n. 2), p. 23.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[19] See James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 13, n. 19), pp. 282–283.

[20] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 14, n. 2), p. 93.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 87. A similar statement could be made about identifying pure experience exclusively with the future.

[22] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, NY, Harper & Row, 1960, pp. 27 ff., 44–47.

[23] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 14, n. 2). p. 9.

[24] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), p. 169. See also pp. 66–63.

[25] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 13, n. 19), p. 290.

[26] Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', in R. Zaner and D. Ihde (eds.), *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, NY, Capricorn, 1973, p. 148. See also p. 160. For an interesting comparison, see Richard Stevens, *James and Husserl: The Foundations of Meaning*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1974.

[27] See, for example, William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, NY, Greenwood Press, 1968, pp. 97, 113.

[28] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 10), p. 42.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. xii.

[30] To be sure, there are problems here which James does not adequately resolve.

[31] If James has a methodological postulate, it is that pure experience is not completely knowable – *not* that pure experience exists.

[32] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 6), p. 190.
[33] *Loc. cit.*
[34] Dewey, *Art as Experience*, NY, Capricorn, 1958, p. 13.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 22, cf., also p. 220.
[36] Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, NY, Dover, 1958, pp. 40–41.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 3 a.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 2 a.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 3 a.
[40] Richard Bernstein, *John Dewey*, NY, Washington Square Press, 1967, p. 84.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 82.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[44] Dewey, *op. cit.* (n. 36), p. 272.
[45] Bernstein, *op. cit.* (n. 40), p. 85.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 86.
[47] Dewey, *op. cit.* (n. 36), p. 259. The topic of the "self or the "person" in Dewey is complex and difficult to unravel. As we have seen, Dewey viewed traditional theories of the self as mind-matter combinations as incorrect, and further, as responsible for many of the false problems of philosophy. As Robert Roth has noted, for Dewey " . . . self-realization means the development of the human personality according to its capacities and energies . . . He [Dewey] considered it of primary importance to work out the conditions for the development of human individuality. Only then would we be able to depict more exactly the nature of this individuality" (*John Dewey and Self-Realization*, Englewood, Prentice Hall, 1962, p. 5). In *Individualism Old and New*, Dewey himself says that " . . . individuality will again become integral and vital when it creates a frame for itself by attention to the scene in which it must perforce exist and develop." (*op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 21), p. 146). However, while demanding that one pay attention to the conditions, i.e., to the context, of the various transactions, Dewey himself admitted that he was " . . . not anxious to depict the form which this emergent individualism will assume" (*Ibid.*, p. 99). Going further, in 'Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder', Dewey admits the justification of Professor Allport's charges " . . . about the absence of an adequate theory of personality. In a desire to cut loose from the influence of older 'spiritualistic' theories about the nature of the unity and stability of the personal self (regarded as a peculiar kind of substantial-stuff), I failed to show how natural conditions provide support for integrated and potentially equilibrated personality-patterns" (*The Library of Living Philosophers*, Vol. 1: 'The Philosophy of John Dewey', LaSalle, Open Court, 1939, pp. 555–556). However, the error is one of omission rather than one of commission. Finally, while it is clear that Dewey would not accept a dualism, it should also be pointed out that his form of behaviorism " . . . differs basically from some theories bearing the same name. In the first place, behavior is not viewed as something taking place in the nervous system or under the skin of an organism but always, directly or indirectly, in obvious overtness or at a distance through a number of intervening links, an interaction with environing conditions. In the second place, other human beings who are also acculturated are involved in the interaction, including even persons at a great distance in space and time, because of what they have done in making the direct environment what it is" (*Ibid.*, p. 555).

In short, while no reductionism is condoned by Dewey, nonetheless by his own admission more work remains to be done in this area.

[48] Bernstein, *op. cit.* (n. 40), p. 87.
[49] Dewey, *op. cit.* (n. 36), p. 19.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[51] *Loc. cit.*
[52] See John Smith, *Purpose and Thought: The Meaning of Pragmatism*, New Haven, Yale UP, 1978, p. 109.
[53] Dewey, *op. cit.*, (n. 36), p. 24 fn.

CHAPTER 15

[1] See Gavin and Blakeley, *Russia and America: A Philosophical Comparison*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1976, pp. 65–75.
[2] See Max H. Fisch (ed.), *Classic American Philosophers*, NY, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951, General Introduction, pp. 20–22.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[4] William James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 2), Vol. I, p. 121.
[5] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 13, n. 34), p. ix. James is quoting B. P. Blood, *The Flaw in Supremacy*, Amsterdam, NY, 1893.
[6] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 14, n. 12), p. 87.
[7] One finds elements of this in the American idealist Josiah Royce and his principle of "loyalty to loyalty". See Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, NY, Macmillan, 1924, pp. 99–146. See below pp. 319–320.
[8] James, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 2), Vol. I, p. 293.
[9] See Royce, *op cit. passim*, but especially pp. 99–146.

CHAPTER 16

[1] For a discussion of this and related points as concerns phenomenology, see Elisabeth Ströker (ed.), *Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls*, Ffm, Klostermann, 1979.
[2] See Michael Henry, *Marx*, Paris, Gallimard, 1976, 2 vols. and L. Kołakowski, *op. cit.* (Ch. 1, n. 6), especially Volume 1. See also Klaus Hartmann, *Die Marx'sche Theorie*, Berlin, DeGruyter, 1970.
[3] E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay, London, Routledge, 1970, 2 vols, Vol. I, para. 38, p. 145.
[4] *Ibid.*, para. 20, p. 96.
[5] M. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, NY, Harper & Row, 1977, p. 76.
[6] See Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: an Analysis of his Phenomenology*, Northwestern UP, 1967.
[7] E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1969, p. 16.
[8] For an approach to history from the standpoint of Husserlian terminology, see David Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*, Northwestern UP, 1974.
[9] Pierre Aubenque, *La prudence chez Aristote*, Paris, PUF, 1963, pp. 169–170: "Car ce n'est pas seulement le projet d'Aristote, mais celui de toute la philosophie, que de rivaliser avec les dieux pour la possession de la sagesse. Depuis Parménide, tous les philosophes se sont proposés, quoique par des voies diverses, de s'élever au-dessus des pensées mortelles

. . . pour parvenir à un savoir absolu, libéré des particularités et des servitudes humains, c'est-à-dire telque les dieux doivent le posséder".

[10] See W. Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, Oxford UP, 1934. For an attempted refutation of Jaeger, based on a different rendering of the term "*phronesis*", see Aubenque *ibid.*

[11] *ST* I, q. 1, a. 5, obj. 1: "Certitudo . . . pertinet ad dignitatem scientiae."

[12] See 'Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis',

[13] See Tom Rockmore, 'Marxian Praxis', in *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 5, No. 1, (January 1978), 3–15.

[14] E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1962, p. 1.

[15] *Ibid. Beilage* XXVIII, p. 508.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[24] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, NY, Harper, 1962, p. 2.

[25] Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Pfüllingen, Neske, 1961, 2 vols.

[26] Heidegger, 'Die Zeit des Weltbildes', in *Holzwege*, Frankfurt a.M., Klostermann, 1963, p. 86.

[27] Heidegger, *op. cit.* (n. 25), p. 44.

[28] *Loc. cit.*

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[32] *Loc. cit.*

[33] *Loc. cit.*

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 62 and 487.

CHAPTER 17

[1] Husserl, *op. cit.* (Ch. 16, n. 14), pp. 106–107.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

[3] See Bruce Wilshire, *William James and Phenomenology: a Study of "The Principles of Psychology"*. Indiana Up, 1968. See also Chapter 14, above.

[4] A. Schutz, *Collected Papers I*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1962, p. 208.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[7] *Loc. cit.*

[8] For a discussion of Husserl's position from this perspective, see Leszek Kołakowski, *Husserl and the Search for Certainty*, Yale UP, 1975. For a more general analysis of this

problem in the history of philosophy, which does not, however, mention Husserl, see John Dewey, *op. cit.* (Ch. 11, n. 7).
9 Heidegger, *op. cit.* (Ch. 16, n. 24), p. 83.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 98.
11 *Holzwege, ibid.*, (Ch. 16, n. 26), p. 171.
12 *Loc. cit.*
13 See, for example, J. L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*, Oxford UP, 1964.
14 *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, NY, Harper, 1977, p. 19.
15 *Ibid.* p. 20.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 32.
17 See Maurice Natanson, *A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology*, Nebraska UP, 1951.
18 See 'Sartre par Sartre', in *Le nouvel observateur* (26 janvier 1969).
19 For a representative analysis of that question, see Marjorie Grene, *Sartre*, NY, New Viewpoints, 1973.
20 J. -P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, NY, Washington Square, 1973, p. 573.
21 *Ibid.*, p. 583.
22 *Ibid.*, p. 621.
23 *Ibid.*, p. 672.
24 For Sartre's generous, but also self-serving account, see 'Merleau-Ponty Vivant', in *Les Temps Modernes*, no. 184–185. For a somewhat different perspective, see Mark Poster, *Marxism in Postwar France*, Princeton UP, 1975.
25 See Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State.*
26 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Les aventures de la dialectique*, Paris, Gallimard, 1955, p. 119.

CHAPTER 18

1 E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, Frankfurt a.M., Klostermann, 1965, p. 11.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
3 *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* (1913), quoted in Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1960, 2 vols, Vol. 1, p. 5.
4 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Paris, Gallimard, 1945, p. viii.
5 For an account, see Emil Fackenheim, *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*, Boston, Beacon, 1967.
6 See *Idee und Methode der Philosophie*, Berlin, DeGruyter, 1975, p. 32.
7 For instance, in the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger asks rhetorically if the form of thinking, which he believes is beyond metaphysics, can be described as humanism, and answers: "Certainly not so far as humanism thinks metaphysically. Certainly not if humanism is existentialism and is represented by what Sartre expresses" (Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, NY, Harper, 1977, p. 213).
8 See Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1967.
9 See *Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel*, Paris, PUF, 1951.
10 It is interesting to note the full title chosen by Maurice Natanson, certainly one of the most perceptive students of Husserlian phenomenology, for a recent study: *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks*, Northwestern UP, 1973.

[11] For a representative sample of texts, see *Seminar; Philosophische Hermeneutik*, ed. Gadamer and Boehm, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1976.
[12] Heidegger, *op. cit.* (Ch. 16, n. 24), pp. 191–192.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 194 (Heidegger's emphases).
[14] Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking*? NY, Harper, 1968, p. 100.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80.
[16] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Tübingen, Mohr/Siebeck, 1975, p. 307 (Gadamer's emphases).
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 448 (Gadamer's emphases).
[18] Letter to Emilio Betti of 18 February, 1961 (Gadamer's emphases) in Betti, *Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1972, p. 51.
[19] For a discussion of the epistemological parallel that arises in Marx's position and post-Husserlian phenomenology, see Tom Rockmore, 'Marxian Epistemology and Phenomenology', in *Against Marxism*, forthcoming.

CHAPTER 19

[1] For a literary view of alienation of the artist as necessary condition of art, see James Joyce, *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, NY, Modern Library, 1928.
[2] For a discussion of the relation between Fichte and Kant, see Tom Rockmore, 'Kant and Fichte's Theory of Man', in *Kant-Studien* 68, No. 3 (1977).
[3] For a discussion of the epistemological consequences of Fichte's position in respect to the philosophical tradition, see Tom Rockmore, 'Fichte, Husserl and Philosophical Science', *International Philosophical Quarterly* 19, No. 1, March 1979, 15–27.
[4] See, for instance, the following passage: "In the absolute identity, subject and object are sublated; but because they are in the absolute identity, they likewise persist. It is their persistence which makes knowing possible, for in knowing, the separation of both is posited in part" (*The Difference Between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy*, Reseda, Calif., Ridgeway, 1978, p. 72.
[5] For a pre-Marxist attempt to view Schelling as a dualist, see Engels' early article, 'Schelling und die Offenbarung. Kritik des neuesten Reaktionsversuchs gegen die freie Philosophie', in *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Berlin, Dietz, 1967: *Ergänzungsband*, Part 2. Engels' later, Marxist view that philosophy is ideology is in effect a generalization of the earlier, pre-Marxist criticism of Schelling's supposed dualism to philosophy itself.
[6] See *Cartesian Meditations*, esp. para. 10: 'Digression: Descartes's failure to make the transcendental turn'.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[9] *Ibid.*, esp. para. 50: "The mediate intentionality of experiencing someone else, as 'appresentation' (analogical apperception)".
[10] *Ideas*, p. 9.
[11] Heidegger, *op. cit.* (Ch. 16, n. 24), pp. 62, 487.
[12] *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Indiana UP, 1962, pp. 3–4.
[13] Heidegger, *op. cit.* (Ch. 16, n. 24), p. 67.
[14] See Lucien Goldmann, *Lukács et Heidegger*, Paris, Denöel, 1973. For an attempt to carry the discussion further, see Assen Ignatow, 'Das schwierige Gespräch oder:

Heideggers Entfremdungsauffassung und der osteuropäische Marxismus', *SST* 19 (1979), 1–36.

[15] See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Existentialism', in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, NY, MacMillan, 1967. Vol. 3.

[16] I. M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, California UP, 1961, p. 173.

[17] *Loc. cit.*

[18] Natanson, *op. cit.* (Ch. 17, n. 17), p. 111.

[19] See Sartre, *op. cit.* (Ch. 17, n. 20), Part 3, Chapter 1.3: 'Husserl, Hegel, Heidegger'.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[22] *Loc. cit.*

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 792 (Sartre's emphases).

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 770.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 773.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 568 (Sartre's emphases).

[27] See *Meditation IV.*

[28] Sartre, *op. cit.* (Ch. 17, n. 20), p. 573.

[29] 'Sartre par Sartre', p. 41.

[30] Sartre, *op. cit.* (Ch. 17, n. 20), pp. 723–724.

CHAPTER 20

[1] *The German Ideology*, NY, International Publishers, 1970, p. 121.

[2] See John E. Smith, 'Some Continental and Marxist Responses to Pragmatism', forthcoming in a *Sovietica* volume.

[3] See Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, NY, Harper, 1965.

[4] 'Foundations of Leninism', in *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, Foreign Languages, 1953, p. 31.

[5] *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions*, Paris, Hermann, 1948 (1939), p. 7.

[6] Although Heidegger traces the etymology of the term "phenomenology" back to the Greek root, he would seem inconsistently to reject the view of phenomena as appearance already found in Plato as a genuine form of phenomenology: "The bewildering multiplicity of 'phenomena' designated by the words 'phenomenon', 'semblance', 'appearance', 'mere appearance', cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the phenomenon is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself." *Being and Time*, p. 54.

[7] For a good account, to which we are indebted here, see Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Introduction.

[8] See G. F. W. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1973, p. 591.

[9] See Mckeon (ed.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, NY, Random House, 1941, p. 595: "Let us now summarize our results about soul, and repeat that the soul is in a way all existing things; for existing things are either thinkable or sensible, and knowledge is in a way what is knowable, and sensation in a way what is sensible . . . Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are *potentially* these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. They must be either the things themselves or

their forms. The former alternative is of course impossible; it is not the stone which is present in the soul, but its form" (De Anima III, 8, 431 b 20–29).

[10] Husserl, *Ideas* (transl. W. R. Boyce Gibson), NY, Collier, 1962, Vol. 1, p. 6.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[15] Husserl, *op. cit.* (Ch. 16, n. 14), pp. 187–188.

[16] Husserl, *op. cit.* (n. 10), p. 16).

[17] See para. 46: 'Das universale Korrelationsapriori'.

[18] For instance, in a passage on the apprenticeship necessary to become a philosopher, Plato writes: "Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining" *Letter* VII, in *Plato: The Collected Dialogues*, NY, Pantheon, 1961, p. 1589. For another use of the metaphor of light in a similar context, see also 344b, p. 1591: "Hardly after practicing detailed comparisons of names and definitions and visual and other sense perceptions, after scrutinizing them in benevolent disputation by the use of questions and answers without jealousy, at last in a flash understanding of each blazes up, and the mind, as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity, is flooded with light."

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